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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 67 of 2013

Ravinder Singh  …Appellant

Versus

Sukhbir Singh & Ors.       …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment  

and order dated 14.12.2011, passed by the High Court  of  Delhi  in  

Crl.M.C.  No. 1262 of  2011, by way of  which the High Court  has  

dismissed the said application preferred by the appellant for quashing  

the criminal proceedings launched by respondent no. 1 under Section  

3(1)(viii) of the Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of  

Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act 1989’).

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

A. The  appellant  claims  to  be  the  owner  of  agricultural  land  

measuring 1  bigha  and 4 biswas,  situated  in  the  revenue estate  of

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village  Nangli  Poona,  Delhi.  Respondent  no.1  allegedly  made  an  

attempt to take forcible possession of the said land, and also filed FIR  

No. 254 of 2005 on 6.4.2005 under Sections 427, 447 and 506, read  

with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred  

to as the ‘IPC’).  Though the appellant was arrested in pursuance of  

the said FIR, however, subsequently he was enlarged on bail.  

B. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a complaint against respondent  

no.1,  as  well  as  against  the  police  officials  involved  and  in  view  

thereof, FIR No.569 of 2005 under Sections 447, 323, 429 and 34 IPC  

was registered. The appellant engaged one Pradeep Rana, Advocate,  

respondent no.2 and filed Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1667 of 2005, inter-

alia, seeking a direction for quashing of FIR No. 254 of 2005. The  

said writ petition was dismissed in limine  vide order dated 29.9.2005.  

In  the  meantime,  in  the  criminal  proceedings  launched  by  the  

appellant,  a  charge  sheet  was  filed  against  respondent  no.1  in  

December, 2005.  

C. After investigating the allegations made in FIR No. 254 of 2005  

against  the  appellant,  the  police  submitted  a  final  report  dated  

20.2.2006,  under  Sections  173  and  169  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

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Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Cr.P.C.’), in the court  

of the Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi. Respondent no.1 approached  

the revenue authorities  i.e. Tahsildar, Narela, seeking the inclusion of  

his name in the revenue record as a person in possession/occupation  

of the said land.  However, his claim was rejected by the Tahsildar  

vide order dated 22.6.2006.  

D. It is at this time, Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2657 of 2006 was filed  

in  the name of  the appellant  by Pradeep Rana,  respondent  no.2 as  

counsel  on 18.11.2006, on the basis of the averments made in the first  

writ petition i.e. Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1667 of 2005, and seeking  

the same relief sought therein. The said writ petition was dismissed in  

default vide order dated 17.8.2007. Meanwhile, respondent no.1 tried  

to get his name recorded in the revenue record as being in cultivatory  

possession, but the same was rejected again by the Tahsildar, Narela,  

vide order dated 13.8.2007.  

E. Respondent no.1 filed another complaint under Section 107/150  

Cr.P.C.  on  18.9.2007,  and  filed  a  fresh  FIR  No.16  of  2007  on  

21.9.2007  under  Sections  379,  427  and  34  IPC,  and  subsequently  

added the provisions of Section 3(1)(v) of the Act 1989. Respondent  

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no.1 also filed an appeal against the order of the Tahsildar, rejecting  

his application made for the purpose of  recording  his  name in the  

revenue records.  

F. Respondent no.1 also filed Contempt Case (Crl.) No.10 of 2007  

before the High Court of Delhi against  the appellant for filing two  

criminal writ petitions seeking the same relief, and for not disclosing  

the fact that he had filed the first writ petition, while filing the second  

writ petition, owing to which, the said writ petition stood dismissed in  

default vide order dated 17.8.2007.  

G. On receiving notice from the High Court, the appellant filed a  

reply  expressing   his  ignorance  regarding  the  filing  of  the  second  

criminal  writ  petition,  and  further  stated  that  he  was  an  illiterate  

person, owing to which, he had given all requisite papers to Pradeep  

Rana,  Advocate,  respondent  no.  2,  and that  respondent  no.2 might  

have filed the said petition, in collusion with respondent no.1. Notice  

was then issued to Pradeep Rana, respondent no.2 by the High Court,  

who appeared and tendered an apology for filing the second petition,  

without disclosing such facts pertaining to the filing and dismissal of  

the first petition.  

