31 July 2014
Supreme Court
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SANJAY GUPTA Vs STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH THROUGH ITS CHIEF SECRETARY

Bench: DIPAK MISRA,V. GOPALA GOWDA
Case number: W.P.(C) No.-000338-000338 / 2006
Diary number: 13713 / 2006
Advocates: PREM MALHOTRA Vs KAMLENDRA MISHRA


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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 338 OF 2006

Sanjay Gupta and others ... Petitioners

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh and others      ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The  10th of  April,  2006,  the  last  day  of  the  India  Brand  

Consumer Show organized by Mrinal  Events and Expositions at  

Victoria Park, Meerut, witnessed the dawn of the day with hope,  

aspiration, pleasure and festivity at the Victoria Park, Meerut, but,  

as ill-fortune (man made) would have it, as the evening set in, it  

became  the  mute  spectator  to  a  devastating  fire  inside  the  

covered premises of the brand show area which extinguished the  

life spark of sixty-four persons and left more than hundreds as

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injured; and with the clock ticking, the day turned to be a silent  

observer of profused flow of human tears, listener of writhing pain  

and cry, and eventually, marking itself as a dark day of disaster in  

human  history.   Some,  who  were  fortunate  to  escape  death,  

sustained serious injuries, and some minor injuries.  The cruelest  

day of April converted the last day of the festival of Consumer  

Show to that of a horrifying tragedy for the families of the persons  

who were charred to death, the victims who despite sustaining  

serious injuries did not fall prey to the claw of fatality, and the  

others, slightly fortunate, who had got away with minor injuries  

bearing the mental trauma.  The dance of death, as it appears,  

reigned supreme and the cruel demon of injury caused serious  

injuries as well as minor injuries.  The assembly of pleasure paled  

into  total  despair  and before the people  could  understand the  

gravity  of  the  tragedy,  it  was  over,  leaving  the  legal  

representatives who have lost their parents, or the parents who  

have forever been deprived of seeing their children, or the wives  

who had become widows within fraction of a minute, blaming and  

cursing  the  officials  of  the  State  Government.   The  

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contemporaneous  history  records  it  as  “Great  Meerut  Fire  

Tragedy.

2. After  the  tragedy  paraded  at  the  Victoria  Park  a  First  

Information Report was lodged against the accused persons under  

Sections 304A, 337, 338 and 427 of Indian Penal Code.  The State  

Government, regard being had to the magnitude of the tragedy,  

vide  notification  No.  2155/p/Chh.p-3-2006-12(51)p/2006  dated  

2.6.2006,  appointed  Justice  O.P.  Garg,  a  former  Judge  of  

Allahabad  High  Court,  as  one  man  Commission  under  the  

Commissions  of  Enquiry  Act,  1952  (for  short  “the  Act”).   The  

Commission was required to submit the report in respect of four  

issues, namely: -

“1. To find out the facts, causes on account of which  the aforesaid accident occurred.

2. To decide  the  ways  and means to  keep up the  situation in control.

3. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination  of liability and the extent thereof.

4. Measures to be adopted to avoid the occurrence of  such incident in future.”

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3. Almost at the time the Commission was appointed, the  

present writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution was filed  

seeking the following reliefs: -

“A. Pass appropriate writ,  order or direction directing  the  respondent  No.  13,  CBI  to  take  up  the  investigation  of  the  case  FIR  No.  95  of  2006,  registered  at  Civil  Lines,  Meerut,  UP,  u/s  304A/337/338/427, IPC and investigate the case in  accordance with law, and this Hon’ble Court may  be pleased to monitor the investigation from time  to time, to ensure that no person guilty of any of  the offences is able to escape the clutches of law  and  that  the  investigation  is  carried  out  as  expeditiously as possible in a free and fair manner.

B. Pass appropriate writ,  order or direction directing  the State Government to initiate action against the  erring administrative officers for their atrocious and  negligent  4ehavior  while  dealing  with  tragedy  of  this magnitude.

C. Pass appropriate writ  order or direction awarding  damages  against  the  respondents,  jointly  and  severally,  to  the  petitioners  including  all  victims  who lost their lives, the names and particulars of  which,  are  given  in  Annexure  P.6  for  a  sum  of  Rs.106 crores (Rs.20 lakhs for 53 dead) with the  direction to equally distribute the same to the first  degree heirs  of  all  the victims evenly or  in  such  manner as may be considered just and proper, by  this Hon’ble Court.

D. Award  damages  against  the  respondents,  jointly  and  severally,  to  the  tune  of  Rs.63  crores  (Rs.5  lakhs for 126 injured) to the injured whose names  and addresses are mentioned in Annexure P-6 to  

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be distributed evenly or in such manner as may be  considered just and proper, by this Hon’ble Court.

