Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4 OF 2016 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.28249 OF 2015)

RAMAKANT DWIVEDI                     …APPELLANT

VERSUS

RAFIQ AHMAD & ORS.                     ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.

1. Leave  granted.   This  appeal  has  been  preferred  

against  order  dated  18th June,  2015  passed  by  the  High  

Court  of  Judicature at Allahabad in PIL No.35233 of  2015  

granting  an  interim  order  against  excavation  of  minor  

minerals by the appellant in respect of lease executed in his  

favour on 17th October, 2013.

2. In the impugned order, the High Court observed that  

lease  granted  to  the  appellant  was  in  violation  of  its  

judgments dated 29th January, 2013  in Nar Narain Mishra  

versus The State  of  U.P.1 and   dated  12th September,  

1

2013(2) ADJ 166

1

Page 2

2014  Sukhan  Singh  versus  State  of  U.P.2.   In  Nar  

Narain Mishra, the operative part of the High Court order  

is as follows :

“In  the  result,  all  the  writ  petitions  are   disposed with the following directions :

1) The  prayers  made  by  the  petitioners/applicants for considering their   applications  for  renewal  of  their  mining  leases which were pending on 31/5/2012,   and  the  applications  for  grant  of  fresh  leases which were pending on 31/5/2012  are refused. 2) The  Government  Order  dated  26/7/2012 and all consequent steps taken  thereunder are quashed.  3) Notices  issued  by  the  District   Magistrate  inviting  applications  by  E- tendering consequent to the Government   Order dated 31/5/2012, cannot be allowed  to  be  finalized  and  are  quashed  with  liberty  to  the  respondents  to  issue fresh  notice in accordance with law. 4) Parties shall bear their own costs.”

3. According to the appellant, on 27th April, 2013, the pre-

existing lease in his favour which expired on 18th November,  

2010, was renewed for further period of three years upto  

26th April, 2016.  Approval was granted on 14th March, 2011  

and  environmental  clearance  was  granted  on  21st  

September,  2012.   It  is  submitted  that  order  of  the  

Government dated 31st May, 2012 was not applicable and  

was later withdrawn on 22nd October,  2014 and thus,  the  

lease was valid.

2 2014(11) ADJ 89

2

Page 3

4. This submission though also supported by the State,  

cannot be accepted.  The High Court has rightly held that  

the  renewal  was  in  pursuance  of  the  Government  Order  

dated 26th February, 2013 which itself was in conflict with  

the order of the High Court in Nar Narain Mishra (supra)  

as reiterated in Sukhan Singh (supra).   In view of order of  

the  High  Court  dated  29th January,  2013  in  Nar Narain  

Mishra (supra) all  pending applications  as  on 31st May,  

2012  stood  rejected.   In  the  case  of  the  appellant,  

environmental  clearance  was granted  on 21st September,  

2012 and renewal was granted on 27th April, 2013.   Orders  

of  the  High  Court  in  Nar  Narain  Mishra  and  Sukhan  

Singh  (supra)   which  are  not  under  challenge  clearly  

debarred the grant of lease under Chapter II after 31st May,  

2012.   This aspect has been dealt with in greater detail in  

Civil Appeal Nos.4845-4846 of 2015 titled Sulekhan Singh &  

Co. versus State of U.P. with which the present appeal was  

tagged,  which is being separately decided today.  Stand of  

the  State,  to  the  contrary,  can  also  not  be  appreciated.  

Reference may be made to the finding recorded by the High  

Court in the impugned order:  

“A  Division  Bench  in  the  case  of  Nar  Narain   Mishra v. State of U.P. and others reported in    2013  (2)  ADJ  166,  after  interpreting  the  Government  Order  dated 31.5.2012 recorded  as principle of law, that once notification has   

3

Page 4

been  published  by  the  State Government  in  exercise of powers under Rule 23 of the Rules   1963,  for  vacant  areas  being  available  for   grant  of  leases  under  Chapter  IV  of  Rules,   1963,  no  grant/renewal  on  the  pending  applications can be made, after 31.5.2012. The  State was not satisfied with the legal position   so explained. It came out with a Government   Order  dated  26.2.2013,  which  provided  that   pending  applications,  for  renewal/grant  in   respect  of  which  orders  of  approval  have  already been made by the State Government  or  by  the  competent  authority  shall  not  be  controlled by the judgment in the case of Nar   Narain  Mishra  (Supra)  such  cases  may  be   processed further.

