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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1873   OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19215 OF 2011]

RAJINDER KUMAR … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS

SHRI KULDEEP SINGH & OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1874    OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 28302 OF 2010]

MOHINDER KUMAR GUPTA … APPELLANT (S)   

VERSUS

SHRI KULDEEP SINGH & OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1875   OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 26419 OF 2011]

MOHINDER KUMAR GUPTA … APPELLANT (S)   

VERSUS

KULDEEP SINGH & OTHERS … RESPONDENT (S)

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REPORTABLE        

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WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1876-1877   OF 2014 [Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 29361-29362 OF 2012]

S. K. GUPTA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS, AND OTHERS … APPELLANT (S)   

VERSUS

SHRI KULDEEP SINGH & OTHERS …  RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

KURIAN, J.:

 Leave granted.  

2. Specific performance is an equitable relief granted by  

the  courts  in  specific  situations.  Plainly  speaking,  

equity means fairness. According to Sir Edward Fry,  

the  Court  by  a  decree  of  specific  performance  

compels  the  defaulting  party  to  do  that  which  in  

conscience  he  is  bound  to  do,  viz.,  actually  and  

specifically  to  perform  his  contract1.  Conscience  

means  a  person’s  moral  sense  of  right  or  wrong2.  

1 FRY A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts by   The Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry, Sixth Edition, see Paragraph   62, at page 29.  2 Concise Oxford English Dictionary, 10th Edition.

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Thus, what is morally wrong cannot be equitably right  

and necessarily what is morally right will be just and  

proper.  This  prelude  is  the  keyhole  for  us  to  see  

through  the  factual  and  legal  position  of  a  three  

decade long litigation on a specific performance.   

FACTS  

3. One Nand Lal (deceased) was the perpetual lessee of  

the  Land  and  Development  Officer  (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘L&DO’) of property bearing Bungalow  

No.  9,  Sunder  Nagar,  New  Delhi  measuring  0.179  

acres equal to 865 sq. yards equal to 721 sq. metres.  

His legal heirs are - (1) Banarsi Das; (2) Dhanpat Rai;  

(3) Din Dayal; and (4) Gaindo Devi (widow of a pre-

deceased son Paras Ram) as his legal  heirs.   Each  

had  a  1/4th share  in  the  suit  property.  Din  Dayal  

passed away leaving behind, as originally claimed -  

(5) his widow Sushila Devi; (6) son Mohinder Kumar  

Gupta;  (7)  son  Surinder  Dayal;  (8)  son  Narinder  

Dayal;  and  (9)  daughter  Vijay  Laksmi  and  each  of  

them had 1/24th share each in the suit property.

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4.  The eight  legal  heirs  of  Nand Lal  entered into an  

agreement to sell the aforesaid immovable property  

on  29/30.07.1980  with  Kuldeep  Singh-(respondent)  

for a total sum of Rs.14,00,000/- out of which Kuldeep  

Singh  paid  Rs.1,40,000/-  as  earnest  money  and  

possession  of  one garage  in  the  suit  property  was  

handed  over  to  him.  The  balance  amount  of  

Rs.12,60,000/- was to be paid by the respondent on  

the execution and registration of the sale deed and  

delivery of possession.  

5. One  Rajinder  Kumar  (Petitioner  in  SLP  (C)  No.  

19215/2011)  claims  that  he  is  son  of  the  late  Din  

Dayal and at the time of agreement to sell, he was a  

minor.  He  filed  a  suit  through  his  maternal  

grandfather  (Suit  No.  1428  of  1981)  and  sought  a  

declaration that the agreement for sale was illegal as  

he was not a party to it. The suit was dismissed for  

default on 22.05.1984. After more than 17 years, it  

was eventually restored on 17.01.2002.  

6. The respondent-Kuldeep Singh filed a suit  (Suit  No.  

280/1982) on 10.01.1982 for specific performance of  

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the  agreement  against  the  eight  legal  heirs,  

impleading also Rajinder  Kumar  in  the said  suit  as  

defendant no. 9, on the original side of High Court of  

Delhi. The suit was decreed ex parte on 30.04.1984.  

Appeal  (RFA  (OS)  NO.  14/1985)  against  the  above  

Judgment dated 30.04.1984 was dismissed vide order  

dated  22.03.1985  as  time  barred.  An  application  

under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure,  

1908 filed thereafter for setting aside the decree was  

also dismissed on 15.07.1985.  Thus, the decree has  

attained finality.

7. Kuldeep Singh filed Execution Petition (No. 164/1990)  

on 07.11.1990. Mohinder Kumar Gupta (petitioner in  

SLP No. 28302 of 2010), one of the judgment debtors,  

filed  Application  No.  110/1991  objecting  to  the  

execution of the decree. Another application EA NO.  

111/1991 was filed by minor Rajinder Kumar under  

Order  XXI  Rule  58  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  

1908.  Single  Judge  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  vide  

Judgment dated 01.02.2002 dismissed both petitions  

holding  that  the  decree  dated  30.04.1984  is  

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executable.  Aggrieved, Mohinder Kumar Gupta filed  

FAO (OS) No. 66/2002 against the aforesaid judgment  

dated 01.02.2002 and Rajinder Kumar filed EFA (OS)  

No.  4/2002  before  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  

Court.  

8. Meanwhile,  on  24.04.1999,  some  of  the  appellants  

filed an application under Section 28 of Specific Relief  

Act,1963 (IA No. 4274/1999 in Suit No. 280/1982) for  

rescission of the agreement. That was dismissed by  

the Single Judge, High Court of Delhi vide Order dated  

23.02.2000. FAO (OS) 110/2000 before the Division  

Bench  of  the  High  Court  arises  against  the  order  

dated 23.02.2000.  

9. The Division Bench vide Judgment dated 19.02.2010  

dismissed FAO (OS) No. 110 of 2000, FAO (OS) NO. 66  

of 2002 but allowed EFA (OS) No. 4/2002 filed by the  

then  minor  Rajinder  Kumar,  holding  that  the  

execution against him cannot be pursued as there is  

no decree against him.   

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10. The  appellants  then  filed  review  petitions  No.  

