REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   846    OF 2011

ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1305 OF 2010

Samittri Devi and another.                  …Appellants              Versus

Sampuran Singh and another                                       …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Gokhale J.

Leave Granted.   

2. This Appeal by Special Leave raises the question as to whether the  

suit of the first appellant for the recovery of her house property filed prior to the  

Benami  Transactions  (Prohibition)  Act,  1988  coming  into  force  could  be  

considered to be prohibited by Section 4 of that Act.

3. This appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order passed by a  

Learned Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 10.9.2009 in Regular  

Second  Appeal  (R.S.A)  No.  1367  of  1996  (O & M),  whereby  the  Judge  has

allowed the Second Appeal filed by  Respondent No. 1 herein, and set aside the  

judgment and order dated 22.2.1996 passed by the Additional District Judge,  

Gurdaspur in Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1991 filed by  appellant No.1 herein.  The  

Learned Additional District Judge had allowed the Civil Appeal filed by  appellant  

No. 1 herein whereby he decreed Civil Suit No. 138 of 1987 filed by  appellant  

No.1,  which  suit  had  been dismissed  by  the  Sub-Judge  at  Pathankot  by  his  

judgment and order dated 3.10.1991.

4. Short facts leading to this appeal are as follows:-

The appellant No.1 herein purchased a house property situated at  

Pathankot from Sarvashri Romesh Chand and Chatar Chand sons of Shri Kartar  

Singh,  vide  registered  sale  deed  dated  26.2.1985  for  a  consideration  of   

Rs. 40,000/-.  This sale deed was, however, executed in the name of her son  

namely Shri Kamal Chand (the appellant No.2 herein) and his brother-in-law   

Shri Jiwan Kumar (respondent No.2 herein).  The appellant no.1 paid the money  

by two bank drafts for purchasing the house property which was actually in the  

possession of a tenant of the previous owner i.e. Home Guard Department and it  

continues to be in their possession.

5. It is the case of the appellant No.1 that taking advantage of her old  

age (presently 93 years),  the above referred Kamal  Chand and Jiwan Kumar  

stealthily removed the sale deed from her possession, and this Jiwan Kumar sold  

half share of the suit house to one Sampuran Singh (Respondent No. 1 herein)  

2

and that too without her knowledge and consent.  The sale was executed by a  

registered sale deed dated 13.4.1987 despite the fact that  appellant No.1 had  

sent, in the meanwhile,  a letter dated 8.4.1987 to  Respondent No. 1 herein  

informing him that she was the real owner of the Suit House.

6. The  appellant  No.  1  therefore,  filed  Suit  No.  138  of  1987  on  

30.9.1987 for a declaration that she was the real owner in possession of the Suit  

House shown in red in the site plan attached by letters A B C D part of No.  

Khasra 574/1, No. Khawat 262,  No. Khatauni 401, as entered in the Jamabandi  

for the year 1976-77 situated in village Daulatpur HB No. 331, Pathankot.  She  

prayed  for  a  permanent  injunction  also  restraining  the  defendants  from  

alienating any part of the suit house and forcibly interfering with the possession  

of the plaintiff of the suit house.  By moving an amendment, she claimed an  

alternative  relief  for  a  decree of  Rs.  40,000/-  with  interest.   Her  son Kamal  

Chand was joined as  defendant No.  1,  his  brother-in-law the above referred  

Jiwan  Kumar  as  defendant  No.  2,  and  the  purchaser  Sampuran  Singh  as  

defendant No. 3.  They are appellant No.2, respondent No.2 and respondent No.  

1 respectively to this appeal.

7. Defendant No. 1 admitted the entire claim of the appellant, but the  

defendant No. 2 disputed it, and contended that half of the consideration of Rs.  

40,000/- had been paid by him.  He denied that it was a Benami Transaction.  

Defendant No. 3 filed his written statement and contended in para 5 thereof that  

even if it is proved to be a Benami Transaction, due to the recent legislation of  

3

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988, the defendants Nos. 1 & 2 were the  

owners of the Suit property, and that the alienation of his share in the property  

by defendant No. 2 in his favour had been effected legally.  He contended that  

he  had  purchased  the  share  of  the  defendant  No.  2  by  sale  deed  dated  

13.4.1987  for  a  consideration  of  Rs.  30,000/-,  and  that  he  was  a  bonafide  

purchaser for value, and that the Suit should be dismissed.

