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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8954/2017 ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO. 26342 OF 2013

RAM MURTI DEVI     … APPELLANT

VERSUS

PUSHPA DEVI AND OTHERS   … RESPONDENTS  

J U D G M E N T  

ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed against judgment of

Allahabad High Court dated 08.04.2013 by which judgment

High Court while allowing  the  revision filed by the

tenant set aside the order passed by Judge Small Causes

Court directing the tenant to hand over the possession

of the disputed shop to the landlord and to pay rent

and damages.

3. The brief facts of the case, giving rise to this

appeal are:

The appellant in this appeal is landlord who let

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out a shop situated at ground floor of the house to

tenant named Amar Nath(since deceased). Landlord issued

a notice terminating the tenancy of the tenant.

Landlord filed suit in the Court of Judge Small Causes

Court praying for decree of eviction of the tenant on

the grounds of arrears of rent as well as subletting.

Appellant  claimed  that monthly rent was Rs. 950 per

month along with house tax and water charges. The

tenant is in default of the rent since 01.01.1995. It

was further pleaded that defendant­tenant had kept

another person, namely, Mohd. Ezaj Khan, S/o Mohd.

Zafar as sub­tenant in one portion of the shop and rent

is being taken at the rate of Rs. 50 per day from him.

The Ezaj Khan was undertaking the repair work of the

watches in the above shop. Defendant­tenant had

rebutted the averments made in the plaint, it was

pleaded that rate of monthly rent is Rs. 710/­. It was

denied that tenant is in arrears of rent. It was also

mentioned in written statement that defendant­tenant

had never kept Moh. Ezaj as sub­tenant and in fact he

was a worker in the shop of the defendant­tenant.

4. Appellant­plaintiff had filed various documentary

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evidence and in oral evidence  Ram  Murthi Devi  PW.1,

PW.2 Vineet Kumar, Pratap Singh PW.3 and Zalim Singh

PW.4 were examined. On behalf of the defendants­tenants

certain documentary evidence were filed and Kishan

Kumar appeared as DW.1 and Dilip Kumar appeared as

DW.2. Trial Court framed several issues. Issue No. 4

was with regard to sub­tenancy, which was to the

following effect:

"4. Whether defendants have kept Shri Moh. Ezaj as a sub­tenant at the shop in question for Rs. 50 per day or for consideration of some other amount. If so, its effect?”

 5. Trial Court after considering the evidence on

record held that tenants were in arrears of rent and

were not entitled to the benefit under Section 20(4) of

the U. P. Urban Building(Regulation of Letting, Rent

and Eviction)Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act

1972'). On Issue No. 4, it was held that Moh. Ezaj had

been kept as sub­tenant, who was held to be in partial

possession of the shop. The suit was decreed directing

the defendant­tenant to hand over the vacant

possession. The defendant­tenant was also held liable

to pay rent and damages.

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6. Aggrieved by the judgment dated 21.02.2013 of Judge

Small Causes Court, a Revision under Section 25 of

Provincial Small Cause Act, 1887 (hereinafter referred

to as 'Act 1887')was filed by the tenant in the High

Court. The High Court vide its impugned judgment has

set aside the judgment of the Trial Court. High Court

held that tenant was not in arrears of rent and the

Trial Court committed an error in accepting the case of

the appellant that tenant had sublet to Moh. Ezaj

sub­tenant.

7. Aggrieved by the the judgment of the High Court

appellant has come up in this appeal. We have heard

Miss Aruna Gupta, learned counsel for the appellant and

Shri S. R. Singh, learned senior counsel, assisted by

Shri Mangal Prasad Yadav for the respondents.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant has not seriously

questioned the finding of the High Court to the effact

that tenant was not in arrears and had deposited the

entire arrears of rent and damages and was entitled to

protection under Section 20(4) of the 'Act 13 of 1972'.

9. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, has

challenged the decision of the High Court, in so far

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as, the High Court held that sub­tenancy was not proved

by the landlord.  It is submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellant  that there was a specific

pleading regarding sub­tenancy in favour of Moh. Ezaj

and the defendants having come up with the case that

Moh. Ezaj was their worker, it was incumbent upon them

to prove that he was employed by them and was also paid

salary in which they miserably failed. It is contended

that the sub­tenant was in possession, was a fact which

was not denied. Burden lay on the tenant to prove that

he was there in the shop not as sub­tenant but as an

employee.

10. Learned counsel for the respondents­tenants

refuting the submission of the learned counsel for the

appellant contends that High Court has rightly reversed

the judgment of the Trial Court since Trial Court did

not consider the evidence in correct perspective.

There was no proper  pleading  on behalf of landlord

owner. Landlord did not discharge its burden of proving

sub­tenancy in favour of Moh. Ezaj.

11. We have considered the submission of learned

counsel of the parties and have perused the record. The

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statutory provisions which govern letting, rent and

eviction in the State of U. P. is U.P. Urban

Building(Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)Act

1972. Section 20(2)(e) and Section 25 which are

relevant for the present case are as follows:­

”Section 20(2)(e) reads as under:

"20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specified grounds­......

(2) A suit for the eviction of a tenant from a building after the determination of his tenancy may be instituted on one or more of the following grounds, namely . . . . . . . .

(e) that the tenant has sub­let, in contravention of the provisions of Section 25, or as the case may be, of the old Act the whole or any part of the building;

The above provision takes this Court to Section 25 of Act, 1972 and it would be appropriate to notice Section 25 also, which reads as under:

"25. Prohibition of sub­letting.­­(1) No tenant shall sub­let the whole of the building under his tenancy. (2) The tenant may, with the permission in writing of the landlord and of the District Magistrate, sub­let a part of the building.

Explanation.­­For the purposes of this section­­ (i) where the tenant ceases, within the meaning of clause (b) of sub­section (1)

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or sub­section (2) of Section 12, to occupy the building or any part thereof, he shall be deemed to have sub­let that building or part;

(ii) lodging a person in a  hotel or a lodging house shall not amount to sub­letting." (emphasis added)”

12. Before we look into the judgment of the High Court,

it is necessary to refer to the evidence on record and

findings returned by Trial Court on the issue of

sub­tenancy.  The Trial Court have noted that appellant

had pleaded in the plaint that Moh. Ezaj had been kept

as sub­tenant by the defendant­tenant at the rate of

Rs. 50/­ per day. The defendant­tenant in Para 18 of

the written statement had denied the above pleading and

pleaded that Moh. Ezaj was not a sub­tenant but was a

worker of the tenant. DW.1 in his deposition had

admitted that Moh. Ezaj was undertaking repair work of

music systems and electronic watches in the shop as a

worker, at the salary of Rs. 1500 per month from the

year 1995­96 to 2000, however, no accounts of salary

etc. were maintained.

13. The Trial Court after considering the pleadings of

the parties and evidence brought on record returned the

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findings that Moh. Ezaj was proved to be a sub­tenant.

It is useful to refer to the discussion of the Trial

Court and findings:­

"It is the specific averment of the Appellant that Shri Moh. Ezaj had been kept as sub­tenant by the Defendants. In their written statement, Defendants had written that the above person was a worker in their above shop and not sub­tenant. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that as per Shop & Commercial Establishment Act or any other enforcing Acts, Defendants had not produced any such certificate to this effect that above Moh. Ezaj worked as worker/skilled worker in their shop. Even it had not been mentioned by the Defendants in their written statement that the above person had been working as a worker in their shop. Suit had been filed in the year 1997 and about 15 years had lapsed by that time, but the Defendants had not produced any employment certificate of any worker under Shop & Commercial Establishment Act. It is required in law that if presence of any person is possible as a sub­tenant on any shop or landlord can make such allegation, then it is necessary for the tenant that he should get registered such employee under the Evidence Act and make clear his bonafide. In the present case, Defendants had failed to produce any such evidence. Since, in the photograph, Moh. Ezaj had been shown sitting on the shop and the Defendants had admitted his presence at the shop and therefore, this inference could be drawn that he was present in the shop in the capacity of the sub­tenant because Defendants had not proved that he

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is their employee.  Mere oral evidence of the Defendants had no significance in this regard because presence of Moh. Ezaj should be supported by law. Defendant No. 1 had mentioned in Para No. 11 of his examination in chief that Ezaj undertook repairing work of music system and electronic watches and he was a worker in the shop and he had quit the job and gone away about 12 years before etc.   In the cross­examination, he had stated that he used to pay the salary of Rs. 1500/­ per month from the year 995­96 to 2000, but he had not maintained the accounts of salary etc., he had not paid income tax.  