210/2010  &  328/2010  against  Judgment  dated  

19.02.2010 in FAO (OS) No. 110/2000. The High Court  

dismissed the Review Petition No. 210/2010 in FAO  

(OS)  No.  110/2000  and  Review Petition No.  328  of  

2010  in  FAO  (OS)  No.  66  of  2002  on  25.04.2011.  

Thus, they are before this Court in these appeals.  

11. It  is the main contention of the appellants that the  

decree dated 30.04.1984 is inexecutable since it  is  

vague and contingent. It is also contended that the  

High  Court  of  Delhi  failed  to  properly  exercise  its  

jurisdiction  while  deciding  the  application  for  

rescinding  the  contract.  There  are  other  ancillary  

contentions as well.

12. Having heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing  

for the parties, we feel that mainly two issues arise  

for consideration:  

A. Is the decree executable? B. Was  the  application  for  rescission  properly  decided?   

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13. The  agreement  for  sale  was  executed  by  the  

appellants (Defendants 1 to 8) on 30.07.1980. They  

received part of the consideration, viz., Rs. 1,40,000/-  

as  earnest  money.  Possession  of  part  of  the  

agreement schedule property, a garage was parted  

with. The balance Rs.12,60,000/-  was to be paid at  

the  time of execution of the  sale  deed.  That  deed  

could  have  been  executed  only  after  obtaining  

permission  from  the  L&DO,  Delhi.  As  per  the  

agreement,  it  was  for  the  vendors  to  obtain  that  

permission from the L&DO on paying the unearned  

increase. There were certain other obligations as well.  

That  the  vendors  actually  intended  to  sell  the  

property  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  they  had  

approached the L&DO and the L&DO gave permission  

on 12.11.1981, subject to payment of an amount of  

Rs.7,17,330/-.  The  unearned  increase  came  to  be  

such  a  large  amount  only  because  of  the  delay  

caused  by  the  purchaser  in  getting  his  power  of  

attorney, it is alleged. The amount was not deposited  

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by the vendors even during the time extended by the  

L&DO.

14. It was in the meanwhile, Rajinder Kumar (petitioner in  

SLP  (Civil)  No.  19215  of  2011)  claiming  to  be  the  

minor  son of Din  Dayal,  filed a  suit  on 15.12.1981  

attacking  the  agreement,  claiming  his  1/24th share  

and for other reliefs. Rajinder Kumar aged 7 years at  

the time of the agreement, filed the suit through his  

maternal  grandfather  even  though  his  mother  and  

natural guardian who is signatory to the agreement  

to sale, was very much alive and available. Smelling a  

rat, the purchaser-Kuldeep Singh on 10.01.1982 filed  

OS No. 1428 of 1981 on the original side of the High  

Court for specific performance. At that time, the suit  

filed  by  Rajinder  Kumar  was  pending  for  plaintiff’s  

evidence. Rajinder Kumar was arrayed as Defendant  

No. 9 in the suit for specific performance. For some  

reason or other, the defendants did not file written  

statement  despite several  chances. Hence,  the suit  

was decreed as prayed for on 30.04.1984.

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15. For the purposes of easy reference, we may extract  

the decree as such:

“(DECREE IN A SUIT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE  AND AWARD OF DAMAGES)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)

Suit No. 280 of 1982 S. Kuldip Singh son of S. Hara Singh Resident of 20, Rajindra Park, New Delhi, Through his General Attorney S. Harkirat Singh       …  Plaintiff

Versus 1. Sh. Banarsi Dass,

son of Shri Nand Lal, R/o M-49, Greater Kailash-I, New Delhi.

2. Sh. Dhanpat Rai, son of Shri Nand Lal resident of E-4, N.D.S.E., Part-I, New Delhi.

3. Shrimati Gaindo Devi, widow of Shri Paras Ram, son of Shri Nand Lal, Resident of N-21, N.D.S.E., Part-I, New Delhi.

4. Smt. Sushila Devi, widow of late Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi.

5. Shri Mohinder Kumar Gupta, son of Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi.

6. Shri Surinder Dayal, son of Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi.

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7. Shri Narinder Dayal son of Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi.

8. Miss. Vijay Lakshmi daughter of Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi.

9. Shri Rajinder Kumar (Minor), son of Late Shri Din Dayal, resident of C-3, House Cooperative Society, South Extension Part I, New Delhi-49

through  his  legal  guardian  and  Maternal  Grand  father Shri Nand Kishore Mittal,

son of Shri Sagar Mal Mittal, 746, Gali Bhagwan, Kotla Mubarakpur, New Delhi.      …

Defendants

Value of the suit for ) purposes of jurisdiction ) Rs. 15,40,000/- Court fee paid ….. Rs. 17,374.40 Suit filed on ….. 11.2.1982

CLAIM: In  the  event  of  Defendant  No.9  being  held  to  have  no  right,  title  or  interest  in  the  property in suit, it is prayed:-

1(A) A  decree  for  specific  performance  of  the  agreement to sale dated 29/30.7.80 in respect of  entire property No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi be  granted  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  Defendants  1  to  8  against  the  total  agreed  consideration of Rupees Fourteen Lakhs.

(B) The Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to deliver the  actual,  physical,  vacant  possession  of  the  said  entire property Bungalow No.9, Sunder Nagar, New  Delhi except one garage, the possession whereof  has  already  been  delivered  to  the  plaintiff  by  Defendants 1 to 8 in terms of the agreement to  sale referred to above.

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(C) That  Defendants  1  to  8  be  ordered  to  deposit  Rs.7,17,330/-  as  the  unearned  increase  in  the  value of the plot No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi,  and failing such payment, the plaintiff be allowed  to deposit the said amount in the account of the  Defendants1  to  8  out  of  the  unpaid  balance  of  Rs.12,60,000/-.

(D) That  Defendants  1  to  8  be  ordered  to  pay  Rs.1,40,000/- as and by way of liquidated damages  for the breach of contract and the said amount of  Rs.1,40,000/- be allowed to be appropriated out of  the unpaid balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-  due and payable to the said Defendants 1 to 8.