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H. The appellant filed a complaint before the Bar Council of Delhi  

against respondent no.2 for filing the second writ petition in collusion  

with respondent  no.1 on 15.12.2008.  The High Court  accepted  the  

version of events submitted by the appellant, and simultaneously, also  

the apology tendered by respondent no.2 and thereafter, it closed the  

said  criminal  proceedings at  the instance of  respondent no.1,  vide  

order dated 16.2.2009.

 I. After a period of six months thereof, respondent no.1 filed a  

criminal complaint under Section 3(1)(viii) of the Act 1989, for the  

filing of a false criminal writ  petition by the appellant in the High  

Court  of  Delhi,  and further  and more particularly,  the  second writ  

petition, without disclosing the factum of filing and dismissal of the  

aforementioned  first  writ  petition.   The  Metropolitan  Magistrate  

rejected the said complaint vide order dated 13.8.2009 on the ground  

that  the  High Court  had closed  the  contempt  proceedings  initiated  

against  the  appellant,  as  well  as  against  respondent  no.2,  at  the  

instance of  respondent no.1.

J. Aggrieved,  respondent  no.1  filed  Revision  Petition  No.23 of  

2009 before the ASJ, Rohini Court, Delhi.  As regards FIR No. 16 of  

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2007,  the  Special   Judge  (SC/ST)  refused  to  proceed  against  the  

appellant and others, making serious comments regarding the conduct  

of respondent no.1, as well as that of the investigating officer. The  

revision  petition  filed  by  respondent  no.1  against  order  dated  

13.8.2009,  was  allowed  by  the  revisional  court  vide  order  dated  

25.10.2010, which was then challenged by the appellant, before the  

High Court by way of him filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.  

as  Crl.M.C.  No.1262  of  2011,  which  has  been  dismissed  by  

impugned judgment and order dated 14.12.2011.  

Hence, this appeal.  

3. Shri  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the appellant, has submitted that filing the instant complaint  

case amounts to abuse of process of the court. The criminal complaint  

is barred by the principle of issue estoppel, as the same issue has been  

fully  adjudicated  by  the  High  Court  in  a  criminal  contempt  case  

before it, and the High Court was fully satisfied that the fault lay in  

the  actions  of  Pradeep  Rana,  respondent  no.2,  counsel  for  the  

appellant.   The  High  Court  even  accepted  the  apology  of  the  

respondent no.2 thereafter, and closed the said criminal proceedings at  

the  instance  of  respondent  no.1.  As  the  issue  has  already  been  

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adjudicated,   and finally  closed by the High Court,  the Magistrate  

court cannot sit in appeal against the said order passed by the High  

Court,  closing  the  said  case  of  criminal  contempt,  as  the  subject  

matter and allegations of the case before him,  are verbatim and have  

already been adjudicated.

To invoke the provisions of the Act 1989, it is not enough that  

the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, as  

it  must further be established that the alleged offence was committed  

with  the  intention  to  cause  harm to  the  person  belonging  to  such  

category.  Moreover,  the  term  false,  malicious  and  vexatious  

proceedings must be understood in a strictly legal sense and hence,  

intention (mens rea),  to cause harm to a  person belonging to such  

category must definitely be established. Where genuine civil matter is  

sub-judice,  and parties are settling their disputes in revenue courts,  

such proceedings must not be entertained.  The High Court therefore,  

committed an error in rejecting the application for quashing criminal  

proceedings.  

