Page 1

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8194 OF 2016

RAJENDER BANSAL & ORS. .....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

BHURU (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

A.K. SIKRI, J.

The appellants in this appeal are the landlords who had filed suit

for eviction of the respondents herein, their tenants.  Suit was filed in the

Civil  Court.   The premises in-question were outside the ambit  of  rent

legislation.   It  is  because  of  this  reason  that  civil  suit  for

possession/ejectment was filed.  However, during the pendency of the

suit  and before  it  could  be finally  decided,  the area in  question was

brought within the sweep of rent legislations by requisite notifications.

Page 2

2

The  effect  of  such  coverage  was  to  give  protective  umbrella  to  the

tenants.  As a fortiorari,  the landlord can now evict the tenant only by

taking recourse to the rent legislation, that too, by filing the petition for

eviction  under  the  Rent  Act  before  the  Rent  Controller/Tribunal

constituted under the said Acts.  Civil Court ceases to have jurisdiction

over the matter insofar as eviction/ejectment of tenant is concerned.   

In this backdrop, the question that has arisen for consideration is

as to whether the Civil Court would cease to have jurisdiction to try the

suit  of  eviction  if  the  suit  property  came  under  notified  area  during

pendency of the suit?  To put it differently, the question is : whether Rent

Act would apply even to the pending suits or it will be enforced only from

the date when notification covering the area in-question is issued and,

therefore,  will  have no effect  on the suits  which are  already pending

before the civil courts?

2) In the instant case, the premises in-question were in rural area in respect

of which suit was filed by the appellants on February 11, 2002. These

premises consist  of  a shop (suit  property)  which is  situate  at  Barkali

Hodal Road, Punhana, Tehsil Punhana, District Gurgaon, Haryana.  In

the State of Haryana, Rent Act, known as Haryana Rent Urban (Control

of  Rent  and  Eviction)  Act,  1973  (for  short,  'Rent  Act,  1973')  is

promulgated.  Its sweep, however, is over the urban areas of Haryana,

Page 3

3

as defined in the Act.  As pointed out above, at the relevant time suit

property was in rural area and, therefore, not covered by the said Rent

Act,  1973.   This  suit  was filed,  after  terminating the tenancy, by  the

landlord, namely, father of the appellants (predecessor of the appellants)

under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.  The ground

taken was that shop was let out to one Rehmat who inducted his son

(respondent/defendant herein)  as a sub-tenant without the consent of

the landlords.  Rehmat passed away in the year 1997 and had not even

paid  rent  for  10  years.   Therefore,  possession  of  the  respondent  as

sub-tenant  was  unauthorised  and  illegal.   Notice  of  vacating  the

premises and handing over the possession was given on October 22,

2001 and as the respondent failed to vacate the premises, suit was filed

on February 11, 2002.  In the suit, brother of the respondent, Yasin, was

also impleaded as a defendant, who did not appear and was proceeded

ex-parte.   Insofar as, Respondent No. 1 is concerned, though he had

appeared but did not pay any rent for more than 14 years and, therefore,

his defence was struck off by the civil court vide order dated May 26,

2008.

3) Five months thereafter, i.e., on October 29, 2008, notification was issued

whereby  the  area  where  the  suit  premises  situate  was  declared  as

urbanised area and, thus, was brought within the fold of Rent Act, 1973.

The Trial Court, however, after striking off defence of Respondent No. 1

Page 4

4

continued  with  the  suit,  recorded  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff  and

ultimately decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated December

12, 2008.  Against this decree, respondent no. 1 filed Civil Appeal No.

11/9 in the Court of Additional District Judge, Nuh taking the plea that the

Civil Judge ceases to have jurisdiction over the matter from October 29,

2008 when Municipal  Committee,  Punhana came into  existence  vide

notification  dated  October  29,  2008  and  the  area  in-question  was

included in municipal limits because of which Rent Act,  1973 became

applicable to the suit premises.  This contention found favour with the

learned Additional District Judge who allowed the appeal vide judgment

dated  March  16,  2009.   Aggrieved  by  that  judgment,  the  appellants

herein preferred second appeal under Section 100 CPC, being RSA No.