Since any Salary Register or Attendance Register of Moh. Ezaj had not been produced by the Defendant, therefore, in my opinion, above statement of the Defendant No. 1 was not supported by any admitted evidence and is not reliable.   Similarly, statement of the Defendant No. 2 is also not reliable.  It was not within the knowledge of the Defendant No. 2 that they used to take how much money from Ezaj in respect of the shop.   Thus, this statement of the witness is insignificant. Thus, statement of this witness is insignificant and Ezaj is proved to be a sub­tenant.”

14. High Court has reversed the judgment of the Trial

Court, referring to the principles laid down by this

Court in several judgments regarding proof of

sub­tenancy. High Court further held that the pleadings

on behalf of the plaintiff that tenant had parted away

exclusive possession of whole or part of tenanted

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premises is missing and further Trial court nowhere

recorded any finding that Moh. Ezaj had the specific

control or possession, wholly or partly, of the

tenanted accommodation. High Court in its judgment

referred to various decisions of this Court. It is

sufficient to refer to few decisions of this Court to

find  out the  ratio  laid down by this Court, in  the

context of sub­letting and the burden of proof, and the

manner of proving of such sub­letting.  

15. This Court in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs.

S. B. Sardar Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933 had occasion

to consider a case, wherein suit was filed by landlord

for eviction of tenant from the hotel building on the

ground of sub­letting. In the above context, this Court

in Para 5 laid down the following:­

“5....The onus to prove sub­letting was on the respondent. The respondent discharged the onus by leading evidence showing that the occupants were in exclusive possession of the apartments for valuable consideration. The appellant chose not to rebut this prima facie evidence by proving and exhibiting the relevant agreements.   The documents formed part of the appellant's case.  The appellant had no right to withhold them from the scrutiny of the Court. In the absence of the best evidence of the grants, the Courts below properly

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inferred sub­lettings from the other materials on the record.”

16. In Jagdish Prasad Vs. Smt. Angoori Devi, (1984) 2

SCC 590, which has also been referred by the High

Court, this Court has held that merely from the

presence of a   person other than tenant in the shop

sub­letting cannot be presumed. Several instances in

which a person other than tenant may be found staying

in the shop which does not amount to sub­letting were

enumerated. In Para 2  of the judgment  following was

stated:­

"2. ....Merely from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop sub­letting cannot be presumed. There may be several situations in which a person other than the tenant may be found sitting in the shop; for instance, he may be a customer waiting to be attended to; a distributor who may have come to deliver his goods at the shop for sale; a creditor coming for collection of the dues; a friend visiting for some social purpose or the like. As long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub­letting flowing from the presence of a person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. The Act does not require the Court to assume a subtenancy merely from the fact of presence of an outsider.....”

17. It is relevant to note that allegation of

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sub­letting to Moh. Ezaj in the present case does not

come in any of the examples as was enumerated in the

above case. Here allegation was that Moh. Ezaj was

present in the shop and carrying on his own business

for which, a rent of Rs. 50/­ per day had been charged

by the landlords. In  Dipak Banerjee versus Lilabati

Chakraborty, (1987) 4  SCC  161, this Court has again

examined the question of proof of sub­letting. The

ingredients which are required to be proved for a

sub­tenancy were pointed out in Para 6 of the judgment

which is to the following effect:

"6....But in order to prove tenancy or subtenancy two ingredients had to be established, firstly the tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly that right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent.....”