4. Per contra, Shri Mukul Sharma, learned counsel appearing for  

respondent no.1, has defended the impugned judgment and order and  

submitted that the findings recorded in the case of criminal contempt  

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cannot  preclude  respondent  no.1  from  initiating  such  criminal  

proceedings  and  that  whether  the  same  are  false,  malicious  and  

vexatious, is yet to be established during trial.  This is not the stage  

where  any  inference  in  this  regard  can  be  drawn.   Furthermore,  

pendency of the issue regarding the ownership of the said land before  

the  revenue  court,  is  no  bar  so  far  as  criminal  proceedings  are  

concerned. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.  

5. We have considered the rival submissions, and heard both, Shri  

Rakesh Khanna, learned ASG for the State of Delhi, and Shri Prasoon  

Kumar,  Advocate,  for  respondent  no.2,  and  have  also  perused  the  

record.  

6. So far as Contempt Case (Crl.) No.10 of 1007 is concerned, it is  

evident  that  the  appellant,  after  becoming aware  of  the  fact  that  a  

second writ petition was filed in his name, filed a complaint before the  

Bar Council of Delhi, through its Secretary against respondent no.2 on  

29.12.2007 (Annx. P/11), wherein it was stated that the said second  

writ  petition  No.  1667  of  2005  was  filed  without  his  instructions,  

using papers signed by him in good faith, in the office  of respondent  

no.2, at his instance. Upon considering the reply of the appellant, the  

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High Court issued notice to Pradeep Rana, Advocate, respondent no.2  

in Contempt Case (Crl.) No. 10 of 2007, and thereafter, respondent  

no.2 filed his reply, wherein he submitted that even though the second  

writ petition was filed on the instructions of the appellant, however,  

he inadvertently, failed to mention the fact that he had filed the earlier  

writ  petition  and  that  the  same  had  been  dismissed,  for  which  he  

tendered absolute and unconditional apology.  

7. The  High  Court,  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  16.2.2009  

disposed of the said contempt proceedings. The order reads as under:  

“Learned  counsel  for  Ravinder  Singh  admits  that  Crl.  Writ  Petition  No.  1667/2005  and  Crl.  Writ  Petition  No.2657/2006 were filed under his signatures but states  that he being not well-versed in English would sign the  petition and supporting affidavits  in  Hindi  and that  he  was  being  guided  by  his  counsel  with  respect  to  the  contents of the petition.

Mr.  Pradeep  Rana,  learned  counsel  for  Mr.  Ravinder  Singh  express  his  regrets  and  tenders  an  unqualified apology for filing two identical petitions one  after the other and not disclosing in the second petition  that the first petition was filed and was dismissed.  

Keeping  in  view the  young  age  of  Mr.  Pradeep  Rana,  learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  states  that  in  view of the fact that Mr.  Ravinder Singh has admitted  that  both petitions  were  filed  under  his  signatures  and  given  an  explanation  as  to  what  had  happened,  the  petitioner does not want to pursue the remedy against  

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the counsel, the instant petition may be disposed of as  not pressed.              We dispose of the petition as not pressed.”                                                                (Emphasis added)

8. The aforesaid order hence,  makes it crystal clear that the High  

Court was satisfied that the appellant had been guided by his counsel  

and that  he himself  was not well-versed with the English language  

and had also filed his supporting affidavit in Hindi and further that it  

had  accepted  the  unqualified  apology  tendered  by  Pradeep  Rana,  

respondent no.2, and that considering the fact that the advocate was of  

a  young age,  even  though both  petitions  had been  filed  under  the  

signature of the appellant, it had decided to drop the said  proceedings,  

as  respondent  no.1 did not  wish to pursue his remedy any further.  

Hence, the petition was disposed of, as the same was not pressed.  

9. In  Masumsha  Hasanasha  Musalman  v.  State  of  

Maharashtra, AIR  2000  SC  1876,  this  Court  has  dealt  with  the  

application of the  provisions of the Act 1989, and  held that merely  

because  the  victim/complainant  belongs  to  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  

Scheduled Tribe, the same cannot be the sole ground for prosecution,  

for  the reason that  the offence mentioned under the said Act 1989  

should be committed against him on the basis of the fact that such a  

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person  belongs  to  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  Scheduled  Tribe.  In  the  

absence of such ingredient, no offence under Section 3 (2)(v) of the  

Act is made out.  

