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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos. 94-95 of 2011  

Sanaullah Khan                              …… Appellant

Versus

State of Bihar                                               …..  Respondent

J U D G M E N T

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

This  is  an  appeal  against  the  judgment  dated  

16.12.2009 of the Patna High Court in Death Reference  

Case No. 1 of 2007 and Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 379 of  

2007.  

FACTS:

2. The  facts  very  briefly  are  that  a  fardbeyan was  

lodged on  17.12.2002  by  one Sanju  Kumar  (hereinafter  

referred to as Informant), resident of Village Mathura, P.S.

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Bidupur, District Vaishali.  In the fardbeyan, it was stated:  

Father  of  the  informant,  namely  Ravindra  Prasad,  was  

running a tea stall near the Eastern gate of the GPO.  For  

the tea stall he required about 25 Litres of milk everyday  

and this milk was being supplied by Sanaullah Khan, the  

appellant  herein,  for  about  a  month.   Sanaullah  Khan  

started mixing water with the milk and the customers of  

the tea stall started making complaints about the quality  

of tea.  On 02.12.2002 at about 2.00 p.m. Sanaullah Khan  

along with Md. Hamid and Arvind came to the tea stall and  

demanded  the  dues  for  the  supply  of  milk.   After  

calculation it  was found that the dues amounted to Rs.  

1,000/-  and  Ravindra  Prasad  gave  Sanauallah  Khan  Rs.  

500/- and told him that the rest of the amount will be paid  

later.  Ravindra Prasad, however, informed Sanaullah Khan  

that the milk supplied by him was not up to the mark and  

therefore he will no longer purchase milk from his Khatal.  

Sanaullah Khan got annoyed and told him that he will not  

allow him to run the tea stall.  Ravindra Prasad retorted  

that he had seen many persons like him at his tea stall.  

Sanaullah  Khan  said  that  he  will  have  to  face  serious  

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consequences and that he will teach him a lesson within  

two to four days.  Thereafter, Sanaullah Khan, Hamid and  

Arvind  went  away.   On  16.12.2002  at  about  8.00  p.m.  

Arvind, who was working with Sanaullah Khan came and  

told Ravindra Prasad that his master was calling him for  

some urgent work and Ravindra Prasad went along with  

Arvind and did not return for an hour.  Arvind again came  

and told  his  brother  Sunny Kumar,  who was in  the  tea  

stall,  that his master was calling him and that Ravindra  

Prasad was in the Khatal.  Sunny Kumar also accompanied  

Arvind.  Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar, however, did  

not return till  the next morning.  The Informant became  

suspicious  and  started  searching  for  his  father  and  his  

brother.  He went to the Khatal of the appellant, but found  

it to be closed.  He suspected that the appellant, Hamid  

and Arvind had kidnapped his father and younger brother.  

3. The fardbeyan given by the Informant was registered  

as  FIR No.451 of 2002 at Kotwali, P.S. for the offence of  

kidnapping under Section 364 read with Section 34 of the  

Indian  Penal  Code,  1860,  (for  short  ‘the  IPC’).  When  

investigation was done by the police, three dead bodies  

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were found concealed in husk in a room on the eastern  

verandah  of  Pearl  Cinema  and  the  dead  bodies  were  

seized and a seizure list was prepared in which Parimal  

Kumar and Baleshwar Ram signed as witnesses.  Two of  

the dead bodies were identified by the informant as those  

of Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar.  Inquest reports and  

postmortem reports  of  the  dead bodies  were  prepared.  

Later the third body was identified to be that of Arvind by  

Ramanand  Ram,  father  of  Arvind.   The  appellant  was  

arrested and pursuant to the confession of the appellant,  

the  shoes,  sandal  and  gamchha  of  the  three  deceased  

persons,  a  rope,  a  small  plastic  bag  and  a  knife  were  

recovered  from  the  garbage  situated  in  north-east  of  

Khatal and were seized and Parimal Kumar and Baleshwar  

Ram signed the seizure list.  Offences under Sections 302,  

120B and 201 IPC were added and a charge-sheet was  

filed against the appellant and Hamid and the case was  

committed to the Court of Sessions.   

