RAMESH HARIJAN Vs STATE OF U.P.
Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001340-001340 / 2007
Diary number: 13601 / 2007
Advocates: RAJENDER PD. SAXENA Vs
GUNNAM VENKATESWARA RAO
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1340 of 2007
Ramesh Harijan …..Appellant
Versus
State of U.P. .... Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.
l. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the judgment
and order dated 23.3.2007 passed by the High Court of Allahabad in
Government Appeal No. 1246 of 1999 by which the High Court has
reversed the judgment of Additional District and Sessions Judge,
Basti in Sessions Trial No. 312 of 1996 dated 2.2.1999 acquitting the
appellant. Thus, the High Court has convicted the appellant for the
offence punishable under Sections 302 and 376 of Indian Penal
Code, 1860 (hereinafter called as `IPC’) and awarded him the life
imprisonment for both the offences. However, both the sentences
have been directed to run concurrently.
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2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:
A. One Smt. Batasi Devi (PW.2) lodged an FIR on 2.2.1996 in
Haraiya Police Station alleging that her daughter Renu, aged 5-6
years, was found dead on her cot in Muradipur, the village of her
maternal grandmother on 30.1.1996 at about 9.00 p.m. Initially, she
had been told that her daughter died of paralysis and she was buried
at the bank of Manorama river. Later on she got information from
Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and other
persons of the same village that her daughter had been raped and
killed by Ramesh, appellant. She also made a request that the dead
body of the child be exhumed and sent for post-mortem.
B. On the order of the concerned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, the
dead body of Renu was dug out from the grave and sent for post-
mortem on 3.2.1996. The autopsy was conducted by Dr. Ajay
Kumar Verma and Dr. S.S. Dwedi of District Hospital. In their
opinion, death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of ante-
mortem vaginal injuries.
C. On the basis of the post-mortem report, Case Crime No. 22 of
1996 was registered against the appellant under Sections 302 and
376 IPC. After having the investigation, the police filed the
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chargesheet against the appellant. During the trial prosecution
examined 14 witnesses to prove its case including Kunwar Dhruv
Narain Singh (PW.1), the scribe of the FIR, Batasi Devi (PW.2),
mother of the deceased Renu, Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7), Shitla
Prasad Verma (PW.8) and after conclusion of the trial and
considering the evidence on record, the trial court vide its judgment
and order dated 2.2.1999 acquitted the appellant of both the
aforesaid charges.
D. Being aggrieved, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.
1246 of 1999 which has been allowed by the High Court vide
judgment and order dated 23.3.2007 and the appellant has been
convicted and awarded the sentence of life imprisonment on both
counts.
Hence, this appeal.
3. Shri Rajender Parsad Saxena, learned counsel appearing for
the appellant, has submitted that High Court has committed an error
by reversing the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal by the trial
court. There is no iota of evidence against the appellant on the basis
of which the conviction can be sustained. The evidence relied upon
by the High Court particularly that of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh
(PW.1), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8)
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cannot stand judicial scrutiny as these witnesses had been motivated;
improvement in the depositions of Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and
Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8) had been to the extent that it is liable to
be discarded as a whole. The other witnesses have turned hostile,
therefore, there is nothing on record to show that the appellant was
connected with the crime by any means. There is no evidence on
record on the basis of which it can be established that Renu
(deceased) used to sleep in the house of the appellant or the appellant
had an opportunity to commit the offence. The findings recorded by
the High Court are perverse not being based on evidence on record.
Thus, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri Manoj Kumar Dwivedi, learned
counsel appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal
contending that the judgment of the trial court has rightly been
reversed by the High Court being contrary to the evidence on record.
The High Court has recorded the findings of fact on correct
appreciation of evidence. Thus, no interference is warranted. The
appeal is liable to be dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
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6. Admittedly, Renu, aged 5-6 years of age, died of vaginal
injuries. The post-mortem report disclosed the following ante-
mortem injuries:
(1) Contusion 4 cm x 2 cm over the right side face
below the right ear lobules on upper part of the neck.