10. Section 3(1)(viii) of the Act 1989 reads as under:

“Punishment for offences of atrocities:(1) Whoever, not being a  member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,-

(i) xx xx xx (viii) institutes false, malicious or vexatious suit or criminal or  

other legal proceedings against a member of a Scheduled  Caste or a Scheduled Tribe;

(ix)            xx xx xx

shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall  not be less than six months but which may extend to five years  and with fine.”

11. The dictionary meaning of word `false’ means that, which is in  

essence,  incorrect,  or  purposefully  untrue,  deceitful  etc.  Thus,  the  

word  ‘false’,  is  used  to  cover  only  unlawful  falsehood.   It  means  

something that  is  dishonestly,  untrue and deceitful,  and implies  an  

intention to perpetrate some treachery or fraud. In jurisprudence, the  

word ‘false’ is used to characterise a wrongful or criminal act, done  

intentionally and knowingly, with knowledge, actual or constructive.  

The word false may also be used in a wide or narrower sense.  When  

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used in its wider sense, it means something that is untrue whether or  

not stated intentionally or knowingly, but when used in its narrower  

sense, it may cover only such falsehoods, which are intentional. The  

question whether in a particular enactment, the word false is used in a  

restricted sense or a wider sense, depends upon the context in which it  

is used.   

12. In  Commissioner  of  Sales  Tax,  Uttar  Pradesh  v.  Sanjiv  

Fabrics,  (2010)  9  SCC 630,  this  Court,  after  relying upon certain  

legal dictionaries, explained that the word false describes an untruth,  

coupled with wrong intention or an intention to deceive.  The Court  

further held that in case of criminal prosecution, where consequences  

are serious, findings of fact must be recorded with respect to mens rea  

in  case  a  falsehood  as  a  condition  precedent  for  imposing  any  

punishment.  

13. In the event that the appellant preferred an application for the  

purpose  of  quashing  the  FIR  lodged  by  respondent  no.1,  and  was  

unsuccessful therein, the same does not mean that the appellant had  

filed a false case against  respondent No. 1.   There is a difference  

between the terms `not proved’ and `false’.  Merely because a party is  

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unable to prove a fact, the same cannot be categorized as false in each  

and every case.  (Vide:  A. Abdul Rashid Khan (dead) & Ors. v.  

P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 636).  

14. Legitimate  indignation  does  not  fall  within  the  ambit  of  a  

malicious act.  In almost all legal inquiries, intention as distinguished  

from  motive  is  the  all  important  factor.  In  common  parlance,  a  

malicious act has been equated with an intentional act  without just  

cause  or  excuse.  (Vide:  Kumaon  Mandal  Vikas  Nigam  Ltd.  v.  

Girja Shankar Pant & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 24).

15. In West Bengal State Electricity Board v. Dilip Kumar Ray,  

AIR  2007  SC  976,  this  Court  dealt  with  the  term  “malicious  

prosecution” by referring to various dictionaries etc. as :

‘Malice in the legal sense imports (1) the absence of all  elements  of  justification,  excuse  or  recognised  mitigation, and (2) the presence of either (a) an actual  intent to cause the particular harm which is produced or  harm of the same general nature, or (b) the wanton and  wilful  doing  of  an  act  with  awareness  of  a  plain  and  strong likelihood that such harm may result.

‘MALICE’ consists in a conscious violation of the  law to the prejudice of another and certainly has different  meanings with respect to responsibility for civil wrongs  and responsibility for crime.