E. Award punitive damages against the respondents  to pay a sum of Rs.50 crores jointly and severally  for the purpose of setting up and augmenting the  Centralized  Accident  and  Trauma  Services  and  other allied services in Western UP.   Respondent  No. 3,  the District Magistrate may be directed to  create a fund for the purpose and submit a detailed  report  to  this  Hon’ble  Court  in  accordance  with  which the said services  will  be set  up under the  supervision of this Hon’ble Court.

F. Pass  appropriate  writ,  order  or  direction  issuing  guidelines  to  be  followed  by  all,  at  the  time  of  creating  a  temporary  structure  for  organizing  Seminars, Exhibitions etc.”

4. In  course  of  hearing  of  the  writ  petition  we  have  been  

apprised  by  Mr.  Vikas  Pahwa,  learned  senior  counsel  that  64  

persons have died in the incident and not 53.  The said fact is not  

disputed  by  learned  counsel  for  the  State.   As  the  hearing  

progressed, this Court directed for filing of the translated copy of  

the relevant portion of the report  of  the commission as it  had  

already  been  submitted  to  the  competent  authority.   In  

compliance  with  the  order  learned  counsel  for  the  State  has  

brought on record the report dated 5.6.2007.  On a perusal of the  

said report, we have found that the Commission has returned its  

findings in respect of all the aspects.

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5. Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  

respondents 10 to 12, the organizers of the event, submitted that  

the Commission has fallen into grave error by not complying with  

Sections 8B and 8C of the Act as a consequence of which the said  

respondents  have  been  seriously  prejudiced.   It  is  his  further  

proponement that they were only issued notices under Section  

4(a)  of  the  Act,  but  that  would  not  meet  the  requirement  as  

mandated under Sections 8B and 8C of the Act.   

6. To appreciate the said submission, it is apposite to refer to  

Sections  8,  8A,  8B  and  8C  of  the  Act.  Section  8  provides  for  

procedure to be followed by the Commission empowering it  to  

have power to regulate its own procedure including the fixing of  

place and time of its sitting and deciding whether to sit in public  

or  in  private.   Section 8A stipulates that  the inquiry not  to be  

interrupted by reason of vacancy or change in constitution of the  

Commission.  Sections 8B and 8C on which emphasis has been  

placed by Mr. Shanti Bhushan need to be reproduced.  They read  

as follows: -

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“8B. Persons likely to be prejudicially affected to  be  heard.  –  If,  at  any  state  of  the  inquiry,  the  Commission, -

i. considers it necessary to inquire into the conduct  of any person; or

ii. is of opinion that the reputation of any person is  likely to be prejudicially affected by the inquiry,

the Commission shall give to that person a reasonable  opportunity  of  being  heard  in  the  inquiry  and  to  produce evidence in his defence:

Provided that  nothing in  this  section shall  apply  where the credit of a witness is being impeached.

8C.  Right  of  cross-examination  and  representation  by  legal  practitioner.  –  The  appropriate  Government,  every  person  referred  to  in  section 8B and, with the permission of the Commission,  any other person whose evidence is  recorded by the  Commission, -

(a) may cross-examine a witness other than a  witness produced by it or him;

(b) may address the Commission; and

(c) may be represented before the Commission  by a legal practitioner or, with the permission of  the Commission, by any other person.”

7. It  is  submitted  by  Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned  senior  

counsel, that no opportunity was given to the respondents 10 to  

12  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses  though  they  are  directly  

affected  by  the  said  inquiry  and  the  findings  recorded  by  the  

Commission.  It is canvassed by him that the notice that was sent  

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to the said respondents is basically under Section 4(a) of the Act.  

To  bolster  his  submission  he  has  drawn  our  attention  to  the  

notices  that  have  been  sent  by  the  Commission.   We  may  

fruitfully refer to one of the notices sent by the Commission to  

one of the organizers, namely, Lakhan Tomar, respondent No. 10.  

The said notice reads as follows: -

“Sh. Lakhan Tomar, (in Jail), Organizer, Consumer Show, Victoria Park, Meerut, Via Superintendent, District Jail, Meerut, Meerut

On 10th of April, a sad incident of massive fire occurred  in the 3 Pandals of Brand Consumer Show at Victoria  Park, Civil Lines area of police station, District Meerut.  In  order  to  ascertain the reasons,  circumstances and  fixing  of  responsibilities,  the  Government  of  Uttar  Pradesh issued notification bearing No. 2155p/Chh.p-3- 2006-12(51)p/2006  dated  2  June,  2006  appointing  a  one  member  Enquiry  Commission  under  the  Commission of Inquiry Act 1952 (Government Order no.  60 of 1952) and the said Commission is  in progress.  The Commission is enquiring into the following issues:

1. To find out the circumstances and causes on account  of which the aforesaid accident occurred.

2. To  recommend ways  and means  to  keep up  such  incidents in check in future.

3. In respect of the aforesaid occurrence, determination  of liability and fixing the same.

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4. Measures to be adopted to prevent such occurrences  in future.