8. The trial court framed the necessary issues including whether the  

sale  deed  dated  26.2.1985  was  Benami,  and  whether  the  sale  deed  dated  

13.4.1987  was  illegal,  and  also  whether  defendant  No.  3  was  a  bonafide  

purchaser without notice.

9. The appellant No. 1 laid the evidence amongst others of a clerk  

from a branch of State Bank of Patiala at Chaki, Pathankot, who deposed to the  

fact that the appellant had made the payment for the sale consideration from her  

account.  Defendant No. 2 had contended that he had arranged Rs. 20,000/-  

from friendly loans to purchase half the share of the Suit House, but he did not  

lead any evidence for proving the availability of such funds with him.  The Trial  

Court therefore, held that it was obvious that the payment was not made by  

defendant nos. 1 & 2, but by the plaintiff i.e. the appellant No.1 herein.

10. The appellant No.1 had produced before the trial court a copy of  

the notice dated 8.4.1987 which she had sent to defendant no. 3, to point out to  

him that she was the real owner of the suit house.  She produced the same  

4

alongwith the certificate of posting.  The sale deed between defendant Nos. 2 &  

3 was executed on 13.4.1987.  The trial court held that the delivery of the notice  

was not proved, and therefore, defendant No. 3 was a bonafide purchaser for  

valuable consideration without notice.  That apart, at the time when the Suit was  

decided on 3.10.1991, the law laid down by this Court in Mithilesh Kumari and  

Anr. Vs. Prem Behari Khare [AIR 1987 SC 1247] : [1989 (2) SCC 95]  

was  governing  the  field  viz.  that  the  provisions  of  Benami  Transactions  

(Prohibition) Act 1988 were retroactive.  It had been held that the prohibition  

under Section 4 of the Act to recover the Benami property was applicable to  

suits, claims or action pending on the date of commencement of the Act.  The  

appellant  No.1  had  filed  her  suit  on  30.9.1987.   The  Benami  Transactions  

(Prohibition) Act 1988 came into force on 5.9.1988.  Thus, this Suit was pending  

on  the  date  on  which  the  Act  came into  force.   The  Trial  Court,  therefore,  

followed the judgment in Mithilesh Kumari (supra), and held that the appellant  

no longer retained the right to recover the property from the Benami holder.  

The suit was, therefore, dismissed for being barred by virtue of the provisions of  

the said Act, though without any order as to costs.

11. The  appellant  No.1  carried  the  matter  in  first  appeal  to  the  

Additional  District  Judge,  Gurdaspur.   As  we have noted,  the  trial  court  had  

already held that  appellant No. 1 had purchased the suit house by making the  

payment from her account.  It had, however, declined to decree her suit on two  

grounds,  firstly  due  to  the  prohibition  under  Section  4  of  the  Benami  

5

Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988 as interpreted in Mithilesh Kumari judgment  

(supra), and secondly on the ground that the appellant did not prove the service  

of her notice dated 8.4.1987 on  respondent No. 1 herein.  By the time the first  

appeal  was being heard, the judgment of the two Judges bench in Mithilesh  

Kumari (supra) had been over-ruled by a bench of three Judges of this Court in  

R.Rajagopal Reddy Vs. Padmini Chandrasekharan  decided on 31.1.1995  

and  reported in  [AIR 1996 SC 238] : [1995 (2) SCC 630]. This Court had  

held that Section 4 or for that matter the Act as a whole was not a piece of  

declaratory  or  curative  legislation.   It  creates  substantive  rights  in  favour  of  

benamidars  and destroys substantive  rights  in  favour  of  the real  owners.   It  

creates  a  new  offence  of  entering  into  such  benami  transactions.   It  had  

therefore, been held that when a statutory provision creates a new liability and a  

new offence, it would naturally have a prospective operation, and Section 4 will  

not apply to pending suits which were already filed and entertained prior to the  

Act coming into force.  The first appellate Court therefore, held that the suit filed  

by  appellant No.1 was not prohibited by the said Act.  As far as the notice dated  

8.4.1987 is concerned, the Court held that there was a presumption under the  

law that the letter which was proved to have been posted well in advance must  

have reached the addressee.  The first appellate court therefore, held that the  

notice will have to be presumed to have been served, and yet respondent No. 1  

herein got the sale deed executed on 13.4.1987.  It was therefore, held that  

respondent No. 1 could not be held to be a bonafide purchaser without any  

notice of the rights of appellant No.1 in the suit property.   The first appellate  

6

court therefore, decreed the suit filed by appellant No.1 to the effect that she  

was  the  real  owner  in  possession  of  the  house  and  the  sale  deed  dated  

13.4.1987  was  null  and  void.   It  also  granted  an  injunction  against  the  

defendants that they shall not alienate any part of the suit house and will not  

interfere in her    possession of  the suit   house.  The Court  awarded cost  of  

Rupees 1,000/-.   