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Malicious  prosecution   means  -  a  desire  to  obtain  a  collateral advantage. The principles to be borne in mind  in  the  case  of  actions  for  malicious  prosecutions  are  these:—Malice is not merely the doing of a wrongful act  intentionally but it must be established that the defendant  was actuated by malus animus, that is to say, by spite or  ill  will  or  any indirect  or  improper  motive.  But  if  the  defendant had reasonable or probable cause of launching  the criminal prosecution no amount of malice will make  him liable for damages. Reasonable and probable cause  must be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet  and reasonable  man;  ‘malice’  and ‘want  of  reasonable  and probable cause,’  have reference to the state of  the  defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of criminal  proceedings and the onus rests on the plaintiff to prove  them.

16. Mala fides, where it is alleged, depends upon its own facts and  

circumstances,  in  fact  has  to  be  proved.   It  is  a  deliberate  act  in  

disregard of the rights of others. It is a wrongful act done intentionally  

without just cause or excuse. (See : State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna  

& Ors., AIR 2001 SC 343;  State of A.P. & Ors. v. Goverdhanlal  

Pitti, AIR 2003 SC 1941;  Prabodh Sagar v. Punjab SEB & Ors.,  

AIR 2000  SC 1684;  and  Chairman and MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P.  

Gururaja & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 4536).  

17. The  word  "vexatious"  means  ‘harassment  by  the  process  of  

law',  'lacking justification' or with 'intention to harass'. It  signifies an  

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action not having sufficient grounds, and which therefore, only seeks  

to annoy the adversary.

The hallmark of a vexatious proceeding is that it has no basis in  

law (or at least no discernible basis); and that whatever the intention  

of the proceeding may be, its only effect is to subject the other party  

to inconvenience, harassment and expense, which is so great, that it is  

disproportionate to any gain likely to accrue to the claimant; and that  

it involves an abuse of process of the court.  Such proceedings are  

different  from  those  that  involve  ordinary  and  proper  use  of  the  

process of the court.

18. The  principle  of  issue-estoppel  is  also  known  as  ‘cause  of  

action estoppel’ and the same is different from the principle of double  

jeopardy or;  autre fois acquit, as embodied in Section 403 Cr.P.C.  

This  principle  applies  where  an  issue  of  fact  has  been  tried  by  a  

competent court on a former occasion, and a finding has been reached  

in favour of  an accused.   Such a  finding would then constitute  an  

estoppel, or res judicata against the prosecution but would not operate  

as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused, for a different or  

distinct offence.  It would only preclude  the reception of evidence  

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that  will  disturb  that  finding  of  fact  already  recorded  when  the  

accused  is  tried  subsequently,  even  for  a  different  offence,  which  

might be permitted by Section 403(2) Cr.P.C. Thus, the rule of issue  

estoppel prevents re-litigation of an issue which has been determined  

in a criminal trial between the parties. If with respect to an offence,  

arising out of a transaction, a trial has taken place and the accused has  

been acquitted,  another  trial  with  respect  to  the  offence  alleged to  

arise out  of  the transaction,  which requires the court  to arrive at  a  

conclusion inconsistent with the conclusion reached at the earlier trial,  

is prohibited by the rule of issue estoppel. In order to invoke the rule  

of issue estoppel, not only the parties in the two trials should be the  

same but also, the fact in issue, proved or not, as present  in the earlier  

trial,  must  be  identical  to  what  is  sought  to  be  re-agitated  in  the  

subsequent trial.  If the cause of action was determined to exist, i.e.,  

judgment  was  given  on  it,  the  same  is  said  to  be  merged  in  the  

judgment. If it was determined not to exist, the unsuccessful plaintiff  

can no longer assert that it does; he is estopped per  rem judicatam.  

(See:  Manipur  Administration,  Manipur  v.  Thokchom,  Bira  

Singh, AIR 1965 SC 87; Piara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1969  

SC  961;  State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  v.  Kokkiligada  Meeraiah  &  

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Anr., AIR 1970 SC 771;  Masud Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1974  

SC 28;  Ravinder Singh v.  State of  Haryana,  AIR 1975 SC 856;  

Kanhiya Lal  Omar v.  R.K. Trivedi  & Ors.,  AIR 1986 SC 111;  

Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 626;  

and Swamy Atmananda and Ors. v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam  

and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 2392).