(E) That it  may also be ordered that all  public dues  payable by the Defendants 1 to 8 in respect [sic] of  the property in suit be paid by the plaintiff in the  account of the said Defendants and the amount so  paid be allowed to be appropriated out of the last  mentioned unpaid balance money payable to the  Defendants 1 to 8 for conveying the said property  to the plaintiff.

(F) That the Defendants 1 to 8 be required to apply to  their respective Income-Tax Officers and to obtain  the respective Clearance Certificates for the sale  of  the  property  in  favour  of the  plaintiff.  It  may  further be ordered that if Defendants 1 to 8 or any  of  them  neglects  to  apply  to  their  Income-Tax  Officers  for  obtaining  the  necessary  Clearance  Certificates for the sale of the said property, then  an  officer  of  this  Hon’ble  Court  do  make  such  application on behalf of the concerned Defendants  1 to 8 and all costs of the said applications as also  any  amounts  demanded  by  the  Taxation  authorities  for  issue  of  the  requisite  Clearance  Certificates be ordered to be deducted out of the  said  amount  of  Rs.12,60,000/-  and  incase  of  a  short  fall  a  decree  for  the  additional  amount  involved by passed in favour of the plaintiff against  the Defendants 1 to 8 jointly and severally.

(G) That the Defendants 4 to 8 be required to produce  the Estate Duty Clearance Certificate in respect of  the  conveyance  of  one  quarter  undivided  right,  

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title  and interest  in  the said  property previously  belonging to Shri Din Dayal, the deceased husband  of Defendant No.4 and father of Defendants 5 to 8.  It may also be ordered that in case Defendants 4  to 8 neglect  to obtain the Requisite Estate Duty  Clearance  Certificate,  then  an  Officer  of  this  Hon’ble Court do apply for the grant of the said  Estate  Duty  Clearance  Certificates  on  behalf  of  Defendants  4  to  8  and  all  costs  of  such  applications  as  also  the  payment  of  any  dues  demanded by the Estate Duty Officer be allowed to  be  deducted  out  of  the  balance  consideration  money, if any, in the hands of the plaintiff and in  the event of the plaintiff being required to pay any  amount to the Taxation authorities, then a decree  for  a  like  amount  be  passed  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff and the Defendants 1 to 8.

(H) That Defendants 1 to 8 be also required to pay all  the public dues, lease money, and misuse charges,  if any pertaining to Bungalow No.9, Sunder Nagar,  New  Delhi,  and  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  then  the  plaintiff  be required to pay all  such dues, and a  decree for a like amount be passed in favour of the  plaintiff  against  Defendants  1  to  8  jointly  and  severally.

(I) That  the Defendants  1 to 8  be ordered to hand  over all the antecedent original title deeds of the  property  No.9,  Sunder  Nagar,  New  Delhi  to  the  plaintiff.

(J) That pending the completion of all the jobs to be  undertaken and completed by the Defendants 1 to  8  as  detailed  above,  the  plaintiff  be  allowed  to  deposit final balance amount if any, payable by the  said Defendants 1 to 8 in this Hon’ble Court and  the said balance may be ordered to be released to  the Defendants 1 to 8 only after they have fully  complied  with  their  part  of  the  contract,  as  decreed by this Hon’ble Court.

II. That  in  the  event  of  this  Hon’ble  court  deciding  that  for  any  reason  whatsoever  a  decree  for  specific  performance is  not to be allowed to the  plaintiff (which is not expected ):-

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Then in the alternative:

A decree for the refund of Rs.1,40,000/- alongwith  interest  thereon  at  Rs.1.25  paise  percent  per  month  or  part  of  a  month  from  the  date  of  payment viz. 30.7.80 to the date of receipt by the  plaintiff be passed in favour of the plaintiff against  the Defendants 1 to 8 jointly and severally and the  said  Defendants  may  further  be  ordered  to  pay  Rs.11,00,000/-  for  breach  of  contract  to  the  plaintiff as and by way of damages, and the same  be decreed accordingly.

III.(A)That in the event that this Hon’ble Court holds that  Defendant No.9 is the owner of an undivided 1/24th  right, title and interest in the said property, then a  decree for specific performance of the agreement  to sale dated 29/30.7.80 in respect of an undivided  23/24th right, title and interest in the said property  No.9,  Sunder  Nagar,  New  Delhi  belonging  to  Defendants  1  to  8  be  granted  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  Defendants  against  the  payment  of  the  agreed  total  consideration  of  Rs.14,00,000/-.

(B) That the Defendants 1 to 8 be ordered to deliver  the  actual,  physical,  joint  possession of the  said  entire property to the plaintiff and Defendant No.9  jointly except one garage, the possession whereof  has  already  been  delivered  to  the  plaintiff  by  Defendants 1 to 8 in terms of the agreement to  sale referred to above.

(C) That  Defendants  1  to  8  be  ordered  to  pay  Rs.7,17,330/- to the Land and Development Officer  as the unearned increase in the value of the plot  No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi, as also the other  dues demanded by the said Officer,  and in case  the Defendants neglect to pay the said amounts  then the plaintiff be permitted to pay the above  amounts in the account of Defendants 1 to 8 and  to deduct the same out of the unpaid balance of  Rs.12,60,000/-.

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(D) That  Defendants  1  to  8  be  ordered  to  pay  Rs.1,40,000/- as and by way of liquidated damages  for the breach of contract and the said amount of  Rs.1,40,000/- be allowed to be appropriated out of  the unpaid balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-  due and payable to the said Defendants 1 to 8.

(E) That it  may also be ordered that all  public dues  payable by the Defendants 1 to 8 in respect of the  property  in  suit  be  paid  by  the  plaintiff  in  the  account  of  the  said  Defendants  1  to  8  and  the  amount so paid be allowed to be appropriated out  of  the  last  mentioned  unpaid  balance  money  payable to the Defendants 1 to 8 for conveying the  said property to the plaintiff.

