REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  2107  OF 2012 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.26892 OF 2011)

Rajvir Singh … Appellant

Versus

Secretary, Ministry of Defence & Others … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Aftab Alam, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated August  

19, 2011 passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Lucknow,  

by which it  dismissed Original  Application No.116 of  2011 filed by  the

appellant and rejected his challenge to the direction for the General Court  

Martial to re-assemble for his trial contending that his trial was barred by  

time as provided under section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 (for the sake of  

brevity “the Act”).

3.   A General Court Martial was directed to be convened by order dated  

August 23/26, 2010 passed by the General Officer Commanding, Madhya  

Bharat Area, (“GOC, MB Area” for short) to try the appellant on different  

charges  relating  to  gross  financial  irregularities  punishable  under  Section  

52(f) of the Act. The appellant challenged the order before the Armed Forces  

Tribunal (in Original Application No. 216 of 2010) on the plea that his trial  

by the General Court Martial was barred by limitation under section 122 of  

the  Act.  At  that  stage,  the  Tribunal  did  not  go  into  the  merits  of  the  

appellant’s  challenge and dismissed the Original Application leaving it open  

for  the  appellant  to  raise  his  objections  before  the  Court  Martial.  In  

pursuance  of  the  liberty  given  by  the  Tribunal,  the  appellant  raised  the  

objection  before  the  Court  Martial  that  his  trial  before  it  was  barred  by  

limitation. The Court Martial upheld the appellant’s objection and by order  

dated February 17, 2011, allowed the “plea in bar” raised by the defence.  

However, the Confirming Authority, i.e., the (Officiating) GOC, MB Area,  

refused to confirm the order of the General Court Martial and by order dated  

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March 29, 2011, which is in some detail, found and held that reckoning from  

the date on which the commission of the offence and the identity of the  

appellant  as  one  of  the  offenders  came  within  the  knowledge  of  the  

competent authority, the order giving direction for convening the General  

Court Martial was passed within a period of three years and, therefore, the  

bar of limitation did not come in the way of the trial of the appellant before  

the General Court Martial. Having, thus, arrived at the finding, he directed  

the GCM to proceed with the trial of the appellant as if the “plea in bar” was  

found not  proved.  The appellant  challenged  the  order  of  the  Confirming  

Authority once again before the Tribunal in Original Application no. 116 of  

2011. But the Tribunal, mainly relying upon the decisions of this Court in  

Union of India and others v. V.N. Singh (2010) 5 SCC 579 and J.S. Sekhon  

v.  Union of India and another (2010) 11 SCC 586, held that the General  

Court Martial was convened within the period of limitation. It, accordingly,  

rejected  the  application  and  upheld  the  order  passed  by  the  Confirming  

Authority.  

4. The charges against  the appellant  pertain to the periods 2005-2006  

and 2006-2007 when he  was  posted  as  officiating  Commandant,  Central  

Ordnance  Depot,  Chheoki.  According  to  the  charges,  in  procurement  of  

stores he violated and flouted the relevant rules and in making purchases  

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worth about Rs.2.2 crores he caused wrongful loss of Rs.60.18 lakhs to the  

Government.  

5. In this regard, first a pseudonymous complaint dated October 27, 2006  

came making allegations of gross irregularities committed by the appellant  

in purchase of stores for the Central Ordnance Depot. The complaint was  

seen  by  the  General  Officer  Commanding-in-Chief,  Central  Command  

(“GOC-in-C,  CC”  in  short)  on  November  15,  2006.  The  complaint  was  

followed  by  a  report  by  the  Central  Command  Liaison  Unit  which  also  

highlighted  the  irregularities  committed  in  procurement  of  stores  at  the  

Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. This report was seen by the GOC-in-C on  