Your  presence  is  mandatorily  required  for  the  said  Enquiry.  You are hereby directed to appear before the  Commission on the 27th of  September 2006 at 10:30  AM and ensure the recording of your Statement.  You  are also required to present before the Commission all  the  Documents,  correspondence,  Acts,  Rules,  Government  Orders,  Departmental  orders,  if  any,  related to the circumstances of the incident.

You are also informed that the above notice is issued  under  the  provisions  of  Commission  of  Enquiry  Act  1952  (Government  Order  no.  60  of  1952)  and  the  compliance  of  which  is  necessary,  mandatory  and  binding.”

8. Similar  notices  were  sent  to  the  other  organizers.   On  a  

perusal of the said notice, it is limpid that the said notice is in the  

nature of notice requiring him to appear.  It has to be construed  

as  a  notice  under  Section  4(a)  of  the  Act.   That  apart,  on  a  

scrutiny  of  the  list  of  witnesses  who  were  examined  by  the  

Commission,  we  find  that  the  respondents  10  to  12  were  

summoned  almost  after  examination  of  45  witnesses  and  the  

respondent-organisers  were  not  afforded  opportunity  of  cross-

examination.  The Commission, on the basis of the evidence and  

taking recourse to certain violation of  statutory provisions,  has  

submitted the report.

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9. In  State  of  Bihar  v.  Lal  Krishna Advani  and others1  

while interpreting Section 8B of the Act which has been brought  

into the statute by the Amending Act 79 of 1971, the Court has  

opined thus: -

“8. It may be noticed that the amendment was brought  about,  about  20 years after  passing of  the main Act  itself.  The  experience  during  the  past  two  decades  must have made the legislature realize that  it  would  but be necessary to notice a person whose conduct the  Commission considers necessary to inquire into during  the course of the inquiry or whose reputation is likely to  be  prejudicially  affected  by  the  inquiry.  It  is  further  provided that such a person would have a reasonable  opportunity of being heard and to adduce evidence in  his defence. Thus the principles of natural justice were  got inducted in the shape of a statutory provision. It is  thus  incumbent  upon  the  Commission  to  give  an  opportunity to a person, before any comment is made  or opinion is expressed which is likely to prejudicially  affect that person. Needless to emphasise that failure  to comply with the principles of natural justice renders  the  action  non  est as  well  as  the  consequences  thereof.”

10. In view of the aforesaid enunciation of law, it is difficult to  

sustain the report.  We are obliged to state here that in course of  

hearing, we had asked the learned counsel for the parties that in  

case  the  report  of  the  Commission  would  be  set  aside,  the  

Commission has to proceed after following the provisions of the  

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(2003) 8 SCC 361

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Act.  The said position was acceded to.  On a further suggestion  

being made, learned counsel for the parties had fairly agreed for  

appointment of another retired Judge as Commission.   Learned  

counsel  for  the parties had suggested certain names in sealed  

covers but there was no commonality.  Regard being had to the  

gravity of the situation and the magnitude of the tragedy, on due  

deliberation we appoint Justice S.B. Sinha, formerly a Judge of this  

Court, as the one man Commission.  It is agreed by the learned  

counsel for the parties that the witnesses, who were examined by  

the previous Commission and not cross-examined by respondents  

10 to  12,  their  depositions  shall  be treated as  examination-in-

chief and they shall be made available for cross-examination by  

the respondent.  It has also been conceded that the documents  

which have been marked as exhibits, unless there is a cavil over  

the  same,  they  shall  be  treated  as  exhibited  documents.  Mr.  

Shanti  Bhushan,  learned  senior  counsel,  submitted  that  the  

contractors who were engaged by the organizers, as they were  

summoned  by  Justice  O.P.  Garg  Commission,  should  be  

summoned by  the present  Commission.   Appreciating  the  said  

submission, we think it apposite that the Commission should issue  

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notices to the contractors so that the proceeding under the Act  

can  continue  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Act.  

Needless to say, they shall have the similar opportunity that has  

been made available to the organizers.  The organizers as well as  

the contractors would be at liberty to adduce evidence in support  

of  their  respective  pleas.   The  Commission  shall  record  the  

evidence at Meerut and hear the arguments in Delhi.  It needs no  

special emphasis to say that the State shall provide the requisite  

infrastructure, secretarial staff to the Commission for its smooth  

functioning and pay the fees of the Commission which shall be  

fixed by the Commission.  The Commission is requested to submit  

the report by the end of January, 2015.

11. Having  so  opined,  we  cannot  comatose  our  judicial  

conscience to the plights of the victims who have approached this  

Court.  Some of the petitioners are themselves the victims or next  

kin of the deceased and the injured persons who have suffered  

because of this unfortunate man made tragedy.  It is the admitted  

position that  64 deaths  have occurred and number  of  persons  

have suffered grievous injuries.  There are also persons who have  

suffered simple injuries as has been asserted by the State.  We  

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have been apprised at the Bar that the State Government has  

already paid Rs.2 lakhs to the legal representatives of the persons  

who have breathed their last, and a sum of rupees one lakh has  

been paid by the Central Government.  As far as seriously injured  

persons are concerned,  rupees one lakh has been paid by the  

State Government and Rs.50,000/- has been paid to the victims  

who have suffered simple injuries.   