3963  of  2009  in  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana,  but

unsuccessfully inasmuch as the High Court has dismissed the appeal

vide judgment dated February 10,  2014.  It  is  this judgment which is

impugned in the present proceedings giving rise to the question of law

that has been noticed in the earlier portion of this judgment.     

4) Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that law applicable on the

date of institution of the suit would govern the suit.  On that basis, it is

submitted  that  since  on  the  date  when  the  suits  were  filed  by  the

appellants in these appeals, the suit properties were not covered by the

Rent Act which legislation came into effect on a subsequent date, when

Page 5

5

the law applicable on the date of institution is to be applied, Civil Court

would have the jurisdiction in the matter in the vein and taking this line of

argument further, it was submitted that the Notification which is issued in

respect of an area in-question, notifying the same to be municipality, is to

take  effect  only  from  the  date  of  such  a  Notification  and  such  an

Order/Notification cannot be given retrospective operation.  In support of

the  aforesaid  submission,  counsel  for  the  appellants  relied  upon  the

following judgments:

(i) Ramesh Chandra Vs. III Addl. Distt. Judge & Ors.1

(ii) Mansoor Khan Vs. Moti Ram & Anr.2

(iii) Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. Vs. Samundri Devi3; AND

(iv) Harijeet Kaur Vs. Sarabjit Kaur4 [P&H High Court]

5) The argument canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondents, on

the other hand, was that having regard to the nature and scheme of the

two  legislations  in-question,  viz.,  Rent  Act,  1973  and  Haryana

Municipality Act, one has to keep in mind that the scheme contemplates

two types of cases: (i)  where the premises are covered by the Rent Act,

1973 but exemption in terms of Section 1(3) of the Rent Act is provided

for a period of 10 years to certain kinds of premises.  It was argued that

in respect of such premises which are enjoying protection and during

1

(1992) 1 SCC 751 2 (2002) 5 SCC 462 3 (1987) 4 SCC 382 4 2013 (1) RCR (Rent) 74

Page 6

6

that period suit is filed in the Civil Court, the rights of the parties to the

suit would be seen on the date on which the suit was filed and even if

the period of exemption expires during the pendency of the suit, Civil

Court would continue to have the jurisdiction to try the said suit, and (ii)

Other cases were those where the particular premises are notified as

coming  within  the  municipal  area  under  the  provisions  of  Haryana

Municipal Act, which had the effect of covering these premises under the

Rent Act as well.  It was argued that in such cases the moment such an

Order/Notification is passed and the premises get covered by the Rent

Act, from the date of such a Notification, Civil Court will cease to have

jurisdiction and it will apply even to the pending suits by relegating the

parties to the Court of Rent Controller/Tribunal created under the Rent

Act.

The learned counsel  further argued that  the aforesaid distinction was

discerned by the learned High Court  in  the impugned judgment  after

scanning through the various judgments of the High Court as well as this

Court.  It was argued that such a distinction can be found after reading

those  judgments  and  the  attention  of  this  Court  was  drawn  to  the

following judgments, in particular:

(i) Mani Subrat Jain Vs. Raja Ram Vohra5

(ii) Lakshmi Narayan Guin and Others Vs. Niranjan Modak6

5 (1980) 1 SCC 1 6 (1985) 1 SCC 270

Page 7

7

6) In order to find out the veracity of the aforesaid arguments and position

taken by the learned counsel on either side and to give answer to the

question  that  has  arisen  for  determination,  it  becomes  necessary  to

traverse through the judgments cited inasmuch as reading thereof would

help in deciding as to on which side the scales are tilted.  We would be

going through these judgments in chronological order.  In that order, first

case that needs our attention is  Mani Subrat Jain5.  In this case, the

landlord had filed a suit for ejectment in Civil Court in the absence of any

rent  legislation  at  the  relevant  time  when  the  suit  was  filed.  The

compromise  decree  was  passed  against  the  tenant.   After  the  said

decree  was  passed,  East  Punjab  Rent  Restriction  Act,  1949  was

extended to Chandigarh vide Notification issued on November 04, 1972.

