30 June 2014
Supreme Court
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RAM KARAN(D) TR.LRS. Vs STATE OF RAJASTHAN .

Bench: SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,KURIAN JOSEPH
Case number: C.A. No.-005853-005853 / 2014
Diary number: 15942 / 2012
Advocates: PRATIBHA JAIN Vs AJAY CHOUDHARY


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.5853 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP (C) No.16638 of 2012)

Ram Karan (Dead) Through LRs. & ors.       … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

State of Rajasthan and Ors.            … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated 2nd February, 2012 passed by the Division Bench of the  

High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur  

in  D.B.  Civil  Special  Appeal  (Writ)  No.557/2002.  By  the  

impugned  judgment  the  High  Court  dismissed  the  appeal  

preferred by the appellant and upheld the order dated 23rd  

May, 2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil  

Writ Petition No.639 of 1996.

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:

The suit property is an agricultural land admeasuring 10  

bighas 13 biswa situated in village Med, Jaipur, Rajasthan.  

The  said  land  was  sold  by  its  recorded  Khatedar,  Dalu  

(hereinafter referred to as the “vendor”) to Ram Karan (since

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deceased) and Mahendra Kumar who belong to upper caste vide a  

registered sale deed dated 12th January, 1962. Ram Karan and  

Mahendra Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the “vendee”) were  

both landless persons on the date of sale of disputed land.  

The said vendees had been in cultivator possession of the  

disputed land prior to 12th January, 1962.

4. Subsequently,  Gram  Panchayat  allowed  the  land  to  be  

mutated in the name of the vendee, Ram Karan and Mahendra  

Kumar. It was mutated on 10th September, 1966 and they became  

Khatedar.

5. After lapse of more than 31 years, Tehsildar, Viratnagar,  

District  Jaipur,  instituted  Case  No.1681/1993  before  the  

Assistant Collector, Shahpura, District Jaipur, u/s 175 of the  

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the,  

‘Act’) seeking ejectment of the vendee.  The said suit was  

filed  on  the  ground  that  the  vendor;Dalu  belonged  to  a  

Scheduled  Caste  category  (Nayak)  and  consequently  the  

disputed land could not be sold to the vendees who belonged  

to an upper caste of ‘Mahajan’. The contention was that the  

sale was void being in contravention of Section 42 of the  

Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘the  

Act’). The Tehsildar also moved an application u/s 112 of the  

Act for appointment of a receiver. The Assistant Collector by  

order  dated  1.1.1994  rejected  the  application  made  by  

Tehsildar for appointment of receiver to take possession of  

the suit land. He held that the vendee had been in possession

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and cultivating the suit land for 32 years and had otherwise  

matured rights by adverse possession. He further held that  

there was no prima facie case in favour of the State and also  

the balance of convenience was in favour of the vendee.  

6. Against the aforesaid order dated 1.1.1994, the Tehsildar  

filed an appeal before Revenue Appellate Authority and the  

same  was  registered  as  Appeal  No.9  of  1994.  The  Revenue  

Appellate Authority by order dated 28th January, 1994 held  

that in order to effectuate the social objective u/s 42 of  

the  Act,  the  State  Government  has  enhanced  the  time  for  

instituting suit u/s 175 so that old cases of sale may be  

reopened.  The  appeal  was  allowed  and  order  dated  1.1.1994  

passed by the Assistant Collector was set aside.   

7. The Tehsildar was appointed as receiver of the said land  

having Khasra nos.2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2318, 2326,  

2327, 2328 total 9 Tulka 25 hectares.

8. The  Vendee,  Ram  Karan  and  Mahendra,  challenged  the  

aforesaid order dated 28.4.1994 in revision before the Board  

of Revenue which remain pending.