12. The question that we would like to pose is whether this Court  

should wait for the Commission’s report and then direct the State  

Government to pay the amount of compensation to the grieved  

and affected persons, who have been waiting for the last eight  

years, or should they get certain sum till the matter is finalized.  

We will be failing in our duty if we do not take into consideration  

the  submission  of  Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned senior  counsel,  

that as far as respondents 10 to 12 are concerned, no liability can  

be  fastened  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  and  

definitely not at this stage.  As far as first part of the submission is  

concerned, we keep it open to be dealt with after the report is  

obtained by this Court.  As far as second aspect is concerned, we  

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shall deal with it after we address the issue of public law remedy  

and the liability of the State in a case of this nature.

13. In  Nilabati Behera (Smt) alias Lalita Behera (through  

the  Supreme  Court  Legal  Aid  Committee)  v.  State  of  

Orissa and others2,  J.S.  Verma,  J.  (as his  Lordship then was)  

speaking  for  himself  and  Venkatachala,J.,  after  referring  to  

various authorities, opined thus: -

“17. It  follows  that  ‘a  claim  in  public  law  for  compensation’ for contravention of human rights and  fundamental  freedoms,  the  protection  of  which  is  guaranteed  in  the  Constitution,  is  an  acknowledged  remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights,  and  such  a  claim  based  on  strict  liability  made  by  resorting to a constitutional  remedy provided for  the  enforcement  of  a  fundamental  right  is  ‘distinct  from,  and  in  addition  to,  the  remedy  in  private  law  for  damages for the tort’ resulting from the contravention  of  the  fundamental  right.  The  defence  of  sovereign  immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept  of  guarantee of  fundamental  rights,  there can be no  question  of  such  a  defence  being  available  in  the  constitutional remedy. It is this principle which justifies  award of monetary compensation for contravention of  fundamental  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution,  when  that  is  the  only  practicable  mode  of  redress  available for the contravention made by the State or its  servants in the purported exercise of their powers, and  enforcement  of  the  fundamental  right  is  claimed  by  resort  to  the  remedy  in  public  law  under  the  Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of the  

2 (1993) 2 SCC 746

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Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul Sah v.   State  of  Bihar3 and  is  the  basis  of  the  subsequent  decisions  in  which compensation was awarded under  Articles  32  and  226  of  the  Constitution,  for  contravention of fundamental rights.

18. A useful discussion on this topic which brings out  the distinction between the remedy in public law based  on  strict  liability  for  violation  of  a  fundamental  right  enabling award of compensation, to which the defence  of sovereign immunity is inapplicable, and the private  law remedy, wherein vicarious liability of the State in  tort may arise, is to be found in Ratanlal & Dhirajlal’s  Law of Torts, 22nd Edition, 1992, by Justice G.P. Singh,  at pages 44 to 48.

Thereafter, the learned Judge referred to the authority in  Union  

Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India4 and observed: -

“We respectfully concur with the view that the court is  not helpless and the wide powers given to this Court by  Article 32, which itself is a fundamental right, imposes  a constitutional obligation on this Court to forge such  new tools, which may be necessary for doing complete  justice  and  enforcing  the  fundamental  rights  guaranteed in the Constitution, which enable the award  of monetary compensation in appropriate cases, where  that is the only mode of redress available. The power  available  to  this  Court  under  Article  142  is  also  an  enabling  provision  in  this  behalf.  The  contrary  view  would not merely render the court powerless and the  constitutional guarantee a mirage, but may, in certain  situations, be an incentive to extinguish life, if for the  extreme contravention the court is powerless to grant  any relief against the State, except by punishment of  the wrongdoer for the resulting offence, and recovery  of damages under private law, by the ordinary process.  

3 (1983) 4 SCC 141 4 (1991) 4 SCC 584

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If  the guarantee that deprivation of life and personal  liberty cannot be made except in accordance with law,  is to be real,  the enforcement of the right in case of  every  contravention  must  also  be  possible  in  the  constitutional scheme, the mode of redress being that  which  is  appropriate  in  the  facts  of  each  case.  This  remedy in public law has to be more readily available  when invoked by the have-nots, who are not possessed  of  the  wherewithal  for  enforcement  of  their  rights  in  private law, even though its exercise is to be tempered  by judicial  restraint to avoid circumvention of private  law remedies, where more appropriate.”