December 6, 2006. On December 9, 2006,  an order was issued on behalf of  

the GOC-in-C, for convening a Court of Inquiry to investigate the alleged  

irregularities/misdemeanors  in  the  Central  Ordnance  Depot  during  the  

financial years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007.   The irregularities/misdemeanors  

that  were required to be inquired into were listed under the headings (a)  

upgradations  of  demand  and  (b)  local  purchase.  The  Court  of  Inquiry  

submitted its report on January 24, 2007 in which, apart from some other  

officers, the appellant was clearly indicted. It appears that the report of the  

Inquiry  Committee  was  first  placed  before  the  GOC,  MB Area,  who on  

February 20,  2007 made a  recommendation  in light  of  the report.  In his  

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recommendations the GOC, MB Area, observed that the Court of Inquiry  

had examined only a small fraction of the local purchase and had the Court  

gone  into  greater  details  more  irregularities  would  have  come  to  light.  

However, on the basis of the materials coming before the Court of Inquiry,  

the  GOC,  MB  Area,  found  that  there  was  adequate  evidence  regarding  

cognizable  acts  of  omission/commission  committed  by  several  officers,  

including the present appellant in regard to whom he observed that he was to  

be  blamed  for  causing  wrongful  loss  to  the  government  to  the  tune  of  

Rs.60.18 lakhs in the process of procurements of stores worth Rs.2.2 crores  

by committing a number of procedural irregularities/illegalities.  

6. The report of the Court of Inquiry along with the recommendations of  

the GOC, MB Area was forwarded to the GOC-in-C, CC on April 26, 2007.  

On  May  7,  2007,  the  GOC-in-C,  CC  wrote  a  note  in  the  form  of  

recommendations  on the  report  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  convened on his  

direction. He started by saying that he had perused the proceedings of the  

Court of Inquiry and he partially agreed with the findings and opinion of the  

Court. He observed that there was cogent and adequate material  evidence  

regarding the cognizable acts of omission/commission committed by various  

officers of the Central Ordnance Depot, Chheoki. In regard to the appellant  

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the  GOC-in-C  made  the  following  observations  in  paragraph  6  of  his  

recommendation:

“6.  The  culpability  of  IC-42501F  Col  Rajvir  Singh,  Offg  Commandant,  COD  Chheoki,  is  established  for  causing  wrongful loss to the Govt to the tune of Rs.60.18 lakhs in the  process of procurement of stores through local purchase in the  years 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 by committing the following  procedural irregularities/illegalities:-”

(The  above  quoted  passage  was  followed  by  a  list  of  different  irregularities/illegalities allegedly committed by the appellant).  

7. It, however, appears that on the basis of the materials before him the  

GOC-in-C, CC was also unhappy and dissatisfied with the role of one Major  

General S.P. Sinha, who, at the material time, was the ADGOS (CN & A) in  

the Central Command and who at the time the GOC-in-C was making his  

recommendation was posted as MGAOC, HQ-Western Command. Hence, in  

paragraph 7 of his recommendations he stated as follows:-

“7. I recommend that a (sic.) appropriate (sic.) constituted C of  I be ordered by integrated HQ of MoD (Army), MGO’s Branch  for  investigation  into  the  acts  of  omission/commission  in  respect  of Maj.  Gen. SP Sinha, ADGOS (CN & A) and any  other  higher  auth,  Col  Rajvir  Singh,  Offg  Commandant  and  offrs of the COD Chheoki as opined by the Court in the process  of procurement of stores by the COD, Chheoki during the pd  2005-06 and 2006-07.”  

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8. It is significant to note that insofar as the appellant is concerned, the  

GOC-in-C,  CC,  was  undeniably  the  competent  authority  to  initiate  

proceeding against him and to convene a General Court Martial to try him.  

Further, on the basis of the Court of Inquiry report and the recommendation  

of the GOC, MB Area, the GOC-in-C, CC, had clearly formed the opinion  

that the culpability of the appellant was established and there was cogent and  

adequate  material  evidence  regarding  the  cognizable  acts  of  

omission/commission committed by him.  Nonetheless, on May 7, 2007, the  

GOC-in-C, CC did not direct for initiating proceeding against the appellant  

and to convene the General Court Martial for his trial but clubbed his case  

with Major General S.P. Sinha in whose case the integrated headquarter of  

MoD Army was the competent authority and sent his recommendation to the  

integrated HQ to hold a Court of Inquiry to examine the role of the Major  

General  in  the  irregularities  committed  at  the  Central  Ordnance  Depot,  

Chheoki, during his tenure there.  

