29 April 2019
Supreme Court
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RAJBIR SURAJBHAN SINGH Vs THE CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE OF BANKING PERSONNEL SELECTION, MUMBAI

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NAGESWARA RAO
Case number: C.A. No.-004455-004455 / 2019
Diary number: 18937 / 2015
Advocates: GAGAN GUPTA Vs


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Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 4455 of 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.18201 of 2015)

RAJBIR SURAJBHAN SINGH .... Appellant(s)

Versus

THE CHAIRMAN, INSTITUTE OF BANKING  PERSONNEL SELECTION, MUMBAI

…. Respondent (s)

J U D G M E N T

L. NAGESWARA RAO, J.

Leave granted.  

1. On 12.08.2013 an advertisement was issued by the

Respondent inviting applications for appointment to posts

of  clerical  cadre  (Clerk-III)  in  Public  Sector  Banks.  The

Appellant participated in a Common Written Examination

(CWE) conducted on 01.10.2013 and secured 110 marks

out  of  200.   He  was  called  for  an  interview  by  the

Respondent  on  14.02.2014.   During  the  interview,  he

submitted a caste certificate dated 28.10.2010, issued by

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the  Naib  Tehsildar,  Nangal  Chowdhary,  Haryana  which

shows  that  he  belongs  to  Ahir  community,  which  is

recognized as Other Backward Class (hereinafter referred

to as the ‘OBC’) as per the Resolutions of the Ministry of

Welfare,  Government of  India.   Another  caste certificate

was issued in the prescribed format to the Appellant by the

Naib  Tehsildar,  Nangal  Chowdhary,  Haryana  on

29.01.2014, declaring him as an OBC candidate belonging

to  Ahir  community  and  that  he  does  not  belong  to  the

‘creamy  layer’.    The  results  were  announced  on

01.04.2014  and  the  Appellant  was  informed  that  his

candidature for the examination has been cancelled as he

could not produce the required certificate at the time of

the interview.  As per the advertisement, the candidates

belonging  to  OBC  category  were  required  to  produce  a

certificate  issued  during  the  period  01.04.2013  and

31.03.2015.   The  Appellant  could  not  produce  the

certificate issued during the said period for which reason

he  was  disqualified  from  participating  further  in  the

selection process.   

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2. The  Appellant  filed  a  Writ  Petition  challenging  the

proceeding dated 01.04.2014 by which he was disqualified

from the selection process, for appointment to the post of

Clerk,  which  was  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  as  not

maintainable.  Hence, this appeal.  

3. The High Court relied upon a judgment in Writ Petition

(L) No.1042 of 2014 and others to dismiss the Writ Petition

filed by the Appellant.  The judgment in Writ Petition (L)

No.1042  of  2014  pertains  to  a  Common  Written

Examination conducted by the Respondent for recruitment

to the posts of Probationary Officers/Management Trainees

in participating organizations i.e. Public Sector Banks. The

High Court was of the view that the Respondent was not a

State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution

of  India  and  there  was  no  public  function  that  was

discharged by the Respondent.   On said grounds, the High

Court opined that the Respondent is not amenable to writ

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under  Article  226  of  the

Constitution of India.  

4. Mr. Gagan Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the

Appellant  submitted  that  in  the  year  1975,  Personnel

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Selection Service (PSS), a unit of National Institute of Bank

Management (NIBM), was constituted with the objective of

developing an efficient system for recruitment, promotion,

and placement services to Public Sector Banks.  Said PSS

unit became an independent entity in the year 1994 and

came to be known as the Institute of Banking Personnel

Selection i.e. the Respondent herein.  The Respondent was

registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and

as a public trust under the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950.

The  Respondent  was  recognized  as  a  Scientific  and

Industrial  Research  Organisation  in  April,  1984  by  the

Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry

of  Science  and  Technology,  Government  of  India.   The

Respondent  is  also  an  associate  member  of  the  Indian

Banks  Association.   Mr.  Gupta  submitted  that  the

Respondent  would  fall  under  the  expression  “other

authorities” under Article 12 of the Constitution of India as

there  is  deep  and  pervasive  control  of  the  Government

over the Respondent.  He stated that the governing body

of  the  Respondent-Institute  consists  of  the  Executive

Director of the Reserve Bank of India; Joint Secretary to the

Department  of  Financial  Services,  Ministry  of  Finance,

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Government of India; Chairman – State Bank of India; the

Chairman and Managing Directors of UCO Bank, Bank of

India, Central Bank of India, Dena Bank; Chair Professor IIT

Mumbai;  CEO  Indian  Institute  of  Banking  and  Finance;

Chief  Executive,  Indian  Banks  Association,  Director  –

National  Institute  of  Bank  Management  amongst  others.

