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PETITIONER: SANJEEV COKE MANUFACTURING COMPANY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/12/1982

BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) BENCH: REDDY, O. CHINNAPPA (J) SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J) BHAGWATI, P.N. VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) ISLAM, BAHARUL (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR  239            1983 SCR  (1)1000  1983 SCC  (1) 147        1982 SCALE  (2)1193  CITATOR INFO :  F          1984 SC 326  (21,26,52,57,94,100)  F          1984 SC 374  (16,17)  RF         1986 SC1466  (13,14)  RF         1988 SC 782  (29,40)  R          1990 SC 123  (27)  D          1990 SC1771  (13)  R          1992 SC 847  (64)  RF&R       1992 SC 938  (22,33)  RF         1992 SC 999  (14)

ACT:      (A)  Constitution of  India, 1950, Articles 226 and 32-           Practice and  Procedure-In  proceedings  involving           constitutional issues, courts cannot travel beyond           their scope.      (B)  Interpretation of  Statutes-Rules of Construction-           Value of grammar.      (C)  Constitution of  India, 1950-Legislative  validity           of-Tests for  determination-Affidavits made in the           courts to sustain legislation, value of.      (D)  Constitution of  India, 1950,  Articles 39(b), 31C           and 14-Directive  Principle of  State Policy under           Article 39(b)-Immunity  of challenge under Article           31 C  on ground  of violation of Article 14 is not           permissible, Coking  Coal Mines  (Nationalisation)           Act 36 of 1972.      (E)  Constitution of  India, Article  14-Whether Coking           Coal Mines  (Nationalisation) Act  is violative of           Art. 14.      (F)  Judicial review  of matters  of State  policy like           scheme   of    Nationalisation-Proceedings   under           Article 226.      (G)  Constitution  of   India,  Article   39(b)-Whether           "material resources  of the community" referred to           is confined to "natural resources".      (H)  Constitution of India, Article 31 C (as amended by           the Constitution  Forty Second Amendment Act 1976,           and Articles  14 and  39 Scope  of-Article 31    C           with its  extended protection  is constitutionally           valid.      (I)  Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act (Act 36 of

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         1972) Sections 3 (g), 3(b) and 4(1)-The definition           of "Coke  oven plants"  in Section  3(b) should be           read together  with clauses  (vi) and  (x) of 3(i)           defining  "mine"  for  understanding  the  correct           description of "Mines" in the Act.      (J)  Costs in proceedings under Articles 226 or 32 when           the grievances  are not frivolous, cost should not           be awarded, when the petition is dismissed. 1001

HEADNOTE:      Consequent to  the passing  of the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Emergency Provisions)  Act, 1971, which was replaced by the Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation)  Act,  1972,  the  Coal Mines (Taking  Over of  Management) Act,  1973 and  the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)  Act, 1973,  all coal mines known to exist in  the country  were nationalised,  whether they  are coking coal  mines or non-coking mines. Along with them coke oven  plants   in  or  belonging  to  the  mines  were  also nationalised. In  addition twelve specified coke oven plants not belonging to the owners of the mines, but known to exist near about  the mines were also nationalised. All other coke oven plants  were left  out of the scheme of nationalisation for private exploitation.      Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, Bhowra Coke Company who were owners of the coke oven plants described in items 2 and 9  of the  Second Schedule  filed writ  petitions in the Calcutta High  Court challenging the inclusion of their coke oven plants  in the  Second Schedule  as  violative  of  the provisions of  Article 14  of  the  Constitution.  The  writ petitions were  withdrawn to the Supreme Court under Article 139 A.      Dismissing the petitions, the Court ^      HELD: 1.  It is  not open to a court to answer academic or hypothetical  questions on  such considerations,  such as that they  dealt  with  Constitutional  amendments  and  not ordinary law,  which of  their own force permitted violation of  freedoms  through  laws  passed  for  certain  purposes, particularly  so  when  serious  constitutional  issues  are involved. Judges  are not  authorised  to  make  disembodied pronouncements   on    serious   and    cloudy   issues   of constitutional policy  without battle  lines being  properly drawn. Judicial  pronouncements cannot  be immaculate  legal conceptions. It  is but right that no important point of law should be  decided without  a  proper  lis  between  parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords. It is  in expedient  for the  Supreme Court  to  delve  into problems which  do not  arise and  express opinion  thereon. [1016 A-C]      2. Adjectives  are  attractive  forensic  aids  but  in matters of interpretation they are diverting intruders. They should not  be allowed  to get the better of the nouns which they qualify. [1020 G-H]      3:1. Validity of legislation is not to be judged merely by affidavits  filed on  behalf of the State, but by all the relevant circumstances  which the  court may ultimately find out and  more especially  by what  may be gathered from what the legislature has itself said. [1029 F-G]      3:2.  Courts   are  not   really  concerned   with  the hollowness or the self-condemnatory nature of the statements made in  the affidavits  filed by the respondents to justify and sustain the legislation. The deponents of the affidavits

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filed into  court may  speak for the parties on whose behalf they swear  to the  statements. They  do not  speak for  the Parliament and  Parliament is never before the Court. Once a statute leaves  Parliament House,  the Court’s  is the  only authentic voice  which may  echo (interpret) the Parliament. This the court will do with reference to the language of the statute and other permissible aids. [1029 A-D] 1002      3:3. No act of Parliament can be struck down because of the under  standing  or  misunderstanding  of  Parliamentary intention by  the executive government or because their (the Government’s)  spokesmen   do   not   bring   out   relevant circumstances  but  indulge  in  empty  and  self  defeating affidavits. They do not and cannot bind Parliament. [1029 E- F]      4:1. The  Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1972 is a  legislation for  giving effect  to the  policy of  the State towards  securing the  principle specified  in Article 39(b) of  the Constitution  and is,  therefore, immune under Article 31-C  from attack  on the ground that it offends the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 14. [1027 C-D]      4:2. By  the Coking  Coal Mines Nationalisation Act all coking coal  mines  known  to  exist  in  the  country  were nationalised. Other coke oven plants which did not belong to the owners  of the  mines but  which were located near about the nationalised  coking coal mines were also identified and nationalised by  express provision  to that  effect. At that stage of the rationalisation and nationalisation of the coal mining industry,  it was  apparently thought  necessary  and sufficient to  nationalise such  coke oven plants as were in or belonged to the nationalised coking coal mines or as were identified as  located near  the  nationalised  coking  coal mines, leaving  out all  other coke  oven plants. [1021 F-H; 1022 A-B]      4:3.   The    object   of   the   coking   coal   Mines (Nationalisation Act  is to recognise and reconstruct coking coal  mines   and  coke  oven  plants  for  the  purpose  of protecting, conserving  and promoting scientific development of the  resources of  coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of  the Iron and Steel Industry and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The requirements of the  Iron and  Steel industry  are recognised as ’Growing requirements’ and  it is found necessary to protect conserve and promote  the  scientific  development  of  resources  of coking coal  so as  to meet those ’growing requirements’ The Act is contemplating the future. If the object of the Act is to provide  for the future, it does not make any difference, if in  the past or in the present, the hard coke produced by the nationalised  coking coal  mines is  diverted  elsewhere than the  Iron and  Steel Industry.  The requirements of the Iron  and  Steel  Industry  which  are  to  be  met  by  the nationalised coke  oven plants are its growing requirements, that is to say, its future requirements. [1026 E-H; 1027 A]      5:1. The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is not violative of  Article 14 of the Constitution. There has been no such infringement, as could be seen from the facts of the right guaranteed under Article 14. [1027 D; 1028 F]      5:2.  The   process  of  nationalisation  of  the  Coal industry is, of course, not complete as yet. Nationalisation of any  industry or  means of production may not be and need not be  effected all  at once. It may be achieved in stages. If in the process of nationalisation some units are left out in the  earlier stages  either because  it is  so planned or because of  some mistake  it cannot  be said  that there has been a  violation of  Article 14.  Nor can  any inference be

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drawn  of   discrimination  from   the   circumstance   that subsequently eighty  seven new  coke oven  plants have  been allowed to  come up. Obviously there is demand for hard coke from industries  other than  the iron and steel industry and normally, 1003 the State does not want to stifle those industries by making it  difficult   for  them   to  obtain  their  requirements, especially since  the production  of the  Nationalised  Coke Oven Plants  has first  to meet the requirements of the iron and steel  industry. What is important to note is that these eighty seven  new coke  oven plants  are not  situated in or about coal  mines though they are in the coal field area, as indeed they are bound to be. [1028 E-H]      6. The  distribution between  public, private and joint sectors  and   the  extent   and  range  of  any  scheme  of nationalisation are  essentially matters  of State    policy which are  inherently inappropriate  subjects  for  judicial review. Scales  of justice  are just  not designed  to weigh competing social  and  economic  factors.  In  such  matters legislative wisdom  must prevail  and judicial  review  must abstain.  The   contention  that   Article  39(b)  would  be attracted, if  the industry  as a whole was nationalised and not if  only a  part of  the industry  was nationalised  is, therefore, misplaced. [1026 B-D]      7:1.  The   expression  "Material   resources  of   the community" as  used in  Article 39(b) of the Constitution is not confined  to natural  resources; it  is not  confined to resources owned  by the  public; it  means and  includes all resources, natural  and man-made,  public and private-owned. [1026 A-B]      7:2.  The   expression  "material   resources  of   the community" means  all things  which are capable of producing wealth  for   the  community.   There  is   no  warrant  for interpreting the  expression in  so narrow  a fashion  as to confine it  to public-owned  material resources  and exclude private owned material resources. The expression involves no dichotomy. The  words must  be understood  in the context of the  constitutional   goal  of   establishing  a  sovereign, socialist, secular’ democratic republic. [1022 H; 1023 A-B]      7:3. When Article 39(b) refers to material resources of the community  it does  not refer only to resources owned by the community  as a  whole, but  it refers also to resources owned   by    individual   members    of   the    community. Resources of the community do not mean public resources only but include  private  resources  as  well  The  distribution envisaged by  Article 39(b)  necessarily  takes  within  its stride the  transformation of  wealth from private-ownership into public-ownership  and is  not confined to that which is already public-owned. [1023 G-H; 1024 A-B]      State of  Karnataka  v.  Ranganathan  Reddy,  [1978]  1 S.C.R. 641 @ 689 followed.      8:1. The  question of  the validity  of  Article  31  C stands concluded  by the  decision of  the Supreme  Court in Keshavananda Bharati’s case. in which it was expressly ruled that Article  31 C,  as it  stood  at  that  time  i.e.,  as inserted by  the Constitution  (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, was constitutionally valid. No doubt the protection of Article 31C  was at  that time confined to law giving effect to the  policy of  the clauses (b) and (c) of Article 39. By the Constitution  Forty Second Amendment Act, the protection was extended  to all laws giving effect to all or any of the principles laid  down in  Part IV. The dialectics, the logic and the  rationale involved  in upholding  the  validity  of Article 31C  when it confined its protection to laws enacted

