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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.406-407 OF 2017 (@ S.L.P. (Criminal) Nos. 9389-90 of 2016)

Ravada Sasikala     …Appellant

Versus

State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr.           …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In  Chetan  Dass  v.  Kamla  Devi1,  this  Court  had

observed:-

“Matrimonial  matters  are  matters  of  delicate human and  emotional  relationship.  It  demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with  sufficient  play  for  reasonable  adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. …”

2. Though the aforesaid observations were made in the

context of a matrimonial dispute arising out of a proceeding

under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 praying

1 (2001) 4 SCC 250

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for dissolution of marriage by granting a decree of divorce,

yet we have commenced our judgment with the same as the

facts of the present case painfully project what a relation in

close proximity can do to a young girl when his proposal for

his  marriage  is  not  accepted  and  he,  forgetting  the

fundamental  facet of  human dignity and totally  becoming

oblivious of the fact that marriage, as a social institution, is

an  affirmance  of  civilized  society  order,  allows  his

unrequited  love  to  be  converted  to  complete  venom  that

leads him on the path of vengeance, and the ultimate shape

of  such  retaliation  is  house  trespass  by  the  accused

carrying an acid bottle and pouring it over the head of the

girl, the appellant herein.    

3. The necessary facts.  On the basis of the statement of

the  injured,  an  FIR  under  Sections  448  and  307  of  the

Indian  Penal  Code  (IPC)  was  registered  at  police  station

Vallampudi. The injuries sustained by the victim-informant

required long treatment and eventually after recording the

statements  of  the  witnesses,  collecting  various  materials

from the spot and taking other aspects into consideration of

the crime, the investigating agency filed the charge sheet for

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the offences that  were originally  registered under the FIR

before the competent court which, in turn, committed the

matter to the Court of Session, Vizianagaram.  The accused

abjured his guilt and expressed his desire to face the trial.   

4. The  prosecution,  in  order  to  establish  the  charges

against  the  accused,  examined  12  witnesses  and  got

marked Ex. P1 to P14 besides bringing 11 material objects

on record.  The defence chose not to examine any witness.

It may be noted that on behalf of the defence, one document

Ex. D-1, was marked.   

5. The learned Assistant  Sessions  Judge,  Vizianagaram

did not find the accused guilty under Section 307 IPC but

held him guilty under Section 326 and 448 IPC.  At the time

of hearing of the sentence under Section 235(2) of the Code

of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the convict pleaded for mercy

on the  foundation  of  his  support  to  the  old  parents,  the

economic  status,  social  strata  to  which  he  belongs  and

certain other factors. The learned trial judge, upon hearing

him, sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one

year and directed to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- with a default

clause under Section 326 IPC and sentenced him to pay a

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fine of  Rs.  1000/- for  the offence under  Section 448 IPC

with a default clause.   

6. The State preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1731 of 2007

under  Section  377(1)  CrPC  before  the  High  Court  of

Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the

State  of  Andhra  Pradesh  for  enhancement  of  sentence.

Being grieved by the judgment of  conviction and order of

sentence,  the  accused-respondent  had  preferred  Criminal

Appeal  No.  15  of  2006  before  the  Sessions  Judge,

Vizianagaram which was later  on transferred to the High

Court  and  registered  as  Transferred  Criminal  Appeal  No.

1052 of 2013.   

7. Both the appeals were heard together by the learned

Single  Judge  who  concurred  with  the  view  taken  by  the

learned trial judge as regards the conviction. While dealing

with the  quantum of  sentence,  the learned Judge opined

thus:-

“However, the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the trial  Court for the offence under Section 326  I.P.C.  is  modified  to  the  period  which  the accused  has  already  undergone,  while maintaining  the  sentence  of  fine  for  both  the offences.”