18. In  Smt. Rajbir Kaur and Another versus M/s S.

Chokesiri  and Co., (1989) 1 SCC 19, while considering

a case of eviction on the ground of sub­letting,

following pertinent observations were made in Para 59:

“59..... lf exclusive possession is established, and the version of the respondent as to the particular and the incidents of the transaction is found

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acceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the respondent to rebut this. Such transactions of subletting in the guise of licences are in their very nature , clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the subtenant and there and there can not be direct evidence got. It is not, unoften, a matter for legitimate inference. The burden of making good a case of subletting is, of course, on the appellants. The burden of establishing facts and contentions which support the party's case is on the party who takes the risk of non­persuasion. If at the conclusion of the trial, a party has failed to establish these to the appropriate standard, he will lose. Though the burden of proof as a matter of law remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially upon a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according as the weight of the evidence adduced by the party during the trial......”  

19. This Court held in the above case that transaction

of sub­letting in their very nature are clandestine

arrangements between tenant and sub­tenant and there

cannot be any direct evidence and even it is a matter

of legitimate inference. It was further held that

burden of proof of establishing fact although lays on

the landlord but it may shift according to the weight

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tenant to whom the property was let out has put some other person into possession of that property. In such a situation, it would be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, the contract or agreement or understanding between the tenant and the sub­tenant. It would also be difficult for the landlord to prove, by direct evidence, that the person to whom the property had been sub­let had paid monetary consideration to the tenant. Payment of rent, undoubtedly, is an essential element of lease or sub­lease. It may be paid in cash or in kind or may have been paid or promised to be paid. It may have been paid in lump sum in advance covering the period for which the premises is let out or sub­let or it may have been paid or promised to be paid periodically. Since payment of rent or monetary consideration may have been made secretly, the law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial, including the delivery of exclusive possession to infer that the premises were sub­let.”

22. A Three Judge Bench in Mahendra Saree Emporium(II)

versus G. V. Srinivasa Murthy, (2005) 1 SCC 481  had

occasion to consider the question of sub­letting

(sub­tenancy) and question of burden of proof.  In Para

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the landlord has to prove by leading

evidence that

(a) A third party was found to be

in exclusive possession of the

whole or part of rented property.

(b) Parting of possession thereof

was for monetary consideration.

(ii) The onus to prove sub­letting is on

the landlord and if he has established

parting of possession in favour of a third

party  either wholly or partly, the onus

would shift to the tenant to explain.

(iii) In the event, possession of the

tenant wholly or partly is proved and the

particulars and the instances of the

transactions are found acceptable, in

particular facts and circumstances of the

case, it is not impermissible for the

Court to draw an inference that the

transaction was entered with monetary

consideration. It may not be possible

always to give direct evidence of monetary

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consideration since such transaction of

sub­letting are made between tenant and

the sub­tenant behind the back of the

landlord.   

24. In each case, the proof of sub­letting /

sub­tenancy thus, has to be established on the

parameters of law, as laid down in the above cases.

Whether,   in particular facts and circumstances

landlord has successfully discharged the burden of

proving sub­tenancy depends on pleading and evidence in

each case?

25. The, High Court in Para 24 and Para 25 has stated

that in the present case very pleading that tenant had

parted away exclusive possession wholly or partly is

missing. High Court in Para 25 has referred to Para 4

of the plaint which is quoted below:

“25. In the present case surprisingly I find that the very pleading is missing this necessary ingredient and statement of fact.  Copy of plaint is Annexure­1 to the affidavit filed in support of stay application(hereinafter referred to as the “Affidavit”). The only averment in respect of sub­letting is contained in para 4 which reads as under:

"4. That the deceased defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 beside non payment

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of allowed one Sri Mohd. Aizaz son of Mohd. Zafar as his sub­tenant without the consent of the plaintiff of a portion of the shop in question and realizing a handsome amount of Rs. 50/­ per day as rent from him and as such the defendants have sub­let a portion of the shop to the said Aizaz Ahmad who is carrying on the business of watch repairs thereon.”

26. When the appellant pleaded that tenant had allowed

one Moh. Ezaj to stay in a portion of the establishment

and was realising a handsome amount of Rs. 50/­ per

day, we fail to see how it can be said that there was

no pleading of parting of possession wholly or partly.

