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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.9699 OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No.33699 of 2011]

Sameer Singh and Another ... Appellants

Versus

Abdul Rab and Others                 ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

 Leave granted.

2. The  Universal  Construction  Company,  the  respondent  

No. 3 herein, instituted Civil Suit No. 480 of 1971 in the High  

Court  of  Calcutta  invoking  its  original  civil  jurisdiction  for  

realization of a sum of Rs.2,15,289.28 paise from the Engineers  

Syndicate (India) Private Limited, the 4th respondent herein, and  

an ex parte decree was passed in the suit.  After obtaining the

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decree, respondent No. 3 assigned the same in favour of Abdul  

Rab, respondent No. 1 herein,  on 20th May, 2005.  After the  

deed  of  assignment  was  given  the  formal  shape,  the  1st  

respondent moved the High Court of Calcutta and got the said  

decree transferred to the Court of Sub Judge-I, Jamshedpur for  

execution  by  way  of  attachment  and  sale  of  immovable  

properties of the 4th respondent situated within the jurisdiction  

of the executing Court.  Thereafter, the 1st respondent filed an  

execution  case  against  the  4th respondent.   A  schedule  of  

property was attached to the execution petition.

3. As the factual matrix would unfurl, the executing court  

after receipt of the decree on 23.8.2006 issued notice to the 4 th  

respondent  by registered post and when the service  was not  

effected,  mode  of  publication  was  taken  recourse  to  for  

appearance of the judgment-debtor.  Eventually, the execution  

case was fixed for ex parte hearing on 9.3.2007 on the petition  

of  the  assignee-decree-holder.   After  following the  procedure,  

the scheduled property was put up for sale by way of auction  

and ultimately Abdul Rafai, respondent No. 2, purchased the  

property  and  pursuant  to  the  order  of  the  Court  took  over  

possession of the said immovable property.

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4. As the factual narration would further undrape, at the  

said juncture, the present appellants filed an application under  

Order XXI, Rules 97, 99 and 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure  

(C.P.C.)  contending,  inter  alia,  that  the  disputed  property  

originally belonged to the 4th  respondent who had borrowed a  

sum of Rs.14,571/- from his deceased father, Gopal Singh, by  

depositing the sale deeds of the said property on 18.2.1971 at  

Calcutta and had delivered possession of the said property to  

Gopal Singh on 19.2.1971 in lieu of interest of said borrowed  

amount.   When  he  failed  to  pay  the  borrowed  sum,  the  4th  

respondent  agreed  to  transfer  the  said  property  for  a  

consideration of Rs.25,000/- to Gopal Singh after adjusting the  

borrowed amount i.e.  Rs.14,571/-.   Regard being had to the  

said arrangement, Gopal Singh had paid the balance amount of  

Rs.10,429/-  and  accordingly  an  agreement  for  sale  was  

executed.  When the 4th respondent did not honour his part of  

the contract, Gopal Singh instituted Title Suit No. 43 of 1974 in  

the  Court  of  Sub  Judge-I,  Jamshedpur  against  the  4th  

respondent  and eventually  the  said  suit  was decreed by  the  

Second  Additional  Sub  Judge-I  on  14.5.1977.   Thereafter,  a  

case was filed and in pursuance of the decree a sale deed was  

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executed on 10.10.1982 in favour of the father of the appellants  

through Court and he was put in possession through Nazir of  

the Civil Court in respect of the property in question, and after  

the demise of Gopal Singh, the appellants, being sons, inherited  

the said property and remained in possession having right, title  

and interest till 27.4.2008 when all of a sudden, respondent No.  

2 through the help of Nazir took delivery of the property after  

dispossessing the appellants therefrom.  On an inquiry being  

made, they came to know under what circumstances they had  

been  dispossessed  by  the  Nazir.   The  application  further  

asserted  that  the  schedule  of  property  which  had  been  

appended  to  Execution  Case  No.  24  of  2006  had  been  

deliberately added though the 4th respondent had no concern  

with  the  same.   It  was  also  put  forth  that  an  order  of  

attachment  was  published  in  a  local  daily  ‘Uditwani’  dated  

23.10.1982 in respect of  the scheduled property by the High  

Court of Calcutta in Suit No. 480 of 1971 and the father of the  

appellants coming to know of the same had filed an objection  

before the High Court which after considering the objection and  

taking note of the right, title and interest of the father of the  

appellants had released the said property from attachment but  

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the 1st  respondent by suppressing all  the facts got the said  

schedule of property attached and put the same in auction and  

respondent  No.  2  who  was  set  up  by  the   respondent  No.1  

became the purchaser of the property.  In essence, it had been  

pleaded that respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had colluded to put the  

property to auction which did not belong to the respondent No.  