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8. At  the  outset,  we must  note  that  the  State  has  not

assailed the said judgment. The appellant,  after obtaining

permission  of  this  Court,  filed  the  special  leave  petition

which we entertained for the simon pure reason it has been

asserted that the period of custody suffered by the accused

is  30  days.  It  is  apt  to  note  here  that  the

accused-respondent has not challenged the conviction and,

therefore, it has to be assumed that apart from accepting

the  judgment  of  conviction,  he  must  have  celebrated the

delight  and  jubilation  of  liberty  inasmuch as  despite  the

sustenance  of  the  judgment  of  conviction,  he  was  not

required to suffer any further imprisonment.  

9. The  centripodal  question,  indubitably  a  disquieting

one,  whether  the  High  Court  has  kept  itself  alive  to  the

precedents pertaining to sentencing or has been guided by

some kind of unfathomable and incomprehensible sense of

individual mercy absolutely ignoring the plight and the pain

of the victim; a young girl who had sustained an acid attack,

a  horrendous  assault  on  the  physical  autonomy  of  an

individual that gets more accentuated when the victim is a

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young woman.  Not for nothing, it has been stated stains of

acid has roots forever.

10. As the factual matrix gets unfolded from the judgment

of the learned trial Judge, the appellant after completion of

her  intermediate  course  had  accompanied  her  brother  to

Amalapuram  of  East  Godavari  District  where  he  was

working  as  an  Assistant  Professor  in  B.V.C.  Engineering

College, Vodalacheruvu and stayed with him about a week

prior  to  the  occurrence.   Thereafter,  she  along  with  her

brother went to his native place Sompuram.  At that time,

the  elder  brother  of  the  accused  proposed  a  marriage

alliance between the accused and the appellant for which

her  family  expressed  unwillingness.  The  reason  for

expressing the unwillingness is not borne out on record but

the  said  aspect,  needless  to  say,  is  absolutely  irrelevant.

What matters to be stated is that the proposal for marriage

was not accepted.  It is evincible from the material brought

on  record  that  the  morning  of  24.05.2003  became  the

darkest and blackest one in her life as the appellant having

a head bath had put a towel on her head to dry, the accused

trespassed into her house and poured a bottle of acid over

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her head. It has been established beyond a trace of doubt by

the ocular testimony and the medical  evidence that some

part of her body was disfigured and the disfiguration is due

to the acid attack.  

11. In this backdrop, the heart of the matter is whether

the imposition of sentence by the learned Single Judge is

proportionate to the crime in question.  

12. In  this  context,  Ms.  Aparna  Bhat,  learned  counsel

appearing for the appellant submits that by no stretch of

imagination, the period undergone, that is, 30 days, can be

regarded as appropriate for the offence under Section 326

IPC and definitely not when there is acid attack.  She would

further urge that in such a situation, the concept of justice

feels  embarrassed  and  a  dent  is  created  in  the  criminal

justice system.  Learned counsel would further submit that

mercy “whose quality is not unstrained”, may be considered

as a virtue in the realm of justice but misplaced sympathy

and exhibition of unwarranted mercy is likely to pave the

path  of  complete  injustice.  She  has  commended  us  to

certain authorities which we shall, in due course, refer to.  

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13. Per contra, contends Mr. Y. Raja Gopala Rao, learned

counsel for the respondent that the occurrence had taken

place long back and with efflux of time, the appellant as well

as  the  respondent  have  been  leading  their  individual

separate  married  lives  and,  therefore,  it  would  not  be

appropriate to interfere with the sentence reduced by the

High Court.  It is canvassed by him that the respondent has

not challenged the conviction before the High Court but he

has been leading a reformed life and after a long lapse of

time, to send him to custody would tantamount to injustice

itself.  