(F) that the Defendants 1 to 8 be required to apply to  their respective Income Tax Officers and to obtain  Clearance Certificate for the sale of the property in  favour of the plaintiff.  It  may further be ordered  that if Defendants 1 to 8 or any of them neglect to  apply to their Income Tax Officers for obtaining the  necessary Clearance Certificate for sale of the said  property, then an officer of this Hon’ble Court do  make such applications on behalf of the concerned  Defendants 1 to 8 and all costs for the making of  the  said  applications  as  also  any  amounts  demanded by the Taxation authorities for issue of  the requisite Clearance Certificates be ordered to  be  deducted  out  of  the  said  amount  of  Rs.12,60,000/- and in case of a short fall a decree  for  the additional  amount  involved be passed in  favour of the plaintiff against the Defendants 1 to  8 jointly and severally.

(G) That the Defendants 4 to 8 be required to produce  the Estate Duty Clearance Certificate in respect of  the  Conveyance  of  one-quarter  undivided  right,  title  and interest  in  the said  property previously  belonging to Shri Din Dayal, the deceased husband  of Defendant No.4, and father of Defendants 5 to  8. It may also be ordered that in case Defendants  4  to  8  or  any  of  them,  neglect  to  obtain  the  requisite  Estate  Duty  Clearance  Certificate,  then  an officer of this Hon’ble Court  do apply for the  

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grant of the said Estate Duty Clearance Certificate  on behalf of the Defendants 4 to 8 and all costs of  such applications as also the payment of any dues  demanded by the Estate Duty Officer be allowed to  be  deducted  out  of  the  balance  consideration  money, if any, in the hands of the plaintiff and in  the event of there being a short fall, the plaintiff be  required  to  pay  the  requisite  amount  to  the  Taxation authorities and a decree for a like amount  be  passed  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff  against  the  Defendants 1 to 8, jointly and severally.

(H) That the Defendants  1 to 8  be ordered to hand  over  all  the  original  title  deeds  of  the  property  No.9, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi to the plaintiff.

(I) That pending the completion of all the jobs to be  undertaken and completed by Defendants 1 to 8,  the plaintiff be allowed to deposit the final balance  amount, if any, payable to the Defendants in this  Hon’ble  court  and  the  said  balance  may  be  ordered to be released to the Defendants 1 to 8  only after they have fully complied with their part  of the contract as decreed by this Hon’ble Court.

(J) The costs of the suit may also be awarded, to the  plaintiff against the Defendants 1 to 8.

30  th   day of April 1984   CORAM:

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Yogeshwar Dayal

For the Plaintiff        : Mr. S. R. Bhagat, Advocate. For the Defendants   : Mr. G.L. Rawal, Advocate

        for Deft. No.9. The suit coming on this day for final disposal  

before this Court in the presence of counsel for the  parties as aforesaid; it is ordered that a decree as  prayed  by  the  plaintiff  and  the  same  is  hereby  passed in  favour of the plaintiff  and against  the  Defendants 1 to 8 only.

It  is  lastly  ordered  that  Defendants  1  to  8  herein do pay to the plaintiff herein the cost of the  suit  incurred by the latter  as  Rs.18,028.75p (Rs.  Eighteen  Thousand  Twenty  Eight  and  Paise  

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Seventy Five only) as taxed by the Taxing Officer  of  this  court  and  noted  in  the  margin  of  this  decree.

Given  under  my  hand  and  the  seal  of  the  court this the 30th day of April, 1984.

Sd/ Dy. Registrar”

16. Appeal was dismissed as time barred. A few months  

thereafter an Application under Order IX Rule 13 of  

Code of  Civil  Procedure,  1908 was filed  for  setting  

aside the ex parte decree. That too was dismissed. It  

appears the vendors lost all hope and left things as  

they were at that stage. It is seen from the pleadings  

that  attempts  were  also  made  for  an  out  of  court  

settlement, but in vain.   

17.  We do not think that the vendors would be justified  

in  setting  up  any  defence  on  executability  of  the  

decree both on law and facts of the case. At the risk  

of  redundancy,  on referring  to  the  facts,  it  can  be  

seen that the vendors had in fact wanted to fructify  

the agreement for sale. Having received the advance  

amount of Rs.1,40,000/-, they had parted possession  

of a part of the property, viz., garage. They had jointly  

made  an  application  to  the  L&DO in  terms  of  the  

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agreement,  for permission to transfer  the property.  

The L&DO did grant the permission but on condition  

of deposit of an amount of Rs.7,17,330/- towards the  

unearned increase, which is  more than 50% of the  

sale consideration. The value of the property had shot  

up by that time. It is pertinent to note that as per the  

original agreement, the unearned increase was to be  

paid by the vendors. On account of the escalation, it  

appears, their hearts started burning and they were  

extremely reluctant to part with the property. Their  

attempts  thereafter  have always been,  one way or  

the other, to delay, if  not deny, their  obligation for  

conveyance of the property.  

18. The main contention of the vendors is that that there  

is no decree in terms of Section 2 (2) of the Code of  

Civil  Procedure,  1908  because  there  is  no  formal  

expression  of  adjudication  and  the  court  has  not  

conclusively determined the rights of the parties. But  

it has to be seen that the vendors did not contest the  

suit. They had not even filed a written statement. In  

that context only, the suit was decreed as prayed for.  

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In  the  Judgment  dated  30.04.1984,  the  Court  has  

referred to the averments in the plaint. The opening  

and concluding sentences of the Judgment  read as  

follows:

“Plaintiff,  S.  Kuldeep Singh has filed the present  suit  against  Shri  Banarsi  Dass  and  8  others  for  specific performance of an agreement to sell dated  29/30th July 1980.  The agreement  relates to plot  No.9, Block No.171 in the layout plan of the New  Capital  of  Delhi,  now  known  as  Bungalow  No.9,  Sunder Nagar, New Delhi. …

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

However, since the Defendants have failed to  file  written  statement,  as  directed  in  my  order  dated 15th February, 1984, I proceed to pronounce  the judgment under the provisions of order 8 rule  10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and decree the  suit of the plaintiff as prayed for with costs against  Defendants 1 to 8 only as there is no relief prayed  against Defendant No.9.”