4 and was not meant for attachment and sale, for it had been  

already released by the High Court of Calcutta and, in any case,  

the respondent No. 4 had no concern with the said property.  In  

the application it was prayed that the appellants, the applicants  

in  the  court  below,  should  be  put  in  possession  of  the  

scheduled  property  and  the  respondents  be  restrained  from  

changing  the  nature  and  character  of  the  property  till  the  

adjudication of the application.   

5. The said application was resisted by respondent Nos. 1  

and 2, the opposite parties No. 1 and 2 before the executing  

court, on many a ground and basically reasseverating the facts  

how the decree had been passed by the High Court of Calcutta  

and how there had been a deed of assignment and further the  

fairness  of  procedure  adopted  in  putting  the  property  to  

auction and the eventual sale.

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6.   The  executing court framed two issues which read as  

follows:-

“I. Whether the transferee executing court has  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  present  petition  filed by the applicants under order  XXI rules  97, 99 and 101 C.P.C.?

II. Whether the applicants are entitled to get as  relief in claim in their application?”

7. The executing court noted the submissions of both the  

parties,  referred  to  the  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Calcutta transferring the decree for execution, adverted to the  

provisions under Sections 39 to 42 of C.P.C., placed reliance on  

certain authorities as regards the limitation on the powers of  

the transferee court under Section 42 of C.P.C., recorded the  

fact that it had already dismissed the execution case to the full  

satisfaction of the decree-holder on 19.12.2008 and informed  

the same to the Registrar of the High Court of Calcutta, and  

eventually came to hold that it had no jurisdiction to reopen  

and discuss the matter pertaining to the title of the parties in  

execution  case  at  the  instance  of  a  third  party.   In  that  

backdrop,  it  observed  that  the  executing  court  had  become  

functus  officio and  could  not  entertain  the  application.  

Adverting to the second issue,  the executing court noted the  

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contentions  and  referred  to  the  authorities  earlier  cited  but  

ultimately opined that as a finding had been recorded to the  

effect that the transferee-executing court had no jurisdiction to  

entertain  the  petition,  regard  being  had to  the  fact  that  the  

decree  had  been  executed  to  the  full  satisfaction  and  an  

intimation had been sent to the Registrar of the Calcutta High  

Court, the controversy raised could not be dealt with and no  

relief could be granted.   

8. The aforesaid order came to be assailed before the High  

Court  in  W.P.C.  No.  348  of  2011  under  Article  227  of  the  

Constitution of India.  A preliminary objection was raised on  

behalf of the 1st respondent that an order passed under Order  

XXI, Rule 98 to 100 of C.P.C. is a decree as per the provisions  

contained under Order XXI, Rule 103 of C.P.C. and, therefore,  

an appeal would lie and the writ petition was not maintainable.  

The  preliminary  objection  was  resisted  by  proponing  a  

contention that only those orders which adjudicate the dispute  

between the parties would be treated as decree but as in the  

case at hand, the Court had not decided the lis in question as it  

had  expressed  an  opinion  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  after  

having become functus officio, an appeal would not lie.   

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9. The  learned  Single  Judge  accepted  the  preliminary  

objection  on  the  foundation  that  dispute  between  parties  

regarding jurisdiction of executing court could be determined  

under Order XXI, Rule 100 of C.P.C. and that when a decision  

had been rendered on that score it would be a deemed decree  

under  Order  XXI,  Rule  103  of  C.P.C.  and  hence,  the  writ  

petition  was not  maintainable.   Expression of  aforesaid  view  

entailed  dismissal  of  the  writ  petition.   Hence,  the  present  

appeal by special leave.

10. We have heard Mr. Saurabh S. Sinha, learned counsel  

for the appellants and Mr. Jayesh Gaurav, learned counsel for  

the respondents.