(2) Contusion 5 cm x 3 cm over the left side face in
front and above tragus of the left ear.
(3) Abraded contusion 4 cm X 3 cm over the back
of the right shoulder joint and scapular region.
(4) Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm over the upper part of
the left scapula and back portion of the shoulder tip.
(5) Abraded contusion 4 cm x 1 cm on each side of
office and labia majora.
(6) Abraded with tearing of labia majora of both
side 2 cm x 1 cm.
(7) Hymen absent, lower part of vagina badly
lacerated and pubic lower part upper abdomen, and
vaginal tear up to upper part of Guel orifice.
The internal examination of the supra pubic
region on opening the abdomen revealed that blood
and gases were present and the lower part of the
uterus had a bloodstained tear 1 cm x 1 cm. The cause
of death was shock and haemorrhage. The death could
have taken place on 30.1.1996 between 9.00 or 9.30
pm. If a hard object like a human penis was inserted
in the vagina it could have caused the injuries Nos. 6
and 7.”
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7. The prosecution has examined Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh
(PW.1), the scribe of the FIR lodged by Batasi Devi (PW.2), mother
of the deceased Renu. He deposed that Renu was living with her
maternal grandmother Smt. Phulpatta Devi who was totally blind
and a very poor woman. Her thatched house had fallen down so she
used to sleep in the house of Ramesh, appellant which was adjacent
to her house. Renu was found dead on 30.1.1996 in the night on her
cot in the house of Ramesh, appellant. Ramesh, appellant made the
extra-judicial confession before him in presence of Jata Shankar
Singh (PW.7) and Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8). The father of
Ramesh used to work in his house, however, at the relevant time, he
was working in Sidharth Nagar. Batasi Devi (PW.2) had come to
him and asked him to write the FIR so that she can lodge the same
with the police station. However, he denied the suggestion that he
had a grudge against Ramesh, appellant as it was because of the
appellant and his father that other persons of the village were not
working at his house.
8. Batasi Devi (PW.2), mother of Renu, deceased, deposed that
her mother was very poor and her house was having a thatched roof
which had fallen down so she used to sleep in the house of Ramesh,
appellant which is in very close proximity of her house. In the
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fateful night, Renu slept with her maternal grandmother in the house
of Ramesh, appellant. She had been informed that her daughter died
of paralysis. Renu had been buried at the bank of Manorama river.
However, on the next day, the rumour broke out that Ramesh,
appellant, had committed rape and she died of the same. Then, she
lodged the FIR.
9. Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) deposed that he was originally of
another village but was living in the house of Kunwar Dhruv Narain
Singh (PW.1), in the same village for 15-16 years. He told that on
30.1.1996 when he was returning alongwith Shitla Prasad Verma
(PW.8), to his house after marketing at about 9.00 p.m., he heard
some whispering near the house of appellant Ramesh. He was
having a torch so he focussed it in the same direction and found that
Ramesh, appellant was committing rape on a little girl of 6 years
beneath a tree situated outside his house. His associate Shitla Prasad
Verma (PW.8) raised a cry as a result of which some persons from
the village gathered but appellant Ramesh ran out. The girl had died
of rape.
10. Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8). has supported the prosecution
case narrating the similar facts as stated by Jata Shankar Singh
(PW.7).
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11. Doctor Ajay Kumar Verma (PW.11) who has conducted the
autopsy on the body of Renu, deceased, supported the prosecution
case to the extent that deceased was having the ante-mortem injuries
as mentioned hereinabove on her body.
12. Sharafat Hussain, S.I., (PW.13), the Investigating Officer,
deposed that he had recovered a part of Khatari (thin mattress) and
white sheet with which Renu was covered. He tried to search the
appellant/accused, however, the appellant could be arrested at 3.35
a.m. in the intervening night of 3/4.2.1996 from the junction of three
roads at Mahulghat when he was waiting for some transport to leave
the area.
13. The prosecution also examined Sumaiya Devi (PW.3),
Urmila Devi (PW.4), Hira Devi (PW.6), Sona Devi (PW.9).
