09 April 2013
Supreme Court
Download

RUSHI GUMAN SINGH Vs STATE OF ORISSA

Bench: SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,M.Y. EQBAL
Case number: C.A. No.-002968-002968 / 2013
Diary number: 35993 / 2011
Advocates: SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Vs KIRTI RENU MISHRA


1

Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. ………………. OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NO.34394 OF 2011]

Rushi Guman Singh                     ...Appellant  

VERSUS

State of Orissa & Ors.                           

...Respondents

       J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the order dated  

15th September 2011 of  the High Court  of  Orissa at  

Cuttack dismissing the Writ Petition (C) No.16450 of  

2010  filed  by  the  appellant  challenging  the  order  

dated 25th February, 2009 directing that the appellant  

shall  be  under  deemed  suspension  with  effect  

from 14th February, 2003.

1

2

Page 2

3. Briefly stated the facts are that the appellant,  

who was working as a Soil Conservation Officer (Class  

I)  with the Government of Orissa,  was placed under  

suspension  by  order  dated  12th June,  1998  in  

contemplation of  a  disciplinary  inquiry  as  envisaged  

under Rule 12(1)(a) of the Orissa Civil Services (CCA)  

Rules,  1962 (in  short  “OCS (CCA)  Rules”).  However,  

the suspension was revoked during the pendency of  

the  enquiry  proceeding  on  20th July,  1999.  In  his  

report,  dated  30th March,  2000,  the  enquiry  officer  

exonerated the appellant of all the charges. However,  

the disciplinary authority disagreed with the findings  

of the enquiry officer and issued a show cause notice  

to the appellant               dated 4 th February, 2002  

proposing the punishment of dismissal. The appellant  

submitted his reply to the show cause notice on 4th  

March, 2002. By an order dated 14th February, 2003,  

the  disciplinary  authority  passed  an  order  imposing  

the punishment  of  removal  on the appellant.  It  was  

also directed that the period of suspension from 13th  

June, 1998 to 20th July, 1999 is treated as such.

2

3

Page 3

4. Aggrieved by the order dated 14th February,  

2003, the appellant moved the Orissa Administrative  

Tribunal, (OAT), Cuttack Bench, Cuttack in OA No.994  

of 2003. On 7th July, 2006, the OA was dismissed by  

the OAT. The appellant challenged the order of OAT in  

Writ Petition (C) No.10653 of 2006 in the Orissa High  

Court.  By  an  order  dated  24th June,  2008,  the  writ  

petition was allowed. The order of OAT was set aside  

and the order of the Government of Orissa dated 14th  

February, 2003 was quashed. A direction was issued  

to  the  disciplinary  authority  to  provide  reasonable  

opportunity  to  the  appellant  before  taking  a  final  

decision in the matter relating to the findings on the  

charges framed against him. Special Leave Petition (C)  

No.24190 of 2008 filed by the State of Orissa against  

the aforesaid order of the High Court was dismissed by  

this Court                       on 17 th October, 2008. After  

dismissal of the aforesaid SLP, pursuant to the orders  

passed  by  the  High  Court  on  24th June,  2008,  the  

disciplinary  authority  issued  a  show  cause  notice  

dated 25th February, 2009 to the appellant calling for  

his representation. He was also informed that as per  

3

4

Page 4

the provisions of law in Rule 12(4) of the OCS (CCA)  

Rules, he has been placed under suspension from the  

date  of  the  original  order  of  removal,  i.e.,  14th  

February,  2003,  from Government  service  and  shall  

continue  to  remain  under  suspension  until  further  

orders.  Being  aggrieved  by  the  aforesaid  order  of  

suspension,  the  appellant  moved  the  OAT  Bench  at  

Cuttack  in  OA  No.1915  ©  of  2009  which  was  

dismissed. The appellant challenged the order passed  

by  the  Government  of  Orissa  dated  25th February,  

2009 and the order passed by the OAT, by filing the  

Writ Petition (C) NO.16450 of 2010.  The aforesaid writ  

petition has been dismissed by the High Court by an  

order  dated  15th September,  2011.  It  is  this  order  

which has been challenged in the present appeal.  