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to  further   Article  39(b)   or   Article   39(c)   should uncompromisingly lead to the same resolute 1004 conclusion that Article 31 C with its extended protection is also constitutionally valid. It cannot also be said that the nature of  the  Directive  Principles  enunciated  in  other Articles of  Part IV  of the  Constitution is  so drastic or different from  the Directive  Principle in  clauses (b) and (c) of  Article 39,  that the  extension  of  constitutional immunity to  laws made  to further  those  principles  would afford  the   basic  structure   of  the   constitution  Any observations made  to the  contrary in  Minerva Mills’ case, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 206 may be held to be obiter. [1016 D-H]      9:2. To contend that a law founded on discrimination is not entitled  to the  protection of  Article 31 C, as such a law can  never be  said to  further the directive principles affirmed in  Article 39(b)  would be  to put the cart before the horse. If the law made to further directive principle is necessarily non-discriminatory  or is  based on a reasonable classification, then  such law  does not need any protection such as  that afforded  by Article  31 C.  Such law would be valid on its own strength, with no aid from Article 31 C. To make it  a condition  precedent that a law seeking the haven of Article  31 C  must not  be discriminatory  or  based  on reasonable  classification   is  to   make  Article   31   C meaningless. If Article 14 is not offended, no one need give any immunity  from an  attack based  on Article 14. [1019 A; 1020 A-B]      The broad  egalitarian principle of social and economic justice  for   all  was  was  implicit  in  every  Directive Principle, and,  therefore, a  law  designed  to  promote  a directive principle,  even if it came into conflict with the formalistic and doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would  most   certainly  advance   the  broader  egalitarian principle and  the desirable  constitutional goal  of social and economic  justice to  all. If  the law  was aimed at the broader egalitarianism  of the Directive Principles, Article 31  C   protected  the   law  from  needless,  unending  and rancourous  debate   on  the   question  whether   the   law contravened Article 14’s concept of equality before the law. The law  seeking the  immunity afforded by Article 31 C must be a  law directing the policy of the State towards securing a Directive Principle. The object of the law must be to give effect to  the Directive  Principle and  the connection with the Directive  Principle must not be "same remote or tenuous connection". [1020 B-F]      9:3. When  Article 31  C comes in, Article 14 goes out. There is  no scope for bringing in Article 14 by a side wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality before the law  of Article  14 with  the  broad  egalitarianism  of Article 39(b) or by treating the principle of Article 14, as included in  the principle  of Article  39(b). To  insist on nexus between  the law  for which  protection is claimed and the  principle   of  Article  39(b)  is  not  to  insist  on fulfilment of  the  requirement  of  Article  14.  They  are different concepts  and in  certain circumstances,  may even run counter  to each  other. That  is why  the need  for the immunity afforded by Articles 31 C. [1021 A-B]      10:1. The word "Mine" as defined in Section 3(j) of the Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation)  Act 36  of  1972  does include ’Coke  Oven Plant’.  If the definition of ’Coke Oven Plant’ in  Section 3(b)  is read  alongside clauses (vi) and (x) of  Section 3(j)  which defines  mine, it  becomes plain that ’coke  oven plant’ belonging to or in a mine is treated as comprised  in ’mine’ as defined. Therefore, all coke oven

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plants belong  to or  in the  mines mentioned  in the  First Schedule, 1005 by the very force of definition of ’mine’, go with the mines and the  right, title,  and interest  thereto  vest  in  the Central Government under Section 4(1) of the Act. [1008 D-F; 1010 D]      Bharat Coking  Coal Ltd.  v.  P.K.  Agarwala  and  Anr, [1979] 3 S.C.R. 609, over ruled.      10:2.   The   object   of   the   Coking   Coal   Mines (Nationalisation) Act  was to  nationalise all  coking  coal mines and  coke oven  plants situated  in or about the mines whether or  not they  belonged to  the owners  of the mines. Those which  belonged to  the owners of the mines, went with the mines,  but [those which did not belong to the owners of the mines, obviously did not go with the mines, and separate provision had  to be  made for  their  nationalisation,  and payment of  compensation etc.  That was  the reason  for the separate definition  of "Coke  Oven Plant"  and the separate provision for  the  nationalisation  of  certain  coke  oven plants. The  reason was  not any  dichotomy between the word ’mine’ on  the one  hand and  the words "coke oven plant" on the other. [1010 E-F]      10:3. All  coke oven plants were not nationalised; only those which  were situated  in  or  about  the  nationalised coking coal  mines were  nationalised. There was no separate legislation providing  for the  take over  of all  coke oven plants but  as a part of the legislation to take over coking coal mines,  such coke  oven plants  were also nationalised. Quite obviously  coke oven  plants situated in or about coal mines had  to be  nationalised along  with the  mines in the interests of convenience and efficiency of the coal industry and to minimise the opportunities for clandestine operations for which  the coal industry has become notorious. Coke oven plants away  from the  mines were  not touched either by the Coking Coal  (Emergency Provisions)  Act or  the Coking Coal (Nationalisation) Act. [1010 H; 1011 A-C]      Amarendra Nath  Sen, J. (Contra) costs generally follow event. When a citizen is deprived of his property by a State action and  feels aggrieved  by the  act of  the  State  and approaches the  Court and  if it  cannot be  said  that  his grievance is  absolutely frivolous,  the citizen  in such  a case should not be saddled with the costs simply because the Court finds  that his  grievance has  no valid  legal basis. [1034 G-H]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  : Transferred Cases Nos. 1 and 2 of 1980.      Transferred from the Calcutta High Court Matter No. 307 of 1979 with the petitions pending in the Court.                             WITH      Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2020 of 1980.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  the 27th November, 1979 of  the Calcutta  High Court  in F.M.A.T.  No. 3124  of 1979.      S.N. Kacker,  A.K. Ganguli  and G.S. Chatterjee for the Petitioner in Transferred Case No. 1 of 1980. 1006      M.C. Bhandare,  Sukumar Bose,  G.S. Chatterjee and Miss Mirdula Ray for Transferred Case No. 2 of 1980.      G.S. Chatterjee for the Petitioner.      L.N. Sinha,  Attorney General,  M.L. Verma  and Miss A.

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Subhashini for the Respondents.      The following Judgment were delivered      CHINNAPPA  REDDY,  J.  In  these  cases,  Sanjeev  Coke Manufacturing Co.  and Sunil  Kumar  Ray,  representing  the Bhowra Coke Company question the nationalisation of the Coke Oven Plants belonging to them.      The history of the legislation concerning the take-over of the  Management and the Nationalisation of Coal Mines has been set  out in some of the earlier judgments of this Court (Tara Prasad  Singh v. Union of India, etc.(1) and it is not necessary for  us to  recall here  that history in any great detail. The  Coking Coal  Mines (Emergency  Provisions) Act, 1971, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, the Coal Mines  (Taking Over  of Management)  Act, 1973, and the Coal Mines  (Nationalisation) Act,  1973  were  respectively enacted in that order.      First came the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency) Provision. Act  1971   which  provided  for  the  taking  over  of  the management of coking coal mines and coke oven plants pending nationalisation of  such mines  and plants. Sec. 3(1) of the Act declared  that  on  and  from  the  appointed  day,  the management of  all coking  coal  mines  shall  vest  in  the Central Government.  All coking  coal mines which were known to exist were specified in the First Schedule to the Act and Sec. 3(2)  declared that  those were  the coking  coal mines whose management vested in the Central Government under sub- sec. (1).  It was further provided that if any coal mine was found, after  investigation  made  by  the  Coal  Board,  to contain coking  coal, a  declaration to  the effect shall be made by  the Board and thereupon the management of such mine shall vest  in the  Central Government and the mine shall be deemed to  be included  in  the  First  Schedule.  The  idea clearly was  not to  leave out  of  the  management  of  the Central Government  any coking  coal mine. The words ’mine’, ’coking coal  mine’ and  ’coke oven  plant’ were  separately defined in 1007 the Act.  ’Mine’ was defined widely enough that ’coking coal mine’ would  take within  its  expanse  ’coke  oven  plants’ belonging to  or in  a  mine.  By  the  very  force  of  the definition of  ’mine’, the  management of  coke oven  plants belonging to  or in  coking coal  mines also stood vested in the Central  Government from  the appointed day. This aspect of the  matter will be considered in slightly greater detail when we  refer to  the provisions  of the  Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act. As one may well expect, there were some coke oven  plants which were situated near about coking coal mines but  which did  not belong to the owners of such mines and  the   management   of   which   did   not,   therefore, automatically vest  in the Central Government along with the vesting of  the management  of the coking coal mines. It was apparently  thought   necessary  and   desirable  that   the management of  such coke  oven plants  also should  be taken over. Twelve  such coke  oven  plants  were  identified  and specified in  the Second  Schedule and  by Sec. 7 of the Act the management  of the  coke oven plants specified in Second Schedule were declared to vest in the Central Government.      Next, The Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was enacted  "to provide for the acquisition and transfer of the right,  title and  interest of  the owner  of the coking coal mines  specified in  the First Schedule, and the right, title and interest of the owners of such coke oven plants as are in  or about  the said  coking coal mines with a view to reorganising and  reconstructing such  mines and  plants for the  purpose   of  protecting,   conserving  and   promoting