9. On the basis of the recommendation made by the GOC-in-C, CC, by  

his  letter  dated  February  19,  2008,  the  integrated  headquarters  of  MoD  

directed the HQ, Western Command (where Major General S.P. Sinha was  

at that time posted) to convene a Court of Inquiry to investigate the acts of  

omission/commission on the part  of the Major General  the then ADGOS  

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(CN & A), detailing the issues into which the investigation was required to  

be made. A copy of the letter was sent to the GOC-in-C, CC for information  

and further  advising him to issue appropriate  directions in respect  of the  

appellant who was indicted by the Court of Inquiry that was held on his  

direction.  

10. It was only then that the GOC-in-C, CC gave direction for initiation of  

disciplinary action against the appellant (and some other officers) vide order  

dated  May 12, 2008, for the misdemeanors as stated in paragraphs 4 to 12 of  

the order insofar as the appellant is concerned (and in paragraphs 13 to 16 in  

regard to some other officers).  

11. Following the order of the GOC-in-C, CC, a tentative charge-sheet  

containing 18 charges was given to the appellant on August 20, 2008. The  

hearing of charges was then held as required under rule 22 of the Army  

Rules, 1954 and at the end of the hearing, the Commanding Officer found  

that none of the charges were proved and there was no sufficient evidence to  

proceed further with the charges. The Confirming Authority, however, did  

not accept the view taken by the Commanding Officer and by order dated  

September 7, 2009, directed for taking additional summary of evidence. As  

directed by the Confirming Authority,  additional  summary  was taken but  

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once  again  the  Commanding  Officer  by  his  order  dated  March  9,  2010,  

found that none of the charges were proved. The Confirming Authority i.e.  

the GOC, MB Area, once again did not accept the order of the Commanding  

Officer. He framed four charges under section 52(f) of the Act relating to  

financial  irregularities  in  procurement  of  store  for  the  Central  Ordnance  

Depot  and  directed  the  appellant  to  be  tried  by  Court  Martial.  It  was  

pursuant to this order that the General Court Martial came to be constituted  

which  was  challenged  by the  appellant  as  barred  by  limitation,  as  noted  

above.  

12. Having narrated the relevant  facts  we may now take a look at  the  

provision relating to limitation. Section 122 of the Act provides as follows:-  

“122. Period of limitation for trial. – (1) Except as provided  by  sub-section  (2),  no  trial  by  court-martial  of  any  person  subject to this Act for any offence shall be commenced after the  expiration  of  a  period  of  three  years  [and  such  period  shall  commence. –  

(a) on the date of the offence; or

(b) where  the  commission  of  the  offence  was  not  known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to  the authority competent to initiate action, the first  day  on  which  such  offence  comes  to  the  knowledge of such person or authority, whichever  is earlier; or

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(c) where it is not known by whom the offence was  committed, the first day on which the identity of  the offender is known to the person aggrieved by  the offence or to the authority competent to initiate  action, whichever is earlier.]

(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to  a trial for an offence of desertion or fraudulent enrolment or for  any of the offences mentioned in section 37.  

(3) In the computation of the period of time mentioned  in sub-section (1), any time spent by such person as a prisoner  of  war,  or  in  enemy territory,  or  in  evading  arrest  after  the  commission of the offence, shall be excluded.  

(4) No  trial  for  an  offence  of  desertion  other  than  desertion on active service or of fraudulent enrolment shall be  commenced if the person in question, not being an officer, has  subsequently  to  the  commission  of  the  offence,  served  continuously in an exemplary  manner for not  less than three  years with any portion of the regular Army.”

13. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the period of limitation  

for his trial before the Court Martial would commence from February 20,  

2007, when on the basis of the report of the Court of Inquiry, the GOC, MB  

Area, sent his recommendation to the GOC-in-C, CC indicting the appellant.  

It is pointed out that it was the GOC, MB Area, who passed the order dated  

August  23/26,  2010  convening  the  General  Court  Martial,  directed  the  

Commanding Officer to take further summary of evidence in the hearing of  

the charges under rule 22 and finally passed the order directing the Court  

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Martial to reassemble for the appellant’s trial. It is, thus, the GOC, MB Area  

who is the competent authority to take action against the appellant and it is  

the date of his knowledge of the commission of the alleged offence and the  

identity of the appellant as the alleged offender that is relevant under section  

122.

14.  It  is  further  submitted  that  in  any  event  the  GOC-in-C,  CC  was  

undeniably the competent authority to initiate action against the appellant.  

On May 7, 2007, the alleged offence and the identity of the appellant as the  

alleged  offender  was  fully  within  his  knowledge  on  the  basis  of  the  

recommendation of GOC, MB Area and the report of the Court of Inquiry  

ordered  by  him.  His  knowledge  is  evident  from his  recommendation  to  

Integrated HQ, wherein, he stated that the culpability of the appellant was  

established. The period of limitation must, therefore, commence from a date  

not later than May 7, 2007 and reckoning from that date, the period of three  

years came to end on May 6, 2010. But the order for convening the General  

Court Martial was finally passed by the GOC, MB Area on August 23/26,  

2010, that is, clearly beyond the period of limitation. Hence, the appellant’s  

trial before the General Court Martial was clearly hit by section 122 and was  

barred by limitation.

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15. On behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, it is argued that the  

period of limitation in this case can only commence from May 12, 2008  

when the GOC-in-C, CC directed that disciplinary action be initiated against  

the appellant and that later date must be deemed to be the date when the  

competent authority had the knowledge within the meaning of section 122 of  

the Act.  

16. This is the argument adopted both in the order passed by the GOC,  

MB Area and the decision of the Tribunal upholding that order.

17.  In the order, dated March 29, 2011 passed by the GOC, MB Area, in  

paragraph 34, it is observed as under: –  

“If the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court had been  followed, the only question which the Court was to decide was,  (sic.) which was the date on which the authority competent to  initiate action issued its direction to initiate disciplinary action.  However, the reasons given by the Court show that the Court  was squarely guided by the issues framed by the learned Judge  Advocate, which ran absolutely contrary to the law laid down  by the  Hon’ble  Supreme Court  (as  also  the  policy  in  vogue  referred to by the learned Advocate Judge)”.

(emphasis added)

18. Affirming  the  view taken  by the  GOC,  MB Area,  the  Tribunal  in  

paragraph 12 of its judgment held and observed as follows –

“In the case at hand on 7/5/2007, the date on which the applicant  alleges  the  competent  authority  to  have  acquired  knowledge,  perusal of the said document which is Annexure No. A-6 to the  

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Original  Application  reveals  that  the  respondent  No.  3  is  not  able to form an opinion as to whether or not any offence has  been  established  and  furthermore  he  is  not  able  to  form a  definite opinion regarding culpability of the applicant therefore  he  recommends  for  constitution  of  an  appropriately  constituted  Court of Inquiry by Integrated HQ of the Mod (Army), MGO’s  Branch for investigation into the acts of omission/commission in  respect of ADGOS (CN & A), the applicant and the officers of the  Central  Ordnance  Depot,  Chheoki.  Thus  it  cannot  be  conclusively established regarding knowledge of the offence by  respondent  No.  3  at  this  stage.  However,  pursuant  to  recommendations  of  7/5/2007  HQ  Central  Command  approached  Integrated  HQ of  the  Mod  (Army)  for  further  inquiry  in  respect  of  officers  for  their  involvement  in  the  allegations.  On 12/5/2008  the  respondent  No.  3  perused  the  proceedings  of  the  Court  of  Inquiry  held  to  investigate  the  allegations  of  various  irregularities  in  Central  Ordnance  Depot,  Chheoki  and  agreed  with  the  recommendations  of  General  Officer  Commanding  Madhya  Bharat  Area.  The  culpability  of  applicant,  according  to  respondent  No.  3  was  established  for  causing  wrongful  loss  to  the  Government.  Upon being so satisfied regarding establishment of culpability  the  respondent  No.  3  on  12/5/2008  he  directed  disciplinary  action  against  the  applicant.  It  is  that  date  which  would  be  counted as starting point towards computation of limitation for the  purposes of Section 122(l) (b) of the Act.”