5. In  the  impugned  order,  the  High  Court  has  

considered the provisions contained in Rule 12(4) of  

the OCS (CCA) Rules which reads as under :-  

“Rule 12(4). Where a penalty of dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  from  service  imposed  upon  a  Government  servant is set side or declared or rendered  void in consequence of or by a decision of a  

4

5

Page 5

court of law and disciplinary authority, on a  consideration of  the circumstances  of  the  case  decides  to  hold  a  further  inquiry  against him on the allegations on which the  penalty  of  dismissal;  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  was  originally  imposed, the Government servant shall be  deemed  to  have  been  placed  under  suspension  by  the  appointing  authority  form  the  date  of  the  original  orders  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  and  shall  continue  to  remain  under suspension until further orders.”   

6. It  has  been  held  that  under  the  aforesaid  

provision  where  a  penalty  of  removal  from  

Government service has been set aside by a Court of  

law and the disciplinary  authority  decides to  hold  a  

further  inquiry  against  him,  on  the  allegations  on  

which the penalty of removal was originally imposed,  

the  Government  servant  shall  be  deemed  to  have  

been  placed  under  suspension.  In  coming  to  the  

aforesaid conclusion, the High Court has relied on the  

ratio of law laid down by this Court in the case of H.L.  

Mehra Vs.  Union  of  India  1   and  the  Constitution  

Bench  Judgment  in  the  case  of  Khem  Chand Vs.  

Union of India & Ors.  2    1 (1974) 4 SCC 396 2 AIR 1963 SC 687

5

6

Page 6

7. We have  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

parties.  

8. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, learned senior advocate  

appearing for the appellant has submitted that after  

the order of removal was quashed by the High Court  

on 24th June, 2008, the appellant was entitled to be  

reinstated  in  service.  In  passing  the  order  

dated 25th February, 2009 retrospectively placing the  

appellant  under  the  deemed  suspension  with  effect  

from  14th February,  2003,  the  respondents  have  

wrongly invoked Rule 12(4) of the OCS (CCA) Rules.  

He  submitted  that  the  appellant  was  not  under  

suspension at the time when the order of removal was  

passed  on  14th February,  2003.  Therefore,  it  was  

necessary  for  the  respondents  to  consider  the  

question as to whether the appellant was to be placed  

under suspension under Rule 12(1) of the OCS (CCA)  

Rules.  Learned counsel  submitted  that  this  Court  in  

the cases of  H.L. Mehra and Khem Chand (supra)  

had considered a similar situation under Rule 10(4) of  

6

7

Page 7

the Central  Civil  Services (Classification, Control and  

Appeal)  Rules,  1965  which  is  pari  materia to  Rule  

12(4) of the OCS (CCA) Rules. Therefore, the law laid  

down  in  the  aforesaid  two  judgments  would  be  

applicable to the facts of this case.  

9. Mr.  Shibashish  Misra,  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  the  respondents  submitted  that  the  

order under Rule 12(4) of the OCS (CCA) Rules dated  

25th February, 2009 was consequential to the direction  

issued by the High Court on 24th June, 2008. By the  

aforesaid order, the High Court had directed to provide  

reasonable  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  appellant  

before taking a final decision in the matter relating to  

the  findings  on  the  charges  framed  against  him.  

Therefore, under           Rule 12(4) of OCS (CCA) Rules,  

the  appellant  was  deemed  to  be  placed  under  

suspension, by operation of Law, even if he was not  

under  suspension  at  the  time  Order  dated  14th  

February, 2003 was passed.  