4. At  the  trial,  altogether  eight  witnesses  were  

examined.    The  Trial  Court  held  that  the  chain  of  

circumstances  is  complete  and  does  not  leave  any  

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reasonable  ground  for  conclusion  consistent  with  the  

innocence of the appellant and it goes to show that in all  

human  probabilities,  the  offences  must  have  been  

committed  by  the  appellant.   The  trial  court,  however,  

acquitted  Hamid  of  the  charges.   After  hearing  on  the  

question of sentence, the trial court took the view that the  

appellant should be hanged by the neck till death as he  

had  killed  three  helpless  persons  brutally  after  

premeditation and if he is allowed to continue to live in the  

present society, he will be a threat to his co-human beings  

and this was one of those rarest of rare cases in which the  

appellant deserves the capital punishment of death.  The  

trial court accordingly referred the sentence of death to  

the High Court.   

5. The appellant also filed a criminal appeal against the  

judgment of the trial court.  On 03.07.2006, the High Court  

directed recording of additional evidence on two points in  

exercise of its powers under Section 391 of the Criminal  

Procedure Code, 1973 (for short ‘the Cr.P.C.’).  Pursuant to  

the direction of the High Court the confessional statement  

of  the  appellant  was marked as  an exhibit  through the  

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investigating  officer  (PW-8)  after  his  recall  by  the  trial  

court and the knife which was seized and listed as item 10  

in  the  seizure  list  was  also  marked  as  an  exhibit.  

Thereafter, the High Court heard the appeal and held that  

the prosecution has been able to bring home the guilt of  

the appellant with regard to the murder of the 3 deceased  

persons by exhibiting four circumstances and these are (i)  

that  the  appellant  was  selling  milk  to  the  deceased  

Ravindra Prasad and Ravindra Prasad stopped buying the  

milk (ii) the appellant summoned the deceased Ravindra  

Prasad and deceased Sunny Kumar through the deceased  

Arvind who was working with the appellant (iii) the dead  

bodies  of  the  three  deceased  persons  were  recovered  

from the  room belonging  to  the  appellant  and  (iv)  the  

weapons used in the murder of three deceased persons  

were  recovered  pursuant  to  the  confession  of  the  

appellant.   The  High  Court  also  confirmed  the  death  

sentence of the appellant saying that the tests laid down  

by this Court in Macchhi Singh vs. State of Punjab [(1983)  

3 SCC 470] regarding the cases in which death penalty  

should  be  imposed  were  present  in  the  facts  and  

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circumstances  of  the  present  case.   Aggrieved  by  the  

judgment of the High Court,  the appellant has filed this  

appeal.

CONTENTIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE  PARTIES:

6. Mr.  Amarendra  Sharan,  learned  senior  counsel  

appearing for the appellant, submitted that there is no eye  

witness to the murder of the three deceased persons and  

the  finding  of  the  High  Court  that  the  prosecution  has  

been able to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond  

reasonable  doubt  are  based  on  4  circumstances  is  not  

correct.  

7. Mr.  Sharan  relied  on  the  evidence  of  PW-3  to  the  

effect that Arvind had a dairy (khatal) at Old Bakri Bazar  

and also on the evidence of PW-4 that the appellant never  

had  any  business  of  milk  but  had  a  business  of  bakri  

(goat).   He submitted that  the first  circumstance which  

was  the  motive  for  the  appellant  to  kill  the  deceased  

Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar is itself not established  

in this case.