House in dispute was situate in Chandigarh.  By that time, the Act was

extended to Chandigarh, the tenant had already suffered a decree but

he was still in possession of the tenanted premises when the execution

petition was filed by the landlord seeking execution of the said decree.

The tenant resisted the same claiming the protection of Section 13(1) of

East  Punjab Rent  Restriction Act,  1949 which provided that  a tenant

could not be evicted in execution of a decree passed before or after the

commencement of the said Act or otherwise and whether before or after

the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the said or in

pursuance of  an Order under Section 13 of  the Rent Restriction Act.

Page 8

8

This Court held that even an ex-tenant will continue to be a tenant.  A

reading of the judgment, however, would show that the Court went by

the definition of “tenant” contained in Section 2(i) of the Rent Restriction

Act  which  included  an  ex-tenant  also  and  more  importantly  the

provisions of Section 13 of the Rent Restriction Act  which specifically

provided that a tenant will not be evicted even in execution of a decree

passed either before or after the commencement of the Rent Restriction

Act,  except  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  Section  13  or  in

pursuance of the order passed under Section 13 of the Rent Restriction

Act.

7) In Lakshmi Narayan Guin6, ejectment decree  was passed by the Civil

Court against which appeal was pending.  During the pendency of the

appeal, Rent Act was made applicable to the area where the premises

in-question situate.  This Court took the view that since appeal was in

continuation of the suit having regard to the fact that premises were now

covered by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act,  protection of  the

said  Act  would  become available  to  the  tenant  having  regard  to  the

provisions of Section 13(1) of that Act which was of the same nature, as

noticed in  Mani Subrat Jain5 case.

8) Judgment in Atma Ram Mittal Vs. Ishwar Singh Punia7, related to the

situation where the premises in-question though covered by the Rent

Control  Act,  were exempted from the provisions of  the said Act  for  a

7 (1988) 4 SCC 284

Page 9

9

particular period.  That case arose under the same Haryana Act of 1973

which we are dealing with.  It  may be pointed out,  at this stage, that

Section 1(3) of the Act,  1973 provides the exemption in the following

manner:  “Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the construction

of which is completed on or after the commencement of this Act, for a

period of ten years from the date of its completion”.

9) Though,  the  area  where  the  building  is  situate  comes  under  the

protected umbrella of the Act, 1973, still for a period of 10 years the said

protection is not available to the tenant in respect of a newly constructed

building, which is completed on or after the commencement of the Act.

In such a case the tenancy in respect of that particular building shall be

governed by contractual terms and under the provisions of the Transfer

of Property Act.  On the termination of tenancy in any of the manners

stipulated in the Transfer of Property Act, the landlord is entitled to file

suit for possession in the Civil Court.  In this backdrop, in  Atma Ram

Mittal8, this Court was concerned with a situation where such a suit was

filed by the landlord in respect of newly constructed premises during the

period of exemption by virtue of Section 1(3) of the Rent Act of 1973.

However, when the suit  was still  pending period of  10 years expired.

The  Court  held  that  on  this  basis,  the  tenant  argued  that  since  the

exemption period had expired, the effect thereof was that the Rent Act

had also become applicable to the building in-question and, therefore,

Page 10

10

Civil Court ceased to have jurisdiction to try even the pending suit.  This

contention was repelled by the Court  holding that  the Civil  Court  will

continue to  have the jurisdiction.   For  coming to  this  conclusion,  the

Court  relied upon its earlier  judgments in  Vineet Kumar  Vs.  Mangal

Sain Wadhera8 and Ram Saroop Rai Vs. Smt. Lilawati9.

