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             REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2394 OF 2019 (@SLP(C) No.  30924/2018)

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION & ANR.                          …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

KAGO KUNYA & ORS.                                                        …RESPONDENTS  

J U D G M E N T

    Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J.

1 Leave granted.

2 This appeal has arisen from the judgment of a Division Bench of the Gauhati

High Court in a Writ Appeal against a judgment of a learned Single Judge. The learned

Single Judge, by a judgment dated 7 September 2016, held that Ramakrishna Mission

is ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. In appeal, the

Division  Bench  held  that  while  Ramakrishna  Mission  may  not  be  ‘State’ within  the

meaning of Article 12 in the strict sense of the term, nonetheless its hospital at Itanagar

performs a public duty and in consequence would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution on a liberal interpretation of the expression ‘author-

ity’ in that Article. 3 The first respondent joined the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital at Itanagar on 15

March 1980 as a General Duty Worker. He was regularised with effect from 1 August

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1980 by a letter  dated 23 July  1980.  On 31 March 1982,  the first  respondent  was

promoted to the substantive post of Nursing Aid. He was made permanent on 13 April

1984. Subsequently on 31 December 2005, he was promoted as an Office Assistant

with effect from 1 October 2005.

4 The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are governed by the

Service  Rules.  Among  them  is  Rule  18  which  provides  for  superannuation  in  the

following terms:

“18.  SUPERANNUATION (RETIREMENT):

(i)   A permanent employee/staff  shall  normally retire from the ser- vices of the Hospital after 35 years of service or an attaining the age of 60 (sixty) years.   Provided further, the Management in the service of the Hospital may extend the service of an employee/staff even af- ter  35 years of  service or  he attains the age of  60 (sixty)  years, whichever is earlier, subject to his medical fitness, in slots of 1 (one) years at a time.

(ii)  However, an employee/staff may be retired earlier if in the event of suffering from physical or mental incapacity in the discharge of his duties  provided  the  physical  or  mental  incapacity  of  the employee/staff is established by a Medical Board duly constituted by the Management.”

On 31 January 2015, the hospital informed the first respondent that he would be retiring

from service on 24 March 2015 in accordance with the Service Rules, consequent upon

the completion of thirty-five years of service.   

5 The first respondent instituted a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution

before the Gauhati High Court to challenge the above communication and sought a writ

of mandamus to allow him to continue in service until he completes thirty-five years of

service, counting the appointment from 31 March 1982 when he was substantively ap-

pointed as a Nursing Aid.     

6 The appellants raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition

on the ground that neither Ramakrishna Mission nor its hospital is ‘State’ within the

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meaning of Article 12 and they are not amenable, in any event, to the writ jurisdiction

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

7 The learned Single Judge allowed the Writ Petition. While rejecting the objections

of the appellants to the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge held

that the appellants fall within the description of ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12. A

direction was issued, on merits, to the hospital to treat the date of appointment of the

first respondent as 31 March 1982 and not 15 March 1980.

8 In consequence, the first respondent was effectively granted an extension of ser-

vice for two years beyond the date of superannuation as computed on the basis of the

initial date of joining service. The first respondent has been paid his terminal dues on

the basis of the date of retirement as computed by the hospital.

9 The Writ  Appeal by the appellants failed before a Division Bench of the High

Court.The Division Bench, while dismissing the appeal, principally relied upon two cir-

cumstances: (i) The hospital was availing of funds for a part of its expenditure and was running a

sixty bedded hospital which constitutes a public duty; and (ii) There  was  a  decision  of  a  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  in  Satyabrata

Chakraborty v State of Arunachal Pradesh1, holding that Ramakrishna Mission

fell with the category of ‘other authorities’ under Articles 12 and 226 of the Consti-

tution. The High Court held that this decision of the learned Single Judge which

had held the field for thirteen years should not   be disturbed. It was further held

that the appellant is running a very large hospital in the State and utilised public

funds for a part of its operation and would be amenable to writ jurisdiction. While

answering the preliminary issues against the appellants, the High Court directed

that the appeal be placed for hearing subsequently.

1 2005 (4) GLT 150

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10 While entertaining the present proceedings, this Court by its order dated 19 No-

vember 2018 issued notice and granted a stay of the judgment and order of the High

Court dated 6 April 2018. In pursuance of the order issuing notice, a counter affidavit

has been filed on behalf of the Union of India through the Ministry of Tribal Affairs as

well as by the Government of Arunachal Pradesh.  

