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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S).  2306-2307 OF 2017

SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE                …. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KESHAV AABA PATIL AND OTHERS                   …. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL  NO(S).  5132-5133 OF 2017

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.

1. The crucial question to be decided is whether a family

member of the original encroacher can be disqualified,

under the Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958 (for

short “the Act”). The enabling provision, as introduced

by an amendment in 2006, reads as follows:  

“14.Disqualifications.-(1)  No  person  shall  be  a member of a Panchayat, or continue as such, who —

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

(j-3) has encroached upon the Government land or public property; or …”

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                                                       2. On  the  undisputed  facts  of  these  cases,  there  is  no

allegation  that  the  appellants  are  encroachers

themselves,  in  the  sense  that  they  themselves  first

encroached  upon  the  Government  property  and  they

continue to occupy the same. The allegation is that their

father/grandfather  are  encroachers  and  they  are  the

beneficiaries  of  the  encroachment.  According  to  the

State and the contesting respondent, the beneficiary of

an encroachment is also an encroacher.

3. The question that arises before us has been dealt with

by  several  judgments  of  the  High  Court  of  Bombay.

However  there  appears  to  be  a  conflict  between  the

various decisions of the High Court.  In  Ganesh Arun

Chavan v.  State  of  Maharashtra  and  others  1,

decided on 24.09.2012, the incumbent was sought to be

disqualified  on  the  ground  of  encroachment.  The

defense was that the encroachment was by his father

and the house was constructed with the income of his

father. The High Court made the following observations:

“10. There is nothing in the Act by which the concept of family or joint residence could be imported as far as

1  2013 (2) Mh. L.J. 955

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the subject of disqualification is concerned. The said provision  contemplates  encroachment  upon  the Government land or public property by a person, as in this  case,  who  is  a  Member  of  the  Panchayat. Therefore, the encroachment must be by the person who is a member and not any third party.

xxx xxx   xxx 12. The Legislature has taken care and wherever the concept of family or joint residence has to be applied, specific provision in that behalf has been made either substantively  or  by  way  of  an  Explanation.  For illustration,  if  the  disqualification  is  under  section 14(1)(h) for failure to pay any tax or fee due to the panchayat  or  the  Zilla  Parishad,  then,  by  virtue  of Explanation  2,  what  the  Legislature  has  done  is  to provide that failure to pay any tax or fee due to the panchayat or Zilla Parishad by a member of HUF or by person  belonging  to  a  group,  then,  that  shall  be deemed to disqualify all members of such family or as the case may be of the group or unit. Equally in case of  clause  14(1)(g)  where  a  person  is  said  to  be disqualified for having any interest either by himself directly or indirectly through or his partner, any share or interest in any work done by order of the panchayat or  in  any  contract  with  by  or  on  behalf  of  or employment  with  or  under  the  panchayat,  the Legislature  by  Explanation  IA  has  clarified  that  a person shall  not be disqualified under clause (g) by reason of only such person having a share or interest in any newspaper in which any advertisement relating to the affairs of the panchayat is inserted; or having a share  or  interest  in  the  occasional  sale  to  the panchayat of any article in which he regularly trades and  having  an  occasional  share  or  interest  in  the letting out or on hire to the panchayat of any article and equally having any share, interest in any lease for a period not exceeding ten years of any immovable property.  Therefore,  once  the  Legislature  itself  has clarified that  an act  of  the member alone incurs or invites disqualification, then, by interpretative process it will not be possible to include in section 14(1)(j-3), the act of encroachment by members of his family and for that purpose, disqualify the elected representative. It is the act of the person seeking to contest election

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or functioning as a member which alone will  attract the provision in question.”

4. In  Yallubai  Kamble v.  State  of  Maharashtra  and

others  2,  decided  on  05-10-2012,  the  petitioner  was

elected as the Sarpanch of  the Gram Panchayat.  The

allegation against the petitioner was that her husband

and  brother-in-law  made  an  encroachment  on  gairan

land and constructed a house thereon. She denied the

allegation and said that she cannot be disqualified if the

encroachment was by her husband and not by her. The

High Court relied on the decision in  Ganesh Chavan

(supra) and finally held as follows:

“14. However, when it comes to encroachment upon Government Land or Public Property, the Legislature is aware that ordinarily and normally such act "is gaining upon the rights or possession of another". That may be an individual or a concerted act. Thus, it envisages acting  either  by  himself  or  herself  or  jointly  with others. Therefore, the extent of participation and the role  of  a  person  therein  assumes  importance  and significance. It may amount to entering upon a land and remaining there, occupying and possessing it or construction thereon.  Equally,  it  may mean not  just possessing  a  land  but  a  Structure,  Building,  House thereon  or  a  part  thereof.  Hence,  which  act,  when committed, by whom are all relevant matters together with  the  time  factor,  namely,  prior  to  or  after Petitioner's  marriage.  Hence,  in  its  wisdom  if  the Legislature disqualifies a person or a member only if the act is committed by him, then, it  is not for this Court to probe it  further.  It  is  for  the Legislature to

2   Writ Petition No. 8497 of 2012

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take remedial steps if this is providing an escape route to  wrongdoers  and  lawbreakers.  This  Court  cannot legislate nor can it step in to fill up an alleged lacuna or defect in law. It has been recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court  that  if  a  matter,  provision for  which may  have  been  desirable,  has  not  been  really provided for by the Legislature, the omission or defect is of the nature which cannot be cured or supplied by a mode of construction which amounts to ironing out the creases. (See AIR 1989 SC 501, Petron Engineering Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Central Board of Direct Taxes). True it is that the character and conduct of the representative of the people should be exemplary and setting  a  high  standard.  He  will  not  be  a  true representative  of  the  people  if  he  indulges  in  acts which  are  immoral,  illegal  and  wrongful  but  the grievance should be raised before some other forum.”

5. A  few  days  later,  in  Kanchan  Shivaji  Atigre v.

Mahadev Baban Ranjagane and others  3 decided on

12.10.2012, the disqualification was also on the ground

of encroachment. It was the case of the petitioner that

the wording of the provision makes it clear that it is the

act  of  the  person  who  is  elected,  which  alone,  is

relevant. The Court held as follows. “13.  …  Therefore,  it  is  the  act  of  the  person contesting  the  poll  as  a  candidate  or  the  act  of elected  member  himself  as  the  case  may  be,  that (sic)  would  disqualify  them.  It  cannot  be  that somebody else commits an act of encroachment even if  he  is  a  Member  of  the  same  family  but  the consequences  are  visited  on  an  elected representative  or  a  person  desiring  to  contest  the election to Gram Panchayat. Even if such person is a Member of that family by marriage or otherwise, still, it will not be permissible to disqualify him or her as

3  2013(1) Mh. L.J. 455

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that would create a vacancy in the Gram Panchayat. It  would not be possible to give broad based,  wide and comprehensive representation of the public in a unit of local self government. The Gram Panchayat is envisaged  to  be  a  unit  of  local  self-government  in terms of Part IX of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the provisions with regard to disqualification will have to be construed in a manner so as not to create a vacuum  or  make  it  impossible  for  the  villagers  to choose  their  representative  and  constitute  a  Gram Panchayat.  That  will  then  create  difficulties  and obstacles  in  constituting  a  Panchayat.  If  that  is equally not intended by the Statute in question, then, by interpretative process, I cannot do so and import or  insert  something  in  the  provision,  which  is  not there. That would amount to legislation and which act a  Court  cannot  perform or  rather  not  permitted  to perform. That is a function which has to be performed by the legislature alone and if there is any difficulty or lacuna in  the legislation,  it  is  for  the  legislature  to step  in  and  not  for  me  to  re-write  the  section  or provision in question.”

6. The other string of decisions interprets  the impugned

provision to include encroachment by a member of the

family of the elected person. In Devidas s/o Matiramji

Surwade v.  Additional  Commissioner,  Amravati

and others  4 decided on 31.07.2012, a division bench

of the High Court of Bombay  held as follows: “5. We find that there is a definite object in making the  said  amendment  to  the  provisions  of disqualification  and  the  object  is  that  one,  who encroaches  upon  the  Government  land  or  the Government  property,  cannot  make  any  claim  to represent  the  people  by  becoming  an  elected, member of the Gram Panchayat. The term person in the said amended provision has to be interpreted to

4  2017 (1) Mh. L.J.102.

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mean  the  legal  heirs  of  such  person,  who  has encroached and continues to occupy the Government land or the Government property, his agent, assignee or  transferee  or  as  the  case  may  be.  If  such  an interpretation is not made in the said provision, the result  would  be  absurd  in  the  sense  that  the Government  land  would  continue  to  remain encroached and the legal  heirs or  the assignees or the  transferees  remaining  on  such  encroached Government land shall claim the right to get elected as a member of democratically elected body.  In no case  our  conscious  permits  such  type  of interpretation  to  defeat  the  very  object  of  the Bombay  Village  Panchayats  (Amendment)  Act, 2006..”