12. Feeling aggrieved by this decision, the first respondent herein filed  

a Regular Second Appeal bearing RSA No. 1367 of 1996.  The Learned single  

Judge of the High Court, who heard the matter, framed the following substantial  

question of law - “Whether the Learned Additional District Judge has misread the   

evidence on record while coming to the conclusion that the suit property was   

benami property of the plaintiff.”  The Learned Judge did not dispute the fact  

that  appellant No. 1 had purchased the suit house out of her money, but he  

noted  that  the  office  of  the  Home  Guard  continued  in  that  property.   The  

Learned Judge did not give any importance to the notice dated  8.4.1987 being  

sent under postal certificate, but held that there was nothing on record to prove  

that  defendant  No.3  had been served with that  notice.   The Learned Single  

Judge therefore, found fault with the finding of the Additional District Judge to  

the effect that defendant No. 3 (Respondent No. 1 herein) was not a bonafide  

purchaser, and further held that, it amounted to misreading of evidence.  The  

Regular Second Appeal was therefore, allowed and the judgment and decree of  

the Addl. District Judge was set aside.

7

13. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the High  

Court this Appeal has been filed by the appellant.  This time, the son of appellant  

No.1,  the  original  defendant  No.1  has  joined  her  as  appellant  No.  2.    

Mr. Saikrishna Rajagopal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants pointed  

out that the order passed by the High Court does not deal with the law laid down  

in  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  R.  Rajagopal  Reddy  case  (Supra).   The  

Judgment was binding on the Learned Judge, and in view thereof the suit filed  

by the appellant No.1 was not hit by the prohibition under Section 4 of the Act.  

He also pointed out that the appellants as well as the respondent No. 1 were  

staying  in  the  same  area  i.e.  College  Road,  Pathankot,  and  therefore,  the  

Learned Additional District Judge was right in his inference that the notice dated  

8.4.1987 must be presumed to have been duly served on respondent No. 1 prior  

to 13.4.1987 when respondent No. 3 purchased half share of the suit house.  He  

submitted that the appellants were ready to return the amount of Rs.30,000/-  

with interest  to  respondent  No.  1 which amount he claims to  have paid  to  

respondent No. 2 to purchase his half share in the property.

14. As  against  this  submission  of  the  appellant,  Mr.  V.K.  Monga,  

learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 repeated the same submissions  

made in the courts below, namely, that he was a bonafide purchaser without  

notice, and that the original defendant No. 2 had purchased half the share of the  

suit house from his money, and from him the respondent No.1 had purchased  

that share, and therefore, the present appeal should be dismissed.

8

15. We have noted the submission of the rival parties.  As far as the  

purchase  of  the  suit  house  by  the  appellant  No.  1  from her  own  money  is  

concerned that finding of the trial court has remained undisturbed all throughout  

and cannot be re-opened in this appeal.  The appellant No.1 led cogent evidence  

before the trial court, and it had been held in her favour that it is out of her  

funds that she had purchased the suit house.  The submission of the original  

defendant  no.  2  that  he  had arranged  the  amount  of  Rs.  20,000/-  through  

friendly  loans  was  negated  by the trial  court  since  there  was  no supporting  

evidence at all.  There is no reason for us to disturb that finding.  Once the High  

Court held that the appellant had purchased the suit house out of her funds, it  

ought to have held that it follows that the defendant No. 2 had no right to deal  

with  it  or  to  sell  his  half  share  merely  because  his  name  was  shown as  a  

purchaser  alongwith  the appellant  No.  2.   Consequently  the purchase of  the  

share of the defendant No. 2 by the respondent No. 1 herein without the consent  

of the appellant No. 1 gave him no rights whatsoever.  Therefore, the High Court  

ought  to  have  held  that  the  suit  of  appellant  No.  1  for  declaration  of  her  

ownership to be valid and maintainable.

