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                                                                                        REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

      CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4715-4716 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) NOs.22263-22264 of 2012)

S.R. Tewari                                                                  ... Appellant  

                                             Versus

Union of India & Anr.                                       ...Respondents

With

Contempt Petition (C) Nos.180-181 of 2013

S.R. Tewari                                                                  ... Petitioner   

                                             Versus

R.K. Singh & Anr.                                       ...Contemnors

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos. 22263-22264 of 2012.

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2. These  appeals  have been preferred against  the judgment  and  

order dated 15.2.2012 of the High Court of Delhi passed in Review  

Petition No.102 of 2012; and the order dated 1.2.2012 in Writ Petition  

No. 4207 of 2011. By way of this order the High Court has allowed  

the writ petition filed by the Union of India – respondent no.1 against  

the order of  the Central  Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter called  

the  ‘Tribunal’),  raising  a  very  large  number  of  grievances.  The  

appellant was running from pillar to post as he had been harassed and  

penalised for no fault of his own and has been awarded a punishment  

which is uncalled for.  Thus, he had moved the Tribunal, High Court  

of Delhi and this Court several times.

3. Facts  and  circumstances  giving  rise  to  these  appeals  and  

contempt petitions are as under:-

A. The appellant, an IPS Officer of 1982 batch joined the service  

on  1.9.1982,  promoted  on  the  post  of  Deputy  Inspector  General  

(D.I.G.), and subsequently as Inspector General of Police (I.G.) in his  

cadre of the State of Andhra Pradesh in May 2001.  The appellant was  

on deputation and was posted as I.G., Frontier Head Quarters, Border  

Security Force (BSF) (North Bengal) from 23.6.2005 to 14.11.2006.   

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B. The  appellant  was  put  under  suspension  vide  order  dated  

13.11.2006 as the disciplinary authority decided to hold disciplinary  

proceedings.  As  a  consequence  thereof,  a  charge  sheet  dated  

23.3.2007 containing 8 charges was served upon him.  The appellant  

denied  all  the  said  charges  and  therefore,  an  Inquiry  Officer  was  

appointed.  The Department examined a large number of witnesses  

and produced documents in support of its case.  The appellant also  

defended himself and the Inquiry Officer submitted the report dated  

23.12.2008  holding  him guilty,  as  charge  no.3  stood  proved  fully  

while charge nos.4 and 6 stood proved partly.

C. The  Disciplinary  Authority  did  not  agree  with  one  of  the  

findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer on one charge and held that  

charge no.4 was proved fully.  In response to the show cause notice  

issued to the appellant by the Disciplinary Authority, he submitted a  

detailed  representation  against  the  disagreement  note  by  the  

Disciplinary Authority on 10.11.2009.

D. On  being  sought,  the  Union  Public  Service  Commission  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘UPSC’)  gave  its  advice  regarding  the  

punishment  on  20.8.2010.   The  Central  Vigilance  Commission  

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(hereinafter referred to as ‘CVC’) also gave its advice in respect of the  

charges against the appellant on 18.2.2009. After considering all the  

material, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of punishment of  

dismissal from service on 8.9.2010.

E. Aggrieved, the appellant challenged the said order of dismissal  

by filing OA No.3234 of 2010 before the Tribunal.  It was contested  

and opposed by respondent no.1. The Tribunal set aside the order of  

punishment dated 8.9.2010 vide judgment and order dated 11.2.2011  

and  directed  for  reinstatement  of  the  appellant  in  service  with  all  

consequential benefits.

F. Aggrieved, respondent no.1, Union of India challenged the said  

order of  the Tribunal  by filing Writ  Petition (C) No.4207 of  2011  

before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court vide  its judgment  

and  order  dated  1.2.2012  set  aside  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

11.2.2011,  passed  by the Tribunal  and directed  respondent  no.1  to  

pass a fresh order in respect of charge nos.4 and 6 as in the opinion of  

the High Court only the said two charges stood proved.

G. Appellant  filed Review Petition No. 102 of  2012 against  the  

order dated 1.2.2012, however, the same was rejected vide order dated  

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15.2.2012.  

H. Aggrieved,  respondent  no.1 filed SLP(C) No.14639 of  2012,  

challenging the said order of the High Court of Delhi dated 1.2.2012.  

However, the same was dismissed by this Court on 9.5.2012.   