7. The contention put forth by the respondent in the case

of  Parvatabai  @  Shobha  d/o  Kisan  Kande v.

Additional Commissioner, Nagpur and others  5 was

that she was merely residing in the house of her father

and as she was not responsible for said encroachment,

she was not  liable to  be disqualified.  The High Court

considered  the  decisions  in  Ganesh  Chavan (supra)

and Devidas Surwade (supra) and held as follows:  

“10. The judgment of the Division Bench in  Devidas Surwade (supra)  was  delivered  on  31-7-2012  and prior  to  the  judgments  of  learned  Single  Judge  in Ganesh  Chavan  (supra)  dated  24-9-2012,  Yallubai Kamble (supra) dated             5-10-2012, Kanchan Atigre (supra)  dated  12-10-2012.  The  judgment  of the Division Bench was not brought to the notice of learned  Single  Judge  when  said  decisions  were rendered.  Moreover,  the  judgment  of  the  Division

5  2015 (5) Mh. L.J. 238

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Bench in Devidas Surwade (supra) on which reliance has  been  placed  by  the  learned  Counsel  for  the respondents indicates that the Statement of Objects and  Reasons  have  been  taken  into  consideration after  which  it  has  been  observed  that  the  term "person" in the amended provisions would have to be interpreted to bring legal heirs of a person who has encroached  and  continues  to  occupy  Government land within its purview. The reasons for interpreting said provisions have thereafter been stated in para 5. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner that instead  of  the  judgment  of  the  Division  Bench  in Devidas Surwade (supra), the view as taken by the learned Single Judge In Yallubai Kamble and Kanchan Atigre (supra)  which  interprets  the  expression "person"  in  a  narrow  sense  should  be  preferred cannot  be  accepted.  The judgment  of  the  Division Bench  binds  this  Court  the  same  will  have  to  be followed.  The reliance sought  to  be placed on the ratio of judgment of the Special Bench is misplaced. The decision in  Devidas Surwade (supra) being that of  the Division Bench and the expression "person" having been duly considered, it is not permissible for this Court to go into the question as to whether the ratio of judgments of learned Single Judge should be followed instead of  the view taken by the Division Bench.  The  ratio  of  the  judgment  of  the  Division Bench will  have to be respectfully followed. Hence, for  aforesaid  reasons,  the  submissions  made  on behalf of the petitioner cannot be accepted.”

The Special  Leave Petition in this case was dismissed at the

threshold.  

8. In  Sandip  Ganpatrao  Bhadade v.  Additional

Commissioner, Amravati and others  6, the finding of

both the authorities below was that the petitioners were

6  2017 (1) Mh.L.J.79.

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residing  in  or  occupying  the  property,  which  is  an

encroachment  over  the  Government  land.  The  Court

analysed the scheme of the Act and held as follows:

“13. The very object of introducing the provision of disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-3)  of the said Act is to avoid the conflict of interest by prohibiting the  persons,  who  are  the  encroachers  upon  the Government land or public property to get elected or continued as a member of the Panchayat, which is a democratically  elected  body  of  the  villagers.  It  is beyond  comprehension  to  assume  that  a  person under statutory obligation or a duty to protect the Government  land  or  public  property  from encroachment,  commits  an  act  of  such encroachment. To permit a person, who proposes to become  a  member  or  becomes  a  member  of  the Panchayat  to  be  the  encroacher  upon  the Government  land  or  public  property,  would  be anathematic,  acting  in  breach  of  statutory  duty, exposing himself  to prosecution under sub-sections (1) an (4) of Section 53, resulting ultimately in losing the protection under Section 180 read with Section 184 of the said Act. It is in this context that the text of disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-3) of the said Act is required to be analyzed and interpreted.

xxx xxx xxx 16.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid  meaning  of  the terminologies  "to  encroach",  "encroachment", "encroacher"  and  "encroached",  whoever  resides  in the  property  or  any  portion  thereof,  which  is  an encroachment  upon  the  Government  land  or  public property,  can be said to have "encroached" upon it and  becomes  an  "encroacher".  Whether  such  an encroachment is jointly with others and/or individually, either at one time or at different times remains hardly of  any  significance  as  he  becomes  liable  to  be removed and prosecuted under Section 53 of the said Act.  Whether  a  person  has  become  liable  to  be removed and/or prosecuted under Section 53 of the said Act from the Government land or public property, becomes a real test of attracting disqualification under