This Government Order dated 26.2.2013 came  up  for  consideration  before  another  Division  Bench  of  this  Court  in  the  case  of  Sukkhan   Singh v.  State of  U.P.  and others reported in   2014 (11) ADJ 89. The Division Bench has held   that  the  Government  Order  dated  26.2.2013  cannot deviate from the legal position, as has   been  explained  in  the  case  of  Nar  Narain   Mishra (Supra).

It, therefore, follows that no application which  was pending on 31.5.2012 can be proceeded  with for grant/renewal of lease under Chapter   II/VI  of  the  Minor  Minerals  Concession  Rules,   1963 after 31.5.2012. The grant, if any, after   31.5.2012 can only be made under Chapter IV   of  the  Rules  of  1963  Le.  by  e-auction  or   tendering.  The State and  its  Officers  have  shown little or no respect to the orders of this   Court.

xxx

Prima  facie,  we  find  no  substance  in  the  contention  raised.  In  our  opinion,  once  a   notification dated 31.5.2012 had been issued  declaring  that  all  the  vacant  areas  are  available for grant of lease only under Chapter   IV, no lease subsequent thereto under Chapter   VI could be executed. The area remains vacant   till  the  execution  of  the  lease  deed.  The  Execution of the lease in the facts of the case  has  taken  place  after  31.5.2012.  Mere  

4

Page 5

grant/approval in our opinion will not alter the   legal position.

The concern of the Court is both, in respect of   best use of natural resources by the State as  well  as  for  avoiding  the  degradation  of   environment, especially near the river beds.”

5. Last submission on behalf of the appellant is that on  

22nd October, 2014 the State of U.P. has declared that the  

mining  leases  will  be  given  under  Chapter  II  and  Order  

dated 31st May, 2012 was withdrawn. In the present case,  

lease was granted in violation of judgment of the High Court  

as  already  noted.  Subsequent  withdrawal  of  the  

Government order dated 31st May, 2012 could not benefit  

the appellant as on the date of grant of lease in favour of  

the appellant, the said Government order was operative.

6. In these circumstances, we do not find any ground to  

interfere  with  the  impugned  interim order  and  leave  the  

issue on merits to be finally decided by the High Court.   

7. The appeal is dismissed.

…………..……..…………………………….J.               

[ ANIL R. DAVE ]

…………..….………………………………..J.               [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

NEW DELHI JANUARY 04, 2016

5

Page 6

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.4845-4846 OF 2015

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4847-4850 OF 2015

SULEKHAN SINGH & CO. & ORS           …APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P.  & ORS.                          ...RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J

1. These appeals by special leave have been preferred  

against  order  dated  6th February,  2015  in  Civil  Misc.  

Review Application Nos.5064 and 5065 of 2015 and order  

dated  15th December,  2014  in  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition  

Nos.38034, 38064, 12622 and 12663 of 2014 passed by  

the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad.

2. The question for consideration is  whether the High  

Court  was justified in quashing mining lease granted in  

favour of the appellants vide orders dated 24th May, 2014  

6

Page 7

and 26th May,  2014 on the ground that  the said  leases  

were granted in violation of the Government Order (G.O.)  

dated  31st May,  2012.   Under  this  order,  mining  leases  

could only be granted under Chapter IV of the U.P. Minor  

Minerals (Concession) Rules, 1963 (the Rules) by way of e-

tendering in the interest of transparency and to safeguard  

the public revenue.

3. Appellants  Sulekhan  Singh  and  company  were  the  

petitioners  in  the High Court  in  Civil  Miscellaneous Writ  

Petition Nos. 12663 of 2014.  The appellants Manoj Kumar  

Sood and Makhan Singh were jointly the petitioners in the  

High Court in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition Nos. 12622  

of 2014.  They sought direction for grant of mining lease.  