14. We  have  noted  earlier  that  the  conviction  under

Section 326 IPC stands established.  The singular issue is

the appropriateness of the quantum of sentence.  Almost 27

years back in  Sham Sunder v. Puran and another2, the

accused-appellant therein was convicted under Section 304

Part I IPC and while imposing the sentence, the appellate

court  reduced  the  sentence  to  the  term of  imprisonment

already undergone, i.e., six months.  However, it enhanced

the  fine.  This  Court  ruled  that  sentence  awarded  was

inadequate.  Proceeding further, it opined that:- 2  (1990) 4 SCC 731

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“No particular reason has been given by the High Court for awarding such sentence. The court in fixing  the  punishment  for  any  particular  crime should take into consideration the nature of the offence,  the  circumstances  in  which  it  was committed,  the degree of  deliberation shown by the offender. The measure of punishment should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence. The sentence imposed by the High Court appears to be  so  grossly  and  entirely  inadequate  as  to involve a failure of justice. We are of opinion that to meet the ends of justice, the sentence has to be enhanced.”

After  so stating the Court enhanced the sentence to

one of rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years.

15. In  Shyam Narain v. State  (NCT of  Delhi)3,  it  has

been ruled that  primarily  it  is  to  be  borne  in  mind that

sentencing for any offence has a social goal. Sentence is to

be imposed regard being had to the nature of the offence

and the manner in which the offence has been committed.

The fundamental purpose of imposition of sentence is based

on  the  principle  that  the  accused  must  realise  that  the

crime committed by him has not only created a dent in the

life of the victim but also a concavity in the social fabric.

The  purpose  of  just  punishment  is  designed  so  that  the

individuals  in  the  society  which ultimately  constitute  the

3  (2013) 7 SCC 77

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collective do not suffer time and again for such crimes. It

serves as a deterrent.  The Court further observed that on

certain  occasions,  opportunities  may  be  granted  to  the

convict for reforming himself but it is equally true that the

principle  of  proportionality  between an offence  committed

and the penalty imposed are to be kept in view.  It has to be

borne in mind that while carrying out this complex exercise,

it is obligatory on the part of the court to see the impact of

the offence on the society as a whole and its ramifications

on the immediate collective as well as its repercussions on

the victim.

16. In  State of  Madhya Pradesh v. Najab  Khan and

others4,  the  High  Court  of  Madhya  Pradesh,  while

maintaining the conviction under Section 326 IPC read with

Section  34  IPC,  had  reduced  the  sentence  to  the  period

already  undergone,  i.e.,  14  days.   The  two-Judge  Bench

referred  to  the  authorities  in  Shailesh  Jasvantbhai  v.

State  of  Gujarat5,  Ahmed  Hussain  Vali  Mohammed

Saiyed v.  State of  Gujarat6,  Jameel  v.  State of  Uttar

4  (2013) 9 SCC 509 5  (2006) 2 SCC 359 6  (2009) 7 SCC 254

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Pradesh7 and  Guru Basavaraj  v.  State  of  Karnataka8

and held thus:-   

“In operating the sentencing system, law should adopt  the  corrective  machinery  or  deterrence based  on  factual  matrix.  The  facts  and  given circumstances  in  each  case,  the  nature  of  the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed,  the  motive  for  commission  of  the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons  used  and  all  other  attending circumstances  are  relevant  facts  which  would enter  into  the  area  of  consideration.   We  also reiterate  that  undue  sympathy  to  impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice  dispensation  system  to  undermine  the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty  of  every  court  to  award  proper  sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large  while  considering  the  imposition  of appropriate punishment.”

In  the  said  case,  the  Court  ultimately  set  aside  the

sentence imposed by the High Court and restored that of

the trial Judge, whereby he had convicted the accused to

suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years.

17. In  Sumer  Singh  v.  Surajbhan  Singh  &  others9,

while elaborating on the duty of the Court while imposing

sentence for an offence, it has been ruled that it is the duty 7  (2010) 12 SCC 532 8  (2012) 8 SCC 734 9  (2014) 7 SCC 323

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of  the court  to impose adequate  sentence,  for  one of  the

purposes of imposition of requisite sentence is protection of

the  society  and  a  legitimate  response  to  the  collective

conscience.  The  paramount  principle  that  should  be  the

guiding  laser  beam  is  that  the  punishment  should  be

proportionate.  It  is  the  answer  of  law  to  the  social

conscience.  In a way, it is an obligation to the society which

has  reposed  faith  in  the  court  of  law to  curtail  the  evil.