I. The  appellant  challenged  the  same  order  of  the  High  Court  

dated 1.2.2012 by filing these appeals.  In the meanwhile,  respondent  

no.1 re-instated the appellant on 23.5.2012 and tentatively formed a  

decision to impose a suitable penalty on the said two charges  in view  

of  the  order  of  the  High  Court  dated  1.2.2012,  a  penalty  of  

withholding  two  increments  for  one  year  without  cumulative  

effect.   The respondent  no.1 sought advice from the UPSC, which  

vide letter dated 13.8.2012 advised that the appellant be compulsorily  

retired. The advice given by the UPSC was served upon the appellant  

and he was asked to make a representation on the same.   

In the meanwhile, this Court vide order dated 5.10.2012 asked  

the appellant to file a detailed representation before respondent no.1,  

who was asked in turn to pass a speaking and reasoned order within a  

stipulated period in respect of the punishment.  However, the order of  

punishment  would  not  be  given  effect  to  immediately  and  the  

same  would  be  placed  before  this  Court  on  the  next  date  of  

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hearing.  In  pursuance  thereof,  the  appellant  submitted  the  

representation  on  5.10.2012.  Respondent  no.1  vide  order  dated  

17.10.2012 passed the order imposing the punishment of compulsory  

retirement.  The said order was given effect to and communicated to  

the appellant vide letter dated 19.11.2012.

J. Thus, the questions that arise for consideration of this Court are  

whether  the  punishment  of  compulsory  retirement  awarded  by  the  

Disciplinary Authority is proportionate to the delinquency proved and  

whether the respondents in the contempt petitions wilfully violated the  

order  dated  5.10.2012  passed  by  this  Court  holding  that  the  

punishment should not be given effect to until it is produced before  

the court at the time of the next hearing.  

4. Shri  P.S.  Patwalia,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant has submitted that there has been misreading of evidence by  

the High Court of Delhi that charge nos.4 and 6 have been proved  

fully.  The charges were trivial in nature and could not warrant the  

punishment  of  compulsory  retirement.   The  appellant  faced  

departmental  proceedings  for  six  years  and  had  been  deprived  of  

being  considered  for  further   promotion.  He  is  due  to  retire  in  

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December,  2013.  The appellant  remained under suspension for 11  

months and was dismissed from service for about 19 months. He had  

been  granted  ‘Z’  class  protection  initially  which was  subsequently  

scaled  down  to  ‘Y’  category.  The  appellant  was  given  the  said  

security/protection  even  during  the  period  of  suspension  and  

dismissal. Even during that period he had  been provided with a bullet  

proof car and PSOs as he had been facing  threats  from naxalites.  

Therefore, the punishment so imposed is to be set aside.

In  view  of  the  orders  passed  by  this  court  stating  that  the  

punishment order can be passed by the respondents but could not be  

given effect to without production before the court stood voluntarily  

violated.   Therefore,  the  respondents  in  the  contempt  petitions  are  

liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of the same.

5. Per  contra,  Shri  R.P.  Bhatt,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  

Union of  India  has  vehemently  opposed  the  appeals  and contempt  

petitions contending that the said charges stood fully proved against  

the appellant. Being an IPS Officer, he knew his responsibilities and  

no leniency should be granted.  The order passed by this Court has not  

voluntarily  been  violated.   Therefore,  the  appeals  as  well  as  the  

contempt petitions are liable to be dismissed.

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6. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. The  chargesheet  dated  23.3.2007  containing  the  following  8  

charges was served upon the appellant under Rule 8 of the All India  

Services  (Discipline  and  Appeal)  Rules,  1969  for  his  alleged  

misconducts during his tenure in BSF, North Bengal, on the following  

counts :-  

(i) Indulged  in  living  with  a  lady  by  name  Smt.  Chandrakala, not being his legally wedded wife.  

(ii)   Allowed  unauthorized  interference  by  Smt.  Chandrakala in the official functioning of North Bengal  Frontier  causing premature  release  of  four  constables  from the Quarter Guard.

(iii) Complete  disregard  to  the  rules  and  without  jurisdiction,  reviewed  punishment  awarded  and  mitigated  the  sentence  awarded  to  No.  86161306  Constable Prakash Singh by Frontier Headquarter, BSF  South Bengal.  

(iv) Favoritism and manipulation in the selection of  Headmaster,  BSF  Primary  School  Kadmatala  even  though  the  candidate  did  not  possess  essential  qualification and was not eligible.  

(v) Assisted enrolment of a person in BSF from his  native district, UP by fraudulent means.  

(vi) Misuse of official vehicle, arms and ammunition  

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and BSF personnel during the marriage of his son in  Feb. 2006 at his native place in Balia, UP.  