Appellant further has clearly pleaded that said Ezaj

was carrying a business of repairing watches, more so,

when the defendant­tenant himself admitted that Moh.

Ezaj was working in the shop, lack of pleading of

parting of possession as found by High Court is

misplaced.

27. The Trial Court had referred to deposition of PW.1

as extracted above, who had mentioned and proved that

Moh. Ezaj undertook the repair work of music systems

and watches and was paying at the rate of Rs. 50/­ per

day. Thus, the ingredients of pleading that tenant had

parted with the possession of  shop partly, is  fully

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proved and High Court erred in observing that there is

no pleading to that effect.

28. High Court in Para 29 has further observed that

Trial Court had nowhere recorded any finding that Moh.

Ezaj had the exclusive control or possession, wholly or

partly of tenanted accommodation.

29. We have carefully looked into the order of the

Trial Court. Trial Court at Page 56 of paper book had

stated as below:

“...It is admittedly proved that Moh. Ezaj had the partial possession on the shop. Defendants had failed to prove that he was a servant. Witnesses of the Appellant had specifically stated that Moh. Ezaj had been kept as sub­tenant at the rate of Rs. 50/­ per day. In my opinion, since Moh. Ezaj admittedly used to undertake the repairing  work of  watches  while sitting outside the disputed shop, therefore, this inference would definitely be drawn that he would be paying something to the Defendant in lieu thereof. Thus, this averment of the witnesses of the Appellant that Moh. Ezaj had been paying something to the Defendant at the rate of Rs. 50/­ per day is admissible. ”

Thus the above two reasons given by the High Court

cannot be sustained.  

30. There is one more reason due to which the judgment

of the High Court deserves to be interfered with. The

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cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does s.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive definition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admitted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at."

This observation has our full concurrence.”

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31. Further in Mundri Lal versus Sushila Rani(Smt) and

Another, (2007) 8 SCC 609 which was a case arising from

Act 13 of 1972 and a Revisional Jurisdiction under

Section 25 of 'Act 1887'. In Para 22 and 23, this Court

held that the jurisdiction under Section 25 of

Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, is wider than

Section 115 of CPC. It is further held that pure

finding of the fact based on appreciation of evidence

although may not be interfered but there are several

circumstances in which the Revisional Court can

interfere with the finding of fact. In Para 22 and 23

following was stated:

“22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the revisional jurisdiction of the High court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that a revision is provided for by the statute, and not an appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises.

23. We, however, do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered therewith. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefor relevant

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fact has been ignored, the revisional court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact.”

32. Present is not a case wherein Trial Court had

considered any irrelevant factor or has ignored any

relevant factor. It may be noticed that Trial Court had

also held that although defendants­tenants claimed that

Mohd. Ezaj was their worker but they had not brought on

record any evidence to prove the same. Requisite proof

of the intimation of name of Mohd. Ezaj had not been

given, as required by statutory provisions of UP Shops

& Commercial Establishments Act 1962.

33. It is relevant to look into the statutory

provisions of Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya

Adhishthan Adhiniyam, 1962 and U.P. Dookan aur Vanijya

Adhishthan Niyamavali, 1963. According to Section 4­B

every owner of a shop or commercial establishment shall

within three months of the commencement of such

business or within three months of the commencement of

the Uattar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan

(Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam 1976, whichever is later apply

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to the Chief Inspector for registration of his shop or

commercial establishment. Section 4­B is quoted below:

4­B.Registration.—(1)Every owner of a shop or commercial establishment shall within three months of the commencement of such business or within three months of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Dookan Aur Vanijya Adhishthan (Sanshodhan) Adhiniyam, 1976, whichever is later, apply to the Chief Inspector for registration of his shop or commercial establishment.

(2) Every application for registration under sub­section (1) shall be in such form and shall be accompanied by such fees as may be prescribed.

(3) The Chief Inspector shall, on being satisfied that the prescribed fee has been deposited, register the shop or commercial establishment in the register maintained under Section 4­A and shall issue a certificate of registration to the owner in such form and in such manner, as may be prescribed.”