While imposing the sentence it is the court’s accountability

to remind itself about its role and the reverence for the rule

of law. It must evince the rationalised judicial discretion and

not  an individual  perception or  a  moral  propensity.   The

Court  further  held  that  if  in  the  ultimate  eventuate  the

proper sentence is not awarded, the fundamental grammar

of  sentencing  is  guillotined  and  law does  not  tolerate  it;

society  does  not  withstand it;  and sanctity  of  conscience

abhors it.  It was observed that the old saying “the law can

hunt  one’s  past”  cannot  be  allowed  to  be  buried  in  an

indecent  manner  and  the  rainbow  of  mercy,  for  no

fathomable  reason,  should  be  allowed  to  rule.  The

conception of mercy has its own space but it cannot occupy

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the  whole  accommodation.   While  dealing  with  grant  of

further compensation in lieu of sentence, the Court ruled:-

“We do not think that increase in fine amount or grant of compensation under the Code would be a justified answer in law. Money cannot be the oasis. It cannot assume the centre stage for all redemption.  Interference  in  manifestly inadequate  and  unduly  lenient  sentence  is  the justifiable warrant, for the Court cannot close its eyes to the agony and anguish of the victim and, eventually, to the cry of the society.”

18. In State of Punjab v. Bawa Singh10, this Court, after

referring to the decisions in  State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Bablu11 and  State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Surendra

Singh12, reiterated the settled proposition of law that one of

the  prime  objectives  of  criminal  law  is  the  imposition  of

adequate,  just,  proportionate  punishment  which  is

commensurate with the nature of crime regard being had to

the manner in which the offence is committed.  It has been

further held that one should keep in mind the social interest

and  conscience  of  the  society  while  considering  the

determinative factor of sentence with gravity of crime. The

punishment should not be so lenient that it would shock

10  (2015) 3 SCC 441 11  (2014) 9 SCC 281 12  (2015) 1 SCC 222

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the conscience of  the society.   Emphasis was laid on the

solemn duty of the court to strike a proper balance while

awarding  the  sentence  as  imposition  of  lesser  sentence

encourages a criminal and resultantly the society suffers.

19. Recently,  in  Raj  Bala  v.  State  of  Haryana  and

others13, on reduction of sentence by the High Court to the

period already undergone, the Court ruled thus:-

“Despite  authorities  existing  and  governing  the field, it has come to the notice of this Court that sometimes the court of first instance as well as the  appellate  court  which  includes  the  High Court,  either  on individual  notion or  misplaced sympathy or personal perception seems to have been  carried  away  by  passion  of  mercy,  being totally  oblivious  of  lawful  obligation  to  the collective as mandated by law and forgetting the oft quoted saying of Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo, “Justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser  too”  and  follow  an  extremely  liberal sentencing  policy  which  has  neither  legal permissibility nor social acceptability.”

And again:-

“A  Judge  has  to  keep  in  mind  the  paramount concept of rule of law and the conscience of the collective  and  balance  it  with  the  principle  of proportionality  but  when  the  discretion  is exercised in a capricious manner, it tantamounts to  relinquishment  of  duty  and  reckless abandonment  of  responsibility.  One  cannot remain  a  total  alien  to  the  demand  of  the

13  (2016) 1 SCC 463

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socio-cultural  milieu  regard  being  had  to  the command of law and also brush aside the agony of  the  victim  or  the  survivors  of  the  victim. Society waits with patience to see that justice is done. There is a hope on the part of the society and when the criminal culpability is established and the discretion is irrationally exercised by the court, the said hope is shattered and the patience is wrecked.”