(vii) Retaining of four BSF Constables for Personal  work.  

(viii) Attachment  of  Shri  Prakash  Singh,  constable  with North Bengal Frontier despite contrary remarks of  the PSO, North Bengal Frontier.  

8. The  Inquiry  Officer  held  that  out  of  the  8  charges  levelled  

against the appellant, charge nos.1, 2, 5, 7 and 8 were not proved at  

all.  Charge no.3 was proved fully and charge nos.4 and 6 stood partly  

proved.   

The Inquiry Officer dealt with the said charges as under:   

I. Charge No.3 stood  proved only to the extent of  passing an  

order  in  a  case  lying  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Commanding  

Officer.

II. Charge  4  proved  partly to  the  extent  of  wrong  selection  of  

Head Master and Teacher in BSF Primary School Kadmatala by the  

Commanding Officer without any favouritism and manipulation.

III. Charge No.6 stood partly proved to the extent  of  using BSF  

vehicle  for  private  journey  outside  jurisdiction  upto  Balia  without  

prior permission of the Competent Authority.  

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9. The  Disciplinary  Authority  dealt  with  two  of  the  charges  

differently:  

Charge No.3:   The appellant though not competent to review  

the  punishment  awarded  to  one  Sri  Prakash  in  his  capacity  as  a  

prescribed officer and thus, it clearly established the misconduct on  

the part of the appellant and the charge stood proved against him.

Charge No.4: Shri S.S. Majumdar did not fulfil the eligibility  

criteria and  was not recommended by the Selection Board for the  

post  of  Head  Master  and  thus,  he  had  been  favoured  by  the  

appellant who  appointed  him as  Head  Master.   Thus,  this  charge  

stood proved.

10. All the proved charges were re-examined by the Tribunal. After  

re-appreciating  the  evidence,  the  Tribunal  dealt  with  charge  no.3  

observing  that  entertaining  a  review  petition  is  a  quasi-judicial  

function. It may be without jurisdiction and the order passed can be  

corrected in further proceedings but it does not amount to misconduct.  

The Tribunal took note of the finding on charge no.4 that the order of  

appointment of a primary school teacher as well as Head Master in  

BSF  School  had  been  without  favouritism/manipulation in  the  

selection process as recorded by the Inquiry Officer and came to the  

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conclusion that the selection was made by the Board having various  

members and not by the appellant alone and it also took note of the  

fact  that  Shri  Majumdar  was  not  appointed  as  a  primary  school  

teacher by the appellant, rather he had been working in the school for  

10 years.  Other teachers who had been working for more than 7 years  

were also considered.  Instead of adducing any documentary evidence  

the Department only examined witnesses in the inquiry. The appellant  

was competent to decide the eligibility criteria for the post of Head  

Master.  There was  no favouritism or manipulation on the part of  

the  appellant.  The  Tribunal  further  took  note  of  the  subsequent  

developments as under:-

“It is rather strange that the same very respondents, who  were harping upon irregular appointment of Majumdar as  Headmaster, the same being against the education code,  when the applicant  issued them show cause  notice for  termination  of  services,  directed  him  to  withdraw  the  same and permit all of them to continue in service. So  much  so,  it  was  specifically  ordered  that  Majumdar  would be continued in service.”  

And then recorded the following finding:

“We accept the contention of the learned counsel for the  applicant that the respondents are blowing hot and cold in  the  same  breath.  The  applicant,  at  the  most,  could  be  jointly  held  responsible  for  making  selection  of  Majumdar  on the  post  of  Headmaster,  even though he  was  the  best  amongst  the  lot  to  the  extent  that  his  

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appointment  was  against  the  educational  qualification  criteria mentioned in the advertisement itself, but for that,  as  mentioned  above,  he  alone  could  not  be  held  responsible.”                                         (Emphasis added)

On charge no.6, the Tribunal took note of the facts as under:

“The charge has been partly proved by them completely  ignoring the explanation furnished by the applicant.  There is thus, an apparent error both on facts and law.  The  respondents  completely  ignored  the  defence  projected by the applicant. Even though, prima facie, we  are  of  the  view  that  the  explanation  furnished  by  the  applicant required acceptance, but once, while doing so  we  will  be  appreciating  evidence,  we  may  not  do  the  same.”                                                    (Emphasis added)

And further held as under:  