Upon grant of lease in pursuance of interim order in their  

favour,   Mohammad  Aakil  and  Masihul  Khan  private  

respondents herein, sought cancellation of mining leases  

granted to the appellants.

4. The Mines and Mineral (Development and Regulation)  

Act,  1957  (MMDR)  provides  for  development  and  

regulation of mines and minerals.  Section 15 provides for  

making  rules  by  the  State  Governments  for  regulating  

grant  of  mining  leases  and  other  matters  in  respect  of  

‘minor minerals’.  The State of U. P. framed the Rules in  

7

Page 8

exercise of the said power.  The Rules contain two sets of  

procedure for  grant  of  mining lease.  Chapter IV of  the  

Rules provides for grant of lease by auction while Chapter  

II  provides for  grant  of  lease otherwise than by way of  

auction.  Prior to 31st May, 2012, the leases were being  

granted in  the State  of  Uttar  Pradesh under  Chapter II.  

G.O. dated 31st May, 2012 changed this practice, providing  

that:

“To bring transparency in connection of approval   of  mining lease  in  the  state,  the  decision  has  been taken to grant lease through e-tendering  system by inviting tenders under the provisions   of  chapter-4  of  Uttar  Pradesh  Minor  Minerals   (Concession) Rules, 1963.  By this step, by lifting   the  minor  minerals  on  remission,  the  transparency would increase and along with that   competition  would  take place and due to that   State Government would get maximum rate.”

5. The above change of policy appears to be consistent  

with the position of law that State largesse ought to be  

distributed by non arbitrary method consistent with Article  

14 of the Constitution3.

6. It  is  a  matter  of  public  knowledge  that  the  

Government of  India appointed a Commission of  Inquiry  

consisting of Shri Justice M.B. Shah, a former Judge of this  

3  (2012) 3 SCC 1 Centre for Public Interest Litigation Vs. Union of India; (2012) 10  

SCC 1  Natural Resources Allocation, in Re, Special Reference No.1 of 2012; (2014) 9 SCC  516 Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal Secretary  and  (2014) 6 SCC 590 Goa Foundation  Vs. Union of India

8

Page 9

Court,  inter  alia,  to  enquire  into  the  deficiencies  of  

management and regulatory and monitoring systems on  

account of which illegal mining could not be tackled, vide  

notification dated 22nd November, 2010.  The Commission  

was  also  to  suggest  remedial  measures.  The  said  

Commission  gave  its  reports,   including  report  dated  

March, 2012 (in respect of State of Goa), June, 2013 (in  

respect  of  the  State  of  Odisha)  and  October,  2013  (in  

relation to the State of Jharkhand).  In its report for the  

State  of  Goa,  the  Commission found that  procedure  for  

grant of lease/renewal of lease required streamlining for  

transparency.  It was further suggested that the authority  

to decide the applications should be a committee headed  

by  Additional  Chief  Secretary  (instead  of  a  lower  rank  

officer)  and  should  also  have  representatives  from  

Departments of Mines, Revenue, Forest and Environment.  

It  was  also  suggested  that  mining  leases  should  be  

granted by public auction for transparency and increase in  

revenue  of  the  State  and  also  to  check  

corruption/favoritism.

7. In its report submitted in June, 2013, in relation to  

the  State  of  Orissa,  referring  to  a  letter  of  the  Chief  

9

Page 10

Minister of Orissa, it was inter alia observed by the Shah  

Commission:

“Competitive bidding should be the general  methodology for grant of lease of the finite   valuable national resources.”

8. These developments led to policy changes to ensure  

fairness  and  transparency  in  allotment  of  mineral  

concessions and optimal  utilization of  mineral  resources  

through  sustainable  mining  practices.   Policy  changes  

include 2015 amendment to the MMDR and amendments  

to rules by some of the States, providing for auction as  

predominant way of giving mining leases.

9. The G.O. dated 31st May 2012, passed by the State of  

U. P. came to be challenged before the High Court  inter  

alia on the ground that applications already made prior to  

31st May,  2012  were  required  to  be  dealt  with  without  

applying  the  G.O.  dated  31st May,  2012.  This  plea  was  

rejected by the High Court vide its judgment dated 29th  

January, 2013 in  Nar Narain Mishra  Vs. The State of  

U.P.4.   Special leave petition filed against the High Court  

judgment  was  dismissed  by  this  Court5.   The  Division  

Bench of the High Court relied upon judgment of this Court  

4 2013(2) ADJ 166 5 SLP (Civil) No.14372/2013, dismissed on 3.3.2014.