20. Though we have referred to the decisions covering a

period  of  almost  three  decades,  it  does  not  necessarily

convey that there had been no deliberation much prior to

that.  There  had  been.  In  B.G.  Goswami  v.  Delhi

Administration14, the Court while delving into the issue of

punishment had observed that punishment is designed to

protect society by deterring potential  offenders as also by

preventing the guilty party from repeating the offence; it is

also designed to reform the offender and reclaim him as a

law abiding citizen for the good of the society as a whole.

Reformatory, deterrent and punitive aspects of punishment

thus  play  their  due  part  in  judicial  thinking  while

determining the question of awarding appropriate sentence.

21. The purpose of referring to the aforesaid precedents is

that they are to be kept in mind and adequately weighed

14  (1974) 3 SCC 85

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while  exercising  the  discretion  pertaining  to  awarding  of

sentence.   Protection of  society on the one hand and the

reformation  of  an individual  are  the  facets  to  be  kept  in

view.  In Shanti Lal Meena v. State (NCT of Delhi)15, the

Court has held that as far as punishment for offence under

the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is concerned, there

is  no  serious  scope  for  reforming  the  convicted  public

servant.   Therefore,  it  shall  depend  upon  the  nature  of

crime, the manner in which it is committed, the propensity

shown and the brutality reflected.  The case at hand is an

example of uncivilized and heartless crime committed by the

respondent  No.  2.   It  is  completely  unacceptable  that

concept of leniency can be conceived of in such a crime.  A

crime of this nature does not deserve any kind of clemency.

It  is  individually  as  well  as  collectively  intolerable.  The

respondent No. 2 might have felt that his ego had been hurt

by such a denial to the proposal or he might have suffered a

sense of hollowness to his exaggerated sense of honour or

might  have  been  guided  by  the  idea  that  revenge  is  the

sweetest thing that one can be wedded to when there is no

response to the unrequited love but, whatever may be the 15  (2015) 6 SCC 185

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situation,  the  criminal  act,  by  no  stretch  of  imagination,

deserves any leniency or mercy. The respondent No. 2 might

not have suffered emotional distress by the denial, yet the

said feeling could not to be converted into vengeance to have

the licence to act in a manner like he has done.    

22. In view of what we have stated, the approach of the

High Court shocks us and we have no hesitation in saying

so.  When there is medical evidence that there was an acid

attack  on  the  young  girl  and  the  circumstances  having

brought  home  by  cogent  evidence  and  the  conviction  is

given the stamp of approval, there was no justification to

reduce the sentence to the period already undergone.  We

are at a loss to understand whether the learned Judge has

been  guided  by  some  unknown  notion  of  mercy  or

remaining oblivious of the precedents relating to sentence or

for  that  matter,  not  careful  about  the  expectation  of  the

collective  from the  court,  for  the  society  at  large  eagerly

waits  for  justice  to  be  done  in accordance with law,  has

reduced  the  sentence.   When  a  substantive  sentence  of

thirty days is imposed, in the crime of present nature, that

is, acid attack on a young girl, the sense of justice, if we

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allow ourselves to say so, is not only ostracized, but also is

unceremoniously  sent  to  “Vānaprastha”.  It  is  wholly

impermissible.

23. In view of our analysis, we are compelled to set aside

the sentence imposed by the High Court and restore that of

the trial court.  In addition to the aforesaid, we are disposed

to  address  on  victim  compensation.   We  are  of  the

considered  opinion  that  the  appellant  is  entitled  to

compensation that is awardable to a victim under the CrPC.

In  Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra16,

the  two-Judge  Bench  referred  to  the  amended  provision,

154th Law  Commission  Report  that  has  devoted  entire

chapter to victimology, wherein the growing emphasis was

on the victim.

24. In Laxmi v. Union of India and others17, this Court

observed thus:-

“12.  Section  357-A  came  to  be  inserted  in  the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  1973  by  Act  5  of 2009  w.e.f.  31-12-2009.  Inter  alia,  this  section provides for preparation of a scheme for providing funds  for  the  purpose  of  compensation  to  the victim or his dependants who have suffered loss or injury as a result of the crime and who require rehabilitation.