(emphasis  added)

19. As noted above, both the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal, base their  

orders on the decisions of this Court in. V.N. Singh (supra) and J.S. Sekhon  

(supra).   The decisions of the GOC, MB Area and the Tribunal appear to be  

based on a complete misinterpretation of the two decisions of the Court. In  

both,  V.N. Singh and  J.S. Sekhon, the real issue before the Court was who  

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was the competent authority to initiate action against the delinquent officer  

and whose knowledge would be relevant for the purpose of section 122 of  

the Act. In both cases, it was contended, on behalf of the delinquent officers,  

that the knowledge of “the person aggrieved” long preceded the knowledge  

of the competent authority and reckoning from the date of knowledge of “the  

aggrieved  person”,  the  order  convening  the  General  Court  Martial  was  

barred by limitation. In V.N. Singh, it was submitted on behalf of the officer  

that  one  Brigadier  K.S.  Bharucha  was  the  aggrieved  person  and  in  J.S.   

Sekhon,  it  was  submitted  that  the  Commander  Works  Engineer  was  the  

person aggrieved and if the period of limitation was computed from the date  

of their knowledge then the order convening the General Court Martial was  

barred by limitation. In both cases, the Court held that that part of section  

122  that  referred  to  the  knowledge  of  the  person  aggrieved  had  no  

application to the facts of the case and the relevant date for computing the  

period of limitation was the date of knowledge of the competent authority to  

initiate action against the delinquent officer. In paragraphs 32 and 34 of the  

decision in V.N. Singh, the Court observed as follows: –

“32.  The term "the person aggrieved by the offence" would be  attracted to natural persons i.e. human beings who are victims of  an offence complained of, such as offences relating to a person or  property and not to juristic persons like an organisation as in the  present  case.  The  plain  and  dictionary  meaning  of  the  term  "aggrieved"  means  hurt,  angry,  upset,  wronged,  maltreated,  

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persecuted, victimised etc. It is only the natural persons who can  be  hurt,  angry,  upset  or  wronged  or  maltreated  etc.  If  a  Government organisation is treated to be an aggrieved person then  the second part  of Section 122(1) (b) i.e.  "when it comes to the  knowledge of the competent authority to initiate action" will never  come into play as the commission of offence will always be in the  knowledge of the authority who is a part of the organisation and  who may not be the authority competent to initiate the action. A  meaningful reading of the provisions of Section 122(1)(b) makes  it absolutely clear that in the case of government organisation, it  will be the date of knowledge of the authority competent to initiate  the  action,  which  will  determine  the  question  of  limitation.  Therefore,  the  finding  of  the  High  Court  that  Brigadier  K.S.  Bharucha  was  an  aggrieved  person  is  legally  and  factually  incorrect and unsustainable. 34. The facts of the present case establish that the Technical Court  of Inquiry was convened by DDST, Headquarter Delhi Area on 8- 1-1994  which  recommended  examination  of  certain  essential  witnesses for bringing into light the correct details and the persons  responsible for the irregularities by a Staff Court of Inquiry and  accordingly the Staff Court of Inquiry was ordered on 7-5-1994 by  GOC-in-C Western Command which concluded in its report dated  31-8-1994, mentioning for the first time the involvement of the  respondent  in  the  offence.  The  GOC,  Delhi  Area  i.e.  the  next  Authority in chain of command to the respondent recommended  on  19-10-1994  initiation  of  disciplinary  action  against  the  respondent  whereas  the  GOC-in-C,  Western  Command  gave  directions on 3-12-1994, to initiate disciplinary action against the  respondent. Therefore, the date of commencement of the period of  limitation for the purpose of GCM of the respondent, commenced  on 3-12-1994 when direction was given by GOC-in-C, Western  Command to  initiate  disciplinary  action  against  the  respondent.  The plea that the date of submission of the report by Technical  Court of Inquiry should be treated as the date from which period  of limitation shall commence has no substance. It  is relevant to  notice that no definite conclusion about the correct details and the  persons  responsible  for  the  irregularities  was  mentioned  in  the  report  of  Technical  Court  of  Inquiry.  On  the  facts  and  in  the  circumstances of the case, this Court is of the view that the High  