10) After  referring  to  the  aforesaid  two  judgments,  the  Court  gave  the

following reasons in support of its conclusion:

“It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of the fault  of  the court  or  delay  in the procedure.  Broom has stated the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit”—an act of court shallprejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the  time  normally  consumed  for  adjudication,  the  ten years’  exemption  or  holiday  from the  application  of  the Rent Act would become illusory, if the suit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It is common knowledge that unless a suit  is  instituted soon after the date  of  letting it  would  never  be  disposed of  within  ten years  and  even  then  within  that  time  it  may  not  be disposed of. That will make the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provide no incentive to the landlords to  build  new  houses  to  solve  problem  of  shortages  of houses.  The  purpose  of  legislation  would  thus  be defeated. Purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.

9.  Judicial  time  and  energy  is  more  often  than  not consumed in finding what is the intention of Parliament or in other words, the will of the people. Blackstone tells us that the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will  of  the legislator  is by exploring his  intentions at  the time when the law was made, by signs most natural and probable.  And  these  signs  are  either  the  words,  the context, the subject-matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law (emphasis by the court) See  Commentaries on the Laws of England  (facsimile of 1st Edn. of 1765, University of Chicago Press, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 59). Mukherjea, J. as the learned Chief Justice then

8 (1984) 3 SCC 352 9 (1980) 3 SCC 452

Page 11

11

was, in Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras (1953 SCR 677) said that  each  word,  phrase  or  sentence  was  to  be construed in the light of purpose of the Act itself. But words must  be  construed  with  imagination  of  purpose  behind them  said  Judge  Learned  Hand,  a  long  time  ago.  It appears,  therefore,  that  though  we  are  concerned  with seeking of intention, we are rather looking to the meaning of  the words that  the legislature has used and the true meaning  of  what  words   as was  said  by  Lord  Reid  in Black-  Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof -Aschaffenburg  A.G.  We are  clearly  of  the  opinion  that having regard to the language we must  find the reason and the spirit of the law. If the immunity from the operation of the Rent Act is made and depended upon that ultimate disposal of the case within the period of exemption of ten years which is in reality an impossibility, then there would be  empty  reasons.  In  our  opinion,  bearing  in  mind  the well-settled principle that the rights of the parties crystallise to  (  sic)    on  the  date  of  the  institution  of  the  suit  as enunciated  by  this  Court  in    Om  Prakash  Gupta    v. Digvijendrapal Gupta  , the meaningful construction must be that the exemption would apply for a period of ten years and will continue to be available until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such  suit  or  proceeding  must  be  instituted within  the  stipulated  period  of  ten  years.  Once  rights crystallise  the  adjudication  must  be  in  accordance  with law.”

(Emphasis added)

11) Judgment in  Ramesh Chandra1,   falls in the category of  Atma Ram

Mittal8 case.  In that case also Court was dealing with the case of newly

constructed property exempted from operation of U.P. Rent Act and the

decision was on the same lines as noted in Atma Ram Mittal8.   

12) At this juncture, we would like to discuss another judgment of this Court

rendered by a  three Judge Bench in  the case of  Shri  Kishan alias

Krishna Kumar & Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors.10 At the outset, it needs

to  be  emphasised  that  it  was  also  a  case  under  the  same  very

10 (1998) 2 SCC 710

Page 12

12

enactment of Haryana, i.e. Rent Act, 1973, and this case also dealt with

a newly constructed property which was exempted from operation of the

said Act for a period of 10 years and the suit was filed by the landlord

during the exempted period. In this case also, the Court held that the law

applicable on the date of the institution of the suit would govern and as

at that time the protection of the Rent Control Act was not available and

thus Civil Court had the jurisdiction, the Civil Court will continue to have

the jurisdiction even after the expiry of the said period of 10 years.  While

coming to this conclusion, the Court had relied upon Ramesh Chandra1,

Atma Ram Mittal8 and other such cases. The  learned

counsel  appearing for  the appellants heavily  relied upon the reasons

given by the Court in taking the aforesaid view and on that basis it was

argued that the principle laid down should be made applicable even in

those cases where the protection of the Rent Control Act is extended in

respect of the area in question after the filing of the suit, in an attempt to

impress upon this Court to take the view that even in such cases the

Civil Court should not be deprived of its jurisdiction in respect of pending

cases, when on the date of institution of the suit the Civil Court had the

requisite jurisdiction to entertain the same.  For this purpose, the learned

counsel referred to the arguments of the tenant in that case recorded in

paragraph 5 thereof  with the submission that this very argument was

specifically rejected.  Paragraph 5 thereof reads as under:

Page 13

13

“5.  It is argued that the Act is intended to be beneficial to the  tenants  and  special  protection  is  afforded  to  them. According to the learned counsel for the purpose of the Act the  expression  “tenant”  includes  a  tenant  continuing  in possession after the termination of his tenancy and at the expiry of period of ten years as set out in Section 1(3) of the Act, the “building” comes within the fold of the Act and the  tenant  in  occupation  will  automatically  have  the protection afforded by the Act.  Emphasis is laid on the wordings  of  Section  13(1)  which  prevents  eviction  of  a tenant  in  possession  except  in  accordance  with  the provisions of the section.  According to the learned counsel the moment the Act becomes applicable to the building in question, the suit in relation thereto has to abate and the remedy of the landlord is to approach the Controller with an application for eviction on any of the grounds set out in the section.  According to him even if a decree is passed by the civil court it will not be enforceable and the tenant cannot be evicted from the building pursuant to the decree as the bar in Section 13(1) is absolute.  In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on some of the rulings of this Court which will be adverted to a little later.”

13) In  order  to  appreciate  this  argument,  we  will  have  to  notice  the

contention which was advanced by the counsel for the landlord in the

said case as the judgment is ultimately passed on the acceptance of

those  submissions.   These  are  contained  in  paragraph  6  and  we

reproduce below that paragraph as well:

“6.   On  the  other  hand,  learned  counsel  for  the respondents  has  placed  before  us  the  following proposition:

(a)  On  the  date  when  the  suit  was  instituted  it  was  to enforce  a  legal  right  which  had  already  accrued  to  the plaintiff and stood crystallized under the law applicable to the building at that time.  In the absence of any specific provision in the Act to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the issue pertaining to that right,  it  cannot be contended that by efflux of ten-year period mentioned in Section 1(3) the Court would lose its jurisdiction.

Page 14

14

(b) The maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium can be excluded only by  a  substantive  legislation  expressly  extinguishing  the said right.  The Act does not contain any such provision to bring to an end the right of the plaintiff which had already accrued and put in issue in the suit.   A judicial  vacuum cannot be created by preventing the Court from deciding an issue which has arisen before it unless the right which had accrued in favour of one party is taken away by the legislation.

(c)   The  principle  of  the  maxim  actus  curiae  neminem gravabit  would apply and because the Court had taken a long time to dispose of the matter before it, the party which had approached it cannot be made to suffer.

(d)   The  provisions  of  Section  1(3)  and  Section  13(1) should  be  so  construed  as  to  advance  the  legislative intention and if the contention of the appellants is accepted it would defeat the purpose of the moratorium and make it futile.

In support of the above contentions learned counsel has referred to several rulings of this Court and submitted that the consistent view taken by this Court is in his favour.”

14) Arguments of both sides have been dealt with by the Court, thereafter, in

the following manner:

“7.  Before referring to the decisions cited before us it is necessary to advert to the provisions of the Act.  We have already quoted Sections 1(3) and 13(1).  Apart from the legislative exemption contained in Section 1(3) there is a provision  in  Section  3  of  the  Act  enabling  the  State Government  to  exclude  any  building  or  any  class  of buildings from the purview of the Act.  Sections 4 to 8 deal with fair rent, deposit of rent etc.  Sections 9 and 10 refer to the amenities to be provided to the tenant.  Section 11 prevents  conversion  of  a  residential  building  into  a non-residential  building  except  with  the  permission  in writing  of  the  Controller.   Section  12  deals  with  the situation  where  a  landlord  fails  to  make  the  necessary repairs.  Section 13 sets out the grounds on which eviction can  be  sought  by  a  landlord.   Section  13-A prescribes special  procedure  for  disposal  of  the  application  by  a landlord in certain cases such as members of the Armed