7

8

Page 8

10. We have considered the submissions made by  

the learned counsel for the parties. We do not find any  

merit in the submissions of Mr. Viswanathan that even  

though the order of removal was set aside by the High  

Court on the ground that the disciplinary authority had  

passed the order dated 14th February, 2003 directing  

the  removal  of  the  appellant  from  Government  

service,  in  breach of  rules  of  natural  justice,  it  was  

necessary  for  the  Government  to  pass  an  order  of  

suspension  of  the  appellant  under  Rule  12(1).  The  

High  Court  directed  the  Disciplinary  Authority  to  

continue with the Disciplinary Proceedings after giving  

an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.  Rule 12(1)  

enables the appointing authority or any authority to  

which it is subordinate to place a Government servant  

under  suspension  where  a  disciplinary  proceeding  

against  him  is  contemplated  or  is  pending.  The  

aforesaid stage in the present case came to an end  

when the appellant was suspended for the first time  

on 12th June, 1998. Undoubtedly, the aforesaid order of  

suspension was revoked on            20th July, 1999.  

Thereafter the appellant was removed from service on  

8

9

Page 9

14th February,  2003  when  the  disciplinary  authority  

disagreed  with  the  findings  of  the  enquiry  officer  

exonerating the appellant. It was this order of removal  

which has been set aside by the High Court on 24th  

June, 2008 in W.P.(C) No.10653 of 2006. At that stage,  

a  department  had  no  option  but  to  pass  an  order  

under Rule 12(4) directing that the appellant shall be  

deemed to have been suspended w.e.f. 14th February,  

2003. The aforesaid understanding of the Rules by the  

Government of Orissa as well as by the High Court is  

in consonance with the interpretation of the identical  

rule, Rule 12(4) which was under consideration of this  

Court in the case of Khem Chand (supra). In Khem  

Chand’s case (supra), the appellant had challenged  

the  vires  of  Rule  12(4)  of  Central  Civil  Service  

(Classification,  Control  &  Appeal)  Rules,  1957,  this  

Court  upon  consideration  of  the  entire  matter  held  

that the rule did not offend the provision contained in  

Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.  

11. Mr. Viswanathan, however, submitted that this  

Court  had  held  that  Rule  12(3)  will  come  into  

9

10

Page 10

operation when the appellate authority  sets  aside a  

penalty  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  

retirement and remits the case to the authority which  

imposed  the  penalty  for  further  enquiry.  In  such  

circumstances, there would be no deemed suspension  

unless  the  employee  was  earlier  under  suspension.  

But  in  the  same  situation,  there  would  be  deemed  

suspension when the order of removal is set aside by  

the  Court.   This,  according  to               Mr.  

Vishwanathan,  would  render  Rule  12(4)  ultra  vires  

Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.  It is not  

necessary for us to examine the aforesaid submission  

on merits as the issue is no longer res integra. A three  

Judge Bench of this Court in Nelson Motis Vs. Union  

of India & Anr.  3  ,   considered the scope and ambit of  

the provisions contained in sub-rule (3) and (4) of Rule  

10 of OCS (CCA) Rules. The aforesaid rules are  pari  

materia to Rule 12(3) and (4) of OCS (CCA) Rules. Rule  

12(1), (3) and (4) of OCS (CCA) Rules reads as under :

“12. Suspension – (1) The appointing authority  or any authority to which it is subordinate or  any authority empowered by the Governor or  the  appointing  authority  in  that  behalf  may  

3 (1992) 4 SCC 711

10

11

Page 11

place a Government servant under suspension  –

(a)  where a disciplinary proceeding against  him is contemplated or is pending, or

(b)  where a case against him in respect of  any  criminal  offence  is  under  investigation or trial.

(3)  Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or  compulsory  retirement  from  service  imposed  upon a Government servant under suspension  is set aside in appeal or on review under these  rules  and  the  case  is  remitted  for  further  inquiry or action or with any other directions,  the order of his suspension shall be deemed to  have continued in force on and from the date  of  the original  order  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  and  shall  remain  in  force until further orders. (4)  Where  penalty  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  from  service  imposed  upon  a  Government  servant  is  set  aside  or  declared or rendered void in consequence of or  by decision of  a court of law and disciplinary  authority,  on  a  consideration  of  the  circumstances  of  the  case  decides  to  hold  a  further inquiry against him on the allegation on  which  the  penalty  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory retirement was originally imposed,  the  Government  servant  shall  be  deemed  to  have  been  placed  under  suspension  by  the  appointing  authority  from  the  date  of  the  original  orders  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  retirement  and  shall  continue  to  remain under suspension until further orders.”

