REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.2990-2991 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.8397-8398 of 2012)

RAJENDRA PRATAPRAO MANE & ORS.    … APPELLANTS   

 Vs.

SADASHIVRAO MANDALIK K.T.S.S.K.  LTD. & ORS.        … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The facts of these appeals give rise to an interesting  

question of law regarding the interpretation of the Rules of  

Business framed by the Governor of Maharashtra in exercise

of  powers  conferred  under  Article  166(2)  and  (3)of  the  

Constitution  of  India.   According  to  the  said  Rules  of  

Business, statutory appeals filed under Section 152 of the  

Maharashtra  Cooperative  Societies  Act,  1960,  hereinafter  

referred to as “the M.C.S. Act, 1960”, are to be heard by  

the Minister-in-charge of the concerned Department.

3. A few facts are required to be set out in order to  

appreciate  the  question  which  has  been  raised  in  these  

appeals.   

4. On 30th June, 2011, the appellants filed an application  

before the Commissioner of Sugar, Maharashtra State, Pune,  

complaining about the unlawful manner in which persons had  

been enrolled by the respondent Karkhana, despite the fact  

that they did not fulfill the required criteria and were  

ineligible from becoming members. As the Commissioner, or  

his subordinates, did not take any action on the application  

filed by the appellants they filed a writ petition, being  

W.P. No.7257 of 2011, before the Bombay High Court, for a  

writ in the nature of Mandamus upon the authorities under

the  M.C.S.  Act,  1960,  to  conduct  an  inquiry  into  the  

allegations made by the appellants.

5.  On  27th September,  2011,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  

Bombay High Court passed an order on the statement made by  

the Regional Joint Director (Sugar), Kolhapur, to the effect  

that an inquiry team would look into the allegations made by  

the appellant.  The Division Bench directed that the inquiry  

be completed within the stipulated time and the report be  

submitted before it. The order of the Division Bench was  

challenged  by  the  respondent  Karkhana  by  way  of  S.L.P.

(C)No.28880 of 2011, which was dismissed by this Court and  

it  was  also  indicated  that  the  inquiry  to  be  conducted  

would be one under Section 11 of the M.C.S. Act, 1960.  

6. Writ Petition No. 7257 of 2011, and the connected Writ  

Petition No.10133 of 2011, were disposed of on a statement  

made by the Government Pleader that the inquiry into the  

complaint by the appellants would be completed within 15th  

February, 2012. While disposing of the Writ Petitions, the  

High Court directed that the previous list of voters for

election to the Managing Committee of the respondent sugar  

factory  should  be  published  only  after  the  inquiry  was  

completed.  In  his  report  dated  10th February,  2012,  the  

Regional  Joint  Director  (Sugar),  Kolhapur,  found  that  a  

total number of 6617 persons did not satisfy the required  

criteria to become members of the respondent sugar factory  

and passed an order under Section 11 read with Section 11A  

of the Act.

7. Immediately,  thereafter,  the  respondent  sugar  factory  

and several of the members, who were held to be ineligible  

from becoming members of the factory, challenged the order  

passed by the Regional Joint Director (Sugar), Kolhapur, by  

filing  appeals  before  the  State  of  Maharashtra,  under  

Section 152 of the M.C.S. Act, 1960. On 22nd February, 2012,  

the  said  appeals  were  listed  for  admission  and  interim  

orders  before  the  Minister  for  Cooperation,   State  of  

Maharashtra, but in view of the allegations of bias made  

against  him  in  W.P.No.1685  of  2012,  the  Minister  recused  

himself from hearing the appeals and transferred the cases  

to the Secretary, Department of Cooperation, for hearing and

disposal. The appellants appeared before the Secretary on  

24.2.20121, but raised an objection to his jurisdiction to  

hear a substantive appeals under Section 152 of the M.C.S.  

Act, 1960. The order of the Joint Director (Sugar), Kolhapur  

was also challenged by the respondent sugar factory and some  

of  the  persons  who  were  held  to  be  ineligible,  

notwithstanding  the  pendency  of  their  substantive  appeals  

under  Section  152  of  the  Act,  challenging  the  very  same  

order before the State of Maharashtra.

