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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1300 OF 2014 ARISING OUT OF

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 2447 OF 2013

RISHIPAL SINGH … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA. J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of order dated 6th November, 2012 of the  

High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  refusing  the  prayer  of  the  

appellant for quashing the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 2397 of  

2012 under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 457, 458 and 477 IPC  

pending on the file of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.

3. The facts relevant for the disposal of this appeal, in a nutshell, are  

that  on  21st March,  2005,  respondent  No.2  herein  filed  a  private  

complaint (Annexure P/2) in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad,

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Uttar Pradesh under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the appellant herein  

and  three  other  accused  who  are  not  parties  before  us,  invoking  

Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 IPC.  According  

to the said complaint, the complainant was holding a Bank Account in  

the Ghaziabad District Co-operative Bank, Maliwada, Ghaziabad where  

the appellant was the Branch Manager.  It was alleged in the complaint  

that  taking  advantage  of  the  innocence  of  the  complainant  and  his  

brother, the accused, mischievously obtained their signatures on blank  

cheques  and  committed  theft  of  their  hand  bag  in  which  the  signed  

cheque  book  was  kept.   When  they  came  to  know  that  their  bag  

containing signed cheques and other papers was missing, not knowing  

the misdeed of the accused, a search has been undertaken for the lost  

bag containing signed cheques and also lodged a written report on 17 th  

May, 2004 at Sihani Gate Police Station to that effect.  The Bank was  

also informed in writing on 17th May, 2004 itself that duly signed cheque  

book of Account No. 1132 has been lost, hence no payment on the lost  

cheques  be  made  to  any  person  and  all  those  cheques  may  be  

cancelled (Annexure P/1).  It was further stated by the complainant that  

when he received a notice dated 6th October, 2004 under Section 138 of  

the Negotiable Instruments Act from Neelam Rani (co-accused, not party  

before us) stating that Cheque No.083697 (one of the lose cheques) for  

Rs.5,00,067/- as if issued by him towards the purchase of Kachi bricks

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and coal  from “Neelam Brick  Field”,  then  he realized that  there  was  

some planned conspiracy and the cheque book was not actually lost but  

was  stolen  and  being  misused  by  the  accused  for  drawing  various  

amounts from his bank account.  In the said complaint, the complainant  

– respondent No.2, has totally denied any such transaction with “Neelam  

Brick Field” and alleged that the accused cooked up that transaction,  

hatched a conspiracy with the bank employees for cheating him, and  

accordingly all the amounts of the complainant and his family have been  

“looted”.

4. The main allegation levelled against the appellant was that when a  

written information had already been given on 17th May,  2004 to the  

appellant who was the Branch Manager of the Bank not to honour the  

lost cheques and cancel them, he should have performed his duties with  

utmost responsibility and when the stolen/lost cheque was presented, he  

should have given the information of its presentation to the police as well  

as to the complainant.  On the contrary, the appellant neither handed  

over the person who presented the cheque, to the police, nor brought to  

the notice of the complainant about its presentation.  It is because of the  

involvement of the appellant in the conspiracy he has not discharged his  

duties  as  Branch  Manager  with  responsibility  and  acted  against  the  

instructions  in  the  letter  dated  17th May,  2004  only  to  harass  the  

complainant and his family financially and mentally.  Thus the appellant

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played a role in the conspiracy, and therefore, the complainant lodged  

the complaint under the aforesaid sections of IPC against the appellant  

as well as other accused.

5. After  registering  the  Complaint  Case,  the  learned  Magistrate  

recorded statements under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and issued  

summons against the accused under Section 204 Cr.P.C.  Two other co-

accused challenged the summoning order before the High Court  in a  

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 6334 of 2006 and the Allahabad  

High  Court  has  stayed  further  proceedings  in  the  Complaint  Case.  

Subsequently,  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  Criminal  Miscellaneous  

Application, and hence, non-bailable warrant has been issued against  

the appellant on 3rd October, 2012.

6. Then  the  appellant  moved  the  High  Court  under  Section  482  

Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings against him.  It was the case of the  

appellant that he came to know about the criminal complaint only when  

the  non-bailable  warrant  has  been issued against  him because from  

August 2004 to January 2007, during which period the proceedings in  

the  criminal  complaint  were  going  on,  he  was  posted  at  Dhaulana  

Branch, therefore, the summons were never served upon him.  But, by  

the impugned order dated 6th November, 2012 the High Court refused to  

quash the criminal proceedings against the appellant.

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7. Before us, the main contention of the learned senior counsel for  

the appellant  is that the appellant  has nothing to do with the alleged  

offence  and  his  name  was  unnecessarily  dragged  into  the  criminal  

complaint.  When Cheque No. 083697 was presented in the Bank on 2nd  

August,  2004,  it  was  not  cleared by  the  Bank in  view of  the written  

instruction  given by  the complainant  and no loss  was caused to  the  

complainant at  the hands of  the appellant.   Afterwards,  the appellant  

was  transferred  from  Maliwara  Branch  to  Dhaulana  Branch  on  21st  

August,  2004  and  he  was  again  transferred  to  Maliwara  Branch  in  

January 2007 where he remained till August 2011.  He further contended  

that the complainant in his letter dated 17 th May, 2004 (Annexure P/1)  

addressed to  the  appellant  has  nowhere  asked him to  inform to  the  

police or to give communication to him when the cheque is presented.  