16  (2013) 6 SCC 770 17  (2014) 4 SCC 427

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13.  We  are  informed  that  pursuant  to  this provision, 17 States and 7 Union Territories have prepared  “Victim  Compensation  Scheme”  (for short  “the  Scheme”).  As  regards  the  victims  of acid attacks, the compensation mentioned in the Scheme  framed  by  these  States  and  Union Territories is un-uniform. While the State of Bihar has provided for  compensation of  Rs 25,000 in such  Scheme,  the  State  of  Rajasthan  has provided for Rs 2 lakhs of compensation. In our view, the compensation provided in the Scheme by  most  of  the  States/Union  Territories  is inadequate.  It  cannot  be  overlooked  that  acid attack victims need to undergo a series of plastic surgeries and other corrective treatments. Having regard  to  this  problem,  the  learned  Solicitor General  suggested to  us that  the compensation by  the  States/Union  Territories  for  acid  attack victims must be enhanced to at least Rs 3 lakhs as  the  aftercare  and  rehabilitation  cost.  The suggestion of the learned Solicitor General is very fair.”

25. The Court further directed that the acid attack victims

shall  be paid compensation of at least Rs 3 lakhs by the

State  Government/Union  Territory  concerned  as  the

aftercare and rehabilitation cost. Of this amount, a sum of

Rs. 1 lakh was directed to be paid to such victim within 15

days of occurrence of such incident (or being brought to the

notice of the State Government/Union Territory) to facilitate

immediate medical attention and expenses in this regard.

The balance sum of Rs.2 lakhs was directed to be paid as

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expeditiously as possible and positively within two months

thereafter  and  compliance  thereof  was  directed  to  be

ensured  by  the  Chief  Secretaries  of  the  States  and  the

Administrators of the Union Territories.

26. In  State  of  M.P.  v.  Mehtaab18,  the  Court  directed

compensation of Rs.2 lakhs to be fixed regard being had to

the limited final resources of the accused despite the fact

that the occurrence took place in 1997.  It observed that the

said  compensation  was  not  adequate  and  accordingly,  in

addition  to  the  said  compensation  to  be  paid  by  the

accused,  held  that  the  State  was  required  to  pay

compensation  under  Section  357-A  CrPC.  For  the  said

purpose, reliance was placed on the decision in  Suresh v.

State of Haryana19.  

27. In  State  of  Himachal  Pradesh  v.  Ram Pal20,  the

Court  opined  that  compensation  of  Rs.  40,000/-  was

inadequate regard being had to the fact that life of a young

girl  aged  20  years  was  lost.  Bestowing  anxious

consideration the Court, placing reliance on Suresh (supra),

Manohar  Singh v.  State  of  Rajasthan and Ors.21 and 18  (2015) 5 SCC 197 19  (2015) 2 SCC 227 20  (2015) 11 SCC 584 21  (2015) 3 SCC 449

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Mehtaab (supra), directed that ends of justice shall be best

subserved if the accused is required to pay a total sum of

Rs.1  lakh and the  State  to  pay  a  sum of  Rs.3  lakhs  as

compensation.

28. Regard being had to the aforesaid decisions, we direct

the  accused-respondent  No.  2  to  pay  a  compensation  of

Rs.50,000/- and the State to pay a compensation of Rs.3

lakhs.  If  the  accused  does  not  pay  the  compensation

amount within six months, he shall suffer further rigorous

imprisonment of six months, in addition to what has been

imposed  by  the  trial  court.   The  State  shall  deposit  the

amount before the trial court within three months and the

learned trial  Judge on proper  identification of  the victim,

shall disburse it in her favour.  

29. The  criminal  appeals  are  allowed  to  the  extent

indicated above.  

………………..J.      (Dipak Misra)

…………………J.      (R. Banumathi) New Delhi; February 27, 2017