12. Considering the pari materia sub-rule (3) & (4)  

of Rule 10 of OCS (CCA) Rules, this Court has held that  

sub-rule (3)  of Rule 10 is  applicable to cases where  

interference  with  the  penalty  is  connected  with  the  

11

12

Page 12

merits of the charges against the Government servant  

and  is  set  aside  by  the  appellate  authority  under  

Rule 27 or by the Revisional authority under Rule 29 or  

by the Reviewing authority under Rule 29A.  In such  

circumstances, Government servant shall be deemed  

to  be  under  suspension  only  if  he  was  under  

suspension at the time when the order of punishment  

was passed. On setting aside the order of punishment  

in such a case by the Departmental authorities,  the  

findings against the Government servant disappeared  

and  he  is  restored  to  the  earlier  position.  This,  

however,  is  not  the position  under  sub-rule  (4),  the  

language  of  which  clearly  stipulates  that  where  a  

penalty  of  dismissal,  removal  or  compulsory  

retirement from service imposed upon a Government  

servant is  set aside or declared or rendered void in  

consequence of or by a decision of a Court of law, the  

Government  servant  shall  be deemed to have been  

placed under suspension by the appointing authority,  

during the pendency of a further proceeding against  

him, in a departmental enquiry until further orders are  

passed. This Court rejected the submissions that the  

12

13

Page 13

deemed suspension under Rule 12(4) should be read  

down to mean that the deemed suspension shall only  

be in case the employee was under the suspension at  

the time when the order of punishment was passed. It  

was observed by this Court as follows :

“The  language  of  sub-rule  (4)  of  Rule  10  is  absolutely  clear  and  does  not  permit  any  artificial rule of interpretation to be applied. It  is well established that if the words of a statute  are clear and free from any vagueness and are,  therefore,  reasonably susceptible  to  only  one  meaning, it must be construed by giving effect  to that meaning, irrespective of consequences.  The  language of  the  sub-rule  here  is  precise  and  unambiguous  and,  therefore,  has  to  be  understood in the natural and ordinary sense.  As was observed in innumerable cases in India  and  in  England,  the  expression  used  in  the  statute  alone  declares  the  intent  of  the  legislature. In the words used by this Court in  State of U.P. v. Dr Vijay Anand Maharaj4 when  the  language  is  plain  and  unambiguous  and  admits  of  only  one  meaning,  no  question  of  construction  of  a  statute  arises,  for  the  act  speaks for itself. Reference was also made in  the reported judgment to Maxwell stating:

“The  construction  must  not,  of  course,  be  strained  to  include  cases  plainly  omitted  from the natural meaning of the words.”

The comparison of  the language with  that of  sub-rule (3) reinforces the conclusion that sub- rule  (4)  has  to  be  understood  in  the  natural  sense. It will  be observed that in sub-rule (3)  the  reference  is  to  “a  Government  servant  under  suspension”  while  the  words  “under  suspension”,  are omitted in sub-rule (4).  Also  the  sub-rule  (3)  directs  that  on  the  order  of  punishment being set aside, “the order of his  suspension shall be deemed to have continued  

13

14

Page 14

in  force” but in sub-rule  (4)  it  has been said  that “the Government servant shall be deemed  to  have been placed under  suspension”.  The  departure made by the author in the language  of  sub-rule  (4)  from  that  of  sub-rule  (3)  is  conscious and there is no scope for attributing  the artificial and strained meaning thereto. In  the circumstances it is not permissible to read  down  the  provisions  as  suggested.  We,  therefore, hold that as a result of sub-rule (4) a  government servant, though not earlier under  suspension, shall also be deemed to have been  placed  under  suspension  by  the  Appointing  Authority from the date of the original order of  dismissal,  provided  of  course,  that  the  other  conditions mentioned therein are satisfied.”