11. Assailing  the  impugned  order  it  is  contended  by  Mr.  

Sinha that the learned Single Judge has failed to appreciate the  

language  employed  in  Order  XXI,  Rules  97  to  103  which  

commands the  executing  court  to  adjudicate  the  controversy  

pertaining to all the aspects and, therefore, when the executing  

Court has only opined that it has become  functus officio,  the  

said order cannot be treated as a decree.  It is urged by him  

that  the  said  order  tantamounts  to  refusal  of  exercise  of  

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jurisdiction duly vested in a Court and, therefore, such an error  

has to be rectified in exercise of the power of superintendence  

by  the  High  Court  under  Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  

India.  It is his further submission that the view expressed by  

the High Court is fallacious as far as its understanding of the  

ratio of the decision in Babulal v. Raj Kumar and Others1.  To  

pyramid the submission that there has to be an adjudication as  

warranted in law, learned counsel has placed reliance on Ghasi  

Ram and Others v. Chait Ram Saini and others2 and Ram  

Kumar Tiwari and Others v. Deenanath and Others3.

12. Mr.  Jayesh  Gaurav,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

respondents in support of the order passed by the High Court  

has  contended  that  when  the  executing  court  had  clearly  

expressed the view that it has no jurisdiction to embark upon the  

issues as required to be gone into under Order XXI, Rules 97 to  

103 of  C.P.C., there was no necessity to proceed further and it  

would be a travesty of justice if it is construed that when there  

has been no adjudication of an application on behalf of a third  

party  it  would  not  be  a  decree.   It  is  canvassed by  him that  

adjudication does not necessarily mean to record evidence and  1 (1996) 3 SCC 154 2 (1998) 6 SCC 200 3 AIR 2002 Chhattisgarh 1

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deal with the issue of right, title and interest to make the order a  

deemed decree as stipulated under Order XXI, Rule 103.  It is  

urged  by  him  that  when  finality  is  given  to  the  objection  it  

assumes the character of a decree as envisaged under Order XXI,  

Rule 103 and, therefore, the reasons ascribed by the High Court  

cannot be faulted.  In support of his contention, learned counsel  

has  commended us  to  the  authority  in  S.  Rajeswari  v.  S.N.  

Kulasekaran and Others4.  

13. To appreciate  the  submissions raised at  the  Bar,  it  is  

necessary to appreciate the whole gamut of provisions contained  

in  Order  XXI,  Rules  97  to  103 of  CPC and the  fundamental  

objects  behind  the  same.   Rule  97  deals  with  resistance  or  

obstruction  to  possession  by  the  holder  of  a  decree  for  

possession  or  the  purchaser  of  any  such  property  sold  in  

execution of  a  decree.   It  empowers such a person to file  an  

application  to  the  Court  complaining  of  such  resistance  or  

obstruction  and  requires  the  Court  under  sub-rule  (2)  to  

adjudicate  upon  the  application  in  accordance  with  the  

provisions provided therein.  Rule 99 deals with dispossession  

by  decree-holder  or  purchaser.   It  stipulates  that  where  any  

person  other  than  the  judgment-debtor  is  dispossessed  of  4 (2006) 4 SCC 412

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immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession  

of  such  property  or  where  such  property  has  been  sold  in  

execution of a decree, by the purchaser thereof, he may make an  

application to the Court complaining of such dispossession.  The  

Court is obliged to adjudicate such an application.  Thus this  

rule,  as  is  manifest,  includes  any  person  other  than  the  

judgment-debtor.   Rule  101  deals  with  the  questions  to  be  

determined.  It provides that all questions including questions  

relating to right, title or interest in the property arising between  

the parties to a proceeding on an application under Rule 97 or  

Rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication  

of the application shall be determined by the Court dealing with  

an  application  and  not  by  a  separate  suit  and  for  the  said  

purpose, the executing court has been conferred the jurisdiction  

to decide the same.  Rule 100 deals with orders to be passed  

upon  application  complaining  of  dispossession.   It  is  apt  to  

reproduce the said rule:-

“Rule  100.  Order  to  be  passed  upon  application  complaining  of  dispossession.-  Upon  the  determination  of  the  questions  referred  in  Rule  101,  the  Court  shall,  in  accordance with such determination,-

(a) make an order allowing the application  and directing that the applicant be put  

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into  possession  of  the  property  or  dismissing the application; or

(b) pass  such  order  as,  in  the  circumstances of the case, it may deem  fit.”  