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Court wrongly concluded that the period of limitation expired on  4-3-1996.”

20. Similarly, in paragraphs 16 and 19 of the decision in  J.S. Sekhon, it  

was held as follows –

“16. According to the counsel appearing for the appellant, when  the  vigilance  check  report  was  submitted,  Commander  Works  Engineer who is the person aggrieved came to know that there was  a commission of an offence and therefore period of limitation as  envisaged under  Section 122 of  the  Act  would  commence  from  that  date  and  when  limitation  is  computed  from the  said  date,  convening of the General Court Martial on 9-3-1998 was barred  by  time,  as  it  was  beyond  the  period  of  three  years  as  contemplated under Section 122 of the Army Act. 19. In our considered opinion, the expression “person aggrieved  by the offence” is irrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the  present  case  and  what  is  relevant  is  the  “knowledge  of  the  authority  competent  to  initiate  action”.  The aforesaid  acts  were  committed against the Government and not a natural person. In the  facts  of  the  present  case  no  single  person  can  be  said  to  be  aggrieved  person  individually  due  to  the  act  of  defrauding  the  Army. What is applicable to the facts of the case is the expression  when it  comes  to  the  knowledge of  the  competent  authority  to  initiate action.”  

21. In both the cases, the authority competent to initiate action against the  

delinquent  officer  had  passed  the  direction  for  taking  action  against  the  

delinquent officer on the same day it came to know about the commission of  

the offence and the identity of the offender. Hence, in both cases, at some  

places,  the date  of  knowledge and date of  the  direction to initiate  action  

against the delinquent officer are used interchangeably and that is the reason  

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for  the  Tribunal  to  misinterpret  the  decision  to  mean  that  the  period  of  

limitation  would  commence  from the  date  of  direction  to  initiate  action  

against the delinquent officer.

22. The  Tribunal  is  also  incorrect  in  observing  that  on  May  7,  2007,  

GOC-in-C,  CC  had  formed  only  a  tentative  opinion  about  the  appellant  

because on that date he made the recommendation to the Integrated HQ for  

investigation  into  the  act  of  omission/commission  in  respect  of  Major  

General S.P. Sinha and any other higher authority, including the appellant. It  

is  noted  above  that  the  recommendation  of  the  GOC-in-C,  CC  to  the  

Integrated HQ was only in regard to Major General S.P. Sinha. So far as the  

culpability of the appellant is concerned, he had already formed the opinion  

on the basis of the report of the Court of Inquiry and the recommendation of  

the GOC, MB Area. Moreover, when the Integrated HQ vide its letter of  

February 19, 2008 pointed out that the appellant was indicted by the Court  

of  Inquiry  ordered  by  him  and  in  his  case  it  was  for  him  to  “append  

directions”,  there  was  no  further  material  before  the  GOC-in-C,  CC  in  

connection with the appellant. The order that the GOC-in-C, CC passed on  

May 12, 2008 for taking disciplinary action against the appellant reads as  

follows: –

“1. I have perused the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held to  investigate  the  allegations  of  various  irregularities  in  Central  

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Ordnance Depot, Chheoki vide Headquarters Central Command,  convening  order  Number  174091/57/C/A(PC),  dated  09  December 06 and generally agree with the recommendations of  the General Officer Commanding, Madhya Bharat Area.   