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scientific development  of  the  resources  of  coking  coal needed to  meet the  growing requirements  of the  iron  and steel  industry  and  for  matters  connected  therewith  or incidental thereto".  By Section  4 of  the Act  the  right, title and  interest of  the owners in relation to the coking coal  mines   specified  in   the  First   Schedule   stands transferred  to   and  vests   absolutely  in   the  Central Government. The  First Schedule  mentions the  names of  214 coking coal  mines, with  their location  and with the names and addresses of the owners of the mines. ’Coking coal mine’ is defined  by Section  3(c) to  mean "a  coal mine in which there exist  one or  more  seams  of  coking  coal,  whether exclusively or  in addition  to any  seam  of  other  coal". ’Mine’ is,  defined by s. 3(j) to mean "any excavation where any operation  for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals has  been or  is being carried on", and to include, among other things.           "(vi) all  lands, buildings, works, adits, levels,      planes, machinery  and equipment,  vehicles,  railways,      tramways and 1008      sidings belonging to, or about, a mine;" and           "(x) all  lands, buildings and equipment belonging      to, or  in,  a  mine  where  the  washing  of  coal  or      manufacture of coke is carried on;" We may also notice here the definition of ’Coke Oven Plants’ as in s. 3(b) which is as follows :           "coke oven  plant" means  the plant  and equipment      with which the manufacture of hard coke has been, or is      being, carried on, and includes-           (i) ...        ...       ...           (ii) ...       ...       ...           (iii) ...      ...       ...           (iv) ...       ...       ...           (v)  all lands,  buildings and equipment belonging                to the  coke oven  plant where the washing of                coal is carried on,           (vi) ...       ...       ... If the  definition of  ’coke oven  plant’ in s. 3(b) is read alongside clause (vi) and (x) of s. 3(j) which defines mine, it becomes plain that ’coke oven plant’ belonging to or in a mine  is   treated  as   comprised  in  ’mine’  as  defined. Therefore, all  coke oven  plants belong  to or in the mines mentioned in  the First  Schedule, by  the very force of the definition of ’mine’, go with the mines and the right, title and interest thereto vest in the Central Government under s. 4(1) of the Act. But the object of the Act was not merely to acquire the  right, title  and interest of the owners of the coking coal  mines specified in the First Schedule including the coke  oven plants  in or  belonging to  such coking coal mines but  also to  acquire the right, title and interest of the owners  of coke  oven plants which were generally, in or about such coking coal mines, even if they did not belong to the owners  of such  mines. Apparently,  it was  not thought sufficient to  acquire the  coke oven plants in the acquired mines or  belonging to  the owners of the acquired mines but it was  thought necessary,  also, to  acquire the  coke oven plants which  were near  about  the  acquired  mines.  So  a separate provision had to be made in the Act to acquire such 1009 coke oven  plants as  were near about the acquired mines but did not  belong to the owners of the mines. Twelve such coke oven plants,  the same  twelve coke  oven plants  which were mentioned in  the Second  Schedule to  the Coking Coal Mines (Emergency Provisions)  Act,  are  again  specified  in  the

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Second Schedule to the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act too and  s. 5  of the Act provides that the right, title and interest of  the owners  of each  of the  coke  oven  plants specified in the Second Schedule, being the coke oven plants which are  situated  in  or  about  the  coking  coal  mines specified in  the First  Schedule also  vest in  the Central Government. Thus,  all coke oven plants which belonged to or which were  in the  mines specified  in the  First  Schedule stood transferred to the Central Government along with those mines  and,   in  addition,  the  twelve  coke  oven  plants specified in the Second Schedule which did not belong to the mines but which were near about coking coal mines also stood transferred to the Central Government.      In order  that the ground may straight away be cleared, we must mention here that in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.K. Agarwala  and   Anr.(1)  Krishna  Iyer  and  A.P.  Sen,  JJ. considered the  definitions of  "Mine" and "coke oven plant" in the  Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation)  Act, 1972  and expressed the  view, wrongly  in our  opinion, that  ’Coking Coal Mine’  did not include a ’coke oven plant’. The learned judges appear  to have  thought that  there was  a dichotomy between the  word ’mine’ on the one hand and the words ’coke oven plant’ on the other and that was why separate provision was made  in the  same Act  for the nationalisation of mines and coke oven plants. The learned Judges observed :           "It must be said in fairness to counsel that there      was some bafflement when confronted by these provisions      although on  a broader  consideration, we  are clear in      our mind  that a  dichotomy was  made  by  the  statute      between mines  on the  one hand  as defined  in Section      3(j) and  coke oven plants as defined in s. 3(b) on the      other. To  give meaning  to this  dichotomy one  has to      read coke  oven plants  as clearly  out from the mines,      which in  turn means  that mere equipment where washing      of coal  or manufacture  of coal  is done  as a  simple      subsidiary or  an equipment  or machinery  which  is  a      small part  of a mine cannot be exalted to the position      of 1010      a coke  oven plant which, as Section 3(b) bears out, is      an important  but separate  equipment  with  which  the      manufacture of  hard coke  is carried  on.  This  is  a      processing of  considerable significance, for coal that      is  extracted   from  a  colliery  has  an  independent      existence. It cannot be confused with a minor item such      as is  covered by  s. 3(j)(xi) or (x) of the Act. It is      easy  to   find  industrial   similarity  when  we  are      referring to  oil mines.  It is  one thing to take over      oil fields and minor machinery or equipment that may be      attached  thereto   necessary  for   the  very   mining      operation, but  by no  stretch of imagination can it be      said that  nationalisation of  oil fields or mines also      covers oil  refineries. In  this view,  we  think  that      there is  no substance  in the  submission on behalf of      the appellant  (Union of India) that mine by definition      includes coke oven" We are  afraid,  we  are  unable  to  agree  with  the  view expressed by Krishna Iyer and A.P. Sen, JJ. that ’coal mine’ as defined  in s.  3(j) particularly  cls. (vi) and (x) does not include  ’coke oven  plant’. As already mentioned by us, there were  in existence  ’coke oven  plants’  in  or  about coking coal  mines, some  of which belonged to the owners of the mines  and some  to persons other than the owners of the mines. The object of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act was  to nationalise  all coking coal mines and coke oven

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plants situated  in or  about the  mines whether or not they belonged to the owners of the mines. Those which belonged to the owners  of the mines went with the mines but those which did not  belong to  the owners  of the mines, obviously, did not so  go with  the mines  and separate provision had to be made for  their nationalisation, and payment of compensation etc. That  was the  reason for  the separate  definition  of ’coke  oven  plant’  and  the  separate  provision  for  the nationalisation of  certain coke oven plants. The reason was not any  dichotomy between  the word  ’mine’ on the one hand and the words ’coke oven plant’ on the other as was supposed in Bharat  Coking Coal  Ltd. v.  P.K. Agarwala. As was said, the separate  definition of coke oven plant and the separate provision for  the nationalisation  of coke  oven plants was necessary  to  cover  those  coke  oven  plants  which  were situated in  or about  the nationalised  mines but which did not belong  to the owners of those mines. It is important to note that  all coke  oven plants were not nationalised; only those which  were situated  in  or  about  the  nationalised coking coal  mines were  nationalised. There was no separate legislation providing  for the  take-over of  all coke  oven plants but as a 1011 part of the legislation to take over coking coal mines, such coke oven  plants as  were in  or about  the mines were also nationalised. Quite  obviously coke  oven plants situated in for about  coking coal  mines had  to be  nationalised along with  the   mines  in   the  interests  of  convenience  and efficiency  of   the  coal  industry  and  to  minimise  the opportunities for  clandestine operations for which the coal industry has  become notorious.  Coke oven  plants away from the mines  were  not  touched  either  by  the  Coking  Coal (Emergency  Provisions   Act)  or   the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act.      The Coking  Coal Mines  (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was followed soon  thereafter by  the Coal Mines (Taking Over of Management) Act,  1973. Coal Mine is defined by sec. 2(b) of the Act  to mean  a mine  in which  there exists one or more seams of  coal. It is seen that the definition of coal mines takes in  coking coal mines also. Mine is defined by Section 2(g) in practically the same terms as in Section 3(j) of the Coking  Coal   Mines   (Nationalisation)   Act   with   some differences which  are not material for the purposes of this case. Sec. 3(1) provides that on and from the appointed day, the managements  of all coal mines shall vest in the Central Government. The  provision is  peremptory;  all  coal  mines whether they  are coking coal mines or non-coking coal mines are included;  none is  excluded. Sec. 3(2) further provides that the  coal mines  specified in  the schedule  to the Act shall be deemed to be the coal mines the management of which shall vest  in the Central Government under sub-sec. (1) and further that  if the existence of any coal mine comes to the knowledge of  the Central Government, the Central Government shall make  a declaration  about the  existence of such mine and the  management of  such coal  mine shall  thereupon  be deemed to  vest in  the Central Government and the coal mine deemed to  be included in the schedule. After the Coal Mines (Taking over  of management)  Act 1972,  came the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act,  1973 which  was enacted  "to provide for the  acquisition and  transfer of  the right,  title and interest  of  the  owners  in  respect  of  the  coal  mines specified in  the schedule  with a view to re-organising and re-constructing  such   coal  mines  so  as  to  ensure  the rational,  coordinated   and  scientific   development   and utilisation of  coal resources  consistent with  the growing