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8. Mr.  Sharan  submitted  that  there  is  absolutely  no  

evidence to  establish  the second circumstance that  the  

appellant  summoned  the  deceased  persons  Ravindra  

Prasad  and  Sunny  Kumar.   He  submitted  that  the  trial  

court and the High Court has relied on the evidence of PW-

6  to  hold  that  the  appellant  summoned  the  deceased  

persons  Ravindra  Prasad and Sunny Kumar  through his  

servant Arvind but PW-6 was not present at the tea stall.  

He submitted that the evidence of PW-7 would show that  

PW-6  was  in  the  house  of  PW-7  on  16.12.2002  and  

remained there till  the morning of 17.12.2002 and thus  

PW-6 was not present at the tea stall on 16.12.2002 when  

Arvind is alleged to have told Ravindra Prasad and Sunny  

Kumar that they have been summoned by the appellant.

9. Mr.  Sharan  next  submitted  that  the  third  

circumstance that dead bodies were recovered from the  

room belonging to the appellant is also not proved in as  

much  as  PW-7  has  said  in  his  evidence  that  the  dead  

bodies were in fact recovered in front of the Pearl Cinema.  

He  submitted  that  the  two seizure  witnesses  PW-1 and  

PW-2 have clearly said that recovery of the dead bodies  

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and the weapon with which the offence was committed  

and other incriminating materials were not made in their  

presence.  He argued that Rajender Tiwari, the officer who  

made the  recoveries  has  also  not  been  examined.   He  

submitted that the recoveries were made from the pile of  

the garbage and not from the drain by the side of Sona  

Medical  Hall  as  is  alleged  to  have  been  stated  by  the  

appellant in his confession.  He submitted that, therefore,  

the fourth circumstance that the incriminating materials  

were  recovered  pursuant  to  the  confession  of  the  

appellant is also not established.  

10.  Mr. Sharan relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs.  

State  of  Maharashtra [(1984)  4  SCC 116]  in  which  this  

Court has laid down the tests to be satisfied before the  

court  convicts  an  accused  on  the  basis  of  only  

circumstantial evidence.  He argued that in this case these  

tests are not satisfied and therefore the conviction of the  

appellant  by  the  trial  court  as  maintained  by  the  High  

Court should be set aside.  He also cited the decision of  

this  Court  in  Javed  Masood  and  Another vs.  State  of  

Rajasthan [(2010) 3 SCC 538] to argue that the evidence  

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of prosecution witnesses was binding on the prosecution.  

He submitted that  the evidence of  PW3,  PW4 and PW7  

relied upon by the appellant to establish his innocence,  

therefore, is binding on the prosecution.  

11.  Mr.  Samir Ali  Khan,  learned counsel  appearing for  

the State, on the other hand, submitted that the evidence  

of  PW-6  is  consistent  and  if  the  evidence  of  PW-6  is  

considered  along  with  the  recovery  of  the  dead  bodies  

from the room belonging to the appellant as well as the  

recovery of the weapons and other incriminating materials  

pursuant to the confessional  statement of  the appellant  

marked Ex.1, the Court will arrive at the only conclusion  

that it is the appellant who has committed the murder of  

three deceased persons.  He submitted that though the  

appellant  retracted  his  confession  before  the  trial  court  

when his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. was  

recorded,  the  appellant  has  not  led  any  evidence  to  

establish his innocence.  He submitted that the trial court  

and the High Court, therefore, have rightly held that the  

prosecution  has  been  able  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  

appellant beyond reasonable doubt.  

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FINDINGS OF THE COURT:

12. The evidence of PW-6 on which both the trial court  

and  the  High  Court  have  relied  on  is  clear  that  on  

16.12.2002 at about 8.00 p.m. when he was present at the  

tea stall, Arvind, servant of the appellant came and called  

Ravindra Prasad saying that the appellant wanted to talk  

to him on certain issues and that Ravindra Prasad left with  

Arvind.  PW-6 has also stated in his evidence that after  

about  an  hour  Arvind  came  again  and  told  that  the  

appellant was calling Sunny also and Sunny went along  

with Arvind and thereafter PW-6 closed the shop and went  

to his house.  No suggestion has also been made to PW-6  

in his cross-examination by the defence that PW-6 was not  

present  at  the  tea  stall  on  16.12.2002.   Mr.  Sharan,  

however, referred to the evidence of PW-7 that PW-6 has  

come to his house on 16.12.2002 and stayed at his house  

at Patna itself in the night and left in the morning but PW-

7 has not  stated the time when PW-6 had come to his  

house on 16.12.2002.  Hence, the evidence of PW-7 does  

not contradict the evidence of PW-6 that he was at the tea  

stall  at  8.00  p.m.  on  16.12.2002  when  Arvind  told  

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Ravindra Prasad and Sunny Kumar that they were being  

called by the appellant.

13. There is also evidence to show that the dead bodies  

of  Ravindra  Prasad,  Sunny  Kumar  and  Arvind  were  

recovered from the Khatal of the appellant.  Though, the  

seizure witnesses PW-1 and PW-2 stated that nothing was  

seized in their presence, PW-6 has stated that when the  

Khatal (cattle shed) of the appellant was opened, he saw  

some splashes of blood  and the dead bodies were found  

in another room and these dead bodies were of Ravindra  

Prasad, Sunny Kumar and Arvind.  He has also stated that  

the  inquest  reports  of  all  the  three  dead  bodies  were  

prepared at the place of occurrence itself and he put his  

signature on it  and all  the three signatures are his and  

these have been marked as Ex.1/5, 1/6 and 1/7.  In cross  

examination  by  the  defence,  PW-6  has  denied  the  

suggestion that the dead bodies had not been recovered  

in  his  presence  and  that  the  inquest  reports  were  not  

prepared  in  his  presence  and  that  he  had  not  put  his  

signatures on the inquest reports.   

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14. Mr. Sharan relied on the evidence of PW-7 to submit  

that the three dead bodies were not recovered from the  

Khatal but we find that PW-7 has also stated that the three  

dead  bodies  were  recovered  from  the  room  of  Pearl  

Cinema where the Khatals of the appellant were situated.  

PW-7  has,  however,  admitted  in  cross-examination  on  

behalf of the defence that he had not seen with his own  

eyes  as  to  from  which  place  the  dead  bodies  were  

recovered.  Thus the evidence of PW-7 may not establish  

the place from which the dead bodies were recovered but  

the evidence of PW-6 clearly proves that the bodies were  

recovered from a room in the verandah of Pearl Cinema,  

which  was  in  occupation  of  the  appellant  and  this  

evidence  of  PW-6  has  not  been  contradicted  by  the  

evidence of PW-7.   

15. PW-8, the I.O. who inspected the place of occurrence  

has stated in his deposition that Pearl Cinema is situated  

to the east of the tea stall in Budh Marg and was closed  

for a long period and there is a verandah to the east of the  

cinema hall  which  is  divided  into  many  rooms  and  the  

rooms  situated  to  the  north  is  in  possession  of  the  

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appellant.  He has further stated in his evidence that in  

the western portion of the floor of this room, blood was  

found in huge quantity which had already clotted and the  

stains of blood were found on the western wall also.  PW-8  

has further stated that to the north of this room and near  

the door there is a vacant place which is fitted with the  

grill  gate and to the north of this place there is another  

room in which there is heap of straw and the three dead  

bodies were found concealed in  this  very  heap of  husk  

which were recovered and the husk was found sticking to  

the injuries on the dead bodies of the deceased persons.  

PW-8 has further stated that the three dead bodies were  

recovered from the place of occurrence itself.  He has also  

stated that Rajender Tiwari, the SI of Police prepared the  

inquest reports of all the three dead bodies and he put his  

signatures  on  all  the  three  inquest  reports  which  have  

been marked as Ex.5, 5/1 and 5/2 respectively.