19. While considering the issue at hand in Shiv Shankar Singh v.  

State  of  Bihar  &  Anr.,  (2012)  1  SCC  130,  this  Court,  after  

considering  its  earlier  judgments  in  Pramatha  Nath  Talukdar  v.  

Saroj Ranjan Sarkar  AIR 1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh & Ors. v.  

Ranjit Kaur AIR 2001 SC 784;  Mahesh Chand v. B. Janardhan  

Reddy & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 702; Poonam Chand Jain & Anr. v.  

Fazru AIR 2005 SC 38 held:

“It is evident that the law does not prohibit filing   or entertaining of  the second complaint  even on   the same facts provided the earlier complaint has   been decided on the basis of insufficient material   or  the  order  has  been  passed  without   understanding the nature of the complaint or the   complete  facts  could  not  be  placed  before  the   court  or  where  the  complainant  came  to  know  certain facts after disposal of the first  complaint   which could have tilted the balance in his favour.   However,  second  complaint  would  not  be   maintainable  wherein  the  earlier  complaint  has   

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been disposed of on full consideration of the case   of the complainant on merit.”

20. In Chandrapal Singh & Ors. v. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR  

1982 SC 1238,  this court has held that it is equally true that chagrined  

and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their  

frustration  by enabling them to invoke the jurisdiction of criminal  

courts in a cheap manner. In such a fact-situation, the court must not  

hesitate to quash criminal proceedings.  

21. There  can  be  no  dispute  with  respect  to  the  settled  legal  

proposition  that  a  judgment  of  this  Court  is  binding,  particularly,  

when the same is that of a co-ordinate bench, or of a larger bench.  It  

is  also correct to state that,  even if  a particular issue has not been  

agitated earlier, or a particular argument was advanced, but was not  

considered,  the  said  judgment  does  not  lose  its  binding  effect,  

provided  that  the  point  with  reference  to  which  an  argument  is  

subsequently  advanced,  has  actually  been  decided.  The  decision  

therefore, would not lose its authority, “merely because it was badly  

argued, inadequately considered or fallaciously reasoned”.  The case  

must be considered, taking note of the ratio decidendi of the same i.e.,  

the general reasons, or the general grounds upon which, the decision  

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of  the  court  is  based,  or  on  the  test  or  abstract,  of  the  specific  

peculiarities  of  the  particular  case,  which  finally  gives  rise  to  the  

decision. (Vide: Smt. Somavanti & Ors. v. The State of Punjab &  

Ors., AIR 1963 SC 151; Ballabhdas Mathuradas Lakhani & Ors.  

v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur, AIR 1970 SC 1002;  Ambika  

Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P.  &  Ors.,  AIR 1980 SC 1762; and  

Director of  Settlements,  A.P. & Ors.  v.  M.R. Apparao & Anr.,  

AIR 2002 SC 1598).    

22. In  The  Direct  Recruit  Class-II  Engineering  Officers’  

Association & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1990 SC  

1607, a Constitution Bench of this Court has taken a similar view,  

observing  that  the  binding  nature  of  a  judgment  of  a  court  of  

competent jurisdiction, is in essence a part of the rule of law on the  

basis of which, administration of justice depends.  Emphasis on this  

point by the Constitution is well founded, and a judgment given by a  

competent court on  merits must bind all parties involved until  the  

same is set aside in appeal, and an attempted change in the form of the  

petition or in its grounds, cannot be allowed to defeat the plea.    (See  

also:  Daryao & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1961 SC 1457;  

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and Forward Construction Co. & Ors. v. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.),  

Andheri & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 391).

23. The  instant  case  is  required  to  be  decided  taking  into  

consideration the aforesaid settled legal propositions.  