9. During the pendency of the proceedings u/s 175 of the  

Act, the Tehsildar filed a reference under Rule 82 of the  

Land Record Rules before 1st Additional Collector, Viratnagar,  

District Jaipur seeking cancellation of the mutation dated  

10.09.1963.  The  same  was  registered  as  Reference  

No.261/94/LR/Jaipur of 1994. The ground taken was that the

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sale deed executed by the vendor, Dalu was in contravention  

of provisions of Section 42 of the Act.  

10. On 26.06.1994, the appellant-vendee moved an application  

before  the  Collector,  Jaipur  seeking  to  stay  reference  

proceedings till the adjudication of the proceedings u/s 175  

of  the  Act  or  to  consolidate  the  reference  and  the  

proceedings u/s 175 of the Act. In reply to the notice on  

reference  the  appellant-vendee  stated  that  the  sale  deed  

executed on 12.01.1962 by Dalu is not in breach of Section 42  

of  the  Act.   It  was,  inter  alia,  contended  that  the  

proceedings u/s 175 of the Act was pending and consequently  

the reference was liable to be dismissed as the same was not  

maintainable.

11. The  First  Additional  Collector  vide  his  order  dated  

19.10.1994 directed to place the matter before the Board of  

Revenue for passing orders to cancel the mutation in favour  

of the vendee and held that the transfer was in breach of  

Section 42 of the Act and there was no limitation for a  

reference to the Board. It was further held that a pending  

application for ejectment u/s 175 of the Act is no bar to a  

reference.

12. On 26.06.1995, the Single Member, Board of Revenue held  

that  the  vendor,  Dalu  being  “Nayak”  by  caste  was  from  

Scheduled Caste category and the sale deed executed being in  

favour of General category person, the mutation carried out  

on the basis of said sale deed was null and void. He further

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held that the sale deed dated 12.01.1962 was void being in  

contravention  of  Section  42  of  the  Act  and,  therefore,  

consequent mutation was illegal. The Member, Board of Revenue  

set  aside  the  sanction  for  mutation  granted  by  the  Gram  

Panchayat and directed striking off the names of the vendees,  

Ram Karan and Mahendra and in their place the name of the  

vendor/heirs was directed to be recorded.    

13. Against  the  aforesaid  order  dated  26.06.1995,  the  

Vendees filed Special Appeal No.1A/95RLAct/Jaipur before the  

Division Bench of the Board of Revenue. The Division Bench of  

the Board of Revenue by order dated 16.11.1995 affirmed the  

order of the Single Member and dismissed the appeal.  

14. The appellant-vendees subsequently filed S.B. Civil Writ  

Petition  No.639  of  1996  challenging  order  dated  19.10.1994  

passed by the Additional Collector; order dated 26.06.1995  

passed by the Single Member of the Board of Revenue and order  

dated 16.11.1995 passed by the Division Bench  of  Board of  

Revenue.

15. Learned Single Judge of the High Court by order dated  

23.05.2002 dismissed the writ petition and held that as the  

sale deed was executed in violation of Section 42 of the Act,  

the dismissal of application u/s 175 of the Act does not  

create any right in favour of the vendees.

16. Against the aforesaid order dated 23.05.2002, the vendee  

preferred D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.557 of 2002.  The  

Division Bench of High Court by impugned judgment and order

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dated 2.2.2012 dismissed the same. The Division Bench held  

that  the  vendor,  Dalu,  was  a  member  of  Scheduled  Caste  

category and further held as follows:-

“Coming to the submission that no steps were  taken by the respondents u/s 183 of the Tenancy  Act, in our considered opinion, even if no action  was  taken,  power  could  have been  exercised  to  annul  mutation  as  transaction  was  illegal  and  void u/s 42 of the Tenancy Act.  There was no  effect of dismissal of the application u/s 175 of  the Tenancy Act being barred by limitation as no  right has accrued in favour of the appellants on  the strength of sale deed which was void.  The  power has been rightly exercised and there is no  infirmity or illegality in the orders which have  been impugned in the intra-court appeal.”

17. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted as follows:

(i) Transfer of land by Scheduled Caste in favour of a  

non Scheduled Caste prior to 1964 may be voidable  

but not void ab initio.  