The entire reading of the said letter does not disclose any case against  

the appellant and his name was included into the criminal complaint only  

to malign and defame him because the complainant has received some  

notices under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act from the  

other accused.  Only to create a defence against those cases under the  

Negotiable  Instruments  Act,  the  complaint  has  been  filed  by  the  

complainant  with  mala  fide intention.   Hence,  the  complaint  filed  by  

respondent  No.2  is  misconceived  and  it  does  not  attract  any  of  the  

offences alleged against the appellant as it was filed only with vexatious

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and oblique motive.  But the High Court, without going into the merits  

and facts of the case, merely relying on the provisions of Section 245  

Cr.P.C. directed the appellant to file application for his discharge before  

the  trial  Court.   This  approach  of  the  High  Court  is  erroneous  and  

contrary to the law laid down by this Court.  The High Court ought to  

have allowed the application of the appellant under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

as the complaint does not attract the ingredients of Sections 34, 379,  

411, 417, 418, 467, 468, 471 and 477 IPC.  He, therefore, prayed to set  

aside  the  impugned order  passed by  the  High  Court  and  quash the  

proceedings in the Complaint Case qua the appellant.

8. On  the  other  hand,  the  learned  counsel  for  respondent  

No.2/complainant while supporting the order passed by the High Court  

submitted  that  the  appellant  has  not  properly  discharged  his  

responsibilities as Branch Manager and acted in a casual manner due to  

which respondent No.2 had to suffer financial loss as well as put to lot of  

hardship.  Particularly, he contended that in the light of the letter dated  

17th May, 2004 when a lost/stolen cheque was presented for clearance,  

it  is  expected  from a  responsible  officer  of  the  Bank that  instead  of  

passing the cheque for payment, he should inform the account holder  

about its presentation and also to bring to the notice of police such mala  

fide presentation  of  cheque  by  the  presenter,  but  the  appellant  has

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totally failed in performing his duties.  So, therefore is no reason for this  

Court to interfere with the order of the High Court.

9. Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the  parties  and  after  

perusing the entire material available on record, including the complaint,  

now the issue for consideration before us is whether in the light of the  

letter dated 17th May, 2004 (Annexure P/1), the appellant has made out  

any case to quash the proceedings in Complaint Case No. 2397/2002  

under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 467, 468, 471 and 477 IPC on  

the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.

10. Before we deal with the respective contentions advanced on either  

side,  we  deem it  appropriate  to  have  thorough  look  at  Section  482  

Cr.P.C., which reads:

“Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect  the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as  may be necessary to give effect to any orders of this Code or to  prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure  the ends of justice”.

A bare perusal of Section 482 Cr.P.C. makes it crystal clear that  

the object of exercise of power under this section is to prevent abuse of  

process of Court and to secure ends of justice.  There are no hard and  

fast  rules that  can be laid down for  the exercise of  the extraordinary  

jurisdiction, but exercising the same is an exception, but not a rule of  

law.  It is no doubt true that there can be no straight jacket formula nor   

defined parameters to enable a Court to invoke or exercise its inherent

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powers.  It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each  

case.   The  Courts  have  to  be  very  circumspect  while  exercising  

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

11. This Court in Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v Biological  

E. Ltd and Others 2000 (3) SCC 269, has discussed at length about the  

scope and ambit while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and  

how cautious and careful the approach of the Courts should be.  We  

deem it apt to extract the relevant portion from that judgement, which  

reads:

“Exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  inherent  power  as  envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have the complaint or  the charge sheet quashed is an exception rather than rule and  the  case  for  quashing  at  the  initial  stage  must  have  to  be  treated as rarest of rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution  with the lodgement of First Information Report.  The ball is set  to roll  and thenceforth the law takes it’s own course and the  investigation ensures in accordance with the provisions of law.  The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and restricted and it’s  undue expansion is neither practicable nor warranted.  In the  event, however, the Court on a perusal of the complaint comes  to a conclusion that the allegations levelled in the complaint or  charge sheet on the fact of it  does not constitute or disclose  any offence alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise  up to the expectation of the people and deal with the situations  as is required under the law.  Frustrated litigants ought not to  be indulged to give vent to their vindictiveness through a legal  process and such an investigation ought not to be allowed to be  continued since the same is opposed to the concept of justice,  which is paramount”.

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12. This Court in plethora of judgments has laid down the guidelines  

with regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts under Section 482  

Cr.P.C.  In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, this  

Court has listed the categories of cases when the power under Section  

482 can be exercised by the Court.  These principles or the guidelines  

were reiterated by this Court in (1) Central Bureau of Investigation v.  

Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. 1996 (5) SCC 592; (2) Rajesh Bajaj v.  

