REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   2419    OF 2011 [Arising out of S.L.P (C) No. 8463 of 2009]

Rajesh Kumar Srivastava             …. Appellant

Versus

State of Jharkhand & Ors.               ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant herein submitted his application offering himself  

as a candidate for the post of Munsif to be recruited by the  

respondents  for  which  an  advertisement  was  also  issued.  

Pursuant to the aforesaid application filed by the appellant, he  

was called to appear in the various tests held, including the  

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interview  conducted  by  the  High  Court.   He  successfully  

completed his tests and consequently was declared successful  

in the year 2001.   

3. After completing his training period, a notification was issued  

on 21.05.2002, appointing him as a Probationer Munsif.  The  

said notification was issued by the Government of Jharkhand.  

He was posted  at  Dhanbad by  a  notification issued  by  the  

High  Court.   On  04.06.2002,  he  assumed  the  charge  as  

Probationer  Munsif  at  Dhanbad.   On  15.07.2002,  he  was  

conferred  with  the  power  of  Judicial  Magistrate  1st Class.  

While he was discharging his duties as such, he passed an  

order  on  06.01.2003,  discharging  all  the  accused  under  

Section 239 Cr.P.C. in G.R. No. 4698 of 1995 under Sections  

406, 408, 420, 120-B IPC.   

4. A complaint from one Ram Kumar was received by the High  

Court on 04.03.2003, wherein it was alleged that the appellant  

had discharged the said accused persons, despite rejection of  

revision application  by  the  High Court  earlier.   It  was also  

alleged that the aforesaid order discharging the accused was  

passed  for  extraneous  consideration.   The  High  Court  on  

receipt of the aforesaid complaint called for a report from the  

District & Sessions Judge, Dhanbad.  On receipt of the said  

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communication, the District & Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, sent  

a  letter  to  the  appellant  directing  him to  offer  his  remarks  

which were submitted by the appellant.  The said remarks and  

report  along  with  confidential  report  of  the  appellant  were  

submitted by the District & Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, before  

the High Court.  On 28.04.2003, the concerned Zonal Judge  

referred  the  matter  to  the  Standing  Committee  for  further  

action.  In terms of the decision of the Zonal Judge, the then  

Chief Justice of the High Court also referred the matter to the  

Standing  Committee  by  way  of  recording  an  order  on  

01.05.2003.  The matter was considered in the meeting of the  

Standing Committee held on 08.07.2003.   

5. After  considering the performance and the suitability  of  the  

appellant, it was resolved that the matter be referred to the  

Full Court for consideration, and a decision as to whether or  

not  the  continuation  of  the  service  of  the  appellant  was  

required.  Consequent thereupon the matter was placed before  

the Full  Court  meeting held  on 18.07.2003,  wherein it  was  

resolved by the Full Court that the continuation of the service  

of the appellant was no longer required and that he should be  

discharged.  Consequent thereupon the resolution of the Full  

Court  was  sent  to  the  Government.   The  Government  of  

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Jharkhand issued an order dated 31.07.2003, stating that the  

services  of  the  appellant  are  no  longer  required  in  public  

interest, and therefore, the appellant stands discharged from  

service with effect from 31.07.2003.   

6. Challenging the said order passed by the State Government,  

the appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court which  

was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by a  

detailed order giving reasons for its decision dated 04.04.2008.

7. The appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by  

the High Court filed the present appeal in this Court, on which  

we heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, who had  

also taken us painstakingly through the records of the case.  

Having  considered  the  same,  we  proceed  to  dispose  of  the  

present appeal by recording our reasons for our conclusion.

8. The counsel  appearing for  the appellant  submitted that  the  

order challenged by way of the Writ Petition was an order of  

removal and the same having been passed without holding an  

enquiry amounts to, not only violation of principles of natural  

justice but also amounts to casting a stigma in the career of  

the  appellant  and,  therefore,  the  order  passed  by  the  High  

Court is illegal and liable to be set aside.

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9. The Counsel appearing for the respondents, however, refuted  

the aforesaid  submissions.  He submitted that  the  appellant  

was on probation when a notification removing him from the  

service in public interest was issued and that the order passed  

was just and proper.  He denied that the impugned order is  

stigmatic  or  in  any  way  punitive  or  that  there  was  any  

violation of the principles of natural justice.   

10. The records placed before us disclose that at the time when  

the impugned order was passed, the appellant was working as  

a Probationer Munsif.  A person is placed on probation so as  

to  enable  the  employer  to  adjudge  his  suitability  for  

continuation  in  the  service  and  also  for  confirmation  in  

service.  There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a  

person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of  

confirmation.  At that stage and during the period of probation  

the action and activities of the appellant are generally under  

scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision  

is  generally  taken  as  to  whether  his  services  should  be  

continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be  

released from service.  In the present case,  in the  course of  

adjudging  such suitability  it  was found by the respondents  

that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and  

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therefore  he  was  not  suitable  for  the  job.   The  aforesaid  

decision  to  release  him  from  service  was  taken  by  the  

respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and  

suitability for the job.  While taking a decision in this regard  

neither any notice is required to be given to the appellant nor  

he is required to be given any opportunity of hearing.  Strictly  

speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out  

by  the  appellant,  but  was  a  case  of  simple  discharge  from  

service.  It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not  

removal  from  service  on  the  grounds  of  indiscipline  or  

misconduct.   While adjudging his performance, conduct and  

overall  suitability, his performance record as also the report  

from  the  higher  authorities  were  called  for  and  they  were  

looked into before any decision was taken  as to whether the  

officer concerned should be continued in service or not.   

11.In a recent decision of this Court in  Rajesh Kohli  vs.  High  

Court of J & K & Anr. reported at (2010) 12 SCC 783: 2010  

(10)  JT  276,  almost  a  similar  issue  cropped  up  for  

consideration,  in  which  this  Court  has  held  that  the  High  

Court  has  a  solemn  duty  to  consider  and  appreciate  the  

service  of  a judicial  officer  before  confirming him in service  

and for this not only judicial performance but also probity as  

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to how one has conducted himself is relevant and important. It  

was also held in the same decision that upright and honest  

judicial officers are needed in the district judiciary, which is  

the bedrock of our judicial system.

12.The order of termination passed in the present case is a fall  

out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his  

overall  performance and the manner in which he conducted  

himself.   Such  decision  cannot  be  said  to  be  stigmatic  or  

punitive.  This is a case of termination of service  simpliciter  

and not a case of stigmatic termination and therefore there is  

no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by  

the High Court.

13.We do not find any merit in this appeal, therefore, we dismiss  

the same, but leaving the parties to bear their own costs.  

.............................................J      [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

                    .............................................J

    [Anil R. Dave]

New Delhi, MARCH 10, 2011.

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