19. Having  referred  to  the  entire  contentions  of  the  

plaintiff, the Judgment was pronounced under Order  

VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 since  

there was no written statement. The Court has taken  

the  position  that  the  defendants  had  failed  to  file  

written statement. Therefore, the Court, in the facts  

of the case, opted to pronounce the Judgment, under  

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Order  VIII  Rule  10  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  

1908 and draw the decree accordingly.  

20. No doubt, the decree passed under Order VIII Rule 10  

of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is an  ex parte  

decree. But merely because it is an ex parte decree,  

the same does not  cease to have the force of the  

decree. It is a valid decree for all purposes.  

21. It is also worthwhile to note that the Judgment was  

pronounced under  the pre-amended Rule  10 under  

Order VIII  of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and  

there was more discretion with the Court regarding  

pronouncement  of  the  Judgment  in  the  absence  of  

written statement. Still further, it is to be noted that  

Rule  10  speaks  about  the  requirement  of  written  

statement  indicating  thereby  that  there  are  cases  

where  written  statement  was  required  to  be  filed.  

Written statement is the defense of the defendants.  

They chose not to file it. Despite the absence of such  

defense,  the  court  still  applied  its  mind  and  after  

referring  to  the  pleadings,  pronounced  a  Judgment  

allowing the suit for specific performance. Though the  

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Judgment says that the suit is decreed as prayed for  

and though all the prayers have been incorporated in  

the decree, it is to be noted that the suit is one for  

specific performance of the agreement. The suit that  

has been decreed is the suit for specific performance  

of  the  agreement.  Once  the  decree  for  specific  

performance attained finality, they cannot thereafter  

turn  round  and  make  weak  and  lame  contentions  

regarding the executability of the decree.

22. If the suit for specific performance is not decreed as  

prayed for, then alone the question of any reference  

to the alternative relief would arise. Therefore, there  

is no question of any ambiguity. As held by this Court  

in Topanmal Chhotamal v. Kundomal Gangaram  

and  Others3 and  consistently  followed  thereafter,  

even if there is any ambiguity, it is for the executing  

court  to  construe  the  decree  if  necessary  after  

referring to the Judgment. If sufficient guidance is not  

3 AIR 1960 Supreme Court 388 – Paragraph 4- “At the worst  the decree can be said to be ambiguous. In such a case it is   the duty of the executing Court to construe the decree. For   the purpose of  interpreting  a  decree,  when its  terms are   ambiguous,  the  Court  would  certainly  be  entitled  to  look   into the pleadings and the Judgment. …”

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available even from the Judgment, the Court is even  

free to refer to the pleadings so as to construe the  

true import of the decree. No doubt, the court cannot  

go behind the decree or beyond the decree. But while  

executing  a  decree  for  specific  performance,  the  

Court,  in case of any ambiguity,  has necessarily to  

construe  the  decree  so  as  to  give  effect  to  the  

intention of the parties. Thus, there is no question of  

any alternate relief regarding the damages etc. in the  

present  case  since  the  suit  for  the  specific  

performance for the conveyance of the property has  

been decreed.  

23. There  is  no  case  that  the  court  does  not  have  

jurisdiction to pass the decree. Nor is there any case  

that  the  decree  is  a  nullity  on  account  of  any  

jurisdictional error. Hence, the decree is executable  

for all intents and purposes but limited to the shares  

of the vendors. The claim of Rajinder Kumar would  

depend on the outcome of the pending suit.

24. Now  we  shall  deal  with  the  issue  regarding  the  

approach  of  the  High  Court  in  dealing  with  the  

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application for rescission. Apparently, the purchaser-

Kuldeep Singh was also not quite serious in pursuing  

the cause. Though the decree is dated 30.04.1984,  

the execution petition was filed only after six and a  

half years, on 07.11.1990. No doubt, it was within the  

time prescribed by the law of limitation. But the efflux  

of time assumes importance and seriousness in the  

background of the escalation of price in real estate.  

25. It  is  very strange that  no serious steps have been  

taken  by the  executing court  for  almost  a  decade.  

While so, only on 24.04.1999, respondents 3 to 7 and  

13 filed Application – IA No. 4274 of 1999 in the suit  

for  rescinding  the  agreement  for  sale.  The  main  

ground taken in the Application for rescission of the  

agreement was that the plaintiff/purchaser failed to  

deposit the balance consideration of Rs.12,60,000/-. It  

was also contended that between the date of decree  

in  1984  and  the  date  of  filing  the  Application  for  

rescission, even the notified rates in land value shot  

up from Rs.2,000/- per square yard to Rs.13,860/- per  

square meter  and the unearned increase would be  

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around Rs.50,00,000/-  and, thus, it  would be highly  

unjust, unconscionable and inequitable to compel the  

vendors  to  make  the  payment  of  the  unearned  

increase. It was also averred that the vendors were  

prepared to pay a reasonable compensation to the  

purchaser. The purchaser-Kuldeep Singh in response  

to the Application for rescission, stated that the court  

had  not  fixed  any  time  for  deposit  of  the  balance  

amount, the balance amount was payable only on the  

execution and registration of the conveyance deed.  

He also contended that execution was possible only  

on  permission  from  the  L&DO  on  payment  of  

unearned increase by the vendors and for which the  

vendors are at fault in not having taken any serious  

steps  in  completing  their  obligations  under  the  

decree;  and  that  the  purchaser  had  always  been  

ready  and  willing  to  perform  his  part  of  the  

agreement.  

26. By Order dated 23.02.2000, the learned Single Judge  

dismissed the applications holding that the purchaser  

was not at fault either in having done something or in  

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not having done something which stood in the way of  

the execution of the decree. On the contrary, it was  

the vendors who did not perform their duties in the  

sequence  of  events  prior  to  and  leading  to  the  

registration of the sale deed. In short, it was held that  

the  vendors having not  performed their  obligations  

under the agreement,  they could not approach the  

court  for  rescinding  the  agreement  on  the  ground  

that  the  purchaser  had  not  deposited  the  balance  

amount.

27. It  is  extremely  important  and  crucially  relevant  to  

note that the court did not advert to one of the main  

contentions regarding the escalation in land value by  

which the vendors had to incur the liability of around  

four  times  the  balance  consideration  by  way  of  

payment of unearned increase to the      L&DO so as  

to  complete  their  obligation.  It  is  pertinent  also  to  

note  that  the  said  unconscionable  liability  for  the  

vendors  arose  only  on  account  of  the  delayed  

execution of the decree.  