16. PW-8 has also stated in his evidence that in course of  

investigation, after the appellant had surrendered in court,  

he  took  him  on  police  remand  and  in  course  of  

investigation  he  gave  his  confessional  statement,  and  

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pursuant to information the appellant divulged, he seized  

two pair  of  blood stained plastic shoes,  a blood stained  

white  gamcha  (towel  of  Indian  type),  a  blood  stained  

chequerred  gamcha,  a  plastic  rope  of  green  colour,  a  

blood stained piece of plastic, a blood stained old sack, a  

small  sack of blood, a blood stained green small  plastic  

sack, a blood stained small container made of plastic, a  

knife of 16 inches used for slaughtering goat.  PW-8 has  

also stated that a seizure list of all  these articles which  

were recovered were prepared by Rajender Tiwari and he  

had identified the writing and signature of Rajender Tiwari  

and the seizure list is marked as Ex.6/1.  Section 27 of the  

Indian Evidence Act,  1872, states that when any fact is  

deposed to as discovered in consequence of information  

received  from a  person  accused  of  any  offence,  in  the  

custody of a police officer, so much of such information,  

whether  it  amounts  to  a  confession  or  not,  as  relates  

distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.  

Hence,  the  information  received  from  the  appellant  

pursuant  to  which  the  aforesaid  incriminating  materials  

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were recovered is not only admissible but also has been  

proved.

17. Thus, three circumstances have been established by  

the prosecution.  The first circumstance established by the  

prosecution  is  that  Arvind  came  to  the  tea  stall  on  

16.12.2002 at about 8.00 p.m. and told Ravindra Prasad  

that he was being called by the appellant and Ravindra  

Prasad  went  with  Arvind  and  within  an  hour  thereafter  

Arvind again came to the tea stall and told Sunny Kumar  

that  he  was  being  called  by  the  appellant  and  Sunny  

Kumar went along with Arvind.  The second circumstance  

that has been established by the prosecution is that on  

17.12.2002  the  dead  bodies  of  Ravindra  Prasad,  Sunny  

Kumar  and  Arvind  were  recovered  from  a  room  in  

occupation  of  the  appellant  in  the  verandah  of  Pearl  

Cinema.  The  third  circumstance  which  has  been  

established  by  the  prosecution  is  that  pursuant  to  the  

information  divulged  by  the  appellant  the  incriminating  

materials were recovered by the I.O.  These three chain of  

circumstances establish beyond reasonable doubt that it  

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was the appellant who had eliminated the three deceased  

persons.

18.   In  Sharad  Birdhichand  Sarda vs.  State  of  

Maharashtra (supra), cited by Mr. Sharan, the following 5  

golden principles were laid down for a proof of guilt on the  

basis of circumstantial evidence (i) the circumstance from  

which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be  

fully  established;  (ii)  the  facts  so  established should  be  

consistent  only  with  the  hypothesis  of  the  guilt  of  the  

accused; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive  

nature  and  tendency;  (iv)  they  should  exclude  every  

possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (v)  

there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to  

leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent  

with the innocence of the accused and must show that in  

all human probability the act must have been done by the  

accused.   Considering the chain  of  three circumstances  

which have been fully established by the prosecution, the  

5 golden principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda  

vs. State of Maharashtra (supra) apply in this case and the  

only hypothesis that we can conclude from the chain of  

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three circumstances  is  that  it  is  the appellant  who has  

committed the murder of the three deceased persons.

19. In  Javed Masood and Another vs.  State of Rajasthan  

(supra) cited by Mr. Sharan, this Court relying on its earlier  

decision in Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari vs. State [(2005) 5 SCC  