“On this  charge,  therefore,  the  course  open  may  have  been to remit the matter to the concerned authorities, but  in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we  refrain from doing so, as even if the charge to the extent  it stood proved, the same requires to be ignored inasmuch  as, once the applicant was entitled to take the vehicle and  PSOs to Balia, not obtaining prior permission would not  be a serious issue at all.”                      (Emphasis added)

11. The High Court while dealing with charge no.3 concurred with  

the Tribunal that entertaining the review petition against the order of  

punishment  could  have  been without  jurisdiction  but  there  was  no  

finding by the Inquiry Officer that it was intentional.  Therefore, there  

could  be  a  judicial  error  which could  be  set  aside  or  corrected  in  

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appeal  or  in  any  other  proceedings  but  it  did  not  amount  to  

misconduct. The same could not be a subject matter of enquiry as it  

was  not  a  misconduct  for  want  of  malafide  or  any  element  of  

corruption or culpable negligence on the part of the appellant.  In such  

circumstances,  it  would  not  be  permissible  to  consider  it  as  a  

misconduct.

So far as the appointment of Shri Majumdar as a Head Master  

of the school is concerned, the High Court held that the appellant was  

guilty of favouritism shown to Shri Majumdar.

Charge No.6 related to the allegation of using the vehicle from  

Patna to Balia.  The High Court also took note that the appellant was  

granted ‘Y’ category security, due to threats from Naxalites. However,  

he was not entitled to an escort vehicle for his journey from Patna to  

Balia without permission. And in view of the above, the High Court  

modified the findings recorded by the Tribunal.

12. We have reconsidered the case within permissible limits. The  

case remained limited to the charge nos.  4 and 6 only as all  other  

charges have lost the significance at one stage or the other, and we  

have to advert only to the said charges.  

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The Inquiry Officer,  the Disciplinary Authority,  the Tribunal  

and the High Court have considered all the facts involved herein. On  

charge  no.4,  the  High  Court  has  admittedly  committed  a  factual  

mistake observing that  Shri  S.S.  Majumdar  had been appointed by  

appellant as a regular teacher with retrospective effect. In fact there is  

no evidence that appellant had appointed him or regularised him as  

Shri Majumdar was already in service for a period of 10 years. Same  

remained the position in respect of charge no.6 as the High Court mis-

directed itself as it  considered the case as if  the charge against the  

appellant  had  been  taking  two  vehicles;  one   his  official  car  and  

another  an  escort,  though  there  had  been  no  such  charge  levelled  

against the appellant.   

The  High  Court  while  dealing  with  the  review  petition  on  

charge no.4,  did not consider the fact that the appointment of Shri  

S.S. Majumdar  as a Head Master, was a unanimous decision of the  

Board and  not that of the appellant alone. The High Court also did  

not correct the mistake in its original judgment regarding the usage of  

two vehicles.  

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13. In  Commissioner  of  Income-tax,  Bombay  &  Ors.  v.  

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1182, this Court  

held that various  parameters of the court’s power of judicial review of  

administrative or executive action on which the court can interfere had  

been well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole  

catena of decisions. The Court further held:  

“It is a settled position that if the action or decision is  perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons,  properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at  by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong  approach,  or  has  been  influenced  by  irrelevant  or  ex- traneous matters the court would be justified in interfer- ing with the same.”  

14. The court can exercise the power of judicial review if there is a  

manifest error in the exercise of power or the exercise of power is  

manifestly arbitrary or if the power is exercised on the basis of facts  

which do not exist and which are patently erroneous. Such exercise of  

power would stand vitiated. The court may be justified in exercising  

the power of judicial review if the impugned order suffers from mala  

fide, dishonest or corrupt practices, for the reason, that the order had  

been passed by the authority beyond the limits conferred upon the au-

thority by the legislature. Thus, the court has to be satisfied that the  

order had been passed by the authority only on the grounds of illegal-

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ity, irrationality and procedural impropriety before it interferes.  The  

court  does  not  have  the expertise  to  correct  the administrative  de-

cision. Therefore, the court itself may be fallible and interfering with  

the order of the authority may impose heavy administrative burden on  

the State or may lead to unbudgeted expenditure. (Vide:  Tata Cellu-

lar v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 11;  People’s Union for Civil  

Liberties & Anr. v.  Union of India & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 456; and  

State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. v.  Sanjeev alias Bittoo, AIR 2005  

SC 2080).  

15. In  Air India Ltd. v.  Cochin International Airport Ltd. &  

Ors., AIR 2000 SC 801, this Court explaining the scope of judicial re-

view held that the court must act with great caution and should exer-

cise such power only in furtherance to public interest and not merely  

on the making out of a legal point. The court must always keep the  

larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its interven-

tion is called for or not.  