10

Page 11

in State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M/s. Hind Stone6  and held  

that  pendency of  application  did  not  create  any vested  

right for the application being considered otherwise than  

by way of order dated 31st May, 2012.  The High Court  

upheld the stand of the State which was as follows :

“The State stand is that there is no inviolable   rights of  renewal in a lease and the right  of   consideration of the renewal and the claim of   renewal of the lease have to be dealt with in  accordance with the Rules as existing at the  relevant time. It is submitted that declaration  under Chapter IV having been issued all areas   stand notified for settlement under Chapter IV,   the renewal of lease cannot be granted since  renewal  can  be  granted  only  in  accordance  with the procedure prescribed under Chapter II   which  provision is  no more applicable.  When  the  State  issued  the  Government  Order  on  31.5.2012  applying  the  same  to  all  vacant  areas,  it  intended  to  apply  the  Government  Order on the areas which were not occupied.   No  exception  has  been  provided  in  the  Government order exclude out those areas in   respect  of  which  renewal  applications  are  pending. An application for renewal of lease is   in essence an application for grant of lease and  same principle has to be applied with regard to   applications  which  are  pending  for  grant  of   lease  and  on  similar  analogy,  if  the  submissions  of  the  petitioners  are  to  be  accepted those areas on which applications for   grant of lease have been submitted should also   be  kept  out  of  purview  of  the  Government   Order  dated  31.5.2012.  No  such  intention  or   object  is  decipherable  from  the  Government   order. By subsequent Government Order dated  5.9.2012, the State Government has provided   that  those  areas  where  renewal  has  been  sanctioned or granted on or before 5.9.2012,   shall not be settled under Chapter IV.”

6 1981 (2) SCC 205

11

Page 12

10. The High Court also rejected the objection that the  

order dated 31st May, 2012 was required to be confined  

only to “Boulder” and did not extend to “Building Stone”.  

It was observed :

“Government Order dated 31/5/2012, uses the  word  "Boulder".  However,  the  Government   Order dated 31/5/2012, does not confine to the  word "Boulder" which is found in the Riverbed.   The  word  "Boulder"  can  be  used  for  the  minerals which is found in the Riverbed as well   as  the  mineral  which  is  found  "In  situ  rock   deposit". Petitioner's case in the writ petition is   that since the word "Boulder" is found only in   the  Riverbed,  the  Government  Order  dated  31/5/2012,  does not cover "Imarti  Patthar" is   misconceived  since  the  Government  Order   dated  31/5/2012,  does  not  confine  the  word  "Boulder"  to  one  which  is  found  in  the  Riverbed. In this context a look of 1st Schedule   and 2nd Schedule to the Rules, 1963 makes it   clear that the word "Boulder" is included in the  heading  "Building  Stone"  as  well  as  when  found in mixed form in the Riverbed.”

11. Further,  following  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Deepak Kumar Vs. State of Haryana7,  the High Court  

directed that measures for protection of environment as  

noted  by  this  Court  be  adopted  while  granting  mining  

leases.

12. The High Court held that no direction for grant of a  

lease  contrary  to  G.O.  dated  31st May,  2012  could  be  

issued and cancelled all applications pending on 31st May,  

7 2012 (4) SCC 629

12

Page 13

2012.  The concluding part of the order of the High Court  

is as follows :

“In  the  result,  all  the  writ  petitions  are   disposed with the following directions:  

5. The  prayers  made  by  the  petitioners/applicants  for  considering  their  applications  for  renewal  of  their   mining leases which  were  pending on   31/5/2012,  and  the  applications  for   grant  of  fresh  leases  which  were   pending on 31/5/2012 are refused.

6. xxxxxxx

7.  Notices  issued  by  the  District   Magistrate  inviting  applications  by  e- tendering  consequent  to  the  Government  Order  dated  31/5/2012,   cannot be allowed to be finalized and  are  quashed  with  liberty  to  the  respondents  to  issue  fresh  notices  in   accordance with law.”