258] has held that it was open to the defence to rely on  

the evidence led by the prosecution.  In this case, we have  

found that the evidence of PW-7 does not contradict the  

evidence of PW-6 and does not support the defence.  It,  

however, appears from the evidence of PW-3 that it was  

Arvind who had a Khatal  at  Old Bakri  Bazar.   We have  

perused the evidence of PW-3 and we do not find that PW-

3 has stated that the appellant did not have a Khatal on  

the verandah of the Pearl Cinema.  Of course, PW4 has  

stated that  the  appellant  runs  business  of  bakri  (sheep  

goat) and never ran milk business but in the evidence of  

PW-4  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  room  on  the  

verandah of Pearl Cinema was not in the occupation of the  

appellant.  At best the defence can rely on PW-4 to argue  

that  the  appellant  did  not  carry  on  milk  business  and  

therefore the motive for committing the offence did not  

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exist.  The evidence of PW4 may thus create some doubt  

with regard to the motive of the appellant to kill Ravindra  

Prasad  and  Sunny  Kumar.   Where  other  circumstances  

lead  to  the  only  hypothesis  that  the  accused  has  

committed  the  offence,  the  Court  cannot  acquit  the  

accused  of  the  offence  merely  because  the  motive  for  

committing the offence has not been established in the  

case.  In Ujjagar Singh v. State of Punjab [(2007) 13 SCC  

90, this Court has held:

“It  is  true that  in  a case relating to  circumstantial  evidence  motive  does  assume great importance but to say  that  the  absence  of  motive  would  dislodge the entire prosecution story  is  perhaps giving  this  one factor  an  importance which is not due and (to  use  the  cliche)  the  motive  is  in  the  mind of the accused and can seldom  be  fathomed  with  any  degree  of  accuracy”.

SENTENCE:

20.   On the  question of  sentence,  the  trial  court  has  

recorded special reasons under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C. for  

awarding death sentence to the appellant.  The trial court  

has held that the appellant has killed Ravindra Prasad and  

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Sunny  Kumar  on  an  issue  of  petty  amount  and  the  

appellant has also not spared his servant, Arvind.  The trial  

court has also found from the post mortem reports of the  

three  deceased  persons  that  they  have  been  brutally  

murdered after premeditation.  The trial court has further  

held that if the appellant is allowed to continue to live in  

society, he will be a great threat to his co-human beings.  

For  the aforesaid  reasons,  the trial  court  took the view  

that the appellant should be awarded the death sentence.  

21.   While  confirming  the  death  sentence,  the  High  

Court has held in the impugned judgment that the present  

case clearly falls under the yardstick laid down in Machhi  

Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab [AIR 1983 SC 957].  The  

reasons, which weighed with the High Court in confirming  

the death sentence, are that the appellant did not hesitate  

to  take  away  three  lives  for  petty  monetary  gain;  the  

tender  age  of  Sunny  was  of  no  concern  to  him;  either  

Ravindra or Sunny had to undergo the trauma of watching  

the father or the son being killed first in front of the other  

and their hands and feet were tied and a butchering knife  

was used to cause multiple murders and the nature of the  

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assault  upon  the  deceased  Arvind  to  do  away  with  all  

evidence whatsoever was dastardly.

22.   We have, however, noticed that the motive for the  

appellant to commit the murder of three persons has not  

been established in this case.  Hence, one of the reasons  

given  by  the  trial  court  and  the  High  Court  that  the  

murders were committed for petty monetary gain is not  

substantiated by evidence.  We have also found that there  

is  no  eyewitness  to  the  manner  in  which  the  appellant  

committed the murder of three persons and the culpability  

of the appellant has been established only by a chain of  

three circumstances established by the prosecution.  The  

finding of the High Court, therefore, that either Ravindra  

or  Sunny  had  to  undergo  the  trauma  of  watching  the  

father or the son being killed first in front of the other is a  

pure surmise.  Similarly, the finding of the High Court that  

the hands and feet were tied and a butchering knife was  

used to cause multiple murders is an inference drawn by  

the High Court from the post mortem report.  What exactly  

happened leading to the murder of three persons by the  

appellant is not known, but what appears from the  post  

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mortem reports is that the three deceased persons were  

brutally killed by the appellant.  It has, however, been held  

by this Court in Subhash Ramkumar Bind @ Vakil & Anr. v.   