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requirements of  the country in order that the ownership and control of  such resources  are  vested  in  the  State  and thereby so  distributed as  best to subserve the common good and for  matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". The expressions ’coal mine’ and ’mine’ are 1012 defined on  practically the  same lines as in the Coal Mines (Taking Over  of Management) Act. Sec. 3(1) declares that on the appointed  day, the  right, title  and interest  of  the owners in  relation to  the  coal  mines  specified  in  the schedule  shall   stand  transferred   to  and   shall  vest absolutely  in   the  Central   Government  free   from  all encumbrances. Sec.  3(2) provides  that if  the existence of any other  coal mine  comes to  the knowledge of the Central Government, after  the appointed  day, the provisions of the Coal Mines  (Taking over  of Management)  Act shall apply to such mine  until that mine is nationalised by an appropriate legislation. We  have already  mentioned that the expression ’mine’  is  defined  in  the  Coal  Mines  (Taking  over  of Management) Act  and the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act in practically the  same terms  as in  the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Emergency  Provisions)   Act  and  the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act. The definition is so wide, as to take in coke  oven plants  belonging to  or in  the mine. So, all coke oven  plants  belonging  to  or  in  a  coal  mine  are nationalised  along   with  the  mine.  But,  there  are  no provisions in  the Coal  Mines  (Nationalisation)  Act  1973 corresponding to Section 5 of and the Second Schedule to the Coking Coal  Mines Nationalisation  Act 1972  to cover  coke oven plants which are situated near the coal mines but which do not  belong to  the owners  of the mines. Therefore, coke oven plants  not belonging  to or in coal mines (not already nationalised under  the Coking  Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act  are  left  out  of  the  Coal  Mines  (Taking  over  of Management) Act  and the  Coal Mines  (Nationalisation) Act, 1973. Of  course, coke  oven plants  situated away  from the mines  are   not  touched   by   either   the   Coal   Mines (Nationalisation)  Act,   1973  or  the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972.      The final  result of  these statutes  is that  all coal mines known  to  exist  in  the  country  are  nationalised, whether they are coking coal mines or non-coking coal mines. Along with  them coke  oven plants  in or  belonging to  the mines also  stand nationalised. In addition twelve specified coke oven  plants not  belonging to  the owners of the mines but  known   to  exist   near  about   the  mines  are  also nationalised. All other coke oven plants are left out of the scheme of  nationalisation. The  design revealed by the Acts is that  mining of  coal is reserved entirely for the public sector, and so, all existing coal mines, whether coking coal or non-coking  coal, are  nationalised and the management of mines which may be discovered in the future is automatically taken over  by the  Central Government until nationalisation by appropriate legislation; and, the 1013 manufacture of hard coke from coal is reserved for the joint sector and  so all  coke oven plants belonging to or in coal mines and twelve specified coke oven plants are nationalised while all  other coke  oven  plants  are  left  for  private exploitation ;  there is  no ban  against any  new coke oven plants being set up.      Sanjeev Coke Manufacturing Company, who were the owners of the  coke oven  plant described  in Item  9 of the Second Schedule and Bhowra Coke Company, who were the owners of the Coke oven  plant described  in Item 2 of the Second Schedule

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filed writ  petitions in the Calcutta High Court challenging the inclusion  of these  coke  oven  plants  in  the  Second Schedule. The  writ petitions  have been  withdrawn to  this Court for  disposal. The  principal ground  of challenge was that other  coke oven  plants standing  in exactly  the same position as  the coke  oven plants  of the  petitioners were left  out   and  had   not  been  nationalised;  there  was, therefore, rank  discrimination. It was said that as many as eighty seven  new coke oven plants were allowed to come into existence subsequent  to the  Nationalisation Act and so the nationalisation of  twelve of  the existing coke oven plants was ex-facie  arbitrary and discriminatory. There were other grounds, branches  and shades of challenge to which we shall refer later  in the  course of  the judgment.  The  straight answer of  the Central Government was that the provisions of the Act  were immune  from the challenge based on the ground of discrimination because of the protection afforded by Art. 31C  of   the  Constitution.  The  Central  Government  also defended the  inclusion of  the  coke  oven  plants  of  the petitioners in  Second Schedule  on merits and explained how it came about that certain coke oven plants were excluded.      The principal question for consideration, therefore, is whether the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 is entitled to  the protection  of Art  31C of the Constitution Art 31C  of the  Constitution, which  was introduced  by the Twenty-fifth Amendment  Act, 1971,  as it  stood before  the Forty-second Amendment,  provided, "Notwithstanding anything contained in  Article 13, no law giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl (b) or  cl.(c) of  Art. 39 shall be deemed to be void on the ground that  it was  inconsistant with,  or  takes  away  or abridges any  of the rights conferred by Art. 14, Art. 19 or Art. 31".  By the  Constitution Forty-second  Amendment Act, the protection  of Art.  31C was extended not merely to laws giving effect  to the  policy of  the State towards securing the principles specified in cl.(b) or (c) 1014 of Art.39  but to  laws giving  effect to  the policy of the State towards  securing all  or any  of the  principles laid down in  Part IV  of the Constitution. The constitutionality of the  original Art.  31C as introduced by the Constitution Twenty-fifth Amendment  Act, was  upheld  by  the  Court  in Keshvananda Bharati  v. The  State of Kerala(1) Section 4 of the Constitution  Forty-second Amendment  Act of  1976 which substituted the  words "all  or any  of the  principles laid down in  Part IV" for the words "the principles specified in Cl.(b) or  (c) of  Art. 39" was struck down by this Court in Minerva Mills’s  case(2) on  the ground  that the nature and quality of  the amendment  was such  that it  virtually tore away the  heart of  basic fundamental  freedoms  by  totally withdrawing the  protection of Articles 14 and 19 in respect of a  large category  of laws;  the amendment  destroyed the balance between Part III and Part IV of the Constitution and thereby ipso  facto destroyed  the basic  structure  of  the Constitution. The  decision of  the Court  in Minerva Mills’ was strongly  relied upon  by Shri A.K. Sen, learned counsel for the  petitioners to  support his  submissions  regarding what he  claimed was  the true content and interpretation of Art. 31C.      We  have  some  misgivings  about  the  Minerva  Mills’ decision despite its rare beauty and persuasive rhetoric.      We confess the case has left us perplexed. In the first place, no  question regarding the constitutional validity of s.4 of  the Constitution  Forty-second Amendment  Act,  1976 appears to  have arisen  for consideration in that case. The

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question was  about the  nationalisation and takeover by the Central Government  of a  certain  textile  mill  under  the provisions    of     the    Sick     Textile    Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act,  1974. The  validity of  some of  the provisions of  that Act  was  impugned.  The  Act  had  been included in  the Ninth  Schedule to  the Constitution by the Constitution Thirty-ninth  Amendment Act, 1975. The validity of  Art.  31B  which  provides  immunity  to  the  Acts  and Regulations specified  in the  Ninth  Schedule  from  attack based on  inconsistency  with  the  Fundamental  Rights  was challenged and  that question, therefore, directly arose for consideration. The question was, however, not decided in the Minerva  Mills   case.  Section   39  of  the  Sick  Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation)  Act, 1974, had also declared that the  Act was enacted for giving effect to the policy of the State  towards  securing  the  principles  specified  in cl.(b) of Art.39 of the Constitution. Article 31C of the 1015 Constitution which had been introduced into the Constitution by  the   Constitution  Twenty-fifth   Amendment  Act   1971 expressly provided  that "Notwithstanding anything contained in article  13, no  law giving  effect to  the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in cl.(b) or cl.(c) of  Art. 39  shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it  is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or article 31". The  Sick Textiles  (Undertakings) Nationalisation  Act 1974  was   passed,  we   may  mention   here,  before   the Constitution Forty  Second Amendment Act came into force. In order, therefore,  to challenge  the provisions  of the Sick Textile Undertakings  (Nationalisation)  Act,  1974  on  the ground of inconsistency or abridgement or taking away of the Fundamental Rights  conferred by  Art. 14 or Art. 19, it was necessary   for    the   petitioners    to   challenge   the Constitutional validity  of  the  Constitution  Twenty-fifth Amendment Act,  1971 by  which Art. 31C was first introduced into the  Constitution. That,  however, was  not open to the petitioners  because  of  the  decision  of  this  Court  in Keshavananda Bharati’s  case. It  was so conceded too by the Learned counsel  who appeared  for  the  petitioner  in  the Minerva Mills case. The counsel who appeared, however, chose to question  the constitutional validity of Section 4 of the Constitution Forty-second  Amendment Act.  1976 by which the immunity afforded  by Art. 31C was extended by replacing the words "the  principles specified  in cl.  (b) or  cl. (c) of Art. 39"  by the  words "all  or any  of the principles laid down in  Part IV".  No question regarding the constitutional validity  of   s.  4   of  the  Constitutional  Forty-second Amendment Act,  1976 arose  for consideration  in the  case, firstly, because  the immunity  from attack  given to  a law giving effect  to the  policy of  the State towards securing the principles specified in cl. (b) or cl. (c) of Art 39 was given by  the Constitution  Twenty-fifth Amendment  Act 1971 itself and  secondly because  the Sick  Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation)  Act   had   been   enacted   before   the Constitution Forty-second  Amendment Act, 1976. Yet, counsel successfully persuaded  the Court to go into the question of the validity  of  s.  4  of  the  Constitution  Forty-second Amendment Act.  An objection  was raised before the Court by the learned  Attorney General  that  the  Court  should  not concern itself  with hypothetical or academic questions. The objection was  overruled on the ground that the Forty-second Amendment was  there for anyone to see and that the question raised was  an important  one dealing  with, not an ordinary law, but,  a constitutional amendment which had been brought