However, they did not support the prosecution case and had been
declared hostile. According to the aforesaid witnesses, they reached
the place of occurrence after having the information of Renu’s death
and they found her dead body lying at the house of her maternal
grandmother Smt. Phulpatta Devi.
14. The learned trial court after appreciating the evidence on
record acquitted the appellant on the following grounds:
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I) The prosecution could not produce any evidence to prove
that in the night of the incidence, Renu, deceased, had been
sleeping in the house of the appellant Ramesh or her dead
body had been lying on the cot in his house.
II) Smt. Phulpatta, maternal grandmother of Renu, deceased,
was neither examined, nor any satisfactory explanation had
been given for not examining her.
III) The deposition of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1) was
not worthy of reliance as he has deposed that the appellant
had made extra-judicial confession before him for
committing the aforesaid crime in the presence of Jata
Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8).
Such statement had not been made by either of the said
witnesses.
IV) Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1) was a Jamindar and it
was because of the appellant’s father that other poor persons
were not rendering service to him and Kunwar Dhruv Narain
Singh (PW.1) had been inimical to the appellant.
V) The deposition of Sumaiya Devi (PW.3), Urmila Devi
(PW.4), Hira Devi (PW.6) and Sona Devi (PW.9) was not in
support of the prosecution case and all the aforesaid four
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witnesses had been cross-examined but they could not be
held to be hostile witnesses.
VI) Sharafat Hussain, S.I., (PW.13), the Investigating Officer,
had recovered a part of the bed sheet and it had been sent for
CFSL report and to the said recovery Ram Prasad alias
Parsadi (PW.5) and Bhikari (PW.10) did not support the
recovery and, therefore, recovery of the aforesaid
incriminating material is to be disbelieved.
VII) The evidence of Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla
Prasad Verma (PW.8) could not be relied upon as they had
made knowingly improvements in the case of having last
seen Renu, deceased, with the appellant rather distorted the
whole case of the prosecution totally as both of them had
deposed that they had seen the appellant committing rape on
Renu, deceased.
15. In the appeal, the High Court has reversed the findings
recorded by the trial court on the following grounds:
(I) There was sufficient evidence on record to show that Smt.
Phulpatta Devi, maternal grandmother of Renu, deceased,
was totally blind and a very poor woman and the roof of her
thatched house had fallen and she used to sleep in the house
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of the appellant Ramesh in her neighbourhood with Renu,
deceased.
(II) It was no one’s case that Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh
(PW.1) was inimical to the appellant for any reason
whatsoever as none of the witnesses had deposed that after
the appellant’s father joined the service, he had supported
the other villagers financially and, therefore, they stopped
working at the house of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh
(PW.1).
(III) The witnesses Sumaiya Devi (PW.3), Urmila Devi (PW.4),
Hira Devi (PW.6) and Sona Devi (PW.9), once had been
cross-examined by the prosecution as they had not
supported the case of the prosecution, the trial court was
wrong that they were not hostile witnesses. Similarly
remained the position of the witnesses of the recovery of
sheet cover and bichona i.e. of Ram Prasad alias Parsadi
(PW.5) and Bhikari (PW.10).
(IV) The evidence of Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1), Jata
Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla Prasad Verma (PW.8)
could be relied upon at least to the extent that deceased was
last seen in the company of the appellant.
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(V) The trial court had given undue importance to the minor
contradictions in the depositions of the witnesses. In fact,
there was evidence that after committing the crime outside,
the appellant brought the corpus of the child and placed it on
the cot.
16. The law of interfering with the judgment of acquittal is well-
settled. It is to the effect that only in exceptional cases where there
are compelling circumstances and the judgment in appeal is found to
be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of the
acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of
innocence of the accused and further that the trial court’s acquittal
bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine
manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless
there are good reasons for interference. (Vide: State of Rajasthan
v. Talevar & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 2271; State of U.P. v. Mohd.
Iqram & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 2296; Govindaraju @ Govinda v.