He referred to a letter dated 20.09.2010 filed in this Court

along  with  the  rejoinder  affidavit,  written  by  the  Under

Secretary to the Ministry of Finance, Government of India

to  the  Director  of  the  Respondent-Institute  conveying

approval  of  the  Government  to  the  proposal  of  the

Respondent  for  conducting  a  Common  Recruitment

Programme for recruitment of both clerks and officers in

Public Sector Banks.  He submitted that the document is

evidence  of  the  fact  of  administrative  control  of  the

Government  of  India  over  the  Respondent-Institute.

Alternatively,  Mr.  Gupta  advanced  an  argument  that,  in

any  event,  the  Respondent-Institute  discharges  public

functions and duties and would be amenable to the writ

jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court.    He  argued  that  the

Respondent-Institute was set up to cater to the selections

made  to  Public   

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Sector  Banks,  apart  from  the  selections  made  for

appointment  of  thousands of  candidates  to  co-operative

banks,  private  banks,  central  and  other  financial

institutions,  public  and  private  enterprises,  government

departments,  Regional  Rural  Banks,  universities,

institutions, Certificate and Scholarship  Examinations, etc.

The  Respondent-Institute  also  conducts  training

programmes for Public Sector Organisations.  In support of

his submissions, Mr. Gupta relied upon the judgments of

this Court in  Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi1,

R.D.  Shetty  v.  I.A.A.I.2,  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  v.

Indian  Institute  of  Chemical  Biology and Others.3,

Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India4, Janet Jeyapaul

v.  SRM  Universities  and  Others5,  Andi  Mukta

Sadguru S.M.V.S.S.J.M.S.T.  and Ors.  v.  V.R.  Rudani

and  Ors.6 and  K.  K.  Saksena  v.  International

Commission on Irrigation & Drainage7.    The further

submission of the learned counsel for the Appellant is that

nationalized banks would fall within the expression “State” 1 1981 (1) SCC 722 2 1979 (3) SCC 489 3 2002 (5) SCC 111 4 2005 (4) SCC 649 5 2015 (16) SCC 530 6 1989 (2) SCC 691 7 2015 (4) SCC 670

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under  Article  12  of  the  Constitution  of  India  and  the

Respondent-Institute  which  conducts  the  selections  for

appointment to Public Sector Banks should be amenable to

the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution of  India.    Referring to the facts  of  the

case, learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that he

produced  the  certificate  issued  in  the  year  2010

inadvertently.   He  submitted  that  non-production  of  the

certificate issued on 29.01.2014 was by mistake and he

should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  be  considered  for

appointment to the post of Clerk as he is fully eligible for

appointment on the basis of the marks obtained by him.

       5. Mr. Adarsh B. Dial, learned Senior Counsel appearing

for the Respondent argued that the Respondent was only

an agency conducting the process of selections after being

engaged by various nationalized banks and other  public

institutions/financial  institutions.   He  stated  that  neither

was  any  aid  received  by  the  Respondent  from  the

Government nor was it administratively controlled by the

Government.   Merely because there were a few members

in the governing body representing the Government and

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the banks, it could not be said that the Government has

administrative control over the Respondent.  According to

the learned Senior  Counsel,  conducting examinations for

appointment  to  various  posts  in  banks  and  financial

institutions  was not  a  public  function.    He asseverated

that  there  was  no  public  duty  discharged  by  the

Respondent and a Writ  Petition under Article 226 of  the

Constitution  of  India  against  the  Respondent  was  not

maintainable.    He  further  submitted  that  after  the

selection process in which the Appellant participated was

completed  in  the  year  2013,  there  were  four  selections

that were conducted subsequently.  The Appellant did not

participate in any of those selections and he is not entitled

to  any  relief  at  this  stage.    He  also  relied  upon  the

following  judgments;  judgment  dated  21.08.2014  of  the

High  Court  of  Manipur  at  Imphal,  13.11.2014  and

18.11.2014 of the Bombay High Court, 10.04.2015 of the

Punjab  and  Haryana  High  Court,  21.05.2015  and

31.08.2015 of the High Court of Jharkhand, and 31.03.2016

of the Delhi High Court, all by which various Writ Petitions

filed  against  the  Respondent  were  dismissed  as  not

maintainable.  