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into 1016 Operation  and   which  of   its  own  force  permitted  the violations of  certain  freedoms  through  laws  passed  for certain  purposes.  We  have  serious  reservations  on  the question whether it is open to a Court to answer academic or hypothetical questions  on such considerations, particularly so when  serious  constitutional  issues  are  involved.  We (judges)   are    not   authorised   to   make   disembodied pronouncements   on    serious   and    cloudy   issues   of constitutional policy  without battle  lines being  properly drawn. Judicial  pronouncements cannot  be immaculate  legal conceptions. It  is but right that no important point of law should be  decided without  a  proper  lis  between  parties properly ranged on either side and a crossing of the swords. We think  it is  inexpedient for  the Supreme Court to delve into  problems  which  do  not  arise  and  express  opinion thereon.      In the second place, the question of the constitutional validity of  Art.31C appears  to us  to be  concluded by the decision of the Court in Keshavananda Bharati’s case.      In Keshavananda  Bharati’s case,  the  Court  expressly ruled  that   Art.  31C   as  it  stood  at  that  time  was constitutionally valid. No doubt, the protection of Art. 31C was at  that time  confined to  laws giving  effect  to  the policy  of  the  cls.  (b)  and  (c)  of  Art.  39.  By  the Constitution Forty-second  amendment Act, the protection was extended to  all laws  giving effect  to all  or any  of the principles laid  down in  Part IV. The dialectics, the logic and the  rationale involved  in upholding  the  validity  of Art.31C when  it confined  its protection to laws enacted to further Art.  39(b) or  Art.39(c)  should,  uncompromisingly lead to  the same resolute conclusion that Art. 31C with its extended protection  is also  constitutionally valid. No one suggests  that   the  nature  of  the  Directive  Principles enunciated  in   the  other  Articles  of  Part  IV  of  the Constitution is  so drastic  or different from the Directive Principles in cls (b) and (c), of Art 39, that the extension of constitutional  immunity to  laws made  to further  those principles  would   offend  the   basic  structure   of  the Constitution. In fact, no such argument appears to have been advanced in the Minerva Mills case and we find no discussion and no  reference  whatsoever,  separately  to  any  of  the distinct principles enunciated in the individual Articles of Part IV  of the  Constitution decision in Minerva Mills. The argument advanced  and the conclusion arrived at both appear to be  general, applicable  to every  clause of Art. 39, and every Article  of Part  IV of  the Constitution,  no less to clauses (b)  and (c)  than to  the other clauses. We wish to say no more about 1017 the Minerva  Mills case as we are told that there is pending a petition to review the judgment.      Thirdly, notwithstanding  the  strong  reliance  placed upon  Minerva   Mills  by   the  learned   counsel  for  the petitioners, we  are not  really concerned with the decision in that case since that is not the point at issue before us. What the  Court held there was that s. 4 of the Constitution Forty-second Amendment Act was invalid. But we are not faced with that  question here. We are concerned with the validity of the  Constitution Twenty-fifth Amendment Act, 1971 and it was conceded  before us, as it was conceded before the Bench in the Minerva Mills case that the Constitution Twenty-fifth Amendment Act is constitutionally valid.      The main  submission of  Shri A K. Sen. learned counsel

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for the  petitioner in  one of  the cases  was based  on the assumption  that   Art.  31   C  as   it  stood  before  the Constitution  Forty-second  Amendment  was  constitutionally valid. Even  so, according  to Shri  Sen, the  protection of Art. 31  C would not be available to a legislation which was not shown  to have  any real  and substantial  nexus to  the Directive Principles  enunciated in  cl. (b)  or cl.  (c) of Art. 39.  Iaw founded on arbitrariness and discrimination he said could  never be  said  to  be  a  law  to  further  the directive principles in clauses (b) and (c) of Art. 39. Shri Sen would  say that Art. 39(b) itself contemplated a broader egalitarian principle  than that  embodied in  Art. 14  and, therefore, it  was impossible to conceive of a law offending the  egalitarian   principle  as  furthering  the  directive principle voiced  in Art.  39(b). On these questions, it was submitted, there  was no difference between the views of the majority of  the Judges  who decided  Minerva Mills  and the dissenting Judge.  He particularly  invited our attention to the following  observations of  Bhagwati, J. at pp. 329-330: "It will,  therefore, be  seen that  if a law is enacted for the purpose of giving effect to a Directive Principle and it imposes a  restriction on  a Fundamental  Right, it would be difficult to condemn such restriction as unreasonable or not in public  interest. So  also where  a law  is  enacted  for giving effect to a Directive Principle in furtherance of the constitutional goal  of social  and economic  justice it may conflict with a formalistic and doctrinaire view of equality before the  law, but  it would  almost always conform to the principle of equality before the law in its  total magnitude and  dimension,   because  the   equality  clause   in   the Constitution does  not speak  of more formal equality before the 1018 law  but  embodies  the  concept  of  real  and  substantive equality which strikes at inequalities arising on account of vast social  and economic  differentials and is consequently an essential  ingredient of social and economic justice. The dynamic principle  of egalitarianism fertilisers the concept of social  and economic  justice; it is one of its essential elements and  there can  be  no  real  social  and  economic justice  where   there  is   a  breach  of  the  egalitarian principle. If,  therefore, there  is a  law enacted  by  the legislature which  is really and genuinely for giving effect to a Directive Principle with a view to promoting social and economic justice, it would be difficult to say that such law violates the  principle of  egalitarianism  and  is  not  in accord with  the principle  of equality  before the  law  as understood not  in its  strict and formalistic sense, but in its dynamic  and activist  magnitude. In  the circumstances, the Court would not be unjustified in making the presumption that a law enacted really and genuinely for giving effect to a Directive  Principle in furtherance of the cause of social and economic  justice, would  not infringe  any  Fundamental Right under Article 14 or 19". . . . .           If this  be  the  correct  interpretation  of  the constitutional provisions,  as I  think it  is, the  amended Article 31  C does no more than codify the existing position under the  constitutional scheme  by providing immunity to a law enacted  really ann  genuinely for  giving effect  to  a Directive Principle,  so that  needlessly  futile  and  time consuming controversy  whether such  law contravenes Article 14 or 19 is eliminated." at pp. 337-338: "Now the question is what should be the test for determining  whether a  law is enacted for giving effect to a Directive Principle. One thing is clear that a claim to

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that effect  put forward  by the State would have no meaning or value;  it is the court which would have to determine the question. Again  it is  not enough  that there  may be  some connection between  a provision  of the  law and a Directive Principle. The  connection has to be between the law and the Directive Principle  and it  must be  a real and substantial connection. To  determine whether a law satisfies this test, the court  would have to examine the pith and substance, the true nature  and character of the law as also its design and the subject matter dealt with by it together with its object and scope.  If on such examination, the court finds that the dominant object  of  the  law  is  to  give  effect  to  the Directive Principle,  it would  accord protection to the law under the  amended Article  31C. But if the court finds that the law though passed seemingly for giving effect 1019 to a Directive Principle, is, in pith and substance. One for accomplishing an  unauthorised purpose-unauthorised  in  the sense of  not being covered by any Directive Principle, such law would not have the protection of the amended Art. 31C.". . . .           The point  I wish to emphasize is that the amended Article 31C  does not  give protection  to a  law which  has merely some  remote or  tenuous connection  with a Directive Principle. What  is necessary  is that  there must be a real and substantial  connection and  the dominant  object of the law must  be to  give effect to the Directive Principle, and that is a matter which the court would have to decide before any claim  for protection  under the amended Article 31C can be allowed. at pp.  339-340: "Where, therefore, protection is claimed in respect of  a statute  under the  amended Article  31C,  the court would  have first  to determine  whether there is real and substantial  connection between  the law and a Directive Principle and  the predominant  object of the law is to give effect to such Directive Principle and if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the court would then have to consider which  are the  provisions of the law basically and essentially necessary  for giving  effect to  the  Directive Principle and  give protection  of the  amended Article 31 C only  to   those  provisions.   The  question   whether  any particular provision of the law is basically and essentially necessary for  giving effect  to  the  Directive  Principle, would  depend,  to  a  large  extent,  on  how  closely  and integrally   such    provision   is   connected   with   the implementation of  the Directive  Principle.  If  the  court finds  that   a  particular   provision  is   subsidiary  or incidental or  not essentially and integrally connected with the implementation  of the Directive Principle or is of such a nature that, though seemingly a part of the general design of the  main provisions  of the statute, its dominant object is to  achieve an  unauthorised purpose,  it would not enjoy the protection  of the  amended Article  31(C) and  would be liable to  be struck  down as invalid if it violates Article 14 or 19."      While we  broadly agree with much that has been said by Bhagwati J.  in the  extracts above  quoted, we do not think that those observations really advance Mr. Sen’s contention. To accept  the submission  of Shri Sen that a law founded on discrimination is  not entitled  to the  protection of  Art. 31C, as  such a  law can  never be said to be to further the Directive Principle affirmed in Art. 39(b), would indeed be, to use a hackneyed phrase, to put the cart before 1020 the  horse.  If  the  law  made  to  further  the  Directive