2.   The Court of Inquiry proceedings reveal that there is cogent  and  adequate  evidence  on  record  to  establish  various  acts  of  omission/commissions  on  part  of  certain  officers  of  Central  Ordnance  Depot,  Chheoki  as  mentioned  in  the  succeeding  paragraphs.

IC-42501F Colonel Rajvir Singh

4.  The  culpability  of  IC-42501F  Colonel  Rajvir  Singh,  Officiating Commandant,  Central  Ordnance Depot  Chheoki,  is  established for causing wrongful loss to the Government to the  tune of Rs. 60.18 Lakhs (Rupees Sixty Lakh eighteen thousand  only)  in  the  process  of  procurement  of  stores  through  local  purchase in the year 2005-06 and 2006-07, by committing the  following illegalities:-

(a) xxx (b) xxx (c) xxx

5. xxx 6. xxx 7. xxx 8. xxx 9. xxx 10. xxx 11. xxx 12. xxx 13. to 16. xxxxxxx 17. Apropos above, I direct that disciplinary action against the  above mentioned officers be initiated for the misdemeanors as  mentioned against each of them in Para 4 to 16 above.”

23. It is, thus, to be seen that the order dated May 12, 2008 is almost in  

identical words as the one passed on May 7, 2007. There is, therefore, no  

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escape  from  the  fact  that  the  GOC-in-C,  CC  was  in  knowledge  of  the  

offence and the identity of the appellant as one of the alleged offenders on  

May 7, 2007. Reckoning from that date, the order passed by the GOC, MB  

Area, to convene the General Court Martial on August 23/26, 2010 is clearly  

beyond the period of three years and hence, barred in terms of section 122.

24. One feels sorry to see a trial on such serious charges being aborted on  

grounds of limitation but that is the mandate of the law. It is seen above that  

GOC-in-C, CC had come to know about the offence and the offender being  

the appellant on May 7, 2007. It took one year from that date for him to pass  

the order  for initiating disciplinary  action against  him on May 12,  2008.  

There were still two years in hand, which is no little time but that too was  

spent in having more than one rounds of hearing of the charges in terms of  

rule  22  with  the  result  that  by  the  time  the  order  came to  be  passed  to  

convene General Court Martial, more than three years had lapsed from the  

date of the knowledge of the competent authority.

25. Before concluding,  we may also note that  other  officers  who were  

allegedly involved in irregular purchases for the Central Ordnance Depot,  

Chheoki,  also  seem  to  have  got  away  with  very  light,  if  at  all,  any  

punishment. Major General S.P. Sinha was subjected to an administrative  

action in which an order was passed on August 6, 2010 expressing severe  

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displeasure (non-recordable) against him. Lt. Col. Neeraj Gaur was finally  

acquitted by the General Court Martial.  Lt.  Col.  Aloke Ghose was given  

severe  displeasure  (non-recordable)  after  the  Commanding  Officer  found  

charges  against  him  not  proved.  Major  (now Lt.  Col.)  M.K.  Bawa  was  

similarly given severe displeasure (non-recordable) after the Commanding  

Officer  found  charges  against  him  not  proved.  Against  Lt.  Col.  Uma  

Shankar  no  further  action  was  taken  after  charges  against  him were  not  

proved in SoE.

26. In light of the discussions made above, the appeal must succeed. The  

judgment and order passed by the Tribunal is set aside and the direction by  

the GOC, MB Area, for reassembly of the General Court Martial is quashed.

27. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.        

………..…………………………….J  (AFTAB ALAM)

     …………………………

……………J (CHANDRAMAULI  KR. PRASAD)

New Delhi, February 15, 2012

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