11 The State government, in support of the view which has been taken by the High

Court, has submitted that:  (i) The land over which Ramakrishna Mission Hospital was constructed was allotted

to the appellants on 12 July 1984 on a concessional rate; (ii) Subsequently on 4 May 2005, additional land admeasuring 4.66 acres was also

allotted on a concessional rate; and  (iii) The hospital receives grants from the State government.

12 The counter affidavit filed by the Union of India does not require to be dealt with,

since the Ministry of Tribal Affairs is not concerned with the subject matter of the present

appeal.

13 On behalf of the appellants, it has been submitted by Dr Abhishek Manu Singhvi,

and Mr K V Viswanathan, learned senior counsel that the High Court in the present

case has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree

Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v V R Rudani2,

without noticing the clear distinction in that case both on facts and law. It was urged that

the aforesaid judgment dealt with a case of a public trust which was managing a college

affiliated to a University. The dispute in regard to the closure of the college and the con-

sequent non-payment of salaries squarely fell within the purview of the regulatory provi-

sions contained in the Ordinances of the University. That apart, it has been submitted

that:

2 (1989) 2 SCC 691

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(i) No public duty is performed by the first respondent; (ii) Ramakrishna Mission has established and manages the hospital purely as  a vol-

untary service to society; (iii) The conditions of service of the employees of the hospital are not governed ei-

ther by statute or by subordinate legislation and hence, there is no public law ele-

ment involved in enforcing a purely private contract of service; and  (iv) As a result of the impugned judgment of the High Court, the entire range of activi -

ties of Ramakrishna Mission will fall within the description of an ‘authority’ within

the meaning of Article 226.

On these grounds, it was sought to be urged that the judgment of the High Court is con-

trary to a line of precedent of this Court, to which we will advert a little later. That apart,

learned senior counsel submitted that each of the circumstances which weighed with

the High Court in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are amenable to the ex-

ercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is contrary to the settled position in law.

14 On the other hand, Mr A Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State

of Arunachal Pradesh has placed reliance on the statement of facts contained in the

counter affidavit, as noticed earlier. Learned counsel submitted that the Ramakrishna

Mission Hospital is the only hospital in the State of Arunachal Pradesh and hence, by

virtue of its monopoly status, must be held to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction under

Article 226. That apart, it was urged that the hospital receives grants in aid from the

State  government.  The  function  of  conducting  a  hospital  in  the  State  of  Arunachal

Pradesh, it was urged, must be held to be a public function rendering the appellants

amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

15 The rival submissions fall for consideration.

16 Ramakrishna Mission runs a 263 bedded hospital at Itanagar. The grant in aid

which is provided by the State government covers the cost of running 60 beds out of

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263 bedded hospital. Relevant factual data in regard to the nature and extent of the

grants has been placed on record. About 32.26 per cent of the total income of the hos-

pital for 2014-2015, 23.33 for 2015-16 and 22.53 per cent for 2016-17 was from the

grants provided by the State government. The revenue expenditure, the audited bal-

ance sheets and accounts of the hospital indicate that 35.23 per cent of the expenditure

for 2014-2015, 23.83 per cent for 2015-2016 and 20.57 per cent for 2016-2017 was

borne from the finances provided by the State government.

17 In assessing whether the appellants are amenable to the writ jurisdiction under

Article 226, we proceed on the basis of the following circumstances which have been

pressed in aid both on behalf of the original petitioner before the High Court and, in re-

sponse to the present appeal, by the State government: (i) A portion of the income of the hospital is generated out of the grants which are

received from the State; and (ii) Land has been made available for the construction of the hospital by the State

government on a concessional rate.

The grant by the State government covers only a portion, namely, 60 beds out of the

263-beds of the hospital at Itanagar. Significantly, the State government does not con-

trol the day to day functioning of the hospital. The management of the hospital is exclu-

sively with the Ramakrishna Mission. Since the State government finances through its

grants a portion of the income of the hospital, it requires the audited accounts to be

submitted to the State government for scrutiny.  

18 The basic issue before this Court is whether the functions performed by the hos-

pital are public functions, on the basis of which a writ of mandamus can lie under Article

226 of the Constitution.