16.      The High Court has clearly erred in ignoring the binding judgment of a  

Bench of three Judges of this Court in R. Rajagopal Reddy (supra).   By this  

decision, this Court had reversed its earlier judgment in Mithilesh Kumari (supra)  

and had held in terms that suits filed prior to the application of the act would not  

9

be hit by the prohibition under Section 4 of that act.  Section 4(1) of the Benami  

Transactions (Prohibition) Act 1988 reads as follows:

“Prohibition of the right to recover property held benami.-   (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any   property  held  benami  against  the  person  in  whose  name  the   property  is  held  or  against  any other  person shall  lie  by  or  on   behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property.”

While  reversing  the  earlier  decision  of  this  Court  in  Mithilesh  Kumari  

(supra),  a  bench  of  three  Judges  observed  in  para  11  of   

R. Rajagopal Reddy (supra) as follows:-

“Before we deal with these six considerations which weighed  with the Division Bench for taking the view that Section 4 will apply   retrospectively  in  the  sense  that  it  will  get  telescoped  into  all   pending  proceedings,  howsoever  earlier  they  might  have  been  filed, if they were pending at different stages in the hierarchy of  the proceedings even up to this Court, when Section 4 came into   operation, it would be apposite to recapitulate the salient feature of   the Act. As seen earlier, the preamble of the Act itself states that it   is an Act to prohibit benami transactions and the right to recover  property  held  benami,  for  matters  connected  therewith  or  incidental thereto. Thus it was enacted to efface the then existing   right of the real owners of properties held by others benami. Such  an Act was not given any retrospective effect by the legislature.   Even when we come to Section 4, it is easy to visualise that sub- section  (1)  of  Section  4  states  that  no  suit,  claim or  action  to   enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against   the person in whose name the property is held or against any other   shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner  of such property. As per Section 4(1) no such suit shall thenceforth   lie to recover the possession of the property held benami by the   defendant. Plaintiff’s right to that effect is sought to be taken away   and any suit to enforce such a right after coming into operation of   Section 4(1) that is 19-5-1988, shall not lie.  The legislature in its  wisdom has nowhere provided in Section 4(1) that no such suit,   claim or  action pending on the date  when Section 4 came into  force shall not be proceeded with and shall stand abated. On the  contrary, clear legislative intention is seen from the words “no such   

10

claim, suit or action shall lie”, meaning thereby no such suit, claim  or action shall be permitted to be filed or entertained or admitted   to the portals of any court for seeking such a relief after coming   into force of Section 4(1).” (Emphasis supplied)

17.       In the impugned judgment, the High Court nowhere refers to the  

judgment  in  R.  Rajagopal  Reddy’s  case (supra)  although the same was very  

much  referred  to  and  relied  upon  by  the  appellant  to  counter  the  contrary  

submission of the respondent No. 1. The High Court has therefore, committed a  

serious error of law in holding that the Additional District Judge has misread the  

evidence on record while coming to the conclusion that the suit property was the  

Benami  Property  of  the  plaintiff-appellant  No.1  herein  and  that  her  suit  to  

enforce the right concerning the same shall not lie.  In fact there was no such  

misreading of evidence on the part of the first appellate court, and hence there  

was no occasion for the High Court to frame such a question of law in view of  

the prevailing judgment in R. Rajagopal Reddy which had been rightly followed  

by the first appellate court.

18.     The High Court has held that there is nothing on record to suggest that  

respondent No.1 herein had, in fact, been served with the notice dated 8.4.1987  

and thereby reversed the finding rendered by the first appellate court.   It is  

material to note in this behalf that it was canvassed by respondent No.1 before  

the first appellate court that a certificate of posting is very easy to procure and it  

does not inspire confidence. The Additional District Judge observed that there  

was no dispute with this proposition of law, but there was no such averment or  

even  allegation  against  appellant  No.1  herein,  that  she  had  procured  the  

11

certificate of posting nor was there any such pleading  to that effect.  It is on this  

background that the first appellate court has drawn the inference that the notice  

must be deemed to have been served within the period of five days thereafter  

i.e. before 13.4.1987, the date on which the respondent No.1 herein entered into  

an agreement to purchase the suit property.  It is also material to note that the  

appellant’s premises are situated on College Road, Pathankot and so also the  

residence of the first respondent where the notice was sent.  Therefore, there  

was nothing wrong in drawing the inference which was permissible under Section  

114 of the Evidence Act that such notice must have been duly served in the  

normal course of business before 13.4.1987.