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Principle is necessarily non-discriminatory or is based on a reasonable classification,  then such  law does not need any protection such as that afforded by Art. 31C. Such law would be valid  on its own strength, with no aid from Art. 31C. To make it  a condition  precedent that a law seeking the haven of  Art.   31C  must   be  non-discriminatory  or  based  on reasonable classification  is to  make Art. 31C meaningless. If Art.  14 is  not offended,  no one need give any immunity from an  attack based  on Art.  14. Bhagwati  J. did not say anything to  the contrary.  On the order hand, it appears to us, he  was at  great pains  to point  out  that  the  broad egalitarian principle of social and economic justice for all was implicit  in every Directive Principle and, therefore, a law designed  to promote  a Directive Principles, even if it came into conflict with the formalistic and doctrinaire view of equality before the law, would most certainly advance the broader   egalitarian    principle   and    the    desirable constitutional goal  of social and economic justice for all. If the  law was  aimed at  the broader egalitarianism of the Directive  Principles,  Art.  31C  protected  the  law  from needless, unending  and rancorous  debate  on  the  question whether the  law contravened  Art. 14’s  concept of equality before the  law. That  is how  we  understand  Bhagwati  J’s observations. Never  for a  moment did Bhagwati J. let in by another door the very controversy which was shut out by Art. 31C. Of  course, the  law seeking  the immunity  afforded by Art. 31  C must  be a  law directing the policy of the State towards securing a Directive Principle. Here, we are content to use  the very  words of  Art. 31C,  While we  agree  with Bhagwati, J.  that the  object of  the law  must be  to give effect to  the Directive  Principle and  that the connection with the  Directive Principle  must not  be ’some  remote or tenuous connection’, we deliberately refrain from the use of the words ’real and substantial’, ’dominant’, ’basically and essentially   necessary’   and   ’closely   and   integrally connected’ lest  anyone chase  after the  meaning  of  these expressions, forgetting  for the  moment the  words  of  the statute, as  happened once  when the  words ’substantial and compelling reasons’  were used  in connection  with  appeals against orders  of acquittal  and a whole body of literature grew up  on what  were ’substantial and compelling reasons’. As we  have already  said, we  agree with much that has been said by  Bhagwati J.  And what  we have  now said  about the qualifying  words  is  only  to  caution  ourselves  against adjectives getting  the better  of the  noun. Adjectives are attractive forensic  aids but  in matters  of interpretation they are  diverting intruders.  These observations  have the full concurrence of Bhagwati J. 1021      We are  firmly of the opinion that where Art. 31C comes in Art.  14 goes out. There is no scope for bringing in Art. 14 by  a side wind as it were, that is, by equating the rule of equality  before the  law  of  Art.  14  with  the  broad egalitarianism of Art. 39(b) or by treating the principle of Art. 14  as included  in the  principle of  Art.  39(b).  To insist on  nexus between  the law  for which  protection  is claimed and  the principle of Art. 39(b) is not to insist on fulfilment of the requirement of Art. 14. They are different concepts and  in certain circumstances, may even run counter to each  other. That  is  why  the  need  for  the  immunity afforded  by   Art.  31C.  Indeed  there  are  bound  to  be innumerable cases  where the  narrower concept  of  equality before the  law may  frustrate  the  broader  egalitarianism contemplated by  Art. 39(b).  To  illustrate,  a  law  which prescribes  that  every  landholder  must  surrender  twenty

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percent of  his holding  as well  as a  law which prescribes that no  one shall hold land in excess of 20 acres, may both satisfy the ritual requirements of Art. 14. But clearly, the first would  frustrate and  the  second  would  advance  the broader  egalitarian   principle.  We  are,  therefore,  not prepared to  accept the submission of Shri Sen, that any law seeking the protection of Art. 31C must not be a law founded on discrimination.      The next  question for  consideration  is  whether  the Coking Coal  Nationalisation Act  is  a  law  directing  the policy of the State towards securing ’that the ownership and control of  the material  resources of  the community are so distributed as  best to  subserve the common good’. Coal is, of course,  one of  the  most  important  known  sources  of energy, and,  therefore, a  vital national  resource.  While coal is  necessary as  a source  of  energy  for  very  many industries, coking  coal is  indispensable for the country’s crucial iron  and steel  industry. So,  Parliament gave  the first priority  to coking  coal. First there was legislation in regard  to the  coking coal  mines  and  then  there  was legislation in  regard to  all coal mines, coking as well as non-coking. By the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act all coking coal  mines  known  to  exist  in  the  country  were nationalised. Coke oven plants which were part of the coking coal mines  so nationalised  being in  or belonging  to  the owners of  the mines  also stood automatically nationalised. Other coke oven plants which did not belong to the owners of the mines but which were located near about the nationalised coking coal  mines were  also identified and nationalised by express provision  to that  effect. At  that  stage  of  the rationalisation  and  nationalisation  of  the  coal  mining industry, it 1022 was  apparently   thought  necessary   and   sufficient   to nationalise such  coke oven plants as were in or belonged to the nationalised  coking coal mines or as were identified as located near the nationalised coking coal mines, leaving out all other coke oven plants.      The nationalisation  of the  coking coal  mines and the coke oven  plants was  ’with  a  view  to  reorganising  and reconstructing such  mines and  plants for  the  purpose  of protecting, conserving  and promoting scientific development of the  resources of  coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of  the iron and steel industry and for matters connected  therewith  or  incidental  thereto’.  We  do  not entertain the  slightest doubt  that the  nationalisation of the coking coal mines and the specified coke oven plants for the above  purpose was  towards securing  that the ownership and control of the material resource of the community are so distributed as  best  to  subserve  the  common  good’.  The submission of Shri A.K. Sen was that neither a coal mine nor a coke  oven plant  owned by private parties was a ’material resource of the community’. According to the learned counsel they would  become material  resources of the community only after they were acquired by the State and not until then. In order to  qualify as material resources of the community the ownership of  the  resources  must  vest  in  the  community i.e.,the State.  A legislation such as the Coking Coal Mines Nationalisation Act may be a legislation for the acquisition by the  State of  Coking Coal  Mines and  coke  oven  plants belonging to  private parties  but it  is not  a legislation towards securing  that the  ownership  and  control  of  the material resources  are so  distributed as  best to subserve the common  good. Shri  Sen invited  our  attention  to  the emphasis  which   Krishna  Iyer,   J.  laid   on  the   word

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"distribute" occurring  in Art. 39(b) of the Constitution in State of  Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy(1) and Krishna Iyer, J’s description of it as ’the key word’ and the dissertation on ’the  genius of  the Article’. Shri Sen urged that if the word "Distribute"  was given  its proper  emphasis, it would inevitably follow that material resources must belong to the community as  a whole,  that is  to say, to the State or the public, before they could be distributed as best to subserve the  common  good.  Since  those  material  resources  which belonged to  the State  only could  be  distributed  by  the State, Shri  Sen argued that material resources had first to be acquired by the State before they could be distributed. A law  providing   for  acquisition   was  not   a   law   for distribution. We  are unable to appreciate the submission of Shri Sen. The expression 1023 ’material resources of the community’ means all things which are capable  of producing wealth for the community. There is no warrant  for interpreting  the expression  in so narrow a fashion as  suggested by  Shri Sen and confine it to public- owned material resources, and exclude private-owned material resources. The  expression involves  no dichotomy. The words must be understood in the context of the Constitutional goal of establishing  a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic. Though  the word  ’socialist’ was  introduced into the Preamble  by a  late amendment of the Constitution, that socialism has  always been  the goal  is  evident  from  the Directive Principles of State Policy. The amendment was only to   emphasise   the   urgency.   Ownership,   control   and distribution of  national productive  wealth for the benefit and use  of the  community and  the rejection of a system of misuse of  its resources  for selfish ends is what socialism is about  and the  words and thought of Art. 39 (b) but echo the  familiar   language  and  philosophy  of  socialism  as expounded generally  by all  socialist writers.  To quote  a recent writer,  "Socialism  is,  first  of  all,  a  protest against the  material  and  cultural  poverty  inflicted  by capitalism on the mass of the people. It expresses a concern for the social welfare of the oppressed, the unfortunate and the disadvantaged.  It affirms  the values  of  equality,  a classless society,  freedom and  democracy. It  rejects  the capitalist  system   and  its  competitive  ethos  as  being inefficient in  its USE  OF RESOURCES--.  They  (Socialists) want a new system, whether by reform or revolution, in which productive wealth  is OWNED  and CONTROLLED by the community and USED FOR COMMUNAL ENDS".      We may  also look  at it this way. When we say that the State of Himachal Pradesh possesses immense forest wealth or that the State of Bihar possesses immense mineral wealth, we do not  mean that  the Governments of the States of Himachal Pradesh and Bihar own the forest and mineral wealth; what we mean is  that there  is immense forest and mineral wealth in the territories  of the  two States,  whether such wealth is owned by  the people  as a  whole or  by individuals. Again, when we  talk of,  say, a  certain area  in  Delhi  being  a Bengali, Punjabi  or South  Indian area, we do not mean that the area is owned by Bengalis, Punjabis or South Indians but only that  large numbers  of  Bengalis,  Punjabis  or  South Indians live  in that  area. When  Art.  39  (b)  refers  to material resources  of the  community it does not refer only to resources owned by the community as a whole but it refers also  to  resources  owned  by  individual  members  of  the community. Resources of the community do not mean 1024 public resources only but include private resources as well.

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Nor do  we understand  the word  "distribute" to  be used in Art. 39  (b) in the limited sense in which Shri Sen wants us to say  it is  used, that  is, in  the sense  only of retail distribution to  individuals. It is used in a wider sense so as to  take in all manner and method of distribution such as distribution   between    regions,   distribution    between industries, distribution  between classes  and  distribution between public,  private and joint sectors. The distribution envisaged by  Art. 39(b) necessarily takes within its stride the transformation  of wealth  from  private-ownership  into public ownership  and is  not  confined  to  that  which  is already public-owned.  The submissions  of Shri Sen are well answered by the observations of Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy which we quote below:           "The key word is distributed and the genius of the      article, if  we may  say so,  cannot but be given fully      play as  it fulfils the basic purpose of re-structuring      the economic  order. Each  word in  the article  has  a      strategic role  and  the  whole  article  is  a  social      mission. It  embraces the  entire material resources of      the  community.   Its  task   is  to   distribute  such      resources. Its  goal is so to undertake distribution as      best to  subserve the  common good.  It re-organizes by      such distribution the ownership and control.           ’Resources’ is  a sweeping  expression and  covers      not only  cash resources  but even  ability  to  borrow      (credit resources).  Its meaning given in Black’s Legal      Dictionary is:           "Money or  any property that can be converted into      supplied;  means   of  raising   money   or   supplies;      capabilities of  raising wealth or to supply, necessary      wants; available means or capability of any kind".           And material  resources of  the community  in  the      context of reordering the national economy embraces all      the national  wealth, not merely natural resources, all      the private  and public  sources  of  meeting  material      needs, not  merely public  possessions.  Everything  of      value  or   use  in  the  material  world  is  material      resources and  the individual  being a  member  of  the      community his resources are part 1025      of those  of the  community. To  exclude  ownership  of      private resources from the coils of Article 39(b) is to      cipherise  its   very  purpose  of  redistribution  the      socialist  way.   A  directive  to  the  State  with  a      deliberate design  to dismantle  feudal and  capitalist      citadels of property must be interpreted in that spirit      and hostility to such a purpose alone can be hospitable      to  the   meaning  which   excludes  private  means  of      production or  goods produced  from the  instruments of      production. Shri  A.K. Sen agrees that private means of      production are  included in  ‘material resources of the      community’ but  by some  baffling logic excludes things      produced. If  a car factory is a material resource, why      not cars  manufactured? ‘Material’ may cover everything      worldly and  ‘resources’,  according  to  Random  House      Dictionary,  takes  in  ‘the  collective  wealth  of  a      country or  its meas of producing wealth : money or any      property that  can be converted into money; assets’. No      further argument  is needed  to conclude  that Articles      39(b) is  ample enough  to rope  in  buses.  The  motor      vehicles are  part of  the material  resources  of  the      operators.           The next  question if  whether nationalisation can      have nexus with distribution. Should we assign a narrow