19 The hospital is a branch of the Ramakrishna Mission and is subject to its control.

The Mission was established by Swami Vivekanand, the foremost disciple of Sri Ra-

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makrishna Paramhansa. Service to humanity is for the organisation co-equal with ser-

vice to God as is reflected in the motto “Atmano Mokshartham Jagad Hitaya Cha”. The

main object of the Ramakrishna Mission is to impart knowledge in and promote the

study of Vedanta and its principles propounded by Sri Ramakrishna Paramahansa and

practically illustrated by his own life and of comparative theology in its widest form. Its

objects include, inter alia to establish, maintain, carry on and assist schools, colleges,

universities, research institutions, libraries, hospitals and take up development and gen-

eral welfare activities for the benefit of the underprivileged/ backward/ tribal people of

society without any discrimination.  These activities are voluntary, charitable and non-

profit making in nature. The activities undertaken by the Mission, a non-profit entity are

not closely related to those performed by the state in its sovereign capacity nor do they

partake of the nature of a public duty.

20 The Governing Body of the Mission is constituted by members of the Board of

Trustees of Ramakrishna Math and is vested with the power and authority to manage

the organization. The properties and funds of the Mission and its management vest in

the Governing Body. Any person can become a member of the Mission if elected by the

Governing Body. Members on roll form the quorum of the annual general meetings. The

Managing  Committee  comprises  of  members  appointed  by  the Governing  Body  for

managing the affairs of the Mission. Under the Memorandum of Association and Rules

and Regulations of the Mission, there is no governmental control in the functioning, ad-

ministration and day to day management of the Mission. The conditions of service of the

employees  of  the  hospital  are  governed  by  service  rules  which  are  framed by the

Mission without the intervention of any governmental body.   

21 In coming to the conclusion that the appellants fell within the description of an au-

thority under Article 226, the High Court placed a considerable degree of reliance on the

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judgment of  a two judge Bench of this  Court  in  Andi Mukta (supra).   Andi Mukta

(supra) was a case where a public trust was running a college which was affiliated to

Gujarat University, a body governed by State legislation. The teachers of the University

and all its affiliated colleges were governed, insofar as their pay scales were concerned,

by the recommendations  of  the  University  Grants  Commission.  A dispute  over  pay

scales raised by the association representing the teachers of the University had been

the subject matter of an award of the Chancellor, which was accepted by the govern-

ment as well as by the University. The management of the college, in question, decided

to close it down without prior approval. A writ petition was instituted before the High

Court for the enforcement of the right of the teachers to receive their salaries and termi-

nal  benefits in accordance with the governing provisions. In that  context,  this Court

dealt with the issue as to whether the management of the college was amenable to the

writ  jurisdiction. A number of circumstances weighed in the ultimate decision of  this

Court, including the following: (i) The trust was managing an affiliated college; (ii) The college was in receipt of government aid; (iii) The aid of the government played a major role in the control, management and

work of the educational institution; (iv) Aided institutions, in a similar manner as government institutions, discharge a

public function of imparting education to students; (v) All aided institutions are governed by the rules and regulations of the affiliating

University; (vi) Their activities are closely supervised by the University; and (vii) Employment in such institutions is hence, not devoid of a public character and is

governed by the decisions taken by the University which are binding on the man-

agement.

22 It was in the above circumstances that this Court came to the conclusion that the

service conditions of the academic staff do not partake of a private character, but are

governed by a right-duty relationship between the staff and the management. A breach

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of the duty, it was held, would be amenable to the remedy of a writ of mandamus. While

the Court recognized that “the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting rights of people

cannot be put into watertight compartments”,  it  laid down two exceptions where the

remedy of mandamus would not be available:  

“15. If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus…”

23 Following the decision in Andi Mukta (supra), this Court has had the occasion to

re-visit the underlying principles in successive decisions. This has led to the evolution of

principles to determine what constitutes a ‘public duty’ and ‘public function’ and whether

the writ of mandamus would be available to an individual who seeks to enforce her

right. 24 In VST Industries Ltd v VST Industries Workers’ Union3, a two judge Bench of

this Court held that a mere violation of the conditions of service will not provide a valid

basis for the exercise of the writ jurisdiction under Article 226, in a situation where the

activity does not have the features of a public duty. This Court noted:  

“7. In de Smith, Woolf and Jowell's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 5th Edn., it is noticed that not all the activities of the private bodies are subject to private law e.g. the activities by private bodies may be governed by the standards of public law when its decisions are subject to duties conferred by statute or when, by virtue of the function  it  is  performing  or  possibly  its  dominant  position  in  the market, it is under an implied duty to act in the public interest… After detailed  discussion,  the  learned  authors  have  summarised  the position with the following propositions: (1) The test of whether a body is performing a public function, and is hence amenable to judicial review, may not depend upon the source of its power or whether the body is ostensibly a ‘public’ or a ‘private’ body. (2) The principles of judicial review prima facie govern the activities of bodies performing public functions.”