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6. The objective of the Respondent-Institute as per the

Memorandum of Association are:

(1) “To establish and to carry on the administration and management  of  “Institute  of  Banking  Personnel Selection.”

(2)To  plan,  promote  and  provide  for  competent,  well- qualified and efficient cadres of personnel at various levels to the banks and financial institutions in the country on a scientific basis.  

(3)To render assistance in organizations in the areas of personnel such as recruitment, selection, placement, by  designing,  developing  and  printing  suitable measurement  test/tools,  assessment  of  answer papers and processing results of examinations, and conduct  such  examination  related  services,  on request.

(4)To carry out theoretical and applied research in the subjects of psychology and education.”

7. One of the functions to achieve said objects of the

Respondent-Institute is to:

“Undertake to conduct on behalf of banks or financial institutions  or  other  organization  a  total  or  partial selection  project  for  recruitment  or  promotion involving  all  stages  like  designing  and  release  of advertisement, receipt and screening of applications, conduct of examination, processing of results etc.”   

8. It  is true that the Governor of the Reserve Bank of

India  and  the  Chairmen  of  certain  Public  Sector  Banks

along with the Joint Secretary, Banking Division, Ministry of

Finance  are  members  of  the  governing  body  of  the

Respondent-Institute.   There  is  no  dispute  that  the

Respondent is not constituted under a statute.  It is also

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not  disputed  that  the Respondent  does  not  receive  any

funds  from  the  Government.   The  Respondent  is  not

controlled  by  the  Government.   The  letter  dated

20.09.2010  produced  by  the  Appellant  along  with  the

rejoinder  affidavit  does  not  show  deep  and  pervasive

control  by  the  Government  of  India.   The  question  of

whether the Council  of Scientific and Industrial  Research

fell under ‘other authorities’ within the meaning of Article

12 was referred to a 7 Judge Bench of this Court.  [See:

Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas  v.  Indian  Institute  of

Chemical Biology and Others. (supra)].  Resolving the

dispute,  the  7  Judge  Bench  in  Pradeep  Kumar  Biswas

(supra)  held  that  the  question  as  to  whether  a

corporation/society would fall within the meaning of Article

12 should be decided after examining whether the body is

financially, functionally and administratively dominated by

or  under  the  control  of  the  Government.   This  Court

observed that such control should be particular to the body

in  question  and  must  be  pervasive.   A  control  which  is

merely regulatory under the statute or otherwise would not

make the body ‘State’  under Article 12.   As there is  no

control  by  the  Government  over  the  Respondent  in  the

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manner mentioned above, we have no doubt in our mind

that the Respondent cannot be said to be falling within the

expression ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution of

India.  

9. The question that remains to be answered is whether

the Writ Petition is maintainable against the Respondent on

the  ground  that  it  discharges  public  duty.  This  Court  in

Andi Mukta Sadguru S. M. V. S. S. J. M.S.T. and Ors.

v. V.R.  Rudani  and  Ors.  (supra)  held  “The  term

‘authority’ used in Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

must  receive  a  liberal  meaning  unlike  the  term  “other

authorities” in Article 12.   Article 12 is relevant only for

the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under

Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to

issue Writs for enforcement of fundamental rights as well

as  non-fundamental  rights.    The words  “any person or

authority”  used  in  Article  226  are,  therefore,  not  to  be

confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities

of the State.  They may cover any other person or body

performing public duty.  The form of the body concerned is

not very much relevant.  What is relevant is the nature of

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the duty imposed on the body.  The duty must be judged in

the light of positive obligation owed by the person or the

authority to the affected party.  No matter by what means

the  duty  is  imposed,  if  a  positive  obligation  exists,

mandamus cannot be denied.”

10. This Court in the said judgment also referred to what

Professor  S.A.  de  Smith  stated  in  ‘Judicial  Review  of

Administrative Action’, which is as follows:

“To be enforceable by mandamus a public  duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute.  It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter, common law, custom or even contract.”