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28. It is significant to note that during the pendency of  

the appeals, the purchaser sought permission of the  

court  to  deposit  the  balance  consideration and,  on  

06.01.2010, the same was granted. He, accordingly,  

deposited  some  amounts  towards  the  liability  of  

unearned income also.

29. It appears from the Order dated 06.01.2010 in FAO  

(OS) No. 66 of 2002 that only oral submissions were  

made for the deposit of balance consideration, by the  

respondent-Kuldeep Singh. For the purpose of ready  

reference, we may extract the Order as such:  

“Learned  counsel  for  Respondent  No.1  (Kuldeep  Singh)  says  that  the  balance  consideration  in  terms  of  the  contract  entered  into  between  the  parties will be deposited by his client on or before  11th January,  2010.  Learned  counsel  for  Respondent  No.1  also  says  that  the  unearned  increase that is required to be calculated by the L  and  DO has  not  yet  been  so  calculated  but  his  client is prepared to deposit an amount of Rs. 10  lakhs on account in this regard. This amount will  be  deposited  with  the  Registrar  General  of  this  Court on or before 11th January, 2010.

List for directions on 12th January, 2010.

Arguments  have been heard and concluded and  judgment is reserved. The matter is listed on 12th  January, 2010 only for compliance with regard to  the deposit.”  

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30. We have referred to above development to keep in  

mind  one  significant  and  important  aspect  of  the  

matter that the vendors did not get an opportunity to  

make their response to the oral submission made by  

the purchaser with regard to deposit of the balance  

consideration, after passage of around 26 years after  

the decree.

31. Having regard to the facts and circumstances which  

we  have  discussed  above,  we  are  afraid  the  High  

Court has not made an attempt to balance equity. As  

in  the  case  of  a  decree  for  specific  performance  

where equity weighs with the court so is the situation  

in considering an application under Section 28 of the  

Specific Relief Act, 1963 for rescinding the contract.  

Under               Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act,  

1963, a vendor is free to apply to the Court which  

made decree to have the contract rescinded in case  

the purchaser has not paid the purchase money or  

other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay  

within the period allowed by the decree or such other  

period  as  the  court  may  allow.  On  such  an  

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application,  the  Court  may,  by  order,  rescind  the  

contract “as the justice of the case may require”. It is  

now settled law that a suit for specific performance  

does not come to an end on passing of a decree and  

the  Court  which  passed  the  decree  retains  control  

over  the  decree  even  after  the  decree  has  been  

passed and the decree is sometimes described as the  

preliminary decree.

32. In  Hungerford  Investment  Trust  Limited  (In  

Voluntary Liquidation) v.  Haridas Mundhra and  

Others4, it has been held that:

“22.  It is settled by a long course of decisions of  the Indian High Courts that the Court which passes  a decree for specific performance retains control  over the decree even after the decree has been  passed. In  Mahommadalli  Sahib  v.  Abdul  Khadir   Saheb (1930) MLJ Vol. 59, p.351 it  was held that  the  Court  which  passes  a  decree  for  specific  performance  has  the  power  to  extend  the  time  fixed  in  the  decree  for  the  reason  that  Court  retains control over the decree, that the contract  between  the  parties  is  not  extinguished  by  the  passing of a decree for specific performance and  that  the  contract  subsists  notwithstanding  the  passing of the decree. …”

(Emphasis supplied)

4 (1972) 3 SCC 684.

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33. The discretionary power vested in court by Section 28  

of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is intended to apply in  

such circumstances:

“The  effect  of  this  provision  is  to  empower  the  court  which  passed  the  decree  for  specific  performance to rescind the contract and set aside  the  decree  which  it  has  passed  earlier  if  the  successful plaintiff failed to comply with the terms  of the decree by making payment of the purchase  money or other sums which the court ordered him  to pay. …5”

(Emphasis supplied)

34. The decree for  specific  performance is  a  decree in  

favour of both the plaintiff and the defendant in the  

suit,  as  held  by  this  Court  in  Hungerford  

Investment Trust Limited case (supra). Hence, the  

decree can be executed either by the plaintiff or the  

defendant.  

35. The plaintiff or the defendant is also free to approach  

the court for appropriate clarification/directions in the  

event  of  any  ambiguity  or  supervening  factors  

making the execution of the decree inexecutable. To  

quote Fry (ibid) (please see Pages-546-548):  

5 Pollock & Mulla,  The Indian  Contract  and Specific  Relief   Acts, 14th Edition, Page 2064.

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“1170.  It may and not unfrequently does happen  that after judgment has been given for the specific  performance  of  a  contract,  some  further  relief  becomes  necessary,  in  consequence  of  one  or  other  of  the  parties  making  default  in  the  performance of something which ought under the  judgment to be performed by him or on his part ;  as,  for  instance,  where  a  vendor  refuses  or  in  unable  to  execute  a  proper  conveyance  of  the  property,  or  a  purchaser  to  pay  the  purchase- money.  The character  of the consequential  relief  appropriate  to  any  particular  case  will  of  course  vary according to the nature of the subject-matter  of the contract and the position which the applicant  occupies in the transaction; but in every case the  application  must,  under  the  present  practice,  be  made only to the Court by which the judgment was  pronounced,  and  the  multiplicity  of  legal  proceedings which sometimes occurred before the  fusion of the jurisdictions of the Courts of Chancery  and Common Law is now practically impossible.

1171. There are two kinds of relief after judgment  for  specific  performance of which either  party to  the contract may, in a proper case, avail himself.  

1172.(i.)  He may obtain (on motion in the action)  an order appointing a definite time and place for  completion  of  the  contract  by  payment  of  the  unpaid purchase-money and delivery over of the  executed conveyance and title-deeds, or a period  within which the judgment is to be obeyed, and, if  the  other  party  fails  to  obey  the  order,  may  thereupon  at  once  issue  a  writ  of  sequestration  against the defaulting party’s estate and effects.  Furthermore, if the default was in the payment of  money, the plaintiff may issue his fi.fa. or elegit: if  in some act other than or besides the payment of  money, he may move, on notice to the defaulter,  for a writ of attachment against him. Indeed, in a  case where a person who had agreed to accept a  lease would not, though ordered by the Court to do  so,  execute  the  lease,  it  was  held  that  an  

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attachment was the only means to which the Court  could resort for enforcing such execution.