3  (2001) 1 SCC 298

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“(3)  …In  the  following  two  situations  judicial  review  will  not normally  be  appropriate  even  though  the  body  may  be performing a public function: (a)  Where  some other  branch  of  the  law  more  appropriately governs the dispute between the parties. In such a case, that branch of the law and its remedies should and normally will be applied; and (b) where there is a contract between the litigants. In such a case  the  express  or  implied  terms  of  the  agreement  should normally govern the matter. This reflects the normal approach of English law, namely, that the terms of a contract will normally govern  the  transaction,  or  other  relationship  between  the parties,  rather  than  the  general  law.  Thus,  where  a  special method of resolving disputes (such as arbitration or resolution by private or domestic tribunals) has been agreed upon by the parties  (expressly  or  by  necessary  implication),  that  regime, and  not  judicial  review,  will  normally  govern  the  dispute.” (Emphasis supplied)

25 In G Bassi  Reddy  v International  Crops Research Institute4,  a  two  judge

Bench of this Court dealt with whether the International Crop Research Institute for the

Semi-Arid Tropics (“ICRISAT”)  which is  a non-profit  research and training centre,  is

amenable  to the  writ   jurisdiction  under  Article  226. The dispute concerned the

termination of  employees of  ICRISAT. The Court  held that  only functions which are

similar  or  closely  related to  those that  are  performed by the State  in  its  sovereign

capacity qualify as ‘public functions’ or a ‘public duty’:

“28. A writ under Article 226 can lie against a “person” if  it  is a statutory body or performs a public function or discharges a public or statutory duty…ICRISAT has not been set up by a statute nor are its activities statutorily controlled. Although, it is not easy to define what a public function or public duty is, it can reasonably be said that such functions are similar to or closely related to those performable by the State in its sovereign capacity. The primary activity of ICRISAT is to conduct  research  and  training  programmes  in  the  sphere  of agriculture  purely  on  a  voluntary  basis.  A  service  voluntarily undertaken cannot be said to be a public duty. Besides ICRISAT has a role which extends beyond the territorial boundaries of India and its activities  are  designed to  benefit  people  from all  over  the  world. While the Indian public may be the beneficiary of the activities of the Institute, it certainly cannot be said that ICRISAT owes a duty to the Indian public to provide research and training facilities.”

4(2003) 4 SCC 225

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Applying the above test, this Court upheld the decision of the High Court that the writ

petition against ICRISAT was not maintainable.

26 A similar view was taken in Ramesh Ahluwalia v State of Punjab5, where a two

judge Bench of this Court held that a private body can be held to be amenable to the

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 when it performs public functions which

are normally expected to be performed by the State or its authorities. 27 In  Federal  Bank  Ltd.  v Sagar  Thomas,6 this  Court  analysed  the  earlier

judgements of this Court and provided a classification of entities against whom a writ

petition may be maintainable:

“18. From the decisions referred to above, the position that emerges is that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be maintainable against (i) the State (Government); (ii) an authority; (iii) a statutory body; (iv) an instrumentality or agency of the State; (v) a  company which is  financed and owned by the State;  (vi)  a private body run substantially on State funding; (vii) a private body discharging  public  duty  or  positive  obligation of  public nature; and (viii) a person or a body under liability to discharge any function under any statute, to compel it to perform such a statutory function.”

(emphasis supplied)

28 In  Binny  Ltd.  v V  Sadasivan7,  a  two  judge  Bench  of  this  Court  noted  the

distinction between public and private functions. It held thus:  

“11…It is difficult to draw a line between public functions and private functions  when  they  are  being  discharged  by  a  purely  private authority. A body is performing a “public function” when it seeks to achieve some collective  benefit  for  the  public  or  a  section  of  the public and is accepted by the public or that section of the public as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercise public functions when they intervene or participate in social or economic affairs in the public interest.”

5 (2012) 12 SCC 331 6 (2013) 10 SCC 733 7(2005) 6 SCC 657

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The Bench elucidated on the scope of mandamus:  

“29. However, the scope of mandamus is limited to enforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determined by the nature of  the  duty  to  be  enforced,  rather  than  the  identity  of  the authority  against  whom  it  is  sought.  If  the  private  body  is discharging a public function and the denial of any right is in connection  with  the  public  duty  imposed  on  such  body,  the public law remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public body may be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such power is immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public law element in such action…There cannot be any general definition of public authority or public action. The facts of each case decide the point.”