13. Inspite  of  the  said  judgment  of  the  High  Court,  

certain leases were granted in violation of G.O. dated 31st  

May, 2012 which came to be challenged before the High  

Court. Reiterating  its  view,  in  its  judgment  dated  12th  

September,  2014  in  Sukhan  Singh  versus  State  of   

U.P.8,  it was held that no pending application as on 31st  

May, 2012 could be taken cognizance of.  It was held that :

“19.   The basic position in law is that the mere   filing of an application either for the grant of a   lease  or  for  the  renewal  of  a  lease  does  not   confer a vested right for the grant or renewal of   a lease and, an application has to be disposed of   

8 2014 (11) ADJ 89

13

Page 14

on the basis of the rules as they stand on the   date of the disposal of the application.  

20.  This being the clear position in law which   has  been  enunciated  in  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu (supra), it   would be impermissible to accept the contention  of  the  fourth  respondent  that  its  applications  were liable to be disposed of, not on the basis of   the provisions of Chapter IV but under Chapter II   of  the  Rules.  Besides,  the  acceptance  of  any   such submission would be contrary to  the law  laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in   Nar  Narain  Mishra  (supra)  which  follows  the  decision of the Supreme Court.”

14. It is in this background that the present matters were  

considered by the High Court. To seek an exception to G.O.  

dated 31st May, 2012, the appellants contended that they  

had already applied in pursuance of notice dated 18th July,  

2009 in accordance with Chapter II of the Rules.   When  

the said notice was cancelled and fresh notice dated 10th  

August,  2010 was issued,  the appellants challenged the  

same.  They were relegated to their departmental remedy.  

They  challenged  the  order  passed  by  the  department  

again by another writ petition and the High Court directed  

the  matter  to  be  considered  vide  order  dated  10th  

February, 2012.  As the said order was prior to 31st May,  

2012,  appellant  acquired  a  right  to  get  lease  as  an  

exception to order dated 31st May, 2012.  The High Court  

passed an interim order in their favour which led to the  

grant of mining leases on 24th May, 2014 and 26th May,  

14

Page 15

2014.    

15. The stand of the appellants was held to be against  

the  earlier  High  Court  judgments.   Thus,  after  hearing  

finally, the High Court rejected this plea as follows :

“It is not in dispute that their applications for   grant of lease had not been disposed of prior   to the date of declaration made under Rule 23   (1) of the Rules of 1963 and they had been  granted the lease by means of  order  dated   24.05.2014 and 26.05.2014, after the date of   declaration,  i.e.  31.05.2012.   In  Nar  Narain   Mishra’s  case,  this  Court  held  that  those  petitioners, who have claimed mandamus for   directing consideration of their lease renewal   application,  which  were  pending  on  31.05.2012 could  not  be granted any relief.   Similarly applications for grant of fresh lease  under  Chapter  II  of  the  Rules,  1963,  which  were pending on 31.05.2012 could also not be   directed to be considered.

In Public Interest Litigation (PIL) No.31643 of   2014,  Sukhan  Singh  vs.  State  of  U.P.  &  3   others.   This  Court  has  considered  the  judgment  of  the  Hon’ble  Supreme  Court   rendered in Deepak Kumar’s case (supra) as   well as judgment of this Court in Nar Narain   Mishra’s case (supra) and has held that “The  basic position in law is that the mere filing of   an application either for the grant of a lease   or for the renewal of a lease does not confer a   vested  right  for  the  grant  or  renewal  of  a   lease and, an application has to be disposed   of on the basis of the rules as they stand on   the date of the disposal of the application.”

16. Additionally, the appellants also argued that the G.O.  

dated 22nd October, 2014 cancelled G.O. dated 31st May,  

2012 and  decided  to  proceed  with  the  grant  of  mining  

15

Page 16

leases  under  Chapter  II  instead  of  Chapter  IV.   It  was  

submitted that in view of change of policy, G.O. dated 31st  

May, 2012 could not be taken into account. This plea was  

also rejected by the High Court  as  the amended policy  

dated 22nd October, 2014 could not be made applicable to  

the grant of lease at a time when the said revised policy  

was not in force.  The High Court observed :

“Through  supplementary  affidavit,  the  respondent no.2 and 3 have brought on record   the  37th Amendment  of  the  Rules  of  1963,  which  is  called  “The  Uttar  Pradesh  Minor   Mineral (Concession) (37th Amendment) Rules,  2014”.