14. Dr.  Anand,J.  (as  his  Lordship  then  was)  in  his  concurring  

opinion has observed that: -

“34. The  public  law  proceedings  serve  a  different  purpose than the private law proceedings. The relief of  monetary  compensation,  as  exemplary  damages,  in  proceedings  under  Article  32  by  this  Court  or  under  Article  226  by  the  High  Courts,  for  established  infringement of the indefeasible right guaranteed under  Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in  public  law  and  is  based  on  the  strict  liability  for  contravention of the guaranteed basic and indefeasible  rights of the citizen. The purpose of public law is not  only  to  civilize  public  power  but  also  to  assure  the  citizen that they live under a legal system which aims  to  protect  their  interests  and  preserve  their  rights.  Therefore, when the court moulds the relief by granting  “compensation” in proceedings under Article 32 or 226  of the Constitution seeking enforcement or protection  of fundamental rights, it does so under the public law  by  way  of  penalising  the  wrongdoer  and  fixing  the  liability  for  the  public  wrong on the State which has  failed  in  its  public  duty  to  protect  the  fundamental  rights of the citizen. The payment of compensation in  such cases is not to be understood, as it is generally  

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understood  in  a  civil  action  for  damages  under  the  private law but in the broader sense of providing relief  by an order of making ‘monetary amends’ under the  public law for the wrong done due to breach of public  duty,  of  not protecting the fundamental  rights of the  citizen.  The  compensation  is  in  the  nature  of  ‘exemplary damages’  awarded against the wrongdoer  for the breach of its public law duty and is independent  of the rights available to the aggrieved party to claim  compensation under the private law in an action based  on  tort,  through  a  suit  instituted  in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  or/and  prosecute  the  offender  under the penal law.”

15. In  Chairman, Railway Board and others v. Chandrima  

Das (Mrs.) and others5, this Court while dealing with an appeal  

arising out  of  a  public  interest  litigation before the High Court  

pertaining to the grant of damages by the railways after referring  

to earlier decisions came to hold as follows:-

“Running of the Railways is a commercial activity.  Establishing  the  Yatri  Niwas  at  various  railway  stations to provide lodging and boarding  facilities  to passengers on payment of charges is a part of  the commercial activity of the Union of India and  this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of  sovereign power.  The employees of  the Union of  India who are deputed to run the Railways and to  manage  the  establishment,  including  the  railway  stations  and  the  Yatri  Niwas,  are  essential  components  of  the  government  machinery  which  carries on the commercial activity. If any of such  employees  commits  an  act  of  tort,  the  Union  

5 (2000) 2 SCC 465

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Government,  of  which  they  are  the  employees,  can,  subject  to  other  legal  requirements  being  satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to  the person wronged by those employees.”

16. In Sube Singh v. State of Haryana and others6, while  

dealing with the grant of compensation in a public law remedy,  

the Court ruled thus:-

 “It  is  thus  now  well  settled  that  the  award  of  compensation against the State is an appropriate  and effective remedy for redress of an established  infringement of a fundamental right under Article  21,  by  a  public  servant.  The  quantum  of  compensation will, however, depend upon the facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  Award  of  such  compensation (by way of public  law remedy) will  not  come  in  the  way  of  the  aggrieved  person  claiming additional compensation in a civil court, in  the enforcement of the private law remedy in tort,  nor come in the way of the criminal court ordering  compensation  under  Section  357  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure.”

17. In  Raghuvansh  Dewanchand  Bhasin  v.  State  of   

Maharashtra and another7, the Court reiterated the view that  

the power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to  

grant  monetary  compensation  in  respect  of  petitioners  under  

Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India and fundamental  

6 (2006) 3 SCC 178 7 (2012) 9 SCC 791

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rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India are violated are  

well-established.

18.  In  Mehmood Nayyar Azam v. State of Chhattisgarh  

and  others8 while  dealing  with  the  mental  torture  of  the  

petitioner  –  an  Ayurvedic  doctor  in  custody,  the  Court  after  

referring to the earlier judgments including in Hardeep Singh v.  

State of M.P.9 ruled:  

 “35.  We  have  referred  to  these  paragraphs  to  understand how with the efflux of time, the concept  of  mental  torture has been understood throughout  the  world,  regard  being  had  to  the  essential  conception of human dignity.

36.  From  the  aforesaid  discussion,  there  is  no  shadow of doubt that any treatment meted out to an  accused  while  he  is  in  custody  which  causes  humiliation and mental trauma corrodes the concept  of human dignity.  The majesty of law protects the  dignity of a citizen in a society governed by law. It  cannot  be  forgotten  that  the  welfare  State  is  governed by the rule of law which has paramountcy.  It  has been said by Edward Biggon “the laws of a  nation  form  the  most  instructive  portion  of  its  history”. The Constitution as the organic law of the  land has unfolded itself in a manifold manner like a  living organism in the various decisions of the court  about the rights of a person under Article 21 of the  Constitution  of  India.  When  citizenry  rights  are  sometimes dashed against and pushed back by the  

8 (2012) 8 SCC 1 9 (2012) 1 SCC 748

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members of  City  Halls,  there has to be a rebound  and when the rebound takes place, Article 21 of the  Constitution springs up to action as a protector. That  is  why,  an  investigator  of  a  crime  is  required  to  possess the qualities of patience and perseverance  as  has  been  stated  in  Nandini  Satpathy v.  P.L.  Dani10.”