(ii) Proviso to Section 42 inserted by Section 4 of the  

Rajasthan Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act No.28 of  

1956,  giving  Section  42  retrospective  has  been  

declared  violative  of  Article  19  of  the  

Constitution of India by the Rajasthan High Court  

in Triveni Shyam Sharma v. Board of Revenue & Ors.,  

[AIR  1965  Raj.54]  which  having  not  challenged  

reached  finality. In  view  of  such  decision,  the  

registered sale deed dated 12.01.1962 executed prior  

to 1.5.1964 cannot be held to be void.

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(iii) The suit filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after  

about 31 years of the sale is barred by limitation  

u/s 175 of the Act.  

18. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-

State  referred  to  legislative  history  of  Section  42  and  

contended as follows:

(i) The sale deed dated 12.01.1962 was covered u/s 42 of  

the Act and therefore void.

(ii) Void sale deed does not create any right in favour  

of the appellants  

(iii) Mutation proceeding had not created any right or  

title in favour of the appellants  

19. For determining the issues, it is desirable to notice  

the Legislative History of Section 42, as amended from time  

to time.

Original  Section  42  came  into  force  w.e.f.  15.10.1955  

reads as under:

“Section  42-Sale  or  Gift-Except  with  the  general  or  special  permission  of  the  State  Government,  no  khatedar  tenant  shall  have  the  right to transfer by sale or gift his interest in  the whole or a part of his holding to any person  who at the date of such transfer is already in  possession of land which together with the land  so  transferred  will  exceed  90  acres  of  un  irrigated or 30 acres of irrigated land.  Explanation- If such land is partly irrigated and  party un-irrigated, one acre of irrigated land,  shall, for calculating the area of land for the  purposes  of  this  Section,  be  deemed  to  be  equivalent to three acres of un-irrigated land.”

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20. The Act was for the first time amended by Act No.27 of  

1956 dated 22.09.1956. By this amendment Section 42 remained  

untouched. The Act was again amended by the Rajasthan Tenancy  

(Second) Amendment Act, 1956 (Act 28 of 1956) which came into  

force  on  22.09.1956.  By  this  amendment  Act  a  proviso  to  

Section 42 was added as under:

“Provided  that  no  khatedar  tenant  being  a  member of Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe  shall so transfer these rights in the whole or a  part of his holding to any person who is not a  member  of  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  a  Scheduled  Tribe.”

Thereafter,  Section  42  was  amended  and  substituted  

w.e.f. 1.05.1964 as under:

“Section  42 General  restriction  on  sale,  gift and bequest- The sale, gift or bequest by a  khatedar tenant of his interest in the whole or  part of holding shall be void if: (a) It is not of a survey number except when the  area  of  the  survey  number  so  sold,  gifted  or  bequeathed  is  in  excess  of  the  minimum  area  prescribed  for  the  purpose  of  sub-sec.(1)  of  Sec.53,  in  which  case  also  the  area  not  transferred shall not be fragment:

Provided  that  this  restriction  shall  not  apply if the area so transferred becomes merged  into a contiguous survey number.

Provided further that the restriction shall  not apply if the sale, gift or bequest is of the  entire interest of a tenant in the survey number;

(b) such sale gift or bequest is by a member of a  Scheduled caste in favour of a person who is not  a member of the scheduled caste, or by a member  of a schedule tribe in favour of a person who is  not a member of the schedule tribe.”

21. Subsequently, the said Section was amended by Rajasthan  

Act 15 of 1970 w.e.f. 18.08.1970; Rajasthan Act 22 of 1992

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w.e.f.  11.11.1994  and  Rajasthan  Act  18  of  1999  w.e.f.  