     (emphasis supplied)

29 More recently in K K  Saksena v International Commission on Irrigation and

Drainage8,  another  two judge Bench of  this  Court  held that  a writ  would not  lie  to

enforce purely private law rights.  Consequently, even if a body is performing a public

duty and is amenable to the exercise of writ jurisdiction, all its decisions would not be

subject to judicial review. The Court held thus:

“43. What  follows  from  a  minute  and  careful  reading  of  the aforesaid judgments of this Court is that if a person or authority is “State”  within  the  meaning  of  Article  12  of  the  Constitution, admittedly a writ petition under Article 226 would lie against such a person or body.  However, we may add that even in such cases writ would not lie to enforce private law rights.   There are a catena of judgments on this aspect and it is not necessary to refer to those judgments as that is the basic principle of judicial review of an action under the administrative law. The reason is obvious.   A private law is that  part  of  a  legal  system which  is  a  part  of  common law  that involves relationships between individuals, such as law of contract or torts.   Therefore, even if writ petition would be maintainable against an authority,  which is  “State”  under  Article 12 of  the Constitution, before issuing any writ, particularly writ of mandamus, the Court has to satisfy that action of such an authority, which is challenged, is in the domain of public law as distinguished from private law.”

8  (2015) 4 SCC 670

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Thus, even if the body discharges a public function in a wider sense, there is no public

law element involved in the enforcement of a private contract of service.  

30 Having  analysed  the  circumstances  which  were  relied  upon  by  the  State  of

Arunachal  Pradesh,  we  are  of  the  view  that  in  running  the  hospital,  Ramakrishna

Mission does not discharge a public function. Undoubtedly, the hospital is in receipt of

some element of grant. The grants which are received by the hospital cover only a part

of the expenditure. The terms of the grant do not indicate any form of governmental

control in the management or day to day functioning of the hospital. The nature of the

work which is rendered by Ramakrishna Mission, in general, including in relation to its

activities concerning the hospital in question is purely voluntary.

31   Before an organisation can be held to discharge a public function, the function must

be of a character that is closely related to functions which are performed by the State in

its sovereign capacity. There is nothing on record to indicate that the hospital performs

functions  which  are  akin  to  those  solely  performed  by  State  authorities.  Medical

services  are  provided  by  private  as  well  as  State  entities.  The  character  of  the

organisation as a public authority is dependent on the circumstances of the case. In

setting up the hospital, the Mission cannot be construed as having assumed a public

function. The hospital has no monopoly status conferred or mandated by law. That it

was the first in the State to provide service of a particular dispensation does not make it

an ‘authority’ within the meaning of Article 226. State governments provide concessional

terms to a variety of organisations in order to attract them to set up establishments

within the territorial  jurisdiction  of  the State.  The State may encourage them as an

adjunct of its social policy or the imperatives of economic development. The mere fact

that land had been provided on a concessional basis to the hospital would not by itself

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result in the conclusion that the hospital performs a public function. In the present case,

the absence of state control in the management of the hospital has a significant bearing

on our coming to the conclusion that the hospital does not come within the ambit of a

public authority.  

32 It has been submitted before us that the hospital is subject to regulation by the

Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act 2010. Does the regulation of

hospitals  and  nursing  homes  by law render  the  hospital  a  statutory  body?  Private

individuals and organizations are subject to diverse obligations under the law. The law

is a ubiquitous phenomenon. From the registration of birth to the reporting of death, law

imposes  obligations  on  diverse  aspects  of  individual  lives.  From  incorporation  to

dissolution, business has to act in compliance with law. But that does not make every

entity  or  activity  an  authority  under  Article  226.  Regulation  by  a  statute  does  not

constitute the hospital as a body which is constituted under the statute. Individuals and

organisations are subject to statutory requirements in a whole host of activities today.