Page 15

15

Forces, government employees etc.  Section 14 prevents reopening of decisions which have become final.  Section 15 prescribes appellate and revisional authorities.  Section 16 provides that an authority exercising powers under the Act  shall  have  the  same  powers  of  summoning  and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence as are vested in a court under the Civil Procedure Code.  Sections 17 to 23 deal with order as  to  costs,  execution,  power  to  transfer  proceedings, penalties etc.  Section 24 repeals the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act 3 of 1949).

8.   There  is  no  provision  in  the  Act  taking  away  the jurisdiction  of  a  civil  court  to  dispose  of  a  suit  validly instituted. There  is  also  no  provision  preventing  the execution of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13(1) does  not  expressly  refer  to  execution  of  a  decree  for possession. On a reading of all the provisions of the Act, it is  evident  that  it  has  not  prevented  a  civil  court  from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the building in question. If the legislature had intended to take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide a suit which had  been  validly  instituted,  it  would  have  been  worded differently. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under Section 1(3) is to encourage construction of new buildings. That purpose would be defeated if the owner  of  the  building  is  deprived  of  his  right  to  get possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten years from the date of its completion. In fact the logical consequence of the argument of the appellants if accepted would be that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord within ten years from its completion it cannot be executed after the expiry of the said period of ten years as such execution would not  be in accordance with the provisions  of  the  Act. It  is  common  knowledge  that  a proceeding  in  a  civil  court  for  recovery  of  immovable property could be dragged on by the defendant easily for a period of ten years or more and thereby any tenant whose tenancy had been terminated validly before the suit would successfully  make  the  proceeding  infructuous  by prolonging the litigation. The argument  of  the appellants cannot  be  accepted  as  otherwise  the  purpose  of exemption would get defeated.”

(emphasis supplied)

15) Thereafter, the Court has referred to various earlier judgments and all

Page 16

16

these  judgments  are  concerned  with  the  provision  of  exemption

contained  in  such  Rent  Acts.   Therefore,  all  these  judgments  are

authority  on  the  issue  that  in  those  cases  where  exemption  from

operation of Rent Control Acts is provided for a particular period and suit

for eviction is filed during the said period of exemption, the Civil Court

shall  continue  to  have  the  jurisdiction  to  adjudicate  the  rights  of  the

parties  under  the  said  suit  even  where  the  period  of  exemption  has

expired during the pendency of the suit.  The reason was that as on the

date of the institution of the suit legal right in favour of the landlord had

already accrued and it stood crystallised under the law applicable to the

building at that time.  The Court was also influenced by the consideration

that the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium can be excluded only by substantial

legislation  expressing  extinguishing  the  said  right.   If  the  delay  in

disposal of the said suit had occurred, that was because of the Court

where the suit kept pending and the principle of the maxim actus curiae

neminem gravabit  shall apply.  In this context, the Court interpreted the

provisions of Section 1(3) and Section 13(1) of the Act pointing out the

purpose for which the Legislature had exempted the newly constructed

buildings from the operation of the Rent Act.  For this, the object of such

an exemption from the applicability of the Act was specifically taken note

of by extracting a passage from Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati11, as can be

seen from paragraph 10 of the judgment:

11 (1980) 3 SCC 452

Page 17

17

“10.  In  Ram Saroop Rai  v.  Lilavati  while dealing with a case  under  the  U.P.  Urban  Buildings  (Regulation  of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, Justice Krishna Iyer referred to the object of exemption from the applicability of the Act in the following words: (SCC p. 453, para 1)