19.      We  may  fruitfully  refer  to  a  few  judgments  laying  down  the  

propositions relating to service of  notice.    To begin with, we may note two  

judgments in the context of the notice to quit, sent to the tenants under Section  

106  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  1882,  though  both  the  judgments  are  

concerning the notices sent by registered post.  Firstly, the judgment in the case  

of  Harihar Banerji Vs. Ramshashi Roy [AIR 1918 PC 102], wherein the  

Privy  Council  quoted  with  approval  the  following  observations  in  Gresham  

House  Estate  Co.  Vs.  Rossa  Grande  Gold  Mining  Co.  [1870  Weekly  

Notes 119] to the following effect:

“……….if a letter properly directed, containing a notice to quit, is   proved to have been put into the post office, it is presumed that   the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to   the regular course of business of the post office, and was received  by the person to whom it was addressed.  That presumption would   

12

appear to their Lordships to apply with still greater force to letters   which the sender has taken the precaution to register, and is not   rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is   produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other  than the addressee himself.”  

20.   Secondly, we may refer to the judgment of a Full Bench of the Allahabad  

High  Court  in  the  case  of  Ganga  Ram  Vs.  Smt.  Phulwati  [AIR  1970  

Allahabad  446],  wherein  the  Court  observed  in  paragraphs  12  and  13  as  

follows:

“12. When a registered article or a registered letter  is handed  over to an accepting or receiving post office, it is the official duty of   the  postal  authorities  to  make  delivery  of  it  to  the  addressee.   Human experience shows that except in a few exceptional cases  letters or articles received by the post office are duly, regularly and  properly taken to the addressee.  Consequently as a proposition it   cannot be disputed that when a letter is delivered to an accepting   or receiving post office it is reasonably expected that in the normal   course it would be delivered to the addressee.  That is the official   and the normal function of the post office.

13. Help  can  also  be  taken  from  Section  16  of  the  Indian  Evidence Act which reads as follows:-

“When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the  existence of any course of business, according to which it naturally   would have been done, is a relevant fact.

Illustrations:

(a) The question is, whether a particular letter was dispatched.   The facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters   put  in  a  certain  place  to  be  carried  to  the  post,  and  that  that   particular letter was put in that place, are relevant.

(b) The question is, whether a particular letter reached A.  The   facts  that  it  was  posted  in  due  course,  and  was  not  returned  through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.”

13

21.     As far as a notice sent under postal certificate is concerned, in  Mst.  

L.M.S. Ummu Saleema  Vs.  B.B. Gujaral & Anr.  [1981 (3) SCC 317], a  

bench of three judges of this Court on the facts of that case, refused to accept  

that  the  notice  sent  under  a  postal  certificate  by  a  detenue  under  the  

Conservation of  Foreign Exchange and Smuggling Activities Act,  1974, to the  

Assistant Collector of Customs, retracting his original statement had been duly  

served on the concerned office.   This was because the respondent rebutted the  

submission  by  producing  their  file  to  show that  such  a  letter  had  not  been  

received  in  their  office  in  the  normal  course  of  business.   However,  the  

proposition  laid  down  in  that  case  is  relevant  for  our  purpose.   This  Court  

observed in paragraph 6 of that judgment as follows:   

“6. …………The certificate of posting might lead to a presumption  that a letter addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was   posted  on  August  14,  1980  and  in  due  course  reached  the  addressee.  But,  that  is only a permissible and not an inevitable   presumption. Neither Section 16 nor Section 114 of the Evidence  Act compels the court to draw a presumption. The presumption   may or may not be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of a   case, the court may refuse to draw the presumption. On the other  hand  the  presumption  may  be  drawn  initially  but  on  a   consideration of the evidence the court may hold the presumption  rebutted  and  may  arrive  at  the  conclusion  that  no  letter  was  received by the addressee or that no letter was ever despatched as   claimed. After all, there have been cases in the past, though rare,   where  postal  certificates  and  even  postal  seals  have  been   manufactured.  In  the  circumstances  of  the  present  case,   circumstances to which we have already referred, we are satisfied   that  no such  letter  of  retraction  was posted as  claimed by  the  detenu.”

22.   The proposition laid  down in this  judgment  has been followed in  two  

subsequent cases coming before this Court in the context of Section 53(2) of the  

Companies Act 1956 providing for presumption of service of notice of the board  

meeting, sent by post.  In M.S. Madhusoodhanan vs. Kerala Kaumudi (P)  

Ltd. and others [2004 (9) SCC 204], a bench of two Judges of this Court  

14

referred to the proposition in Mst. L.M.S. Ummu Saleema (supra) in para 117 of  

its  judgment,  and  held  in  the  facts  of  that  case,  that  the  notice  by  postal  

certificate  could  not  be  presumed to  have been effected,  since the  relations  

between the parties were embittered, and the certificate of posting was suspect.  