Thereafter placing reliance on  Raghuvansh Dewanchand  

Bhasin  (supra),  Sube  Singh (supra)  and  Hardeep  Singh  

(supra),  the Court  granted a sum of  Rs.5,00,000/-  (rupees five  

lakhs only) as compensation.

19. Having stated about the legal position pertaining to public  

law  remedy  under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India  as  

regards the grant of compensation we are obliged to address with  

regard to the responsibility and involvement of the State.   Mr.  

Vikas Pahwa, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners,  

would submit that the organizers had sought permission from the  

Additional  District  Magistrate,  Meerut  City,  vide  letter  dated  

27.3.2006 for  conducting  the  Consumer  Show and in  the  said  

letter  they had undertaken to  follow all  the guidelines  and all  

suggested security and precautionary measures and also sought  

other permissions from the competent authorities under the U.P.  10 (1978) 2 SCC 424

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Fire  Services  Act,  1944  and  the  authorities  of  the  State  had  

granted permission without proper verification and hence, they  

should be held liable to pay first subject to recovery of the same  

proportionately  from  the  organizers  and  contractors  after  

recording the findings on all the contentions issues including the  

quantum of compensation that may be determined in the report  

by the Commission.

20. Mr.  Gaurav  Bhatia,  learned  Additional  Advocate  General  

appearing for the Sate, submitted that the liability that would be  

eventually determined, has to be apportioned between the State  

and the organizers and the same has to be done on percentage  

basis, that is to say, the liability of the organizers should be 85%  

and  that  of  the  State  should  be  15% and  said  proportionality  

should be followed at this stage also.   

21. Mr.  Shanti  Bhushan,  learned senior counsel,  would submit  

that  the  liability  cannot  be  fastened  on  the  organizers  under  

Article  32  of  the  Constitution  as  the  grievance  is  not  tenable  

against  the  private  persons  and,  in  any  case,  the  organizers  

cannot vicariously be held liable for the act of the contractors.  

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We have noted these submissions but we are not intending to  

address these aspects in praesenti. Be it stated, with regard to  

the precise exact quantum, liability of the organizers, liability of  

the contractors and, if found liable by this Court, would depend  

upon the eventual verdict, regard being had to the report of the  

Commission.  As stated hereinbefore, we have to see whether the  

State  and  its  authorities  prima  facie  are  responsible  to  make  

them liable to pay the compensation.  The issue of apportionment  

would come afterwards.  As we find from the material on record,  

pursuant to the letter of request issued by the organizers,  the  

Additional  District  Magistrate  obtained  a  report  from  the  

Superintendent  of  Police,  Meerut  and expressed  the  view that  

there  was  no  objection  if  the  programme was  organized  from  

6.4.2006  to  10.4.2006.  It  has  also  come  on  record  that  after  

obtaining permission from the Additional District Magistrate the  

organizers  requested  the  Principal,  Government  Inter  College,  

Meerut, requesting for providing of the GIC Play Ground and toilet  

facilities  for  hosting of  the build-in-style  exhibition on the said  

dates.  The relevant part of the said letter reads as follows: -

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“The event is assured to be both an elite and very tidy  affair conducted in the maximum possible professional  manner,  with  support  and  involvement  of  many  a  senior officials/ technocrats, major companies and well  placed professionals.  Moreover it has been purposely  scheduled at the time when it does not interfere with  the regular school classes or other activity.

With the above inference it is earnestly requested that  we may please graciously be allowed to use the GIC  Playground and the allied services for toilet etc. for the  purpose on the above dates and also make the ground  available  for  general  maintenance/preparatory  works  etc. 4 days prior to the proposed event.”

22. The  Principal  of  the  Government  College  granted  the  

permission subject to certain restrictions.  Be it clarified, the said  

premises was an additional one.  It is averred in the petition that  

though the pandals were not properly constructed, there was only  

one entry and one exit gate, there had been violation of UP Fire  

Services Act, 1944, there was no proper fire safety arrangements  

yet the permission was granted to hold the exhibition.  Few things  

are  extremely  clear  from  the  entire  assertion  of  facts.   The  

Consumer Show was organized at a place belonging to the State  

Government,  permission was granted by the Additional  District  

Magistrate in consultation with the Superintendent of Police, the  

State Government had not taken pains to see whether the other  

statutory  authorities  as  required  under  law  had  granted  “No  

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Objection Certificate” or not and also how far the organizers had  

complied with the directions.  The primary obligation of the State  

was  to  see  whether  the  preparations  made  at  the  place  of  

exhibitions  by  the  organizers  involved  any  risk  or  not  and  

whether, there was proper arrangement for extinguishing the fire  

or not in the covered area.  Under these circumstances, we are  

disposed to think that there has to be some initial arrangement  

for  payment of compensation by the State awaiting the report  

from the Commission.

23.  We will  be failing in  our  duty  if  we do not  take note of  

another submission of Mr. Gaurav Bhatia, who would vehemently  

urge  that  the  principles  stated  in  Municipal  Corporation  of  

Delhi v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy & ors.11,  

as regards the apportionment of damages should be considered.  