“…  Chronic  scarcity  of  accommodation  in  almost every part of the country has made ‘eviction’ litigation explosively  considerable,  and  the  strict  protection against ejectment, save upon restricted grounds, has become  the  policy  of  the  State.  Rent  control legislation  to  give  effect  to  this  policy  exists everywhere, and we are concerned with one such in the State of U.P. (U.P. Act 13 of 1972). The legislature found that rent control law has a chilling effect on new building  construction,  and  so,  to  encourage  more building operations, amended the statute to release, from  the  shackles  of  legislative  restriction,  ‘new constructions’ for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord  who  has  let  out  his  new  building  could recover possession without impediment if he instituted such proceeding within ten years of completion.”

The  aforesaid  observations  would  apply  in  the  present case too.”

16) From the  aforesaid  discussion  in  Atma  Ram  Mittal,  Vineet  Kumar,

Ram Saroop Rai,  Ramesh Chandra and  Shri Kishan alias Krishna

Kumar cases, the apparent principles which can be culled out, forming

the ratio decidendi of those cases, are as under:

i) Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the

suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the date of filing of the suit will

continue to apply until suit is disposed of or adjudicated.

ii) If during the pendency of the suit, Rent Act becomes applicable to the

premises in question, that would be of no consequence and it would not

take  away  the  jurisdiction  of  civil  court  to  dispose  of  a  suit  validly

Page 18

18

instituted.   

iii) In order to oust the jurisdiction of civil  court, there must be a specific

provision  in  the  Act  taking  away  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  in

respect of those cases also which were validly instituted before the date

when protection of  Rent  Act  became available  in  respect  of  the said

area/premises/tenancy.

iv) In case aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of the Rent

Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted prior in point of

time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have the

consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act

becoming applicable to the said area/premises, inexecutable after the

application of these Rent Act in respect of such premises.  This would

not be in consonance with the legislative intent.   

17) In laying down the aforesaid dicta, the Court also took support of two

well  known maxims viz. (i)  ubi jus ibi  remedium which lays down the

principle that  where there is a right  there is a remedy and it  can be

excluded only by substantial legislation expressly extinguishing the said

right AND (ii) actus curiae neminem gravabit, which means that nobody

should be allowed to suffer because of the act of the Court.  Here the act

attributed is delay in disposal of the case. Additionally, the Court took aid

of purposive interpretation i.e. legislative intent in not making Rent Act

applicable to new constructions for a period of ten years.  

Page 19

19

18) What we notice is that in the impugned judgment, the High Court has

divided the cases into two categories and restricted the law laid down in

the  aforesaid  judgments  only  in  respect  of  those  category  of  cases

where  Rent  Act  exempts  from  its  applicability  newly  constructed

properties for a period of ten years.  Second category of cases carved

out covers those cases where the Rent Act was not applicable when the

suit was filed but extended to the area/premises in question during the

pendency of the suit.  In respect of later category the High Court held

that the dicta in the aforesaid judgments would not be applicable and the

moment Rent Act  is extended to such areas where the premises are

situate, civil  court shall cease to have jurisdiction to continue with the

suits though instituted even at a point of time when Rent Act was not

applicable.  This distinction, according to us, is illusory.  The principles of

law laid down in the aforesaid judgment as culled out above would apply

in equal force to second category of cases as well inasmuch as the basic

principle which is laid down in the aforesaid judgments is that rights of

the parties get crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and

the law applicable on the date of filing the suit would continue to govern

such suit.   