30.09.1999. On such amendments Section 42 reads as below:

“42.  General  restrictions  on  sale,gift  and  bequest-The sale, gift or bequest by a khatedar  tenants of his interest in the whole or part of  his holding shall be void, if

[(a)...deleted w.e.f. 11.11.1992] (b) such sale, gift or bequest is by a member of  Scheduled Caste in favour of a person who is not a  member of the Scheduled Caste, or by member of a  Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person who is not a  member of the Schedule Tribe. [(c) Omitted by Raj. Act 15 of 1970, published in  Raj. Gaz. Ext., Part IV (ka), dated 18.8.1970 and  shall always be deemed to have been omitted].

(bb) Such sale, gift or bequest, notwithstanding  anything contained in clause (b), is by a member  of Saharia Scheduled Tribe in favour of a person  who is not a member of the said Saharai tribe.  [inserted  vide  Rajasthan  Act  18  of  1999  with  effect from 30.09.1999]

22. According  to  respondents,  sale  deed  in  question  was  

registered on 12.01.1962. The second amendment in Section 42  

by which a proviso was added to Section 42 was brought into  

force on 22.9.1956 and the sale in question had been effected  

on 12.01.1962 which is much later to coming into force of the  

second  Amendment  in  Section  42  of  the  Act.   Since  after  

22.09.1956 there was clear prohibition in making any sale by  

a member of Scheduled Castes or Schedules Tribes in favour of  

a person who was not member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled  

Tribes, the transfer made on 12.01.1962 is against the said  

prohibition  as  well  as  provisions  of  Section  23  of  the  

Contract Act.

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23. So far as amendment made by Act No.12 of 1964 dated  

1.5.1964 in Section 42 is concerned the only change made was  

that a declaration was given that the sale, gift or bequest  

by a khatedar tenant in violation of Section 42  “shall be  

void”.  

24. The amendment Act No. 12 of 1964 though brought into  

force on 1.05.1964 after the alleged sale on 12.1.1962, the  

fact remains that even the earlier proviso which was added to  

Section  42  by  second  Amendment  Act  No.  28  of  1956,  also  

prohibits any transfer of interest in holding by a Member of  

Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes to any person who was  

not a member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes. The  

second amendment Act No.28 of 1956 which came into force on  

22.09.1956 was in force at the time of alleged sale, The sale  

being forbidden by law and being opposed to public policy  

within the meaning of Section 23 of the Contract Act, 1872,  

it was not enforceable by law in view of proviso to Section  

42. Section 2 of the Contract Act, 1872 also provides that an  

agreement which is not enforceable by law is said to be void.

25. Hence, the question that arises for our consideration is  

whether in view of proviso to Section 42 inserted by Second  

Amendment  Act  No.28  of  1956,  the  sale  deed  executed  on  

12.01.1962 is void or not.

26. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Division  

Bench of the Rajasthan High Court decision in Triveni Shyam  

Sharma  v.  Board  of  Revenue  &  Ors,  AIR  1965  Raj.54 and

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submitted that in view of the said decision, retrospective  

effect  of  proviso  having  been  declared  ulta  vires  is  not  

applicable  to  the  sale  in  question.  But  such  submission  

cannot be accepted.

27. In the case of Triveni Shyam Sharma(Supra), the Division  

Bench of the Rajasthan High Court considered the effect of  

amendment on sale of proprietary right prior to the Second  

amendment and held as follows:

“10. The main question for determination is  whether the sale of the proprietary right made  by Gyarsia in favour of the petitioner became  invalid  on  account  of  the  subsequent  legislation, namely the addition of the proviso  to Section 42 by the Second Amendment Act.  A  perusal of the language of the proviso which was  added to Section 42, would show that if it is  read without the context of the deeming clause,  it cannot be said that it was to be applied  retrospectively. The difficulty was created only  because of the words “shall be deemed always to  have been so added” inserted in Section 4 of the  second Act while introducing the proviso.”