14. Rule 98 deals with orders after adjudication.  Sub-rule  

(1) provides that upon the determination of questions referred  

to in Rule 101, the Court in accordance with determination and  

subject  to  provisions  of  sub-rule  (2)  therein  make  an  order  

allowing the application and directing that the applicant be put  

in possession of the property or dismissing the application or  

pass such other order, as in the circumstances of the case it  

may deem fit.  As far as sub-rule (2) is concerned, the same is  

not necessary to be taken note of for the purposes of present  

case.  Rule 103 which is significant reads as follows:-

“Rule 103. Orders to be treated as decrees.-  Where  any  application  has  been  adjudicated  upon  under  Rule  98  or  Rule  100,  the  order  made thereon shall have the same force and be  subject to the same conditions as to an appeal  or otherwise as if it were a decree.”

15. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants  

is  that if  the scheme underlying the said Rules is appositely  

appreciated, it is clear as crystal that the legislature in order to  

avoid multiplicity of proceedings has empowered the executing  

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court  to  conduct  necessary  enquiry  and  adjudicate  by  

permitting  the  parties  to  adduce  evidence,  both  oral  and  

documentary, and to determine the right, title and interest of  

the parties and, therefore, such  an order has been given the  

status of a decree.  As has been put forth by him, a proceeding  

in terms of Rule 97 or Rule 99 is in the nature of a suit and the  

adjudication is similar to that of a suit and when in the case at  

hand, the Court has declined to embark upon any enquiry by  

calling  for  reply,  recording  evidence  and  appropriately  

adjudicating  the  controversy,  the  order  passed  cannot  be  

regarded under  Rule 103 of  Order XXI as a decree.   In this  

context, the authorities that have been commended to us need  

to be carefully noticed.  

16.  In Noorduddin v. Dr. K.L. Anand5, the executing court  

had  rejected  the  application  of  the  appellant  therein  on  the  

ground that  the High Court  had already adjudicated the lis.  

Analysing the language employed in Rules 97, 98 and 100 to  

104, the Court held:-

“Thus,  the  scheme  of  the  Code  clearly  adumbrates  that  when  an  application  has  been made under Order 21, Rule 97, the court  is enjoined to adjudicate upon the right, title  

5 (1995) 1 SCC 242

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and  interest  claimed  in  the  property  arising  between the parties to a proceeding or between  the  decree-holder  and  the  person  claiming  independent  right,  title  or  interest  in  the  immovable  property  and  an  order  in  that  behalf  be  made.  The  determination  shall  be  conclusive between the parties as if  it  was a  decree  subject  to  right  of  appeal  and  not  a  matter  to  be  agitated  by  a  separate  suit.  In  other  words,  no  other  proceedings  were  allowed to be taken. It has to be remembered  that  preceding  Civil  Procedure  Code  Amendment  Act,  1976,  right  of  suit  under  Order 21, Rule 103 of 1908 Code was available  which has been now taken away. By necessary  implication,  the  legislature  relegated  the  parties  to  an  adjudication  of  right,  title  or  interest  in  the  immovable  property  under  execution and finality has been accorded to it.  Thus, the scheme of the Code appears to be to  put an end to the protraction of the execution  and  to  shorten  the  litigation  between  the  parties  or  persons  claiming  right,  title  and  interest  in  the  immovable  property  in  execution.”

Elucidating further, the Court opined that adjudication  

before  execution  is  an  efficacious  remedy  to  prevent  fraud,  

oppression, abuse of the process of the court or miscarriage of  

justice. The object of law is to meet out justice and, therefore,  

adjudication under Order XXI, Rules 98, 100 and 101 and its  

successive rules is sine qua non to a finality of the adjudication  

of the right, title or interest in the immovable property under  

execution.