State  NCT  of  Delhi  1999  (3)  SCC  259  and;  (3)  Zandu  

Pharmaceuticals Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Anr (2005)  

1 SCC 122.  This Court in Zandu Pharmaceuticals Ltd., observed that:  

“The power under Section 482 of the Code should be  used sparingly and with to prevent abuse of process of Court,  but not to stifle legitimate prosecution.  There can be no two  opinions on this, but if it appears to the trained judicial mind that  continuation of a prosecution would lead to abuse of process of  Court,  the  power  under  Section  482  of  the  Code  must  be  exercised and proceedings must be quashed”.  Also see  Om  Prakash and Ors. V. State of Jharkhand 3012 (12) SCC 72.

What emerges from the above judgments is that when a prosecution at  

the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the tests to be applied by the  

Court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made in the  

complaint  prima  facie establish  the  case.   The  Courts  have  to  see  

whether the continuation of the complaint amounts to abuse of process  

of  law and whether  continuation of  the criminal  proceeding results  in  

miscarriage of  justice or  when the Court  comes to  a conclusion that

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quashing these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice,  

then the Court can exercise the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  While  

exercising the power under the provision, the Courts have to only look at  

the  uncontroverted  allegation  in  the  complaint  whether  prima  facie  

discloses an offence or not, but it should not convert itself to that of a  

trial Court and dwell into the disputed questions of fact.

13. In  the backdrop of  the legal  position,  well  settled by this  Court  

through catena of judgements, we would like to deal with the facts of the  

present case which lead to filing of the present complaint against the  

appellant under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477  

I.P.C. on the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.

14. The  facts  of  the  case  which  are  not  in  dispute,  for  better  

appreciation  of  the  facts  and  arguments  advanced  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant,  it  is necessary for us to have a thorough look at the letter  

dated 17th May, 2004 addressed to the appellant/Branch Manager by  

respondent No.2.

“Sir,

It is requested that the Applicant has issued Cheque Book in  which from Cheque No. 083691 to 083700 were 10 cheques in  Account No. 1132, out of which, payment up to Cheque No.  083696 has  been received  and on  rest  of  the  cheques are  signature of the applicant/account holder.  The above cheque  book and other necessary payers were in my hand bag and I by  Bus from Pikhuwa was coming to Ghaziabad then in the bust  itself by mistake that bag was left and even on making to much

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search  could  not  found.   Its  information  immediately  I  have  given at the police station, Sihani Gate.

Therefore, it is requested that you may treat the above cheques  as cancelled and on that may not kindly make payment to any  person.

It will be very kind of you”.

A  reading  of  the  above  letter  makes  it  very  clear  that  the  

complainant has instructed the appellant/Branch Manager not to pass  

cheques bearing Nos. 083697 to 083700, the four cheques which were  

already signed.  There is no dispute that after submitting the above letter  

to the appellant, when Cheque No. 083697 was presented in the Bank  

on  2ndf  August,  2004,  the  same  was  not  cleared  by  the  

appellant/Branch  Manager  in  view  of  the  letter  of  the  complainant.  

Subsequently,  the  appellant  was  transferred  from  that  Branch  to  

Dhaulana Branch on 21st August, 2004, there was any instruction to the  

Bank  to  inform  the  account  holder  or  police  when  the  cheque  is  

presented.  It appears from the letter that only a request was made to  

the Bank that the said four cheques shall not be honoured.   

15. If we look at the complaint and letter addressed by the complainant  

to the Branch Manager, the entire grievance of the complaint appears to  

be that basing on the written information which had been given to the  

appellant on 17th May, 2004, when the stolen cheque was presented, he  

should have given a complaint to the police.  As the appellant has not  

chosen to give the complaint to the police, according to the complainant

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the other  accused hatched a conspiracy with the appellant  – Branch  

Manager and accordingly cheated him.  

16. It  is no doubt true that the Courts have to be very careful while  

exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  At the same time we  

should not allow a litigant to file vexatious complaints to otherwise settle  

their  scores  by  setting  the  criminal  law into  motion,  which  is  a  pure  

abuse of process of law and it has to be interdicted at the threshold.  A  

clear reading of the complaint does not make out any offence against  

the appellant/Branch Manager,  much less the offences alleged under  

Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 I.P.C.  We are  

of the view that even assuming that the Branch Manager has violated  

the instructions in the complaint in letter and spirit.   It  all  amounts to  

negligence in discharging official work at the maximum it can be said  

that it is dereliction of duty.

17. In view of our above discussion, we have come to an irresistible  

conclusion  that  continuation  of  the  criminal  proceedings  against  the  

appellant for commission of the alleged offence under Sections 34, 379,  

411, 417, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 I.P.C. is a pure abuse of process  

of law and the complaint case deserves to be quashed in the interest of  

justice.

18. We  accordingly  allow  this  appeal  setting  aside  the  impugned  

judgment  of  the  High  Court  by  quashing  the  criminal  proceedings

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pending against the appellant in C.C. No. 2397 of 2012 under Sections  

34, 379, 411, 418, 420, 467, 458 and 477 I.P.C. on the file of Additional  

Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh.

….……………………………….J. (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI)

.....………………………………J.       (N.V. RAMANA)  

NEW DELHI JULY  2 , 2014