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PETITIONER: RUPINDER SINGH SODHI AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/11/1982

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ) SEN, AMARENDRA NATH (J)

CITATION:  1983 AIR   65            1983 SCR  (1) 841  1983 SCC  (1) 140        1982 SCALE  (2)1073

ACT:      Freedom of  movement on  Highways-Reasonable restraints during mass agitations-Extent of.

HEADNOTE:      In the  wake of a threatened Morcha by Akalis which was to coincide  with the  inauguration of  the Asian  Games  at Delhi,  some   States  apprehended  that  the  Morcha  might interfere with the holding of the games and took measures to intercept The-  movement of Akalis to Delhi. On the question raised by  the petitioners  that placing  of obstructions on highways so  as to  impede free  flow of  traffic was per se unlawful, ^      HELD: No  one is  entitled to barricade a highway so as to prevent  members of  the public  from using it while they are OD  their lawful  business  in  the  pursuit  of  normal avocations of  life. But  the police,  whose duty  it is  to enforce law  and  order  in  the  wake  of  threatened  mass agitations which  are reasonably likely to lead to breach of public peace,  are entitled in the discharge of that duty to impose reasonable  restraints on  the physical  movement  of members of  the public  to protect  public property  and  to avoid needless  inconvenience to  other  citizens  in  their lawful  pursuits.   But  all  such  restraints  on  personal liberty, if  at all, have to be commensurate with the object which furnishes  their justification.  They must  be minimal and cannot  exceed constraints  of the particular situation, either in  nature or  in duration. above all, they cannot he used as  engines of  oppression, persecution,  harassment or the like.  The sanctity  of person  and of privacy has to be maintained at  all costs  and that  cannot ever  be violated under the  guise of maintenance of law and 1 order. The rule of law  requires that no person shall be subjected to harsh, uncivilized  or   discriminatory  treatment  even  when  the objective is the securing of the paramount exigencies of law and order. [842-F-H; 843-A-G]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition Nos. 8816 and 8817

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of 1982. G      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)      Hardev  Singh   and  Bishambhar   Lal  Khanna  for  the Petitioner.      K.G. Bhagat  Addl. Sol-Gen.,  R.N. Poddar  and Mrs.  S. Dikshit for Respondents 3 and 4. 842      The order of the Court was delivered by      CHANDRACHUD,  C.J.   BY  these   writ  petitions,   the petitioners, some  of whom  are practising  lawyers and some Members of  the Parliament,  ask  for  an  appropriate  writ directing the  State of  Haryana  and  the  State  of  Uttar Pradesh to  remove all  obstructions on  the highways and to allow unhindered  and  unintercepted  the  use  of  highways railways  and  airways  without  making  any  discrimination against the  Akali Sikhs  on the  ground of religion. Stated briefly, the  case of  the petitioners is that in the recent past, a  movement was  set afoot  in  the  State  of  Punjab consequent upon  certain demands  made by the members of the Akali Party  and as a result  of that movement, large scale arrests of  Sikhs were effected, bordering on harassment and persecution. It  would appear that a declaration was made by certain Akali  leaders that a Morcha would be taken to Delhi on November  19, 1982  which coincides with the inauguration of the  Asiad  games.  Apprehending  that  the  Morcha  will interfere with  the holding of the games, the border States, particularly Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, appear to have taken certain measures  to intercept the movement of Akalis across the border  on to  Delhi with  a view  to ensuring  that the proposed Morcha  is not  staged in the manner feared and the Asiad not disrupted.      Mr.  Hardev   Singh  who   appears  on  behalf  of  the petitioners argues that highways are dedicated to the public and are  meant for  their use  for  passing  and  repassing. Therefore, he  argues, no  obstruction can be placed thereon which will  impede  the  free  flow  of  traffic,  any  such obstruction being  per se unlawful. Having given our anxious consideration to the submissions made by Mr. Hardev . Singh, we agree  that no  one is entitled to barricade a highway so as to prevent members of the public from using it while they are on  their lawful  business  in  the  pursuit  of  normal avocations of  life. But  the police,  whose duty  it is  to enforce law  and  order  in  the  wake  of  threatened  mass agitations which  are reasonably likely to lead to breach of public peace,  are entitled in the discharge of that duty to impose reasonable  restraints on  the physical  movement  of members of  the public  in order to the protection of public property and  the avoidance  of  needless  inconvenience  to other citizens  in  their  lawful  pursuits.  But  all  such restraints on  personal liberty,  if  at  all,  have  to  be commensurate  with   the  object   which   furnishes   their justification. They  must be  minimal and  cannot exceed the Constraints of the particular situation, either in nature or in duration.  Above all  they cannot  be used  as engines of oppression, 843 persecution, harassment  or the like. The sanctity of person and of  privacy has  to be  maintained at all costs and that cannot ever  be violated  under the  guise of maintenance of law and order.      We feel  uneasy and concerned to hear that policemen of certain States  have violated  the norms of decency in their dealing with  the situation  arising out  of the Akali-Asiad tangle. We  assume for  lack of  better  evidence  that  the grievance made  by the  petitioners before  us is  more  the

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offspring of  a  natural  feeling  of  resentment  at  being stopped and  searched than  of any  substantial invasion  of their personal  freedom. If  and  when  there  is  proof  of latter, Courts  may have  to step  in and stop the excesses. But the  rule of  law a  requires that  no person  shall  be subjected to  harsh, uncivilised or discriminatory treatment even when  the objective  is the  securing of  the paramount exigencies of  law and  order. Therefore,  no  Sikh  can  be allowed to be so treated if our Constitution has to have any meaning and effect.      We believe  it not  to be  true that any Chief Minister has made  a public declaration that police officers who will treat the Akali Sikhs harshly will be dealt with lightly. It is incredible  that any  highly placed  person in his senses can possibly  make  such  a  Statement,  with  the  kind  of pressure of public opinion and the press which, fortunately, we have in our country to-day. E      There does  not appear  to be  any executive  order  in existence, in writing at any rate, authorising the police to barricade any  highway or to subject every Sikh in motion to physical  restraint.   But  in   an  appropriate   case,   a presumption may well be drawn as to the existence of such an order if  it is found that the police are generally p acting systematically according to a set and uniform pattern or are otherwise engaged  in a large scale operation of any similar or mister kind. For want of acceptable evidence, we hesitate to draw  that presumption  in this  case and  will leave the matter where  it lies for the time being. Redress may, if so advised, be sought in individual cases by those aggrieved by the alleged acts Of excesses.      This order will dispose of these writ petitions. H.L.C. 844