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Section 14(1)(j-3) of the said Act. If the answer is in the affirmative, the disqualification is incurred. 17. In view of the aforesaid position, the provision of Section 14(1)(j-3) of the said Act is attracted even in a case where a member of a Panchayat resides in the property  or  any  portion  thereof,  which  is  an encroachment  upon  the  Government  land  or  public property. The question as to whether any other person or  a  member  of  a  family  has  already  made  an encroachment, loses its significance and as soon as a member  or  proposed  member  joins  such  act,  he cannot  escape  from  the  clutches  of  disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-3) of the said Act. The question framed is answered accordingly. 18. If an intention of the Legislature is to prevent an encroachment  upon  the  Government  land  or  public property by a person, who is deemed to be a "public servant"  under  Section  184  entitled  to  enjoy  all privileges attached to it under Section 180 of the said Act,  can  it  be  said  that  such  an  intention  of  the Legislature be defeated by adopting circuitous way of occupying the property, which is an encroachment on the Government land or public property. The answer would  obviously  be  in  the  negative,  for  two  main reasons  -  (i)  the  act,  which  is  prohibited  directly, cannot  be  promoted  or  encouraged  indirectly  to defeat the object and purpose of such prohibition, and (ii) it would amount to promoting or encouraging the conflicting  interest,  necessarily  resulting  in  the disqualification  under  Section  14(1)(j-3)  of  the  said Act.”

9. The  High  Court  in,  Anita  Laxman  Junghare v.

Additional  Commissioner,  Amravati  Division  and

others  7 made  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the  different

streams of thought.  

“6. The views expressed both by the learned Single Judge in the case of  Kanchan Atigre (supra) and the

7  Writ Petition No. 1660 of 2017

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Division Bench in the case of Devidas Surwade (supra) can  certainly  be  reconciled.  There  is  no  conflict between the two. For attracting disqualification under section  14(1)  (j-3),  in  a  case  like  this,  the  crucial question  to  be  answered  is:  Does  the  legal representative or member of the original encroacher's family  continue  to  occupy  the  government  land  or property.  If  he  does,  he  attracts  the  disqualification under Section 14(1)(j-3). It is not an answer then for such person that the original encroachment was by his predecessor or family member and not by himself. If that  encroachment  is  continued by him,  he attracts the  disqualification.  That  was  the  case  in  Devidas Surwade. The original encroachment may have been by the petitioner's father,  but after the death of his father,  he  continued  to  occupy  the  property  and thereby attracted the disqualification of section 14(1) (j-3). On the other hand, in Kanchan's case, it was the petitioner's father-in-law, who was the encroacher; she had nothing to do with it. It was not the case of the State that she continued to occupy the property either as a legal heir of her father-in-law or as a member of her husband's  family.  The emphasis is  really on the continued  encroachment  and  not  so  much  on  the original act of encroachment. Encroachment, after all, is  not  a  one-time  act.  It  is  a  continuous  act.  If someone's  encroachment  is  continued  by  another, that other is equally an encroacher, as much as the original encroacher.”

10. The  case  before  us  is  of  a  post  election  scenario,

wherein the Collector has taken steps to disqualify an

elected  member  on  the  petition  filed  by  certain

individuals much after the election. It is the contention

of  the  learned  Counsel  for  the  respondents  that  the

incumbent being a member of the Panchayat and the

Panchayat being the primary authority  to  go into the

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question  of  encroachment  and  take  steps  for  the

eviction  of  encroachers,  the  participation  of  an

interested  member  in  the  Panchayat  would  be

detrimental to the object of the statute and it would be

against the larger public interest. In this context Section

53(1), (2) and (2A) of the Act are relevant:

“53.  Obstructions  and  encroachments  upon public  streets  and  open  sites.-(1)  Whoever, within the limits of the village,—