13. Rejecting the next submission that sub-rules  

(3)  and  (4)  cannot  be  divided  into  two  separate  

classes  and  subjected  to  differential  treatment.  The  

court observed as under :-

“Let  us  examine  the  circumstances  which  separate  the  two  categories  of  cases  to  be  governed by the two sub-rules. Sub-rule (3) is  attracted only to those cases of dismissal etc.  where the penalty is set aside under the CCS  (CCA)  Rules,  and  the  case  is  remitted  for  further inquiry or action in accordance with the  direction.  The  application  is,  therefore,  confined  to  cases  where  the  penalty  is  set  aside by the appellate authority while hearing  a  regular  appeal  under  Rule  27  or  by  the  President  exercising  the  power  of  revision  under Rule 29 or of review under Rule 29-A. On  all  such  occasions  a  reconsideration  of  the  merit  of  the charge is  involved.  The grounds  mentioned in Rule 27 (2) permit the appellate  authority  to  re-appraise  the  evidence  on  the  record  for  examining  whether  the  findings  recorded  by  the  disciplinary  authority  are  warranted  by  such  evidence.  So  far  non-

14

15

Page 15

compliance of a procedural rule is concerned,  the appellate authority  is  enjoined,  by clause  (a) of Rule 27 to consider whether such non- compliance has resulted in the failure of justice  or  in  the  violation  of  any  constitutional  provision,  before  interfering  with  the  punishment.  In  view  of  its  sub-rule  (3),  the  same  consideration  arises  under  Rule  29.  Similarly,  the provisions of Rule 29-A indicate  that the power to review can be exercised by  the  President  only  on discovery  of  such new  evidence which has the effect of changing the  very nature of the case. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 10  is applicable to these groups of cases, where  the interference with the penalty is connected  with  the  merits  of  the  charge  against  the  government  servant.  On  the  setting  aside  of  the  order  of  punishment in  such a  case,  the  finding  against  the  government  servant  disappears  and  he  is  restored  to  the  earlier  position.  Consequently  only  if  he  was  under  suspension earlier, he will be deemed to have  continued so with effect from the date of the  order  of  dismissal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  category  of  cases  attracting  sub-rule  (4) is  entirely on a different footing.  Sub-rule  (4) governs only such cases where there is an  interference  by  a  court  of  law  purely  on  technical grounds without going into the merits  of  the  case.  In  cases  governed  by  the  CCS  (CCA) Rules, a court of law does not proceed to  examine the correctness of the findings of the  disciplinary  authority  by  a  reconsideration  of  the evidence. Unless some error  of  law or  of  principle is discovered, a court of law does not  ordinarily  substitute  its  own  views  on  the  evidence. But the matter does not end there.  The scope of the sub-rule, for the purpose of  automatic suspension has been further limited  by  the  proviso  as  mentioned  earlier  in  paragraph 6, which reads as follows:

“Provided that no such further inquiry shall  be ordered unless it is intended to meet a  situation  where  the  Court  has  passed  an  order  purely  on  technical  grounds  without  going into the merits of the case.”

15

16

Page 16

The cases which attract sub-rule (4), are thus  those  where  the  penalty  imposed  on  the  government servant is  set aside on technical  grounds not  touching the merits  of  the case.  Since  at  one  stage  the  disciplinary  authority  records  a  finding on the charges against  the  government  servant,  which  is  not  upset  on  merits,  the situation is entirely different from  that in the cases covered by sub-rule (3). The  classification is thus founded on an intelligible  differentia,  having  a  rational  relation  to  the  object of the rules and Rule 10 (4) has to be  held as constitutionally valid.”

14. In our opinion, the aforesaid observations are  

a  complete  answer  to  the  submissions  made  by  

Mr. Viswanathan.  

15. We see no merit in the appeal and the same is  

hereby dismissed.             

…..…….…………………J.    [Surinder Singh  

Nijjar]

  …..……………………….J.    [M.Y.Eqbal]

16

17

Page 17

New Delhi; April 09, 2013.

17