19) At the juncture, we take note of the law laid down in  Mansoor Khan2

which is in tune with what we have stated above.  That was a case which

arose out of Central Provinces and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent

Page 20

20

Control  Order,  1949.  Clause  13  thereof  provided  protection  to  the

tenants against  eviction and stipulated grounds which would entitle  a

landlord  to  seek  eviction  of  the  tenant  by  filing  a  petition  before  the

Controller appointed under the said Act.  This Order was applicable to

certain areas but did not include city of Risod.  The said area of Risod in

the erstwhile province of C.P. and Berar was covered under the Order,

1949 by Notification dated October 09, 2010.  However, much before this

Notification, the landlord in that case had filed the suit for possession in

the Civil Court after the lease had been determined.  This Court held that

Civil  Court shall  continue to have jurisdiction as Order, 1949 was not

retrospective in operation and where the eviction suit had already been

initiated and was pending on the date when order became applicable to

the area in which the suit premises was situate, provisions of the order

would  not  affect  validity  of  previously  instituted  proceedings  and  the

Court  was  competent  to  pass  eviction  decree  under  the  Transfer  of

Property Act.   

20) A significant question would be as to how we need to read judgments in

Mani  Subrat  Jain  and  Laxmi  Narayan  Guin  cases,  the  outcome

whereof went in other direction.  However, when we understand the ratio

of  the  aforesaid  two  cases  appropriately,  we  find  no  contradiction

between these two cases and other line of cases like Atma Ram Mittal

etc. discussed above.  Insofar as judgments in  Mani Subrat Jain  and

Page 21

21

Laxmi Narayan Guin are concerned, these were rendered keeping in

view the definition of “tenant” appearing in the rent legislations therein,

namely, East  Punjab Rent Restriction Act  and West Bengal Premises

Tenancy  Act.   What  was  found  that  definition  of  tenant  in  those

enactments included even an ex-tenant.  This coupled with the fact that

there was specific provision laying down that a tenant will not be evicted

even  in  execution  of  a  decree  passed  either  before  or  after  the

commencement  of  the  enactment,  except  in  accordance  with  the

provisions contained in the Rent Act, impelled the Court to take the view

that the moment Rent Act became applicable to the area in question, the

tenant  or  even  ex-tenant  stood  protected  and  could  be  evicted  only

under the said Rent Acts.  Therefore, the principles which we have culled

out  above  in  para  16  would  be  subject  to  one  exception.   In  case

definition  of  'tenant'  and  provisions  pertaining  to  eviction  of  tenants

contained in Rent Acts cover even those cases where the tenancy has

been terminated (or depending upon the provisions of the Rent Act, even

when Civil Court has passed the decree) the protection provided under

such provision would come to the rescue of the tenant even in respect of

pending  cases.   It  is  because  of  the  reason  that  such  a  Rent  Act

specifically provides for protection of this nature and bars the jurisdiction

of  civil  court  even in  respect  of  pending cases.   On the other  hand,

where there is no such specific protection given under the provisions of

Page 22

22

the said Rent Act, the principle as laid down in Mansoor Khan2  will be

applicable.

21) When we apply the principles laid down above to the instant case, we

find that this case would fall in the category of  Atma Ram Mittal  and

Mansoor Khan etc. as under the scheme of the Rent Act, no protection

to the ex-tenants is provided and no provision is made excluding the

jurisdiction  of  civil  courts  in  respect  of  pending  cases,  expressly  or

impliedly.  On the other hand, in the facts of the present case, it needs to

be  highlighted  again  that  the  respondents  had  not  only  sublet  the

premises but had not paid rent for a period of 14 years.  His defence was

struck off by the civil court and ultimately suit was even decreed.  It is

only during the pendency of the appeal that the notification was issued

covering the area where suit premises are situate under the Rent Act.  It

will be travesty of justice if the appellants/landlords are deprived of the

fruits of the said decree.   

22) We  are,  thus,  unable  to  accept  the  view  taken  by  the  High  Court.

Accordingly,  this  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  judgment  of  the  First

Appellate  Court  as  well  as  High  Court  is  set  aside.   As  the  only

contention  which  was  taken  by  the  respondents  before  the  First

Appellate Court, challenging the decree of the trial court, was that civil

court ceased to have jurisdiction, the said first appeal preferred by the

Page 23

23

respondents stands dismissed thereby restoring the decree passed by

the trial court.   

There shall, however, be no order as to cost.   

.............................................J. (A.K. SIKRI)

.............................................J. (N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 18, 2016.