In the said case the Municipal Corporation had approached this  

Court  assailing  the  decision  of  the  Division  Bench of  the  High  

Court of Delhi.  This Court analysed the factual matrix, took note  

of the contentions of various parties and modified the award as  

follows: -

11 AIR 2012 SC 100

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“Taking  note  of  the  facts  and  circumstances,  the  amount of compensation awarded in public law remedy  cases, and the need to provide a deterrent, we are of  the  view  that  award  of  Rs.10  lakhs  in  the  case  of  persons  aged  above  20  years  and  Rs.7.5  lakhs  in  regard to those who were 20 years or below as on the  date of the incident, would be appropriate.  We do not  propose to disturb the award of Rs.1 lakh each in the  case of injured.  The amount awarded as compensation  will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the  date  of  writ  petition  as  ordered  by  the  High  Court,  reserve liberty to the victims or the L.Rs. of the victims  as the case may be to seek higher remedy wherever  they  are  not  satisfied  with  the  compensation.   Any  increase shall be borne by the Licensee (theatre owner)  exclusively.”

24. Thereafter, in the concluding portion the Court recorded its  

conclusion in seriatim.  Some of the conclusions we reproduce  

below: -

“(iv) The licensee (appellant in CA No. 6748 of 2004)  and Delhi Vidyut Board are held jointly and severally  liable  to  compensate  the  victims  of  the  Uphaar  fire  tragedy.  Though their liability is joint and several, as  between them, the liability shall be 85% on the part the  licensee and 15% on the part of DVB.

(v) CA No. 6748 of 2004 is allowed in part and the  judgment of the High Court is modified as under:  

(a) The compensation awarded by the High Court in  the case of death is reduced from Rs.18 lacs to  Rs.10 lacs (in the case of those aged more than 20  years) and Rs.15 lacs to Rs.7.5 lacs (in the case of  those aged 20 years and less).  The said sum is  payable to legal representatives of the deceased  

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to be determined by a brief and summary enquiry  by the Registrar General (or nominee of learned  Chief Justice/Acting Chief Justice of the Delhi High  Court).

(b) The compensation of Rs. One lakh awarded by the  High Court in the case of each of the 103 injured  persons is affirmed.

(c) The interest  awarded from the  date  of  the  writ  petition on the aforesaid sums at the rate of 9%  per annum is affirmed.

(d) If the legal representatives of any deceased victim  are not satisfied with the compensation awarded,  they  are  permitted  to  file  an  application  for  compensation with supporting documentary proof  (to  show  the  age  and  the  income),  before  the  Registrar  General,  Delhi  High Court.   If  such an  application if filed within three months, it shall not  be rejected on the ground of delay.  The Registrar  General or such other Member of Higher Judiciary  nominated  by  the  learned  Chief  Justice/Acting  Chief Justice of the High Court shall decide those  applications in accordance with paras above and  place the matter before the Division Bench of the  Delhi High Court for consequential  formal orders  determining  the  final  compensation  payable  to  them.”

25. In the said case, Radhakrishnan, J., in his concurring opinion,  

after  referring  to  earlier  decisions  of  this  Court,  especially  the  

pronouncements in Nilabati Behera (supra) and Union of India  

v. Prabhakaran12, came to hold as follows: -

12 (2008) 9 SCC 527

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“Right  to  life  guaranteed  under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution of India is the most sacred right preserved  and protected under the Constitution, violation of which  is  always  actionable  and  there  is  no  necessity  of  statutory  provision  as  such  for  preserving  that  right.  Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be read  into all public safety statutes, since the prime object of  public safety legislation is to protect the individual and  to compensate him for the loss suffered.  Duty of care  expected from State or  its  officials  functioning under  the  public  safety  legislation  is,  therefore,  very  high,  compared  to  the  statutory  powers  and  supervision  expected from officers functioning under the statutes  like  Companies  Act,  Co-operative  Societies  Act  and  such similar legislations.  When we look at the various  provisions of  the Cinematographic Act,  1952 and the  Rules made thereunder, the Delhi Building Regulations  and Electricity Laws the duty of care on officials was  high and liabilities strict.”

xxx xxx xxx

Legal liability in damages exist solely as a remedy  out of private law action in tort which is generally time  consuming  and  expensive  and  hence  when  fundamental  rights  are  violated  claimants  prefer  to  approach  constitutional  courts  for  speedy  remedy.  Constitutional  courts,  of  course,  shall  invoke  its  jurisdiction only  in  extraordinary  circumstances when  serious  injury  has  been  caused  due  to  violation  of  fundamental  rights especially  under Article 21 of  the  Constitution of India.  In such circumstances the Court  can invoke its own methods depending upon the facts  and circumstances of each case.”

26. Relying on the said decision, Mr. Bhatia has placed emphasis  

on the facet of apportionment.  We have also been commended  

to the decision in DAV Managing Committee and another v.  