1173. (ii.) He may apply to the Court (by motion in  the action) for an order rescinding the contract. On  an application of this kind, if  it  appears that  the  party  moved  against  has  positively  refused  to  complete  the  contract,  its  immediate  rescission  may be ordered : otherwise, the order will be for  rescission in default of completion within a limited  time.  And  where  a  deposit  has  been  paid,  and  there is no condition of the contract determining,  expressly or impliedly, what is to be done with it in  the  event  of  such  a  rescission,  the  Court  will  decline to order  the deposit  to  be returned to a  defaulting purchaser. An order for the defendant to  pay  the  plaintiff’s  costs,  and  a  stay  of  further  proceedings in the action, except such proceedings  as may be necessary for recovery of the costs of  the action and the costs of the motion, may also be  obtained on this application. A vendor plaintiff  is  not  debarred  from  moving  for  an  order  for  rescission by the fact that the judgment at the trial  contained a  declaration of his  vendor’s lien,  and  gave him liberty to apply as to enforcing it.

In some cases the order has expressly excepted  from the stay of proceedings any application to the  Court to award and assess damages sustained by  the plaintiff’s by reason or in consequence of the  breach  of  contract.  In  Henty  v.  Schroder (12  Ch.D.666), however, Jessel M.R. declined to make  this exception, consider that the plaintiffs could not  at  the  same  time  obtain  an  order  to  have  the  contract  rescinded  and  claim  damages  for  the  breach of it.  If  this be so, it  would seem that  in  many cases the Court must fail to give the plaintiff  the full measure of relief requisite for replacing him  in  the  position  in  which  he  stood  before  the  contract,-the repayment, for instance, of expenses  incurred by him in showing his title.”

(Emphasis supplied)

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36. Dealing  with  a  situation  where  deterioration  takes  

place by the conduct, according to Fry (ibid) (please  

see Page 654):

“1431.  If,  after  the  contract  and  before  the  purchaser takes, or ought to take, possession, any  deterioration  take  place  by  the  conduct  of  the  vendor or his tenants, he will be accountable for it  to the purchaser. “He is not entitled to treat the  estate as his own. If he willfully damages or injures  it,  he is liable to the purchaser ;  and more than  that,  he is  liable  if  he does not take reasonable  care of it.” And this liability may be enforced by  action, even after a conveyance made in ignorance  of the facts. 1432. Where a purchaser had paid his money into  Court  under  an  order,  and  was  held  entitled  to  compensation for  deterioration,  which had taken  place  while  the  vendors  retained  possession,  he  was  allowed  the  amount  out  of  his  purchase- money, with interest at 4 per cent., and the costs  of an issue to ascertain the amount of damage.”

(Emphasis supplied)

37. In  the instant  case, converse is  the position. If  the  

purchaser  is  entitled  to  claim  compensation  for  

deterioration,           a fortiori it must be held that  

vendor should also be entitled to compensation for  

accretion  in  value  of  the  subject  matter  of  the  

agreement  for  specific  performance,  in  case  the  

execution thereof is unduly delayed by the purchaser.  

Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act provides that the  

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court has to pass an order as the justice of the case  

may require. Justice is not an abstract proposition. It  

is a concrete reality. The parties on approaching the  

court must get the feeling that justice has been done  

in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  

particularly in specific performance related cases, in  

terms of equity, equality and fairness.

38. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is very  

difficult to balance the equity and balance the rights  

of  both  the  parties  in  the  background  of  their  

conduct.  No doubt  there  was  no  time  fixed  in  the  

agreement for payment of the purchase money. That  

was also contingent on a series of obligations to be  

performed  by  the  vendor  and  the  duty  of  the  

purchaser  to  pay  the  purchase  money  was  only  

thereafter.  But  if  we closely  analyze  the  pleadings  

and submissions, we can see that the purchaser had  

made an attempt, though belatedly, for getting the  

obligations performed even at his expense.

39. The  plaintiff  purchaser  very  well  knew  that  the  

vendors have been delaying the performance of their  

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obligation  under  the  agreement  and  things  were  

getting complicated.  It  was open to the plaintiff,  in  

such circumstances, to file an application, rather he  

ought  to  have  filed  an  application  in  court  on  the  

original side for appropriate direction with regard to  

the  payment  of  purchase  money  and  for  other  

procedural  formalities.  Despite  the  application filed  

by  the  vendor  for  rescission  of  the  agreement  in  

1999, for the first time, an oral prayer was made by  

the  purchaser  before  the  court  for  the  deposit  of  

balance of purchase money only in  the year  2010.  

That  too  was  merely  an  oral  submission.  

Consequently,  the  defendants  never  had  an  

opportunity to  respond to the same or contest  the  

proposition. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that in  

the  peculiar  factual  background  of  this  case,  the  

plaintiff  purchaser  was  also  at  fault  in  not  taking  

prompt steps.

40. In this context, one more reference to  Hungerford  

Investment  Trust  Limited (supra)  would  be  

relevant:

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“25. It was contended on behalf of Mundhra that  he  was  always  ready  and  willing  to  pay  the  purchase  money,  but  since  the  decree  did  not  specify any time for payment of the money, there  was  no  default  on  his  part.  In  other  words,  the  contention  was  that  since  the  decree  did  not  specify a time within which the purchase money  should be paid and, since an application for fixing  the time was made by the appellant and dismissed  by  the  Court,  Mundhra  cannot  be  said  to  have  been in default in not paying the purchase money  so that the Appellant might apply for rescission of  the decree. If a contract does not specify the time  for performance, the Law will imply that the parties  intended  that  the  obligation  under  the  contract  should  be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time.  Section 46 of the Contract Act provides that where,  by a contract, a promiser is to perform his promise  without application by the promise, and no time for  performance is specified, the engagement must be  performed  within  a  reasonable  time  and  the  question  "what  is  reasonable  time"  is,  in  each  particular case, a question of fact. ...”