16. There may be a case where the holders of public offices have  

forgotten that the offices entrusted to them are a sacred trust and such  

offices are meant for use and not abuse. Where such trustees turn to  

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dishonest means to gain an undue advantage, the scope of judicial re-

view attains paramount importance. (Vide: Krishan Yadav & Anr. v.  

State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1994 SC 2166).

17. The court must keep in mind that judicial review is not akin to  

adjudication on merit by re-appreciating the evidence as an appellate  

authority. Thus, the court is devoid of the power to re-appreciate the  

evidence and come to its own conclusion on the  proof of a particular  

charge,  as  the scope of judicial  review is limited to the process of  

making the decision  and not against the decision itself and in such a  

situation  the  court  cannot  arrive  on  its  own  independent  finding.  

(Vide: High Court of Judicature at Bombay through its Registrar  

v.  Udaysingh s/o Ganpatrao Naik Nimbalkar & Ors., AIR 1997  

SC 2286;  Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. Mohd. Nas-

rullah Khan, AIR 2006 SC 1214; and  Union of India & Ors.  v.  

Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535).

18. The question of interference on the quantum of punishment, has  

been considered by this Court in a catena of judgments, and it was  

held that if the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the gravity  

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of the misconduct, it would be arbitrary, and thus, would violate the  

mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution.  

In  Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India & Ors.,  AIR 1987 SC  

2386,  this Court observed as under:

“But the  sentence has to suit  the offence and the of- fender.  It  should not  be vindictive  or unduly harsh.  It   should not  be so disproportionate  to the offence as to   shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive   evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part   of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even   on the aspect,  which is otherwise,  within the exclusive   province  of  the  Court  Martial,  if  the  decision  of  the   Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of   logic, then the sentence would not be immune from cor- rection. In the present case, the punishment is so strin- gently disproportionate as to call for and justify interfer- ence. It cannot be allowed to remain uncorrected in judi- cial review.”                                (Emphasis added)

(See also: Union of India & Anr.  v. G. Ganayutham (dead by Lrs.),  

AIR  1997  SC  3387;  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  &  Ors.  v.  J.P.  

Saraswat, (2011) 4 SCC 545; Chandra Kumar Chopra v. Union of  

India & Ors.,  (2012)  6 SCC 369;  and  Registrar General,  Patna  

High Court  v.  Pandey Gajendra Prasad & Ors.,  AIR 2012 SC  

2319).  

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19. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1996 SC  

484, this Court after examining various its earlier decisions observed  

that  in  exercise  of  the  powers  of  judicial  review,  the  court  cannot  

“normally” substitute its own conclusion or penalty. However, if the  

penalty imposed by an authority “shocks the conscience” of the court,  

it would appropriately mould the relief either directing the authority to  

reconsider the penalty imposed and in exceptional and rare cases, in  

order to shorten the litigation, itself, impose appropriate punishment  

with cogent reasons in support thereof. While examining the issue of  

proportionality,  court  can  also  consider  the  circumstances  under  

which the misconduct was committed. In a given case, the prevail-

ing circumstances might have forced the accused to act in a certain  

manner though he had not intended to do so. The court may further  

examine the effect,  if  the order is  set  aside or substituted by some  

other penalty.  However, it  is only in very rare cases that the court  

might, to shorten the litigation, think of substituting its own view as to  

the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the  

Competent Authority.  

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20. In  V. Ramana v. A.P.S.R.T.C. & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 3417,  

this Court considered the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of  

punishment is permissible only if it is found that  it is not commen-

surate with the gravity of the charges and if the court comes to the  

conclusion that the scope of judicial review as to the quantum of pun-

ishment is permissible only if it is found to be “shocking to the con-

science of the Court, in the sense that it was in defiance of logic or  

moral standards.” In a normal course, if the punishment imposed is  

shockingly disproportionate, it would be appropriate to direct the Dis-

ciplinary Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.  However,  in  

order to shorten the litigation, in exceptional and rare cases, the  

Court itself can impose appropriate punishment by recording co-

gent reasons in support thereof.

21. In  State of Meghalaya & Ors. v. Mecken Singh N. Marak,  

AIR 2008 SC 2862, this Court observed that a Court or a Tribunal  

while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons  

as to why it is felt that the punishment is not commensurate with the  

proved charges. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for  

interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases.  The  

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punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate au-

thority unless shocks the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected  

to judicial review. (See also: Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. v. P. Ja-

yaram Reddy, (2009) 2 SCC 681).