28. The Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court further  

held:   

“14..........It  is  contended  by  him  that  the  proviso  was  added  for  the  protection  of  the  interests of the members of the Scheduled tribe  and, therefore, it was saved by this Clause. In  our  opinion,  this  contention  is  not  tenable  because  even,  according  to  Clause  (5),  reasonable  restrictions  on  the  fundamental  rights  embodied  in  Article 19(1)(f) can  be  imposed only for the protection of the interests  of the members of the scheduled tribe. The word  'interests' appearing in the said Clause refers  to  subsisting  interests  and  not  to  those  interests which cease to exist even before the  law is enacted. The term 'protection' is also  suggestive  of  subsisting  interests.  If  the  interests already cease to exist, there would

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remain nothing which may be protected by law. In  the case of interests which cease to exist, it  would be revival of the interests and not the  protection thereof. In a case like the present  one, where Gyarsia  had already transferred his  interests before the second Act came into force,  the deeming clause, if held to be valid, would  not  protect  the  vendor,  but  would  tend  to  deprive the vendee, i. e., the petitioner of the  rights and interests which had already vested in  him. The deeming clause would not, therefore, be  saved by Clause (5) and it would be violative of  Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India.

15. In this view of the matter there seems to be  no  force  in  the  contention  raised  by learned  counsel for the contending respondents, because   Gyarsia had parted with his Khatedari rights in  the property long before the proviso was added  to  Section  42.  The  insertion  of  the  proviso  could not revive his interest merely because the  deeming  clause  rendered  its  operation  retrospective. His interest had already ceased  to  exist  and  there  remained  nothing  to  be  protected by law. We, therefore, hold that the  deeming clause was violative of Article 19 in so  far as it resulted in divesting the petitioner  in whom the vendor's rights and interests had  vested before the second amendment.”

“18. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  has  urged  that  according  to  Clause  (b)  of  the  amended  section,  the  sale  in  favour  of  the  petitioner was void since he was not a member of  a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. It would  suffice to say that while substituting Section  42, the Legislature took good care in not making  the change to operate retrospectively. The plain  reading of Section 3 would show that the new  Section 42 was substituted in place of the old  one with effect from the date this amended Act  came into force namely, 1st May, 1964. This Act  also  does  not  seek  to  validate  the  deeming  clause appearing in Section 4 of the second Act,  which  was  invalid  from  the  very  date  it  was  introduced,  as  held  above.  The  Constitution  (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, protects the  Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 as it stood on the  date the said amendment of the Constitution of  India, came into force.”

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29. The Rajasthan Tenancy (Second) Amendment Act, 1956 (Act  

28 of 1956) came into force on 22.09.1956. The vendor executed  

the  sale  deed  in  favour  of  the  vendee,  predecessor  in  

interest of the appellant on 12.01.1962 i.e. after the second  

amendment. The appellants cannot claim that their right was  

created  much  prior  to  the  second  amendment  i.e.  before  

proviso  to  Section  42  was  inserted.  Counsel  for  the  

respondents  rightly  contended  that  the  alleged  sale  deed  

dated 12.01.1962 was effected much after the date of coming  

into force (22.09.1956) of proviso to Section 42. There was  

clear prohibition in making any sale by a member of Scheduled  

Castes or Scheduled Tribes in favour of person who was not  

member of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes since after  

22.09.1956. The transfer made on 12.01.1962 was against the  

said prohibition.   

30. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as  

follows:

“23.  What  consideration  and  objects  are  lawful, and what not.—The consideration or object  of an agreement is lawful, unless—  

it is forbidden by law;  or is of such a nature  that,  if  permitted,  it  would  defeat  the  provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; involves  or implies, injury to the person or property of  another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or  opposed to public policy.  

In  each  of  these  cases,  the  consideration  or  object of an agreement is said to be unlawful.  Every  agreement  of  which  the  object  or  consideration is unlawful is void."

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31. In  the  present  case,  the  sale  deed  in  question  was  

alleged to be made when it was forbidden by law (proviso to  

Section 42). Therefore, the appellant cannot derive advantage  

of decision rendered by the Rajasthan High Court in  Trivei  

Shyam Sharma(Supra).  