The complaint in dispute filed by the respondent no.1 is based  

on the ground that there has been a false declaration by the appellant  

while filing the second writ petition as he suppressed the truth that  

earlier for the same relief a writ petition had been filed and it was  

done  so  to  gain  a  legal  advantage  and  therefore,  it  was  a  false,  

vexatious and malicious one attracting the provisions of Section 3(1)

(viii)  of  the  Act  1989.   The  High  Court  while  dealing  with  the  

contempt case did not record such a finding.  The first writ petition  

was dismissed  in limine while the second was dismissed in default.  

The issue of filing a false affidavit has been dealt with by the High  

Court  in  contempt  case  which  the  respondent  no.1  did  not  press  

further.   

24. The facts on record make it evident that the land on which both  

parties  claim  title/interest  had  initially  been  allotted  to  one  Anant  

Ram, a member of the Schedule Caste community, under the 20 Point  

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Programme  of  the  Government  of  India  (Poverty  Elevation  

Programme) and he sold it to one Ram Lal Aggarwal in the year 1989,  

who further transferred it to his son Anil Kumar Aggarwal in the year  

1990.   Anil  Kumar Aggarwal sold the same to appellant  Ravinder  

Singh in the year 2005.  Respondent No. 1, who at the relevant time  

was holding a very high position in the Central Government, claimed  

that initial transfer by Anant Ram, the original allottee, in favour of  

Ram Lal  Aggarwal  was  illegal  and he  could  not  transfer  the  land  

allotted  to  him  by  the  Government  under  Poverty  Elevation  

Programme and further  that  as  the  said  land had been encroached  

upon by his  father,  he  had a  right  to  get  his  name entered  in  the  

revenue record.  Thus, it is clear that the respondent no. 1, became the  

law unto  himself  and  assumed  the  jurisdiction  to  decide  the  legal  

dispute himself to which he himself had been a party being the son of  

a rank trespasser. Transfer by the original allottee at initial stage, even  

if illegal, would not confer any right in favour of the respondent no.1.  

Thus, he adopted intimidatory tactics by resorting to revenue as well  

as  criminal  proceedings  against  the appellant  without realising that  

even if  the initial  transfer  by the  original  allottee  Anant  Ram was  

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illegal, the land may revert back to the Government, and not to him  

merely because his father had encroached upon the same.      

25. The High Court has dealt with the issue involved herein and the  

matter  stood  closed  at  the  instance  of  respondent  no.1  himself.  

Therefore, there can be no justification whatsoever to launch criminal  

prosecution on that basis afresh. The inherent power of the court in  

dealing  with  an  extraordinary  situation  is  in  the  larger  interest  of  

administration of justice and for preventing manifest injustice being  

done. Thus, it is a judicial obligation on the court to undo a wrong in  

course  of  administration  of  justice  and  to  prevent  continuation  of  

unnecessary  judicial  process.   It  may  be  so  necessary  to  curb  the  

menace  of  criminal  prosecution  as  an  instrument  of  operation  of  

needless  harassment.  A  person  cannot  be  permitted  to  unleash  

vendetta to harass any person needlessly. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt  

in the inherent power of the court and the whole idea is to do real,  

complete and substantial justice for which the courts exist.  Thus, it  

becomes  the  paramount  duty  of  the  court  to  protect  an  apparently  

innocent person,  not to be subjected to prosecution on the basis of  

wholly untenable complaint.    

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In view of the above, the judgment of the High Court impugned  

herein dated 14.12.2011 as well as of the Revisional Court is set aside.  

Order of the Metropolitan Magistrate dated 13.8.2009 is restored. The  

complaint filed by respondent no.1 under the provisions of Section  

3(1)(viii) of the Act 1989  is hereby quashed.   The appeal is thus  

allowed.

Before parting with the case, it  may be necessary to observe  

that any of the observations made herein shall not affect by any means  

either  of  the  parties  in  any  civil/revenue  case  pending  before  an  

appropriate authority/court.  

……………………………….J.   (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

    ………………………………J.                       (V. GOPALA GOWDA)

New Delhi,  January 11, 2013  

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