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17. In  Babulal  (supra),  the appellant apprehending that it  

would be dispossessed in an execution proceeding had filed an  

application  based  on  possessory  title  and  obtained  interim  

injunction.  He had also filed an application stating, inter alia,  

that  he  should  not  be  dispossessed.   His  objection  was  

overruled by the executing court holding that since he had not  

been dispossessed,  an application under  Order  XXI,  Rule 98  

was not maintainable.  The said view was affirmed by the High  

Court in Civil Revision Petition.  The Court while interpreting  

the  Order  XXI,  Rules  98  to  102  referred  to  the  decision  in  

Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain and Another6  and opined that  

it  is  clear  that  an  adjudication  is  required  to  be  conducted  

under  Order  XXI,  Rule  98 before  removal  of  the  obstruction  

caused  by  the  objector  or  the  appellant  and  a  finding  is  

required to be recorded in that behalf. The Court ruled that the  

order is treated as a decree under Order XXI, Rule 103 and it is  

subject to an appeal.  It has been observed in the said case that  

prior to 1976, the order was subject to suit,  but  under the  

amended Code, right of suit under Order XXI, Rule 63 of old  

Code  has  been  taken  away,  and  the  determination  of  the  

question  of  the  right,  title  or  interest  of  the  objector  in  the  6 (1995) 1 SCC 6

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immovable property under execution needs to be adjudicated  

under Order XXI, Rule 98 which is an order and is a decree  

under Order XXI, Rule 103 for the purpose of appeal subject to  

the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise as if it were a  

decree.  The Court further opined that the procedure prescribed  

is a complete code in itself and, therefore, the executing court is  

required to determine the question.  

18. In  Ghasi  Ram  and  Others  (supra) while  making  a  

distinction  between  the  provisions  prior  to  the  amendment  

brought in 1976 in CPC and the situation after the amendment,  

a two-Judge Bench observed thus:-  

“The position has changed after amendment of the  Code of Civil  Procedure by the Amendment Act of  1976.   Now,  under  the  amended  provisions,  all  questions,  including  right,  title,  interests  in  the  property  arising  between   the  parties  to  the  proceedings under Rule 97, have to be adjudicated  by  the  executing  court  itself  and  not  left  to  be  decided by way of a fresh suit.”

19. In the case of  S. Rajeswari  (supra), the appellant was  

one  of  the  persons  who  had  obstructed  the  execution  of  a  

decree obtained by the 1st  respondent therein and  had filed an  

application under Section 151 of CPC which was rejected by the  

executing court on the ground that  it  was not  maintainable.  

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Being grieved by the said order he preferred a revision petition  

which was allowed by the High Court.  The Court treated the  

application  preferred  under  Section  151  of  C.P.C.  to  be  one  

under  Order  XXI,  Rule  97  because  the  executing  court  

proceeded  to  record  evidence  and thereupon adjudicated  the  

matter.  The evidence of the decree-holder was considered and a  

conclusion was arrived at that the identity of plot in question  

had not been established and thereby the plaintiff was disabled  

from  executing  the  decree  for  possession  of  the  land.   A  

contention was raised before this Court that the High Court had  

erred  in  entertaining  a  revision  petition  under  Section  115,  

C.P.C., for the order was a decree under Order XXI, Rule 103 of  

C.P.C.  and  hence,  an  appeal  lay.   The  said  contention  was  

accepted by this Court.   

20. At  this  juncture,  we  may  refer  with  profit  to  the  

pronouncement  in  Brahmdeo  Chaudhary  v.  Rishikesh  

Prasad Jaiswal  and another7 wherein  a  two-Judge  Bench  

scanning the anatomy of the rules came to hold that:-

“...  a  stranger  to  the  decree  who  claims  an  independent  right,  title  and  interest  in  the  decretal property can offer his resistance before  getting  actually  dispossessed.  He  can  equally  

7 AIR 1997 SC 856

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agitate his grievance and claim for adjudication  of  his  independent  right,  title  and interest  in  the  decretal  property  even  after  losing  possession as per  Order  XXI,  Rule  99.  Order  XXI, Rule 97 deals with a stage which is prior  to  the  actual  execution  of  the  decree  for  possession  wherein  the  grievance  of  the  obstructionist can be adjudicated upon before  actual  delivery  of  possession  to  the  decree- holder. While Order XXI, Rule 99 on the other  hand deals  with  the  subsequent  stage  in  the  execution  proceedings  where  a  stranger  claiming  any  right,  title  and  interest  in  the  decretal  property  might  have  got  actually  dispossessed  and  claims  restoration  of  possession on adjudication of his independent  right,  title  and interest  dehors the interest  of  the  judgment-debtor.  Both  these  types  of  enquiries in connection with the right, title and  interest of a stranger to the decree are clearly  contemplated by the aforesaid scheme of Order  XXI and it is not as if that such a stranger to  the decree can come in the picture only at the  final stage after losing the possession and not  before  it  if  he  is  vigilant  enough to  raise  his  objection  and  obstruction  before  the  warrant  for  possession  gets  actually  executed  against  him.”