32. To determine the second issue in relation to limitation,  

it is desirable to notice the relevant provisions of the Act.  

Section  175 of  the  Act  deals  with  ejectment  for  illegal  

transfer or sub-letting and reads as follows:

“175. Ejectment for illegal transfer or sub-let- ting.-(1) If a tenant transfers or sub-lets, or  executes an instrument purporting to transfer or  sublet, the whole or any part of his holding oth- erwise than in accordance with the provisions of  this Act and the transferee or sub-lessee or the  purported such part in pursuance of such transfer  or sub lease, both the tenant and any person who  may have thus obtained or may thus be in posses- sion of the holding or any part of the holding,  shall on the application of the land holder, be  liable to ejectment from the area so transferred  or sub-let or purported to be transferred or sub- let.

(2) To every application, under this Section the  transferee  or  the  sub-tenant  or  the  purported  transferee or the sub-tenant, as the case may be,  shall be joined as a party.

(3) On an application being made under this sec- tion, the court shall issue a notice to the op- posite party to appear within such time as may be  specified therein and show cause why he should  not be ejected from the area so transferred or  sublet or  purported  to be  transferred  or  sub- let.]

(4) If appearance is made within the time spe- cified in the notice and the liability to eject- ment is contested, the court shall, on payment of  the proper court fees, treat the application to  be a suit and proceed with the case as a suit:

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Provided  that in  the event  of the  application  having been made by a Tehsildar in respect of  land held directly from the State Government no  court-fee shall be payable.

(5) If no such appearance is made or if appear- ance is made but the liability to ejectment is  not contested the court shall pass order on the  application as it may deem proper.”

33. As per Schedule 3 read with Section 214 of the Act the  

limitation for filing a suit for any illegal transfer was 30  

years. The relevant entry which was in Rajasthan Tenancy Act,  

1967 Edition reads as follows:

S.NO. Section  of  Act

Description  of  suit,  application or appeal

Period  of  Limitation  

1 2 3 4 66 175 Application for ejectment for  

illegal  transfer  or  sub- letting

Thirty  years

Time  from  which  period  begins  to  run

Proper Court fees Court/officer  competent  to  dispose of

5 6 7 Date of transfer or  

sub-lease 50 Paise Assistant Collector

34. Counsel for the appellants referred to decision of this  

Court in Nathuram v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 13 SCC 585 and  

in the said case this Court held:

“4. The  contention  urged  by  the  appellant’s  counsel is that by virtue of Section 42 of the  Rajasthan Tenancy Act, any transaction made in  contravention has been declared to be void and,  therefore, the period of limitation is not ap- plicable and that the authority should have held  that the  appellants are entitled to get posses- sion. It may be noticed that for taking an action  under Section 175 of the Act, the procedure as  prescribed under sub-section 4(A) of Section 175  has to be adopted. It is also to be noticed that  under Section 214 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,

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period of limitation is prescribed for initiating  action under Section 175. Under Section 214, it  is stated that:

“214. (1) The suits and applications specified  in the Third Schedule  shall  be  instituted and  made within the time prescribed therein for them  and  every  such  suit  instituted  or  application  made after the expiry of the period of limitation  so prescribed shall be dismissed:”

Under the Third Schedule, in clause 66, for an  application for ejectment for illegal transfer or  sub-letting, the period of twelve years is ori- ginally prescribed for filing such an application  from the date of transfer or sub-lease. The pro- vision relating to the period of limitation was  later on amended with effect from 5-10-1981 and  the period was prescribed as 30 years. So far as  the present transaction is concerned, the period  of  limitation  applicable  is  twelve  years.  The  transfers being one on 2-4-1964 and another on 4- 5-1964, the proper application should have been  filed within twelve years, but it was filed be- fore the Sub-Divisional  Officer only on  22-11- 1976. In that view of the matter, the proceedings  were initiated beyond the period of limitation.  Therefore, it was barred by limitation and the  finding  of  the  SDO  is  correct  which  has  been  rightly confirmed by the authorities right up to  the High Court.”

35. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  also  referred  to  

decision  of  this  Court  in  State  of  Punjab  v.  Bhatinda  

District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd., (2007) 11 SCC  

363.  In the said case this Court while noticed that no  

period of limitation was prescribed under the statute held:

“18. It is trite that if no period of limitation  has been prescribed, statutory authority must ex- ercise  its  jurisdiction  within  a  reasonable  period. What, however, shall be the reasonable  period would depend upon the nature of the stat- ute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other  relevant factors.

19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion,  should ordinarily be exercised within a period of  three years having regard to the purport in terms

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of the said Act. In any event, the same should  not exceed the period of five years. The view of  the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be un- reasonable.  Reasonable  period,  keeping  in  view  the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found  out from the statutory scheme. As indicated here- inbefore, maximum period of limitation provided  for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act  is five years.”

36. In the present case, no action was taken either by the  

Vendor or by the State for more than 31 years.  The sale deed  

was executed on 12.01.1962 and the land was mutated in the  

name  of  the  appellants’  predecessor  in  interest  on  

10.09.1963.  It was after about 31 years, on 6.07.1993 the  

suit was filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar being Case No.1681  

of 1993.  In the said suit for the first time an application  

was filed for appointment of receiver.  The said application  

was rejected by the Assistant Collector, Shahpura vide order  

dated 1.1.1994 holding that the vendee has been in possession  

and cultivating the suit land for 32 years.  

37. In view of the position of law, as noticed above, it is  

not necessary to see whether the petition for cancellation of  

mutation was filed on time or not.  The decision of this  

Court in Nathu Ram (supra) relates to Section 42 of the Act  

and the transaction made in contravention with the provisions  

of the said Act. In the said case similar plea were taken by  

the parties, having noticed sub-section 4(A) of Section 175  

and  Section  214 of  the Act,  this Court  held that as the  

transaction was made much beyond the period of 12 years, the

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proceeding  was  beyond  the  period  of  limitation  and,  

therefore, barred by limitation.  

38. In  State  of  Punjab  &  Ors.  v.  Bhatinda  District  

Cooperative Milk Union Ltd. (supra) this Court held that if  

no  period  of  limitation  has  been  prescribed,  statutory  

authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable  

period. However, what shall be the reasonable period would  

depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities  

thereunder and other relevant factors. In the present case,  

neither  any  objection  was  raised  nor  was  any  application  

filed by vendors for restoration of land in their favour. The  

suit was filed by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar after more than 31  

years.  No ground is shown to file such petition after long  

delay nor it was mentioned as to whether the vendors i.e.  

original landholders made any application for restoration of  

land in their favour.  

39. In view of the matter, we hold that the suit being filed  

beyond the reasonable period was fit to be dismissed.  The  

Additional Collector rightly dismissed the suit being barred  

by limitation.  

40. Counsel  for  the  appellant  submitted  that  under  

notification dated 20.09.1977 “Nayak” were not declared as  

Scheduled Castes and, therefore, there was no occasion for  

the Tehsildar to file a suit in the year 1993 i.e. 16 years  

after notification dated 20.09.1977 on the ground of violation  

of Section 42.. This question has not been dealt with by the

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High Court and the fact aforesaid has not been disputed by  

the respondents.  

41. Therefore,  it  is  clear  that  the  proceeding  for  

restoration of land initiated by the Tehsildar, Viratnagar  

was  barred  by  limitation  and  was  not  maintainable.  We,  

accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment dated 2.02.2012  

passed by the Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court as  

well as judgement and order dated 23.05.2002 passed by the  

Single Judge. The appeal is allowed. No costs.  

……………………………………………………………………….J.                (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

……………………………………………………………………….J. NEW DELHI,    (KURIAN JOSEPH) JUNE 30, 2014.