(a) builds or sets up any wall, or any fence, rail,  post,  stall,  verandah,  platform,  plinth, step  or  structure  or  thing  or  any  other  en- croachment or obstruction, or (b)  deposits,  or  causes to  be placed or  de- posited, any box, bale, package or merchan- dise or any other thing, or (c)  without  written  permission  given  to  the owner  or  occupier  of  a  building  by  a  Pan- chayat, puts up, so as to protect from an up- per storey thereof, any verandah, balcony, room or other structure or thing,  

in or over any public street or place, or in or over upon any open drains, gutter, sewer or aqueduct in such street or place, or contravenes any condi- tions, subject to which any permission as aforesaid is given or the provisions of any by-law made in re- lation  to  any  such  projections  or  cultivates  or makes any unauthorised use of any grazing land, not being private property, shall, on conviction, be punished with fine, which may extend to fifty ru- pees, and with further fine which may extend to five rupees for every day on which such obstruc- tion,  deposit,  projection,  cultivation  or  unautho- rised use continues after the date of first convic- tion for such offence.

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(2).  The  Panchayat shall  have power to remove any such obstruction or encroachment and to re- move any crop unauthorisedly cultivated on graz- ing land or any other land, not being private prop- erty, and shall have the like power to remove any unauthorised obstruction or encroachment of the like  nature  in  any  open  site  not  being  private property, whether such site is vested in the pan- chayat or not, provided that if the site be vested in Government the permission of the Collector or any officer authorised by him in this behalf shall have been first obtained. The expense of such re- moval shall be paid by the person who has caused the said obstruction or encroachment and shall be recoverable  in  the same manner  as  an amount claimed on account of any tax recoverable under Chapter IX. It shall be the duty of the Panchayat to remove such obstruction or encroachment im- mediately after it is noticed or brought to its no- tice, by following the procedure mentioned above.

[(2A) If any Panchayat fails to take action under sub-section (2), the Collector  suo motu or on an application made in this behalf, may take action as [provided in that sub-section, and submit the report thereof to the Commissioner]. The expense of such removal shall be paid by the person who has caused the said obstruction or encroachment or unauthorized cultivation of the crop and shall be recoverable from such person as an arrear of land revenue.]”

(Emphasis supplied)

11.  Thus,  under  the  statutory  scheme,  an encroacher  is

liable  to  be  evicted  by  the  Panchayat  and  if  the

Panchayat  fails,  the Collector  has  to  take action.  The

encroacher  is  also  liable  to  be  prosecuted.

Encroachment  is  certainly  to  be  condemned,  the

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encroacher  evicted  and  punished.  Desirably,  there

should  not  be  a  member  in  the  Panchayat  with

conflicting interest. But once a person is elected by the

people,  he  can  be  unseated  only  in  the  manner

provided under law. Even with the best of intention, if

there  is  no  statutory  expression  of  the  intention,  the

court cannot supply words for the sake of achieving the

alleged intention of the law maker. It is entirely within

the realm of the law maker to express clearly what they

intend. No doubt, there is a limited extent to which the

court  can  interpret  a  provision  so  as  to  achieve  the

legislative intent. That is in a situation where such an

interpretation is permissible, otherwise feasible, when it

is absolutely necessary, and where the intention is clear

but the words used are either inadequate or ambiguous.

That is not the situation here. In the Act, wherever the

law-makers wanted to specify  family,  they have done

so.  As  noted  by  some of  the  judgments  of  the  High

Court, in Explanation 2 for Section 14(1)(h), the failure

to  pay  any  tax  or  fee  due  to  the  Panchayat  or  Zila

Parishad  by  a  member  of  a  Hindu  Undivided  Family

(HUF) or  by a person belonging to a group has been

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expressly mentioned as a disqualification on others in

the family or group. It is, therefore, evident that when

the intent of the legislature was to disqualify a member

for the act of his family, it has specifically done so.  The

Court, in the process of interpretation, cannot lay down

what is desirable in its own opinion, if from the words

used, the legislative intention is otherwise discernible.   12.  Abhiram Singh v.  C.D.  Commachen (D)  By Lrs.

and others  8 is a recent Constitution Bench judgment of

this Court dealing with corrupt practices. Appeal on the

grounds of religion, race, caste, community, language,

etc.  of  the  candidates  and  the  electorate,  and

canvassing  votes  accordingly,  has  been held  to  be  a

corrupt  practice.  The  Court,  to  hold  so,  adopted  a

purposive  interpretative  process  declaring  that  the

Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1951  should  be

interpreted  in  that  context  to  be  electorate  centric

rather than candidate centric. That is not the situation

in the present case. The appellants were elected by the

people to the Panchayat. There is no case that they are

original encroachers on the public property. And this is

not the case where the alleged act of encroachment has 8  (2017) 2 SCC 629

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influenced the will of the people in which case, going by

Abhiram Singh (supra),  the  court  would  have  been

justified  in  attempting  a  purposive  interpretation  to

achieve a laudable object.