8. In the above-mentioned appeals assigned for hearing to  

the  Secretary,  Cooperation  Department,  an  objection  was  

raised on behalf of the Respondent No.2 that neither under  

the  Maharashtra  Cooperative  Societies  Act  and  Rules,  nor  

under  the  provisions  of  the  Rules  of  Business  of  the  

Government  of  Maharashtra,  was  the  Secretary  of  the  

Department entitled to hear the appeals and that it was only  

the Minister in charge of the Department who could do so.  

The same objection was raised in the writ petitions also.  

The  learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court,  while  

disagreeing with the said decision, and referring the matter

for  determination  of  the  issue  by  a  larger  Bench,  also  

observed that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the  

case of Ravindra V. Gaikwad & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra  

& Ors. still held the field and, accordingly, attempted to  

work out a solution to solve the deadlock.  The learned  

Single Judge was of the view that the answer to the question  

which had arisen, lay in Rules 6 and 6-A of the Rules of  

Business of the Government, which provides as follows :

“6. The  Chief  Minister  and  a  Minister  in  consultation with the Chief Minister may allot to a  Minister of State or a Deputy Minister any business  appertaining  to  a  Department  or  part  of  a  Department.

6-A. When the Chief Minister is unable to discharge  his functions owing to absence, illness, or for any  other cause, the Chief Minister may direct any other  Minister to discharge all or any of his functions  during his absence.  When any Minister is likewise  unable  to  discharge  his  functions,  the  Chief  Minister may direct any other Minister to discharge  all or any of the functions of the Ministers during  the Minister’s absence.”

9. The learned Judge, after recording that the Minister for  

Cooperation had expressed his inability to hear and decide  

the appeals, felt that this was a case, where the Chief

Minister could himself hear the appeals or direct any other  

Minister  to  exercise  the  function  of  the  Minister  for  

Cooperation for hearing the appeals. The learned Judge was  

of the view that the said power contained in Rule 6-A would  

have  to  be  exercised  by  the  Chief  Minister.  Since,  the  

appeals were already pending before the State Government,  

the  learned  Single  Judge  directed  the  Chief  Minister  to  

either  hear  the  appeals  himself  or  to  appoint  any  other  

Minister  to  hear  and  decide  the  same  by  performing  the  

function of the Minister for Cooperation, in relation to the  

hearing of the above appeals.   

10. The present appeals have been filed by the Respondent  

Nos.3, 4 and 5 on various grounds.  The first ground, which  

has  been  urged  by  Mr.  Mukul  Rohatgi,  learned  Senior  

Advocate,  appearing  for  the  Appellants,  is  that  the  High  

Court was not justified in disposing of the writ petitions  

with  directions,  without  giving  the  Appellants  herein  an  

opportunity of being heard.  

11. The  second  ground  taken  for  filing  the  appeals  is  

whether  the  High  Court  could  have  directed  the  Chief  

Minister of Maharashtra to invoke the Rules of Business in  

terms  of  Rules  6  and  6-A  thereof  and  also  whether  the  

appeals  could  at  all  be  heard  by  the  Secretary  of  the  

Cooperation Department.  Mr. Rohtagi contended that when the  

Minister  of  State  for  the  Department  of  Cooperation  was  

available,  as  were  other  Ministers  who  could  decide  the  

appeals in terms of Rule 6-A of the Rules of Business, there  

was no reason for having the appeals heard by the Secretary  

of the Department.

12. Yet  another  ground  was  taken  as  to  whether  the  High  

Court  was  justified  in  hearing  the  writ  petition  of  the  

Respondent, when its substantive appeal under Section 152 of  

the M.C.S. Act, 1960, in respect of the same order, was  

pending before the Government of Maharashtra.  Mr. Rohatgi  

also  urged  that  Rule  10  of  the  Rules  of  Business  were  

probably  overlooked  by  the  High  Court  while  passing  the  

impugned order, since by virtue of the said Rule, it was the  

Minister  in  charge  of  the  Department,  who  was  to  be

primarily responsible for the disposal of the business of  

the Department.   

13. On the other hand, Mr. Uday U. Lalit, learned Senior  

Advocate,  urged  that  in  view  of  the  peculiar  situation  

created by the Minister concerned and, thereafter, the Chief  

Minister who also recused himself from the hearing of the  

appeals, on account of the allegation of bias against them,  

the Court had no alternative but to work out a solution so  

that  the  elections  to  the  Cooperative  Societies  could  be  

held. The ground realities were such as to make it almost  

impossible  to  have  the  appeals  heard  out,  unless  the  

Secretary of the Department was directed to do so.   