22. The role of the court in the matter of departmental proceedings  

is very limited and the court cannot substitute its own views or find-

ings by replacing the findings arrived at by the authority on detailed  

appreciation of the evidence on record.  In the matter of imposition of  

sentence, the scope for interference by the court is very limited and re-

stricted to exceptional cases. The punishment imposed by the discip-

linary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the con-

science of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. The court  

has to record reasons as to why the punishment is disproportionate.  

Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere state-

ment that it is disproportionate would not suffice. (Vide: Union of In-

dia & Ors.  v.  Bodupalli  Gopalaswami, (2011) 13 SCC 553;  and  

Sanjay  Kumar  Singh  v.  Union  of  India  & Ors.,  AIR  2012  SC  

1783).   

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23. In  Union of  India  & Ors.  v.  R.K.  Sharma, AIR 2001 SC  

3053,  this Court explained the observations made in Ranjit Thakur  

(supra) observing that if  the charge was ridiculous, the punishment  

was harsh or strikingly disproportionate it would warrant interference.  

However, the said observations in  Ranjit Thakur (supra) are not to  

be taken to mean that a court can, while exercising the power of judi-

cial review, interfere with the punishment merely because it considers  

the punishment to be disproportionate.  It  was held that only in ex-

treme cases, which on their face, show perversity or irrationality, there  

could be judicial  review and courts should not  interfere merely on  

compassionate grounds.  

24. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be per-

verse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding rel-

evant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible  

material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is “against  

the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic  

as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on  

the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence  and no  

reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse.  But  

if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which  

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could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse  

and the findings would not be interfered with. (Vide:  Rajinder Ku-

mar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1984 SC 1805; Kuldeep  

Singh v.  Commissioner  of  Police  &  Ors., AIR  1999  SC  677;  

Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao & Ors. v.  State of Andhra Pradesh  

thr.  Secretary, AIR 2010 SC 589;  and  Babu v.  State  of  Kerala,  

(2010) 9 SCC 189).  

Hence, where there is evidence of malpractice, gross irregular-

ity or illegality, interference is permissible.   

25. So far as charge no.4 is concerned, the matter was considered  

by a Board consisting of several officers and the appellant could not  

have been selectively targeted for  disciplinary action.  Further,  no  

material could be placed on record that BSF  had ever formulated a  

policy for regularisation of a temporary teacher as a regular teacher  

and in such a fact-situation, the appellant could not have regularised  

the services of Shri Majumdar as a school teacher, even if he had the  

experience  of  10  years.  (This  was  not  even  a  charge  against  the  

appellant nor there was any finding of the Inquiry Officer, nor has  

such a matter been agitated before the Tribunal).

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It is evident from the record that as per letter dated 4.4.2013  

sent by the Government of India to the appellant through the Chief  

Secretary, Andhra Pradesh, the proposed punishment is as under:

“A penalty of withholding two increments for one year  without cumulative effect, be imposed on the appellant as  a  punishment  under  Rule  6  of  the  All  India  Services  (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969.”

26. The proved charges remained only charge nos.4 and 6 and in  

both the cases the misconduct seems to be of an administrative nature  

rather than a misconduct of a serious nature. It was not the case of the  

department that the appellant had taken the escort vehicle with him.  

There was only one vehicle which was an official vehicle for his use  

and charge no.6 stood partly proved. In view thereof, the punishment  

of compulsory retirement shocks the conscience of the court and by  

no stretch of imagination can it be held to be proportionate or com-

mensurate to the delinquency committed by and proved against the  

appellant.  The only punishment which could be held to be commen-

surate to the delinquency was as proposed by the Government of India  

to withhold two increments for one year without cumulative effect. It  

would have been appropriate to remand the case to the disciplinary  

authority to impose the appropriate punishment. However, consider-

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ing the chequered history of the case and in view of the fact that the  

appellant had remained under suspension for 11 months, suffered the  

order of dismissal for 19 months and would retire after reaching the  

age of superannuation in December 2013, the facts of the case warrant  

that this court should substitute the punishment of compulsory retire-

ment to the punishment proposed by the Union of India i.e. withhold-

ing of two increments for one year without having cumulative effect.  

In view thereof, we do not want to proceed with the contempt  

petitions. The appeals as well as the contempt petitions stand disposed  

of accordingly.  

………………………………J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………J. (DIPAK MISRA)

New Delhi, May 28, 2013  

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