That  by  itself  cannot  be  conclusive  of  whether  such  an  individual  or  organisation

discharges a public function. In Federal Bank (supra), while deciding whether a private

bank  that  is  regulated  by  the  Banking  Regulation  Act,  1949  discharges  any  public

function, the court held thus:

“33. …in our view, a private company carrying on banking business as  a  scheduled  bank,  cannot  be  termed  as  an  institution  or  a company carrying on any statutory or public duty. A private body or a person  may  be  amenable  to  writ  jurisdiction  only  where  it  may become necessary to compel such body or  association to enforce any statutory obligations or such obligations of public nature casting positive obligation upon it. We don't find such conditions are fulfilled in respect of a private company carrying on a commercial activity of banking.  Merely  regulatory  provisions  to  ensure  such  activity carried  on by private bodies work within  a discipline,  do not confer  any such status upon the company nor  put  any such

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obligation upon it which may be enforced through issue of a writ under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution.  Present  is  a  case  of disciplinary  action  being  taken  against  its  employee  by  the appellant Bank. The respondent's service with the Bank stands terminated.  The  action  of  the  Bank  was  challenged  by  the respondent  by  filing  a  writ  petition  under  Article  226  of  the Constitution of India. The respondent is not trying to enforce any statutory duty on the part of the Bank…”

     (emphasis supplied)

33 Thus, contracts of a purely private nature would not be subject to writ jurisdiction

merely by reason of the fact that they are structured by statutory provisions. The only

exception to this principle arises in a situation where the contract of service is governed

or regulated by a statutory provision.  Hence, for instance, in K K Saksena (supra) this

Court held that when an employee is a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947, it constitutes an exception to the general principle that a contract of personal

service is not capable of being specifically enforced or performed.

34 It is of relevance to note that the Act was enacted to provide for the regulation

and registration of clinical establishments with a view to prescribe minimum standards

of  facilities and services.  The Act,  inter  alia,  stipulates conditions to be satisfied by

clinical establishments for registration.  However, the Act does not govern contracts of

service entered into by the Hospital with respect to its employees. These fall within the

ambit of purely private contracts, against which writ jurisdiction cannot lie. The sanctity

of this distinction must be preserved.  

35 For the above reasons, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High

Court was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellants are amenable to

the  writ  jurisdiction  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  as  an  authority  within  the

meaning of the Article.

16

36 For the  reasons  that  we  have  adduced  above,  we  hold  that  neither  the

Ramakrishna Mission, nor the hospital would constitute an authority within the meaning

of Article 226 of the Constitution.

37 Before concluding, it would be necessary to also advert to the fact that while the

learned Single Judge had come to the conclusion that the appellants are ‘State’ within

the  meaning  of  Article  12,  the  Division  Bench  has  not  accepted  that  finding.  The

Division Bench ruled, as we have noticed earlier, that the appellants do not fall within

the description of ‘State’ under Article 12. This finding has not been challenged before

this Court by the State of Arunachal Pradesh.   

38 Even  otherwise,  we  are  clearly  of  the  view  that  the  tests  which  have  been

propounded  in  the  line  of  authority  of  this  Court  in  Ajay  Hasia  v  Khalid  Mujib

Sehravardi9, Pradeep Kumar Biswas v Indian Institute of Chemical Biology10  and

Jatya Pal Singh v Union of India11 support the conclusion of the High Court that the

appellants are not ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

39 For the above reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and

order  of  the  High  Court  dated  6  April  2018  in  Writ  Appeal  No  25  (AP/2017).    In

consequence, the writ petition filed before the High Court namely W.P. (Civil) No 520

(AP/2015) shall stand dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

40 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

……………………...............................J.                                                                        [Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

.…...…………………...........................J.             [Hemant Gupta]

9 (1981) 1 SCC 722 10 (2002) 5 SCC 111 11 (2013) 6 SCC 452

17

New Delhi; February 28, 2019.

18

ITEM NO.1               COURT NO.12               SECTION XIV

              S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C)  No(s).  30924/2018

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated  06-04-2018 in WA No. 25/2017 passed by the Gauhati High Court At Itanagar)

RAMAKRISHNA MISSION & ANR.                         Petitioner(s)                                 VERSUS KAGO KUNYA & ORS.                                  Respondent(s)   Date : 28-02-2019 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :  HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv. Mr. K.V. Viswanathan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Arijit Mazumdar, Adv. Mr. Amit Bhandari, Adv. Mr. Arunabha Deb, Adv. Mr. Shambo Nandy, Adv.

                 Mr. Abhinav Mukerji, AOR Mr. Deepan Kumar Sarkar, Adv.

                   For Respondent(s) Mr. A. Tewari, Adv.

Ms. Eliza Bar, Adv.                   Mr. Shree Pal Singh, AOR

                 Ms. Priyanka Das, Adv. Mr. Vibhu Shankar Mishra, Adv. Ms. Ragni Pandey, Adv. Mr. Raj Bahadur, Adv. Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR                     

         UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

Leave granted.

The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  reportable

judgment.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(MANISH SETHI)                                  (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR) COURT MASTER (SH)                                  BRANCH OFFICER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)