14. At  this  stage,  it  may  be  recalled  that  the  entire  

controversy arose on account of the disqualification of 6617  

voters,  who  were  found  ineligible  to  be  members  of  

Respondent  No.1  Karkhana  by  the  Regional  Joint  Director  

(Sugar), Kolhapur.  

15. As  indicated  hereinbefore,  the  order  passed  under  

Section  11  read  with  Section  25A  of  the  Maharashtra

Cooperative Societies Act, was challenged by the members of  

the  said  factory.   The  Appellants  herein,  who  appeared  

before the Secretary, brought to his notice that in view of  

the  decision  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  in  the  case  of  

Ravindra  V.  Gaikwad (supra),  he  possibly  did  not  have  

jurisdiction to hear the appeals under Section 152 of the  

said Act.  It was, thereafter, that the writ petitions were  

filed and orders were passed by the learned Single Judge,  

whereby  he  directed  the  Chief  Minister  to  exercise  his  

powers under Rule 6-A of the Rules of Business.   

16. The Writ Petitions were heard and disposed of by the  

learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court by the order  

impugned in these appeals, at the very threshold, without  

issuing notice to the Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5.  In our  

view, the said Respondents, who are likely to be affected by  

the   order,  should  have  been  given  notice  before  the  

impugned  order  was  passed.  Such  being  the  position,  the  

normal course for us would have been to remand the matter to  

the  High  Court  for  a  fresh  decision  after  hearing  the  

Appellants herein, but nothing fruitful will materialize if

we were to pass such an order, in view of the reasoning of  

the learned Judge while making the impugned order.  Apart  

from  the  above,  we  have  heard  Mr.  Rohtagi  on  the  legal  

aspect  of  the  question  regarding  the  competence  of  the  

Secretary of the Department to hear the appeals in the light  

of Rule 6-A of the Rules of Business.  Any further hearing  

before the High Court on this question would only amount to  

duplication and waste of judicial time.  

17. In  our  view,  the  order  passed  by  the  learned  Single  

Judge, was a pragmatic attempt by the High Court to ensure  

that the elections were duly held and the same was within  

the parameters of Rule 6-A of the Rules of Business, which  

has  been  extracted  hereinabove  and  indicates  that  if  the  

Chief Minister was unable to discharge his functions for the  

reasons  indicated,  he  could  direct  any  other  Minister  to  

discharge all or any of his functions during his absence.  

Likewise, if any other Minister was unable to discharge his  

functions,  the  Chief  Minister  could  direct  any  other  

Minister to discharge all or any of the functions of the  

Minister during the absence of the said Minister.

18. The  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  has  been  made  

within the framework of the aforesaid Rules and as indicated  

hereinabove, was a pragmatic attempt to break the impasse so  

that the elections to the Board of Directors of the Karkhana  

could be held.  Rule 6-A of the Rules of Business does not  

contemplate the functions of a Minister being discharged by  

the Secretary of the Department or any other officer for  

that matter.  

19. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order  

passed by the learned Single Judge, and the appeals are,  

therefore, dismissed.   So as not to delay the elections any  

further,  we  request  the  Chief  Minister  to  take  immediate  

steps to have the appeals filed by the Appellants herein  

under  Section  152  of  the  M.C.S.  Act,  1960,  heard  and  

disposed  of  as  early  as  possible,  but  not  later  than  2  

months from the date of communication of this judgment.  In  

the event the Chief Minister is unable to hear the appeals  

himself  and  entrusts  the  hearing  to  one  of  the  other  

Ministers,  which,  in  our  view,  would  also  include  the

Minister  of  State  of  the  concerned  Department,  he  should  

also  impress  upon  the  said  Minister  the  urgency  of  the  

matter since the elections to the Board of the Karkhana have  

not been held since 2007.

20. The  appeals  are  accordingly  disposed  of  with  the  

aforesaid directions.   

21. There will be no order as to costs.               

………………………………………………………J.    (ALTAMAS KABIR)

………………………………………………………J.                        (J. CHELAMESWAR)

New Delhi March 22, 2012.