13. The respondents have placed reliance on Hari Ram v.

Jyoti  Prasad  and  another  9 to  say  that  an

encroachment is a continuing wrong. While there is no

quarrel with the aforesaid position, this case does not

further the point made by the respondents. It is a case

where there was an allegation of encroachment upon a

substantial part of a street by the appellant which was

causing inconvenience to the users of the street.  Hari

Ram (supra)  does  not  relate  to  interpretation  of  a

statute  dealing  with  election  to  a  public  office  or

disqualification  on  the  ground  of  encroachment.

Furthermore,  it  does  not  deal  with  the  question  of

whether a legal heir can be considered an encroacher.

Thus, the reliance on Hari Ram (supra) is misplaced in

the light of the present case.

14. As we have already noted above, the duty of the court

is not to lay down what is desirable in its own opinion.

Its  duty  is  to  state  what  is  discernible  from  the 9   (2011) 2 SCC 682

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expressions  used  in  the  statute.  The  court  can  also

traverse to an extent to see what is decipherable but

not to the extent of laying down something desirable

according  to  the  court  if  the  legislative  intent  is

otherwise  not  discernible.  What  is  desirable  is  the

jurisdiction  of  the  law-maker  and  only  what  is

discernible is that of the court. 15. From the Statements  of  Objects  and Reasons  for  the

amendment  introduced  in  2006,  it  is  seen  that  the

purpose  was  “to  disqualify  the  person  who  has

encroached  upon  the  Government  land  or  public

property, from becoming member of the Panchayat or

to continue as such”.  The person, who has encroached

upon the Government land or public  property,  as the

law now stands, for the purpose of disqualification, can

only be the person, who has actually, for the first time,

made the encroachment.  However,  in view of Section

53(1) of the Act, in case a member has been punished

for  encroachment,  he  shall  be  dismissed.  Similarly,  a

member against whom there is a final order of eviction

under Section 53(2) or (2A), shall also not be entitled to

continue as a member.

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16. In  case,  the  appellants  suffer  from  any  of  the  three

situations indicated above, they shall be unseated. The

rest  is  for  the  State  to  clarify  by  way  of  a  proper

amendment  in  case  they  really  and  truly  want  to

achieve the laudable object of preventing persons with

conflicting  interest  from  becoming  or  continuing  as

members  of  the  Panchayat.  The  extent  of  conflicting

interest is also for the Legislature to specify.   17. The impugned judgments are set aside and the appeals

are disposed of as above.

18. There shall be no order as to costs.

........................J.               (KURIAN JOSEPH)  

.......................J. (R. BANUMATHI)  

New Delhi; November 13, 2017.

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ITEM NO.1501 + 1502         COURT NO.5               SECTION III                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal  No(s).  2306-2307/2017 SAGAR PANDURANG DHUNDARE                           Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS KESHAV AABA PATIL & ORS.                           Respondent(s) with

Civil Appeal Nos. 5132-5133 of 2017

Date : 13-11-2017 These appeals were called on for Judgment today.  

Counsel for the  parties Mr. M.Y. Deshmukh, Adv.  

Mr. Yatin M. Jagtap, Adv.  Mr. Shakti Pandey, Adv.   Mr. Vijay Kumar, Adv.  Ms. Aparna Jha, Adv.  Mr. Sushil Karanjkar, Adv.  Mr. Srikant R. Deshmukh, Adv.  Mr. Sagar N. P. Patil, Adv.  Mr. Vinay Navare, Adv.  Ms. Gwen Karthika, Adv.  Ms. Abha R. Sharma, Adv.  Mr. Anurag Kishore, AOR Mr. Abdul Gaffar, Adv.  Mr. R. C. Sharma, Adv.  

                     Mr. Braj Kishore Mishra, AOR                      

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kurian Joseph pronounced the reportable judgment  of  the  Bench  comprising  His  Lordship  and  Hon'ble  Mrs. Justice R. Banumathi.

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The  appeals  are  disposed  of.   Pending  Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.   

(JAYANT KUMAR ARORA)                              (RENU DIWAN)    COURT MASTER                                ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)