State by Srirampuram Police Station & Anr., (2012) 4 SCC 722;
and State of Haryana v. Shakuntla & Ors., (2012) 4 SCALE 526).
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17. In the aforesaid fact-situation, we have to weigh as to
whether the High Court is justified in reversing the judgment and
order of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
We have been taken through the entire evidence on record
and after re-appreciating the same we can unhesitatingly record that:
(i) Undoubtedly, the trial court has not made any reference to
the depositions of Batasi Devi (PW.2) and also of Kunwar Dhruv
Narain Singh (PW.1) in respect to the fact that the thatched house of
roof of Smt. Phulpatta Devi, maternal grandmother of Renu,
deceased had fallen and she as well as Renu used to sleep in the
house of Ramesh, appellant which was in very close vicinity of Smt.
Phulpatta’s house. Ganga Ram (DW.1) has stated that on the day of
occurrence, Smt. Phulpatta Devi and Renu did not sleep in the house
of Ramesh, however, as he was living permanently in the city and
did not say that he was present on that day in the village, his
evidence cannot be taken into consideration so far as this issue is
concerned. The defence did not cross-examine Kunwar Dhruv
Narain Singh (PW.1) and Batasi Devi (PW.2) on this issue. Thus, the
trial court committed an error recording such finding of fact.
(ii) It has come on record that Smt. Phulpatta Devi was an old,
infirm and totally blind woman and it was for this reason that Renu,
deceased was left for her assistance. The trial court ought not to have
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drawn adverse inference for not examining Smt. Phulpatta Devi by
the prosecution. Thus, the adverse inference drawn by the trial court
on this count is unwarranted and uncalled for.
(iii) The trial court has held that Kunwar Dhruv Narain Singh
(PW.1) had been inimical to Ramesh and his family for the reason
that appellant’s father had been working in the agricultural field at
the said witness and after joining the service appellant’s father had
rendered financial help to other poor persons of the village and thus
those poor persons were not available for work to the said witness.
In this regard, the defence has examined Ganga Ram (DW.1) who
had deposed that the appellant’s father had been looking after the
agricultural work of that witness, however, joined the service in
court 14 years prior to the date of incident and Ganga Ram’s family
was also looking after the agricultural work of the said witness but 8
years prior to the date of incident. He had also left the village and
opened a beetle shop in the city after getting financial aid from
appellant’s father.
Such an evidence is required to be examined in the light of
attending circumstances and particularly taking into consideration
the proximity of time. Time is the greatest heeler. In case the
appellant’s father had left working in the field of the witness 14
years prior to the date of incident and Ganga Ram’s (DW.1) family
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has left 8 years prior to the said date, the time gap itself falsifies the
testimony for the reason that the time gap is a factor of paramount
importance in this regard. More so, it is not the defence case that
any other family or labour was available in the village to look after
the agricultural work of the said witness.
(iv) The recovery of part of the sheet and white clothes having
blood and semen as per the FSL report has been dis-believed by the
trial court in view of the fact that Ram Prasad alias Parsadi (PW.5)
and Bhikari (PW.10) did not support the prosecution case like other
witnesses who did not support the last seen theory. The trial court
failed to appreciate that both the said witnesses, Ram Prasad alias
Parsadi (PW.5) and Bhikari (PW.10) had admitted their
signature/thumb impression on the recovery
The factum of taking the material exhibits and preparing of
the recovery memo with regard to the same and sending the cut out
portions to the Serologist who found the blood and semen on them
vide report dated 21.3.1996 (Ext. Ka 21) is not disputed. The
serological report also revealed that the vaginal swab which was
taken by the doctor was also human blood and semen stained.
18. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a
prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the
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prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross examine him.
The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or
washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the
extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful
scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana,
AIR 1976 SC 202; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR
1977 SC 170; Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC
1848; and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR 1991 SC 1853).
19. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR
1996 SC 2766, this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness
would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution
or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that
portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the
prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been
reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of
Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State
of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb
& Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 951; Sarvesh Narain Shukla
v. Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320; and Subbu Singh v.
State by Public Prosecutor, (2009) 6 SCC 462.
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Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the
evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and
relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by
the prosecution or the defence. (See also: C. Muniappan & Ors. v.
State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718; and Himanshu @ Chintu
v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36)
20. Undoubtedly, there may be some exaggeration in the
evidence of the prosecution witnesses, particularly, that of Kunwar
Dhruv Narain Singh (PW.1), Jata Shankar Singh (PW.7) and Shitla
Prasad Verma (PW.8). However, it is the duty of the court to
unravel the truth under all circumstances.
21. In Balka Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC
1962, this Court considered a similar issue, placing reliance upon its
earlier judgment in Zwinglee Ariel v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
AIR 1954 SC 15 and held as under:
“The Court must make an attempt to separate grain from the chaff, the truth from the falsehood, yet this could only be possible when the true is separable from the falsehood. Where the grain cannot be separated from the chaff because the grain and the chaff are so inextricably mixed up that in the process of separation, the Court would have to reconstruct an absolutely new case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, then this principle will not apply.”
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22. In Sukhdev Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar, AIR 2001
SC 3678, this Court held as under:
“It is indeed necessary however to note that there would hardly be a witness whose evidence does not contain some amount of exaggeration or embellishment, sometimes there would be a deliberate attempt to offer the same and sometimes the witnesses in their over anxiety to do better from the witness-box details out an exaggerated account.”
23. A similar view has been re-iterated in Appabhai & Anr. v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696, wherein this Court has
cautioned the courts below not to give undue importance to minor
discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the
prosecution case. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of
men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material
on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness
for the reason that witnesses now-a-days go on adding
embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their
testimony being rejected by the court. However, the courts should
not dis-believe the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are
otherwise trustworthy.
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24. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2003 SC 3617,
this Court had taken note of its various earlier judgments and held
that even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in
case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of
the court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material
witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to
end. The maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus has no application in
India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar. In case this maxim
is applied in all the cases it is to be feared that administration of
criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot
help in giving embroidery to a story, however, true in the main.
Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the
evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some respects
the court considers the same to be insufficient or unworthy of
reliance, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must
be disregarded in all respects as well.
25. In Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of
Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 2622, this Court held :
“…Thus too frequent acquittals of the guilty may lead to a ferocious penal law, eventually eroding the judicial protection of the guiltless. For all these reasons it is true to say, with Viscount Simon, that "a miscarriage of justice may arise from the acquittal of the guilty no less than from the
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conviction of the innocent ..." In short, our jurisprudential enthusiasm for presumed innocence must be moderated by the pragmatic need to make criminal justice potent and realistic. A balance has to be struck between chasing chance possibilities as good enough to set the delinquent free and chopping the logic of preponderant probability to punish marginal innocents. We have adopted these cautions in analysing the evidence and appraising the soundness of the contrary conclusions reached by the courts below. Certainly, in the last analysis reasonable doubts must operate to the advantage of the appellant…”
(See also: Bhagwan Singh & Ors. v. State of M.P., AIR 2002 SC
1621; Gangadhar Behera & Ors. v. State of Orissa, AIR 2002 SC
3633; Sucha Singh (supra); and S. Ganesan v. Rama
Raghuraman & Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 83).
26. Therefore, in such a case the paramount importance of the
court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. The benefit
of doubt particularly in every case may not nurture fanciful doubts
or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. A
reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible
doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.
27. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that
the acquittal in the instant case by the trial court was totally illegal,
unwarranted and based on mis-appreciation of evidence for the
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reason that the court had given undue weightage to unimportant
discrepancies and inconsistencies which resulted in miscarriage of
justice. Thus, the High Court was fully justified in reversing the
order of acquittal.
In view of the above, the appeal lacks merit and is
accordingly dismissed.
………………………..J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
………………………..J. (DIPAK MISRA)
New Delhi, May 21, 2012
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