11. In Regina v. Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers,

Ex  parte  Datafin  PLC  and  Another8,   Lloyd  L.  J.

speaking for the Court of Appeal held that if the duty is a

public  duty,  then  the  body  in  question  is  subject  to

public law.  The distinction must lie in the nature of the

duty imposed, whether expressly or by implication.  He

referred  to  an  earlier  judgment  in  Reg.  v.  Criminal

Injuries Compensation Board, Ex. Parte Lain9 where

Diplock L.J. held that in addition to looking at the source

of  power  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  the  question 8  [1987] 1 Q.B.  815 (C.A.) 9 [1967] 2 Q.B. 864, D.C.  

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pertaining to public law, nature of power is an important

facet to decide whether a dispute pertains to public law

or private law.     

12. There is no manner of doubt that a Writ Petition under

Article  226 is  maintainable  even against  a  private  body

provided it discharges public functions.  While deciding the

question as  to  whether  ICRISAT is  amenable to  the writ

jurisdiction under Article 226, this Court held that it is not

easy to define what a public function or public duty is.  It

can reasonably be said that such functions as are similar to

or closely related to those performable by the State in its

sovereign  capacity,  are  public  functions.   The  primary

activity  of  ICRISAT  is  to  conduct  research  and  training

programmes  in  the  sphere  of  agriculture,  purely  on  a

voluntary  basis  which  according  to  this  Court,  is  not  a

public  duty10.    A  private  company  carrying  on  banking

business  as  a  scheduled  commercial  bank  cannot  be

termed as  an  institution  or  a  company  carrying  on  any

statutory or public duty11.   

10 G. Bassi Reddy v. International Corps Research Institute (2003) 4 SCC 225 11 Federal Bank v. Sagar Thomas (2003) 10 SCC 733

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13. In  K.K. Saksena  (supra),  this  Court  observed that

the  Respondent  therein  would  not  be  amenable  to  Writ

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

as  the  activities  were  voluntarily  undertaken  by  the

Respondents  and  there  was  no  obligation  to  discharge

certain  activities  which  were  statutory  or  of  public

character.    Reference  was made to  the  Federal  Bank

case wherein  it  was held  that  the Writ  Petition was not

maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

in spite of the regulatory regime of the Banking Regulation

Act and the other statutes being in operation.  The relevant

questions,  according  to  this  Court  in  K.  K.  Saksena

(supra),  to  be  answered  for  the  purpose  of  deciding

whether a Writ Petition is maintainable under Article 226

are:

a)Whether  a  private  body  which  is  a  non- governmental  organization partakes the nature of public duty or State action?  

b)Whether  there  is  any  public  element  in  the discharge of its functions?  

c) Whether there is any positive obligation of a public nature in the discharge of its functions?

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d)Whether the activities undertaken by the body are voluntary,  which  many  a  non-governmental organization perform?   

14. The  Respondent-Institute  has  been  set  up  for  the

purpose  of  conducting  recruitment  for  appointment  to

various  posts  in  Public  Sector  Banks  and other  financial

institutions.   Applying the tests mentioned above, we are

of the opinion that the High Court is right in holding that

the  Writ  Petition  is  not  maintainable  against  the

Respondent.   Conducting  recruitment  tests  for

appointment in banking and other financial institutions, is

not a public duty.  The Respondent is not a creature of a

statute  and  there  are  no  statutory  duties  or  obligations

imposed on the Respondent.   

15. This  Court  in  Federal  Bank case  held  that  a  Writ

Petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  is  not

maintainable against a scheduled bank on the ground that

the business of banking does not fall within the expression

“public  duty”.    As  the  activity  of  the  Respondent  of

conducting the selection process for appointment to the

banks is voluntary in nature, it cannot be said that there is

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any public function discharged by the Respondent.   There

is no positive obligation, either statutory or otherwise on

the Respondent to conduct the recruitment tests.   For the

reasons above, we are of the considered opinion that the

Respondent is not amenable to the Writ Jurisdiction under

Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.   

16. We are informed by the learned Senior Counsel  for

the  Respondent  that  there  were  four  recruitments  that

were conducted after the year 2013 but that the Appellant

did not participate in any of these recruitments.  As he did

not participate in any of said subsequent recruitments, the

Appellant is not entitled to any relief.   

17. For  the  aforementioned  reasons,  the  appeal  is

dismissed.     

            ..…................................J.                             [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

                             ..…................................J.                        [M.R. SHAH]

New Delhi, April 29,  2019.  

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