By this amendment, several directions issued   by this Court as well as Hon’ble Supreme Court   have  been  incorporated.   The  State   Government  has  also  issued  a  Government   Order dated 22.10.2014 whereby provisions 2,   3 and 6 of the Rules of 1963 have been made  applicable.   The  Government  Order  also  requires  a  fresh  exercise  for  grant  of  lease   under  the  terms  of  Government  order  dated   22.10.2014 as well as under the provisions of   37th Amendment of the Rules of 1963.  Several   subsequent developments in the matter as has   been made as discussed above, do not lead us   to  permit  the  respondents  no.4  and  5  to   operate their leases further.”

17. When the matter came up for consideration before  

this  Court,  an  interim  order  dated  15th May,  2015  was  

passed permitting  the appellants  to  operate  the mining  

leases in question.    This appears to be on account of the  

fact  that  the  State  of  U.P.  supported  the  stand  of  the  

16

Page 17

appellants  by  filing  affidavit  dated  13th April,  2015  and  

submitted that “Building Stone” were not covered by G.O.  

dated  31st May,  2012.   We  now find  that  this  stand  is  

clearly contrary to the judgment of the High Court in Nar  

Narain Mishra (supra).

18. On the other hand, Respondent No.4, the original writ  

petitioner  before  the  High  Court,  has  filed  an  affidavit  

objecting to the grant of leases in favour of the appellants  

under Chapter II and supported the view taken by the High  

Court.   In  its  counter affidavit  dated 8th May,  2015, the  

said  respondent  has  pointed  out  that  in  view of  earlier  

judgment of the High Court in  Nar Narain Mishra and  

Sukhan  Singh  (supra)   grant  of  mining  lease  under  

Chapter II was not permissible. The G.O. dated 31st May,  

2012 covered “Building Stone” also.  It was also submitted  

that  mining  lease  of  less  than  five  hectares  was  not  

permissible in view of judgment of this Court in  Deepak  

Kumar (supra) which also rendered lease in favour of the  

appellants  illegal.  It  is  further  pointed out  that  Special  

Leave Petition (Civil) No.35075 of 2014 filed against the  

judgment dated 12th September, 2014 of the High Court of  

Judicature at Allahabad in Sukhan Singh was dismissed by  

this Court on 5th January, 2015.

17

Page 18

19. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  and  

perused the record.

20.  The plea of the appellants that they had acquired a  

vested right prior to G.O. dated 31st May, 2012 cannot be  

accepted.  Order dated 31st May, 2012 was issued by the  

State of U.P. to bring about transparency and to safeguard  

the  Government  revenue  and  was  consistent  with  the  

decisions of  this  Court  in  Article  14 of  the Constitution.  

The validity thereof was upheld by the High Court in Nar  

Narain Mishra (supra).  The said judgment applied to  

the mineral  in  question as specifically  laid down by the  

High Court.  The High Court upheld the stand of the State  

that pendency of application did not create any right in  

favour  of  the appellants.  All  applications  pending as  on  

31st May, 2012 stood rejected including the application of  

the appellants.  Admittedly, the appellants did not make  

an  application  after  the  changed  policy  dated  22nd  

October, 2014 and thus the said G.O. had no application to  

the  present  case.   We  are  not  called  upon  to  decide  

validity  of  order  dated 22nd October,  2014 in  cancelling  

order dated 31st May, 2012.  This question can be gone  

into as and when raised.