34. Rules, 1963 provide for mechanism and necessary

particulars which are required to be sent by an owner

for registration under the Act. Rule 2A(2) provides for

making an application in Form 'L' to the Inspector

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concerned for registration of his shop or commercial

establishment.

35. Rule 2­A sub­rule (2) which requires making of an

application in Form 'L' is as follows:

“Section 2A ­ Form of Register to be kept by the Inspector concerned of the shop or commercial establishment and the fees charged for their registration and its validity

(1) ..........

(2) The owner of every shop or commercial establishment shall within the period as specified in sub­section (1) of Section 4­B of the said Act, make an application in Form "L" to the Inspector concerned for registration of his shop or commercial establishment. The application shall be signed by the owner and accompanied by a Treasury Challan/Bank Draft (crossed) in favour of the Inspector concerned in proof of payment of registration fee as specified below. The maximum number of employees employed in the shop or commercial establishment on any day during the financial year in respect of which the registration is sought will be taken into consideration for deciding the amount of fee leviable.

... ... ... ... ...”

36. Form 'L' is a part of Rules, 1963, Column 9 of

which is as follows:

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“9. Names of employees:

(1) in managerial, confidential and      supervisory capacity.

(2) Total number of employees.”

37. Section 33 of the Act provides that any person, who

contravenes, or fails to comply with any of the

provisions of this Act, or of the rules made

thereunder, other than those of sub­section (1) of

Section 20, shall be guilty of an offence under this

Act. Thus, registration under the Act, 1962 is a

mandatory requirement and in the Form to be submitted

for registration the name of the employee of the shop

has to be mentioned. Rule 2­A sub­rule(1) further

mandates that owner shall communicate in Form 'N' to

the Inspector concerned any change in the name and

address of the shop or commercial establishment, name

or names of the employees or change in the number of

employees within 15 days of the date of occurrence of

such change.

38. The Trial Court has observed that no document has

been produced by the tenant to prove that the name of

Mohd. EZaj is intimated as employee of the shop which

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is   required as per above statutory requirement. The

Trial Court did not commit any error in drawing adverse

inference against the tenant to the effect that Mohd.

Ezaj was not the employee of the tenant, in view of the

non­producing of any relevant document which could have

been produced by the tenant had Mohd. Ezaj been an

employee of the shop.

39. The above reason was also a valid consideration on

which Trial Court based its decision. We are of the

view that judgment of the High Court deserves to be set

aside and that the judgment of Judge Small Causes Court

dated 21.2.2013 is to be restored.

40. Learned counsel for the respondents lastly prayed

that shop being with the defendants­respondents, who

have been carrying on a business for quite a long time,

time of one year be allowed to the respondents to

vacate the premises. We accept the aforesaid prayer of

the learned senior counsel for the respondents and we

provide that on necessary undertaking being filed by

the respondents before the Trial Court within four

weeks from today, the tenants shall be allowed to

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remain in possession for the period of one year from

this date.

41. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

...............................J. ( A.K. SIKRI )

...............................J. ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

NEW DELHI, JULY 11, 2017.

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ITEM NO.5               COURT NO.7               SECTION XI                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 26342/2013 (Arising  out  of  impugned  final  judgment  and  order  dated 08-04-2013 in CR No. 134/2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad) RAM MURTI DEVI                                Petitioner(s)

VERSUS PUSHPA DEVI & ORS.                            Respondent(s) Date : 11-07-2017 This petition was called on for hearing  today. CORAM :           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHUSHAN For Petitioner(s)

Ms. Aruna Gupta, Adv. Mr. Anish Maheshwari, Adv. Mr. Zain Ali Khan, Adv. Mr. Prashant Chaudhary, AOR

                   For Respondent(s)

Mr. S. R. Singh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Mangal Prasad, Adv. Mohd. Muztaba, Adv. Ms. Shweta Yadav, Adv. Ms. Asha Gopalan Nair, AOR

                    UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R Leave granted. The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed reportable

judgment.

(NIDHI AHUJA)       (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT MASTER COURT MASTER

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]