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    or spacious  sense to  this concept?  Doubt  less,  the      latter,  for  reasons  so  apparent  and  eloquent.  To      ‘distribute’, even in its simple dictionary meaning, is      to ‘allot,  to divide  into classes or into groups’ and      ‘distribution’ embraces  ‘arrangement,  classification,      placement, disposition, apportionment, the way in which      items,  a   quantity,  or   the  like,  is  divided  or      apportioned; the system of dispersing goods through out      a community’ (see Random House Dictionary). To classify      and  allocate   certain  industries   or  services   or      utilities or  articles  between  the  private  and  the      public sectors of the national economy is to distribute      those resources.  Socially  conscious  economists  will      find little  difficulty in  treating nationalisation of      transport as a distributive process for the good of the      community.  You   cannot   condemn   the   concept   of      nationalisation in  our Plan  on the score that Article      39(b) does  not envelope  it. It  is a matter of public      policy left  to legislative wisdom whether a particular      scheme of take-over should be undertaken". 1026 We hold  that the  expression  ‘Material  resources  of  the community’ is  not confined  to natural resources; it is not confined to  resources owned  by the  public; it  means  and includes all  resources, natural  and man-made,  public  and private-owned.      The learned  counsel submitted that Art. 39(b) would be attracted if  the industry  as a  whole was nationalised and not if  only  a  part  of  the  industry  was  nationalised. According to  him, all  the coke  oven plants  wherever they existed had  to be  nationalised and no privately owned coke oven plants  could be allowed to be set up in the future, if Art. 39(b) was to be applied. We are unable to see any force in this submission. The distribution between public, private and joint  sectors and the extent and range of any scheme of nationalisation are  essentially  matters  of  State  policy which are  inherently in  appropriate subjects  for judicial review. Scales  of justice  are just  not designed  to weigh competing social  and  economic  factors.  In  such  matters legislative wisdom  must prevail  and judicial  review  must abstain.      Another submission  of the learned counsel was that the coke produced  by the  nationalised  coke  oven  plants  was always sold  in the  open market  in the  past and was never used by  the steel  industry because  steel plants had their own captive  coke ovens to meet their requirements. That the coke produced  by the  nationalised  coke  oven  plants  was previously used  and is  even now  being used  by  consumers other than  those of  the steel industry is neither here nor there since  we are  really concerned  with the  future  for which the  Act provides. The object of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation)  Act  is  to  reorganize  and  reconstruct coking coal  mines and  coke oven  plants for the purpose of protecting, conserving  and promoting scientific development of the  resources of  coking coal needed to meet the growing requirements of  the Iron and Steel Industry and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The requirements of the  Iron and  Steel Industry  are recognized as ‘growing requirements’ and it is found necessary to protect, conserve and promote  the  scientific  development  of  resources  of coking coal  so as  to meet  those growing requirements. The Act is contemplating the future. If the object of the Act is to provide  for the future, we do not see what difference it makes if  in the  past or  in the  present,  the  hard  coke produced by  the nationalised cocking coal mines is diverted

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elsewhere than the Iron and Steel Industry. The requirements of the Iron any Steel Industry which are to be met by the 1027 nationalised coke  oven plants are its growing requirements, that is  to say,  its future  requirements.  The  design  of nationalisation as  it  appears  from  the  statute  itself, including  the  preamble,  is  that  the  increasing  future demands of  the iron and steel industry are to be met by the nationalised coke  oven plants and demands of other industry are to  be met  by the  non-nationalised and  new coke  oven plants That the iron and steel industry is not now utilising the hard  coke produced by the nationalised coke oven plants is not  material since  the industry  is expected to expand, its requirements  of hard  coke are expected to grow and the nationalised coke  oven plants are to be harnessed and be in readiness to meet those requirements.      In view  of the  foregoing discussion, we hold that the Coking  Coal   Mines  (Nationalisation)   Act,  1972   is  a legislation for  giving effect  to the  policy of  the State towards securing  the principle  specified in  Art. 39(b) of the Constitution  and  is,  therefore,  immune,  under  Art. 31(C), from  attack  on  the  ground  that  it  offends  the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 14.      But we  do not  also see that there is any merit in the attack based  on Art.  14. The  facts that  we are  able  to gather from  the several  affidavits filed  in the  case are like this:  In the  beginning, that is, when the Coking Coal Mines  (Nationalisation)  Act  was  passed,  there  were  in existence seventy  five coke  oven plants.  Later, that  is, after the Nationalisation Acts came into force, eighty seven new coke  oven plants  came into  existence. Now, out of the original seventy five coke oven plants, forty six were parts or units of the coking coal mines which were nationalised by the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act. Those forty six coke oven plants stood nationalised as parts or units of the Coking Coal  Mines. Another coke oven plant which was in the same position  went out  of  the  statutory  nationalisation design by  reason of  the judgment  of this  Court in Bharat Coking Coal Company v. P.K. Agarwala and another, a judgment from which  we have now retracted. We are told that the coke oven plant  which was  the subject  matter of  Bharat Coking Coal Company v. P.K. Agarwala has since been acquired by the Central Government  by private  treaty. Out of the remaining twenty six  coke oven  plants,  twelve  were  identified  as situated near  nationalised Coking  Coal Mines  and so  they were expressly specified in the 1972 Nationalisation Act and nationalised. 1028 Of the  remaining fourteen,  eleven were  parts or  units of non-coking Coal  Mines and  they too stood nationalised when non-coking coal  Mines also  were nationalised  by the  Coal Mines Nationalisation  Act, 1973. That leaves out three pre- existing coke  oven plants unaccounted. After the passing of the Nationalisation  Acts, eighty seven new coke oven plants were allowed  to come into existence. Thus, finally, we have three pre-existing  and eighty  seven new  coke oven  plants outside the nationalisation scheme.      From the  additional affidavit  filed by  P.R. Desai on behalf of  Bharat Coking  Coal Limited,  it transpires  that when the  Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 was passed, fourteen coke oven plants were left out as they were not situated  in or  about coking  coal mines  but they were expected to  be nationalised  when the  coal mines  in which they were  located or  to which  they belonged  were  to  be nationalised by  the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973.

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In fact,  eleven coke  oven plants were so nationalised. But it  was  later  discovered  that  three  coke  oven  plants, Nichitpur Coke  Oven Plant, Shri Gopinathpur Coke Oven Plant and Royal Tisra Coke Oven Plant did not belong to the owners of the collieries after which they were named and near which they were  located. So  they were  not covered  by the  1973 Nationalisation Act too. Quite obviously, legislation is now necessary to  nationalise these three coke oven plants also. The process  of nationalisation  of the coal industry is, of course, not complete yet. Nationalisation of any industry or means of  production may not be and need not be effected all at once.  It may be achieved in stages. If in the process of nationalisation, some  units are  left out  in  the  earlier stages, either  because it  is so planned or because of some mistake, we  do not think we can possibly say that there has been a  violation of  Art. 14. Nor can we draw any inference of discrimination  from the  circumstance that  subsequently eighty seven  new coke even plants have been allowed to come up. Obviously, there is demand for hard coke from industries other than  the iron  and steel industry and, naturally, the state does  not want to stifle those industries by making it difficult for  them to obtain their requirements, especially since the  production of  the Nationalised  Coke oven plants has first  to meet  the requirements  of the  iron and steel industry. What  is important  to note  is that  these eighty seven new coke oven plants are not situated in or about coal mines though they are in the coal field area, as indeed they are bound to be. 1029      Shri Ashok  Sen drew  pointed attention  to the earlier affidavit filed  on behalf of Bharat Coking Coal Company and commented severally  on the  alleged  contradictory  reasons given therein  for the exclusion of certain coke oven plants from the  Coking Coal  Mines (Nationalisation)  Act. But, in the  ultimate   analysis,  we  are  not  really  to  concern ourselves  with  the  hollowness  or  the  self-condemnatory nature of the statements made in the affidavits filed by the respondents to  justify and  sustain  the  legislation.  The deponents of  the affidavits  filed into Court may speak for the parties  on whose  behalf they  swear to  the statement. They do  not speak  for the Parliament. No one may speak for the Parliament  and Parliament  is never  before the  Court. After Parliament  has said  what it intends to say, only the Court may  say what  the Parliament meant to say. None else. Once a  statute leaves  Parliament House, the Court’s is the only  authentic   voice  which   may  echo  (interpret)  the Parliament. This  the court  will do  with reference  to the language of  the statute  and other  permissible  aids.  The executive  Government  may  place  before  the  court  their understanding of what Parliament has said or intended to say or what they think was Parliament’s object and all the facts and  circumstances   which  in   their  view   led  to   the legislation.  When  they  do  so,  they  do  not  speak  for Parliament. No  Act of Parliament may be struck down because of the  understanding or  misunderstanding of  Parliamentary intention by  the executive government or because their (the Government’s)  spokesmen   do   not   bring   out   relevant circumstances  but   indulge  in  empty  and  self-defeating affidavits. They  do not  and they  cannot bind  Parliament. Validity of  legislation is  not  to  be  judged  merely  by affidavits filed  on behalf  of the  State, but  by all  the relevant circumstances  which the  court may ultimately find and more  especially by  what may  be gathered from what the legislature has  itself said. We have mentioned the facts as found by  us and  we do  not think  that there  has been any