State  of  Maharashtra [AIR  2003  SC  269]  that  brutality  

would  be  a  relevant  factor  but  how the same did  take  

place  is  also  a  relevant  and  necessary  material  to  be  

considered  while  deciding  whether  to  award  life  

imprisonment  or  death  for  the  offence  of  murder.  

Moreover, in Panchhi & Ors. v. State of U.P. [AIR 1998 SC  

2726] a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held:

“Brutality of the manner in which a murder  was perpetrated may be a ground but not the  sole criterion for judging whether the case is  one of the “rarest of rare cases” as indicated  in,  Bachan Singh’s case, (AIR 1980 SC 898),  in  a  way  every  murder  is  brutal,  and  the  difference between one from the other may  be on account  of  mitigating or  aggravating  features surrounding the murder.”

23.     The  trial  court,  however,  has  held  that  as  the  

appellant  has  eliminated  the  three  deceased,  if  the  

appellant is allowed to continue to live in society, he will  

be a great threat to his co-human beings.  This reason for  

awarding  the extreme penalty  of  death is  based on an  

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apprehension  and  may  not  be  enough  to  impose  the  

extreme  penalty  of  death.   As  has  been  held  by  the  

majority of four Judges in Bachan Singh’s case (supra), the  

extreme penalty of death can be inflicted only in gravest  

cases of extreme culpability and in making choice of the  

sentence, in addition to the circumstances of the offence,  

due  regard  must  be  paid  to  the  circumstances  of  the  

offender  also.   In  the  present  case,  we  do  not  find  

evidence  to  establish  the  gravest  case  of  extreme  

culpability  of  the  appellant  and  we  do  not  also  have  

evidence to establish the circumstances of the appellant.  

24.   We have, however, sufficient evidence to establish  

the  culpability  of  the  appellant  for  three  offences  of  

murder as defined in Section 300, IPC, and for each of the  

three  offences  of  murder,  the  appellant  is  liable  under  

Section  302,  IPC  for  imprisonment  for  life  if  not  the  

extreme penalty of  death.   Section 31(1)  of  the Cr.P.C.  

provides that when a person is convicted at one trial of  

two  or  more  offences,  the  Court  may,  subject  to  the  

provisions  of  Section  71  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code,  

sentence  him  for  such  offences,  to  the  several  

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punishments  prescribed  therefor  which  such  Court  is  

competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of  

imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of  

the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the  

Court  directs  that  such  punishments  shall  run  

concurrently.   Thus,  Section  31(1)  of  the  Cr.  P.C.  

empowers the Court to inflict sentences of imprisonment  

for more than one offence to run either consecutively or  

concurrently.   In  Kamalanantha & Ors. vs.  State of T.N.  

[(2005)  5  SCC 194],  this  Court  has  held  that  the  term  

“imprisonment” in Section 31 of the Cr. P.C. includes the  

sentence for imprisonment for life.  Considering the facts  

of this case, we are of the opinion that the appellant is  

liable under Section 302, IPC for imprisonment for life for  

each of three offences of murder under Section 300, IPC  

and the imprisonments for life should not run concurrently  

but  consecutively  and  such  punishment  of  consecutive  

sentence of imprisonment for the triple murder committed  

by the appellant will serve the interest of justice.    

25.   In  the  result,  we  maintain  the  conviction  of  the  

appellant for three offences of murder under section 302,  

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IPC, but convert the sentence from death to sentence for  

rigorous  imprisonment  for  life  for  each  of  the  three  

offences  of  murder  and  direct  that  the  sentences  of  

imprisonment  for  life  for  the  three  offences  will  run  

consecutively and not concurrently.  Thus, the appeals are  

allowed only on the question of sentence, and dismissed  

as regards conviction.  

.……………………….J.                                                            (A. K. Patnaik)

………………………..J.                                                            (Madan B. Lokur) New Delhi, February 15, 2013.    

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