21. In Hind Stone (supra), this Court observed:  

18

Page 19

“13.  Another  submission  of  the  learned  counsel  in   connection  with  the  consideration  of  applications  for   renewal  was  that  applications  made  sixty  days  or  more   before  the  date  of  GOMs No.  1312 (December  2,  1977)   should be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force.   It was also contended that even applications for grant of   leases made long before the date of GOMs No. 1312 should   be dealt with as if Rule 8-C had not come into force. The   submission was that it was not open to the government to   keep applications for the grant of leases and applications   for renewal pending for a long time and then to reject them   on the basis of Rule 8-C notwithstanding the fact that the   applications had been made long prior to the date on which   Rule  8-C  came  into  force.  While  it  is  true  that  such   applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time,   it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an   application  disposed  of  in  a  reasonable  time  clothes  an   applicant for a lease with a right to have the application   disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of   the making of the application. No one has a vested right to   the grant or renewal of a lease and none can claim a vested   right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a   lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular   provisions. In the absence of any vested rights in anyone,   an application for a lease has necessarily to be dealt with   according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of   the application despite the fact that there is a long delay   since  the  making  of  the  application.  We  are,  therefore,   unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel that   applications for the grant of renewal of leases made long   prior to the date of GOMs No. 1312 should be dealt with as   if Rule 8-C did not exist.

22. Reiterating the decision in  Hind Stone (supra), this  

Court  in  Monnet  Ispat  &  Energy  Ltd.  vs. Union  of  

India9 held as under:

“132.  ……Minerals—like  rivers  and forests—are a valuable   natural resource. Minerals constitute our national wealth and   are  vital  raw material  for  infrastructure,  capital  goods  and   basic industries. The conservation, preservation and intelligent   utilisation of minerals is not only the need of the day but is   also very important in the interest of mankind and succeeding   generations. Management of minerals should be in a way that   helps in the country’s economic development and which also   leaves  for  future  generations  to  conserve  and  develop  the   

9 2012 (11) SCC 1

19

Page 20

natural resources of the nation in the best possible way. For   the  proper  development  of  economy  and  industry,  the   exploitation  of  natural  resources  cannot  be  permitted   indiscriminately; rather the nation’s natural wealth has to be   used judiciously so that it may not be exhausted within a few   years.

133.…………..No person has any fundamental right to claim   that he should be granted mining lease or prospecting licence   or permitted reconnaissance operation in any land belonging   to the Government. It is apt to quote the following statement of   O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in  Hind Stone (SCC p. 213, para 6)   albeit in the context of minor mineral,

“6. … The public interest which induced Parliament to make   the declaration contained in Section 2 … has naturally to be   the  paramount  consideration  in  all  matters  concerning  the   regulation of mines and the development of minerals”.

He went on to say: (Hind Stone case, SCC p. 217, para 10)

“10. … The statute with which we are concerned, the Mines   and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, is aimed …  at  the  conservation  and  the  prudent  and  discriminating   exploitation  of  minerals.  Surely,  in  the  case  of  a  scarce   mineral, to permit exploitation by the State or its agency and to   prohibit exploitation by private agencies is the most effective   method of conservation and prudent exploitation. If you want   to conserve for the future, you must prohibit in the present.”

23. It was further observed :

“182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked   in abstract. When it is sought to be invoked, the court must   consider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved   and the  public  good at  large.  The  fundamental  principle  of   equity  must  forever  be  present  to  the  mind  of  the  court.   Absence  of  it  must  not  hold  the  Government  or  the  public   authority to its promise, assurance or representation.”

xxxx

188.3 Where the decision of an authority is founded in public   interest  as  per  executive  policy  or  law,  the  court  would  be   reluctant  to  interfere  with  such  decision  by  invoking  the   doctrine of legitimate expectation. The legitimate expectation   doctrine cannot be invoked to fetter changes in administrative   policy if it is in the public interest to do so.”

20

Page 21

24. In view of  the above,  we do not find any merit  in  

these appeals.  We also do not approve the stand of the  

State  of  U.P.  in  supporting  the  appellants,  as  already  

mentioned.

25. Accordingly,  the  appeals  are  dismissed.   Interim  

order granted by this Court stands vacated.   The State  

will assess the extent of pecuniary advantage taken by the  

appellants under the interim order and recover the same  

from the appellants.  

…………..……..…………………………….J.              

[ ANIL R. DAVE ]

…………..….………………………………..J.               [ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]

NEW DELHI JANUARY 04, 2016

21