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infringement of the right guaranteed by Art. 14.      In the  Writ Petition  filed  by  Sanjeev  Coking  Coal Company, a  question has  been raised  about the identity of the coke  oven plant, sought to be taken over. Item 9 of the Second Schedule  to the  Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act is as follows:- 1030 ____________________________________________________________ Sl. Name of the coke  Location of the     Name & address No. oven plant        coke oven plant     of the owners of                                           the coke oven                                           plant ____________________________________________________________ x       xx              xxx                   xxx 9.  New Sudamdih      New Sudamdih Col-   Sanjeev Coke Manu-                       liery, Post office  facturing Company,                       Patherdih, Distt.   Care of H. D.                       Dhanbad.            Adjmera, Post                                           Office Patherdih                                           District Dhanbad. x       xx              xxx                   xxx      The submission of the petitioner was that Item 9, which was the  new Sudamdih  Coke Oven Plant did not belong to the petitioners, but non-the-less they were wrongly shown as the owners. Taking  advantage of  the error,  that is, the wrong description of  the owner,  the Central Government had taken over the  coke oven  plant belonging  to them, though it was not the  New Sudamdih coke oven plant at all. The submission of the  petitioners would  suggest that  there were two coke oven plants-one  belonging to  the New Sudamdih mine and the other belonging  to the Sanjeev Coking Coal Company and that as a  result of  the mixing up of the names of the plant and owner, the  coke oven plant belonging to the petitioners has been taken over. The respondents have denied that there were two coke oven plants-one belonging to the owners of the mine and another belonging to the Sanjeev Coking Coal Company. It is submitted  on behalf  of the  respondents that  there was only one  coke oven  plant and  that as it did not belong to the owners  of the mine, it had to be included separately in the Second  Schedule. If  it was  part of  the mine or if it belonged to  the owners  of the  mine, there  was no need to include it separately in the Second Schedule. That there has never been  any real  doubt about  the identity  of the coke oven plant that was meant to be taken over and in fact taken over is  clear from  the very  statements in  the  affidavit filed on  behalf of  the petitioners. In paragraph 19 of the petition, it is stated: "Your peti- 1031 tioner’s coke  oven plant is included in the Second Schedule in Item No. 9 thereof." In paragraph 23, it is stated: "Your petitioner states  that your  petitioner has  never been the owner of  any coke  oven plant  by the name of New Sudamdih, the name  of the  coke oven  plant  of  your  petitioner  is Sanjeev  Coke   Manufacturing  Company’s  coke  oven  plant. Although the  said coke  oven plant  is  situated  near  New Sudamdih Colliery  as every  coke oven  plant has  got to be situated near a colliery, the address of the coke oven plant of your  petitioner  is  not  New  Sudamdih  Colliery.  Your petitioner states  that the  name of  your petitioner’s coke oven plant  has been wrongly given in the second schedule to the said  Act." We  do not think there is any possible doubt about the  identity of the coke oven plant shown as Item No. 9  in   the  second   schedule  to  the  Coking  Coal  Mines (Nationalisation) Act.  It is  the coke oven plant belonging to the Sanjeev Coking Coal Company.

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    One point  which was  touched by  Shri A.  K. Sen,  the learned counsel  for Sunil  Kumar Ray, was that in any event the coaltar  plant of  the petitioners  did not  vest in the Government, as  a result  of the  Nationalisation Act.  Shri Sen, however,  conceded that  the definition  of  coke  oven plant  was   wide  enough  to  include  the  coaltar  plant. Therefore, he did not press the point.      In the  result, the  Writ Petitions  of Sanjeev  Coking Coal Company  and Sunil  Kumar Ray  are both  dismissed with costs, quantified at Rs. 10,000/- in each case.      AMARENDRA NATH  SEN, J.  I  have  had  the  benefit  of reading in  advance  the  judgment  of  my  learned  Brother Chinnappa Reddy, J. All the material facts have been set out in the judgment of my learned brother who has also carefully considered all  the arguments  which were  advanced from the Bar. It  does not,  therefore, become  necessary for  me  to reproduce the same in this judgment.      After tracing  the history  of the  relevant  Acts  and analysing the  provisions thereof  my  learned  brother  has held:-           "The final  result of  these statutes  is that all      coal  mines   known  to   exist  in   the  country  are      nationalised, whether  they are  coking coal  mines  or      non-coking coal mines. 1032      Along with them coke oven plants in or belonging to the      mines  also  stand  nationalised.  In  addition  twelve      specified coke  oven plants not belonging to the owners      of the  mines but  known to  exist near about the mines      are also  nationalised. All  other coke oven plants are      left out  of the  scheme of nationalisation. The design      revealed by the Acts is that mining of coal is reserved      entirely for  the public  sector, and  as, all existing      coal mines, whether coking coal or non-coking coal, are      nationalised and  the management  of mines which may be      discovered in the future is automatically taken over by      the   Central    Government   until   nationalised   by      appropriate legislation;  and, the  manufacture of hard      coke from  coal is reserved for the joint sector and so      all coke  oven plants belonging to or in coal mines and      twelve specified  coke  oven  plants  are  nationalised      while all  other coke  oven plants are left for private      exploitation; there is no ban against any new coke oven      plants being set up."      I entirely agree with these observations. In these writ petitions, the  validity of  the inclusion  of the coke oven plants belonging  to the  petitioners in the second schedule has been  challenged mainly  on the  ground that  other coke oven plants  standing in  exactly the  same position  as the coke oven  plants of  the petitioners  were left out and had not been  nationalised. The  petitioners complain that there has been  a clear  violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The principal answer of the Central Government to the charge of discrimination  is that  the provisions  of the  Act  are immune  from   the  challenge   based  on   the  ground   of discrimination in  view of  the protection  afforded by Art. 31C  of   the  Constitution.  The  Central  Government  also contends that  the inclusion  of the coke oven plants of the petitioners in  the second  schedule  is  clearly  justified without any infringement of Art. 14 of the Constitution.      My learned  brother on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the  respective parties  has come  to the conclusion that there is  no merit  in the  attack based  on Art. 14. He has also held  that Art.  31C of  the Constitution  will in  any

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event afford a clear answer to the charge of discrimination, if there be any; and he has further expressed the 1033 view that  the declaration  in the instant case that the law is for  giving effect  to the  policy of  the State  towards securing "that  the ownership  and control  of the  material resources of  the community  are so  distributed as  to best subserve the  common good"  as enumerated  in Art. 39 (b) of the Constitution, is clearly justified.      I must  frankly confess that I had doubts in my mind as to the  legality of  the nationalisation  of the  coke  oven plants of  the petitioners  in view  of  the  discrimination alleged. But on an anxious and very careful consideration of the matter  I have  come to the conclusion that in the facts and circumstances  of this case it cannot be said that there has been  any such discrimination as infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.      My learned  brother Chinnappa Reddy, J. in his judgment observed:-           "Coke oven  plants which  were part  of the coking      coal mines as nationalised being in or belonging to the      owners  of   the   mines   also   stood   automatically      nationalised. Other  coke oven  plants  which  did  not      belong to  the owners  of  the  mines  but  which  were      located near  about the  nationalised coking coal mines      were  also   identified  and  nationalised  by  express      provision  to   that  effect.  At  that  stage  of  the      rationalisation and  nationalisation of the coal mining      industry,  it  was  apparently  thought  necessary  and      sufficient to nationalise such coke oven plants as were      in or belonged to the nationalised coking coal mines or      as were  identified as  located near  the  nationalised      coking coal  mines, leaving  out all  other  coke  oven      plants.           The nationalisation  of the  coking coal mines and      the coke  oven plants  was ‘with a view to reorganising      and  reconstructing  such  mines  and  plants  for  the      purpose  of   protecting,  conserving   and   promoting      scientific development  of the resources of coking coal      needed to meet the growing requirements of the iron and      steel industry  and for  matters connected therewith or      incidental thereto’.  We do not entertain the slightest      doubt that the nationalisation 1034      of the  coking coal  mines and  the specified coke oven      plants for  the above purpose was towards securing that      ‘the ownership and control of the material resources of      the community  are so  distributed as  best to subserve      the common good.’      I agree with these observations. To my mind, therefore, there was  a logical  basis for  the nationalisation  of the coke oven plants of the petitioners, leaving out a few and I am not  satisfied that  there has been any rank or arbitrary discrimination in  violation of Art. 14. I am further of the opinion that  even if  on the  basis of  a  doctrinaire  and formalistic attitude, it could be said that Art. 14 had been infringed, Art.  31C of the Constitution and the appropriate declaration, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, would provide the necessary remedy for such violation, if there  be any. Applicability of Art. 31C and the validity of  the   declaration  will,  to  my  mind,  depend  on  the particular facts and circumstances of a case. In the present case as  the State  has enacted  the law  in  directing  its policy towards securing the principles formulated in Art. 39 (b) of  the Constitution, Art. 31C is properly attracted and

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the declaration is valid.      The decision of this Court in Minerva Mills case relied on by  Mr. Sen,  is not  of any  great assistance and in the view that  I have  taken it does not become necessary for me to refer to the same. It has been represented to us that the said decision is pending review in this Court. I, therefore, refrain from  dealing with the said decision and from making any observations or comments on the same.      I  agree  with  my  learned  brother  that  these  writ petitions must fail and should be dismissed. Costs generally follow event.  To  my  mind,  however,  when  a  citizen  is deprived of  his  property  by  a  State  action  and  feels aggrieved by  the act  of the State and approaches the Court and if  it cannot  be said  that his grievance is absolutely frivolous, the  citizen in such a case should not be saddled with the  costs simply  because the  Court  finds  that  his grievance has no valid legal basis. To my mind, it cannot be said that  the Writ  petitions filed by the petitioners were vexatious particularly in view 1035 of the  earlier decision of this Court in Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v.  P.K. Agarwala.(1) I would, therefore, dismiss these writ petitions without any order as to costs. S.R.                                     Petition dismissed. 1