21. The aforesaid authorities clearly spell out that the court  

has the authority to adjudicate all the questions pertaining to  

right,  title  or  interest  in  the  property  arising  between  the  

parties.   It  also  includes  the  claim  of  a  stranger  who  

apprehends dispossession  or  has  already been dispossessed  

from the immovable property.  The self-contained Code, as has  

been emphasised by this Court, enjoins the executing court to  

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adjudicate the lis and the purpose is to avoid multiplicity of  

proceedings.  It is also so because prior to 1976 amendment  

the grievance was required to be agitated by filing a suit but  

after the amendment the entire enquiry has to be conducted by  

the  executing  court.   Order  XXI,  Rule  101 provides  for  the  

determination of necessary issues.  Rule 103 clearly stipulates  

that when an application is adjudicated upon under Rule 98 or  

Rule 100 the said order shall have the same force as if it were  

a decree.  Thus, it is a deemed decree.  If a Court declines to  

adjudicate on the ground that it does not have jurisdiction, the  

said order cannot earn the status of a decree.  If an executing  

court only expresses its inability to adjudicate by stating that it  

lacks  jurisdiction,  then  the  status  of  the  order  has  to  be  

different.   In  the  instant  case  the  executing  court  has  

expressed an opinion that  it  has become  functus officio  and  

hence, it cannot initiate or launch any enquiry. The appellants  

had invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article  

227  of  the  Constitution  assailing  the  order  passed  by  the  

executing court on the foundation that it had failed to exercise  

the jurisdiction vested in it.   The appellants had approached  

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the High Court as per the dictum laid down by this Court in  

Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and others8.   

22. Whether  the  executing  court,  in  the  obtaining  

circumstances,  has  correctly  expressed the  view that  it  has  

become functus officio or not and thereby it has jurisdiction or  

not, fundamentally pertains to rectification of a jurisdictional  

error.   It  is  so  as  there  has  been  no  adjudication.   If  a  

subordinate court exercises its jurisdiction not vested in it by  

law or fails to exercise the jurisdiction so vested, the said order  

under Section 115 of the Code is revisable as has been held in  

Joy  Chand  Lal  Babu  v.  Kamalaksha  Chaudhury  and  

others9.  The same principle has been reiterated in Keshardeo  

Chamria  v.  Radha  Kissan  Chamria  and  others10 and  

Chaube  Jagdish  Prasad  and  another  v.  Ganga  Prasad  

Chaturvedi11.   Needless  to  emphasise,  the  said  principle  is  

well-settled.  After the amendment of Section 115, C.P.C. w.e.f.  

1.7.2002, the said power is exercised under Article 227 of the  

Constitution as per the principle laid down in Surya Dev Rai  

(supra).   Had the executing court apart from expressing the  

view that  it  had  become  functus  officio had adjudicated the  8 (2003) 6 SCC 675 9 AIR 1949 PC 239 10 AIR 1953 SC 23 11 AIR 1959 SC 492

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issues on merits, the question would have been different, for in  

that event there would have been an adjudication.   

23. In view of the forgoing analysis,  we conclude and hold  

that the High Court has fallen into error by opining that the  

decision  rendered  by  the  executing  court  is  a  decree  and,  

therefore,  an appeal  should have been filed,  and resultantly  

allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order.  The High  

Court shall decide the matter as necessary under Article 227 of  

the Constitution of India.  As a long span of time has expired  

we  would  request  the  High  Court  to  dispose  of  the  matter  

within a period of three months.  There shall be no order as to  

costs.  

.............................J. [Dipak Misra]

.............................J.                                               [V. Gopala Gowda]

New Delhi; October 14, 2014

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