As against that, in a subsequent matter under the same section, in the case of  

VS Krishnan Vs. Westfort Hi-Tech  Hospital Ltd. [2008 (3) SCC 363],  

another bench of two Judges referred to the judgment in M.S. Madhusoodhanan  

(supra), and drew the presumption in the facts of that case that the notice sent  

under postal certificate  had been duly served for the purposes of Section 53(2)  

of the  Companies Act, 1956, since the postal receipt with post office seal had  

been produced to prove the service.  Thus, it will all depend on the facts of each  

case whether the presumption of service of a notice sent under postal certificate  

should be drawn.  It is true that as observed by the Privy Council in its above  

referred judgment,  the presumption would apply with greater  force to letters  

which are sent by registered post, yet, when facts so justify, such a presumption  

is expected to be drawn even in the case of a letter sent under postal certificate.  

23.      Having seen the factual and the legal position, we may note that in the  

present case it has already been established that the appellant had purchased  

the property out of her own funds. Therefore, it could certainly be expected that  

when  she  came  to  know  about  the  clandestine  sale  of  her  property  to  

respondent No.1, she would send him a notice, which she sent on 8.4.1987.  As  

noted earlier, the notice is sent from one house on the College Road to another  

15

house on the same road in the city of Pathankot.  The agreement of purchase is  

signed by the defendant No.3 five days thereafter i.e. 13.4.1987.  The appellant  

had  produced a copy of  the notice  along with postal  certificate  in  evidence.  

There  was  no  allegation  that  the  postal  certificate  was  procured.   In  the  

circumstances, it could certainly be presumed that the notice was duly served on  

respondent  No.1  before  13.4.1987.   The  High  Court,  therefore,  erred  in  

interfering  in  the  finding  rendered  by  the  Additional  District  Judge  that  

respondent  No.1  did  receive  the notice  and,  therefore,  was  not  a  bona fide  

purchaser for value without a notice.  

24. The judgment  of  the  High  Court,  therefore,  deserves  to  be  set  

aside.   The  appellants  through  their  counsel  have,  however,  in  all  fairness  

offered to compensate the first respondent herein by paying him the amount of  

Rs. 30,000/- with appropriate interest.  The first respondent did not evince any  

interest in this suggestion.  Yet, the end of justice will be met, if this amount of  

Rs. 30,000/- is returned by the appellants to him as offered by them with simple  

interest at the rate of 10%.

25. In the circumstances this appeal is allowed.  The Judgment and  

order dated 10.2.2009 passed by the High court in R.S.A No. 1367 of 1996 and  

that of the Sub-Judge, Pathankot in Civil Suit No. 138 of 1987 dated 3.10.1991  

are set aside.  The judgment and order dated 22.2.1996 passed by Addl. District.  

Judge, Gurdaspur in Civil Appeal No. 203 of 1991 is confirmed.  The suit filed by  

the appellant No.1 bearing Civil Suit No. 138 of 1987 is decreed and it is declared  

16

that  the appellant  No.  1  is  the owner  of  the  suit  house.   There  shall  be  a  

permanent injunction restraining the defendants from alienating any part of the  

suit house and forcibly interfering into the possession of the plaintiff of the house  

in dispute.   In view of the offer given by the appellants to compensate the first  

respondent,  the appellants  shall  pay him the amount of  Rs.  30,000/-(Rupees  

thirty thousand only), with simple interest at the rate of 10% for the period from  

13.4.1987 till the decision of the first appellate court i.e. 22.2.1996, within twelve  

weeks  from today,  though  it  is  up  to  the  respondent  No.  1  to  receive  the  

amount.  The interest is restricted upto 22.2.1996 for the reason that respondent  

No.1  ought  to  have  accepted  the  decision  of  the  First  Appellate  Court,  

particularly in view of the judgment of this Court in R. Rajagopal Reddy (supra),  

and should not have dragged the appellants to the High Court in Second appeal.  

26.       The first respondent will pay a cost of Rs. 10,000/- to the 1st appellant  

for this appeal.

…………..……………………..J.  ( Dalveer Bhandari )

  …………………………………..J.  ( H.L. Gokhale  )

New Delhi

Dated:  January 21, 2011

17