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Dabwali  Fire  Tragedy  Victims  Association  and  others13  

wherein the Court took note of the fact that the High Court had  

modified  the  percentage  of  the  compensation  as  fixed  by  the  

Inquiry Commission and appreciating the factual  score held as  

follows:

“It is not possible for this Court to apportion the liability  of  compensation  between  the  appellants  and  Respondent  8,  particularly  in  the  absence  of  the  material evidence on record either before the Inquiry  Commission or before the High Court and particularly  having  regard  to  the  fact  that  what  is  stated  that  economic  capacity  of  the  partners  of  Rajiv  Marriage  Palace. In the absence of such findings it is not proper  for  this  Court  to  frustrate  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  which  is  based  on  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  report  submitted by a retired Judge of  the Allahabad  High Court and further on behalf of Respondent 8 it is  stated  that  out  of  six  family  members,  two persons,  namely,  Kewal  Krishan  and  Chander  Bhan  died  on  account of  the burn injuries in  the said function and  further the land where Rajiv Marriage Palace was built  up has been taken over by the district authorities and  the  same  has  been  converted  into  “Shahid  Smarak  Park” and what is the other properties left out of the  partners of Rajiv Marriage Palace and the evidence is  not forthcoming in this Court or before the High Court  or in these proceedings. In this way, in the absence of  the same it is not possible for this Court to apportion  the  liability  of  compensation  and  confine  the  same  upon the appellants and Respondent 8 out of 55% of  the liability of compensation confined and holding both  the  appellants  and  Respondent  8  responsible  jointly  and severally.”

13 (2013) 10 SCC 494

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27. We have referred to aforesaid authorities as Mr. Bhatia has  

impressed upon us for apportionment at this stage.  The principle  

of apportionment can be thought of only after the Commission’s  

report  is  received,  but,  a  pregnant  one,  the  victims  and  the  

families cannot be left on the lurch.  As we find, there has been  

statutory violations and negligence on the part of the authorities  

in not taking due care while granting permission and during the  

exhibition  was  in  progress,  we  intend  to  direct  payment  of  

compensation, by way of interim measure, by the State.  Regard  

being had to the facts and circumstances of the case and taking  

note of the fact that some amount has already been given, we  

direct, as an interim measure, that the legal representatives of  

the deceased shall  be paid  Rs.5 lakhs more and the  seriously  

injured persons would be paid a further sum of Rs.2 lakhs each  

and the persons who have suffered minor injuries would be paid  

an  additional  sum  of  Rs.75,000/-.   The  said  amount  shall  be  

deposited before the District  Judge,  Meerut  within  two months  

hence.  The learned District Judge may nominate an Additional  

District Judge, who, on making summary enquiry, shall  pay the  

amount to the legal representatives and the victims.  Be it noted,  

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as  asseverated  by  the  State,  the  legal  representatives  of  the  

deceased  have  been  paid  certain  ex  gratia  amount  and  the  

injured persons have been paid certain amount ex gratia, their  

identity  is  known  and,  therefore,  the  Additional  District  Judge  

shall  conduct  a summery enquiry only for  proper  identification  

and disburse the amount.  The Collector, Meerut shall produce all  

the documents for facilitating the summary enquiry at the earliest  

so that the victims should not suffer and for the said purpose we  

grant  four  weeks’  time  to  the  Collector,  Meerut.   The  

disbursement shall be made within one month from the date of  

deposit.

28. We are absolutely conscious about the fixation of liability,  

the quantification and their apportionment as has been held in  

Uphaar  Tragedy and  Dabwali  Fire  Tragedy cases.   Our  

direction to the State Government, at present, is only to see that  

the victims do not remain in a constant state of suffering and  

despair.   We have taken note of  the submission of  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan  and  observed  hereinbefore  that  we  will  address  the  

issue of maintainability of the writ petition after submission of the  

report.  Needless to say, in any event the issue of apportionment  

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is kept open.  But the organizers cannot be allowed to remain as  

total  strangers  in  this  regard.   In  course  of  hearing  we  had  

observed  that  the  organizers  should  deposit  certain  amount  

before the Registry of this Court and regard being had to the said  

observation we direct the respondents 10 to 12 to deposit a sum  

of Rs.30 lakhs before the Registry of this Court within a period of  

two months.  The said amount shall be kept in a fixed deposit on  

an interest bearing account.  We repeat at the cost of repetition  

that this arrangement is absolutely interim in nature and without  

prejudice  to  the  contentions  to  be  raised  by  the  learned  

Additional  Advocate  General  for  the  State  and  Mr.  Shanti  

Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the respondent Nos. 10 to  

12.

29. As we have fixed the date i.e. 31.1.2015 for submission of  

the report by the Commission, let the matter be listed on 11th  

February,  2015.   In  case  the  report  is  submitted  earlier,  the  

registry shall list the matter immediately before the Court.

.............................J. [Dipak Misra]

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.............................J. [V. Gopala Gowda]

New Delhi; July 31, 2014.

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