(Emphasis supplied)

41. Analyzing  the  conduct  of  the  vendors-defendants  

also, one can see that they are equally at fault. In the  

contract,  no  time  was  fixed  for  payment  and,  

therefore,  the  purchaser  was  obliged  to  pay  the  

purchase money within a reasonable time. Owing to  

the laches or lapses on the part of the parties in case  

there is any insurmountable difficulty, hardship or, on  

account of subsequent development, any inequitable  

situation  had  arisen,  either  party  was  free  to  

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approach the court for appropriate direction. Though  

the suit was decreed in the year 1984 and execution  

petition filed in  1990,  the application for  rescission  

was filed only in the year 1999.

42. In Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corporation (P) Ltd.  

and Others6, it has been held by this Court:

“6. It  is  true  that  grant  of  decree  of  specific  performance lies in the discretion of the court and  it is also well settled that it is not always necessary  to grant specific performance simply for the reason  that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that  the  court  in  its  discretion  can  impose  any  reasonable  condition  including  payment  of  an  additional amount by one party to the other while  granting  or  refusing  decree  of  specific  performance.  Whether  the  purchaser  shall  be  directed to pay an additional amount to the seller  or  converse  would  depend  upon  the  facts  and  circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is  not to be denied the relief of specific performance  only  on  account  of  the  phenomenal  increase  of  price during the pendency of litigation. That may  be,  in  a  given  case,  one  of  the  considerations  besides many others to be taken into consideration  for refusing the decree of specific performance. As  a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the  plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone,  the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the  value of the property during the pendency of the  litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the  consideration to be kept in view is as to who is the  defaulting  party.  It  is  also  to  be  borne  in  mind  whether a party is trying to take undue advantage  over the other as also the hardship that may be  

6 (2002) 8 SCC 146

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Specific  Relief  Act,  1963  cannot  be  entrapped  within any precise expression of language and the  contours thereof will always depend on the facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  ultimate  guiding test would be the principles of fairness and  reasonableness as may be dictated by the peculiar  facts  of  any  given  case,  which  features  the  experienced  judicial  mind  can  perceive  without  any real difficulty. It must however be emphasized  that  efflux  of  time  and  escalation  of  price  of  property,  by  itself,  cannot  be  a  valid  ground  to  deny  the  relief  of  specific  performance.  Such  a  view has been consistently adopted by this Court.  By  way  of  illustration  opinions  rendered  in P.S.  Ranakrishna Reddy v. M.K. Bhagyalakshmi8:   and  more  recently  in Narinderjit  Singh  v.  North  Star  Estate  Promoters  Ltd.9 may  be  usefully  recapitulated.

41.  The  twin  inhibiting  factors  identified  above if are to be read as a bar to the grant of a  decree of specific  performance would amount  to  penalizing the plaintiffs for no fault on their part; to  deny them the real fruits of a protracted litigation  wherein the issues arising are being answered in  their favour. From another perspective it may also  indicate the inadequacies of the law to deal with  the  long  delays  that,  at  times,  occur  while  rendering  the  final  verdict  in  a  given  case.  The  aforesaid two features, at best, may justify award  of additional compensation to the vendor by grant  of a price higher than what had been stipulated in  the agreement which price, in a given case, may  even be the market price as on date of the order of  the final Court.”

(Emphasis supplied)

44. The circle rate of the residential property based on  

which  the  unearned  increase  is  calculated  by  the  8 (2007) 10 SCC 231 9 (2012) 5 SCC 712

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L&DO,  would  show  a  sharp  increase  during  the  

period.  Sunder  Nagar  comes  under  Category  ‘A’  

colonies.  Under  the  Delhi  Stamp  (Prevention  of  

Undervaluation  of  Instruments)  Rules,  2007,  the  

notified circle rate for Category ‘A’ colonies from July  

2007  was  Rs.43,000/-  per  square  meter  and  from  

February  8,  2011,  it  was  Rs.86,000/-  per  square  

meter. From November 16, 2011, it was Rs.2,15,000/-  

per  square  meter  and  from  January  5,  2012,  it  is  

Rs.6,45,000/- per square meter.

45. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case,  

we are of the view that the trial court should have  

passed  an  equitable  order  while  considering  the  

application for rescission.  Having regard to the fact  

that the decree was passed in 1984, we feel that it  

would be unjust and unfair to relegate the parties to  

the  trial  court  at  this  distance  of  time.  For  doing  

complete justice to the parties, we are of the view  

that  it  is  a  case  where  the  purchaser  should  be  

directed to pay the land value to the vendors as per  

the circle rate notified for the residential property in  

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Category ‘A’ colonies prevailing during November 16,  

2011 to January 5, 2012, at the rate of Rs.2,15,000/-  

per square meter. The purchaser shall also be liable  

to  meet  the  liability  arising  by  way  of  unearned  

increase  to  be  paid  to  the  Land  and  Development  

Office. He is free to withdraw the amounts deposited  

by him in the court as per order dated 06.01.2010. It  

is  also  ordered  that  in  case  the  plaintiff  does  not  

deposit the amount to be paid to the vendors within  

three months from today, the vendors shall deposit in  

court  within  two  months  thereafter  the  amount  

calculated as per the circle rate referred to above by  

way of compensation to be paid to the purchaser, and  

in which event, they shall stand discharged of their  

obligations under the contract and the decree. In the  

event  of  the  purchaser  depositing  the  amount  as  

above,  the execution proceedings shall  be finalized  

within another one month. The Court in seisin of the  

Suit OS No. 1428 of 1981 shall dispose of the same  

within three months from today.

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46. The Appeal filed by Rajinder Kumar [arising out of SLP  

(C)  No.  19215/2011]  is  dismissed  and  the  other  

Appeals  are  partly  allowed  as  above.  There  is  no  

order as to costs.

.……………………….…..…………J.                (CHANDRAMAULI KR.  

PRASAD)

…………...……..……………………J.    (KURIAN JOSEPH)

New Delhi; February 07, 2014.  

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