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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 486 OF 2010

Raja @ Rajinder ... Appellant

Versus

State of Haryana        ...  

Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The present appeal is directed against the judgment  

and order dated 7.09.2009 of the High Court of Punjab and  

Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 770-DB of  

2006,  whereby  the  Division  Bench  has  confirmed  the  

judgment of conviction and order  of  sentence passed by  

the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Sirsa  in  Sessions  

Case No. 357 of 2003 convicting the present appellant for  

the  offences  punishable  under  Sections  302 and Section  

201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and

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sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and  

payment  of  fine  of  Rs.5000/-  under  Section  302  and  

rigorous imprisonment of three years and fine of Rs.1000/-  

under Section 201 read with Section 34  IPC with default  

clause for the fine amount in respect of both the offences  

with  the  stipulation  that  both  the  sentences  would  be  

concurrent.   

2. Bereft of unnecessary details, the prosecution case, as  

has been unfurled is  that on 18.1.2003 about 6.30 p.m.,  

Het  Ram,  the  deceased,  had  left  his  home  with  the  

accused-appellant  and  did  not  return  till  the  morning  of  

19.1.2003.  The family members of the deceased searched  

for  him  at  various  places  and  made  enquiries  from  the  

relations  but  despite  their  best  efforts,  he  could  not  be  

found.   In  course of  that enquiry it  was revealed by the  

owner of a tea-stall that on 18.01.2003 about 8.30 p.m. the  

appellant  and the  deceased had taken tea together  and  

thereafter they had left that place.  Being so informed by  

the  tea  stall  owner,  Subhash,  PW-8,  brother  of  the  

deceased along with  Pala Ram and Ramesh went  to  the  

house of the accused-appellant, and came to learn from his  

father Krishan Kumar, the co-accused, that Raja had gone  

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to  village  Kharia  but  could  not  be  contacted  as  the  

telephone  number  of  village  Kharia  was  out  of  order.  

Thereafter,  Subhash,  PW-8, the informant returned to his  

house and waited till night for the return of Het Ram.  When  

the deceased did not come till  night, Subhash along with  

his relations again proceeded to the house of the appellant  

who was present in the house, and informed them that in  

the night of 18.01.2003 he and the deceased had taken tea  

together but when they were returning to their houses, a  

Sikh boy met them and Het Ram went with that boy on his  

motor cycle.  After getting the said information, when the  

informant and others were returning from the house of the  

accused, they noticed blood stains in the street in front of  

the  houses  of  Mohan  and  Mahender  Singh.  It  aroused  

suspicion of the informant that his brother might have been  

murdered by the appellant and the dead body could have  

been  disposed  of.   The  motive  behind  the  incident,  as  

mentioned,  was  that  the  appellant  was  indulged  in  

consuming poppy husk and the father of the appellant had  

a suspicion that the deceased was instrumental in making  

his  son  a  drug  addict.   On  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  

allegations, an FIR No. 45 dated 20.1.2003 was lodged at  

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the police station Rania.  After the criminal law was set in  

motion, the investigating agency went to the place where  

blood stains  were found and prepared the site  plan and  

seized  the  bloodstained  earth.   On  the  next  day,  police  

went  to  village Bani  in  connection with  the investigation  

and blood stains were found on the stairs, platform and wall  

of a well situated in the old Abadi of the village.  The police  

collected the bloodstained bricks from there and noticed a  

bundle inside the well and eventually recovered the dead  

body of Het Ram which was found inside the said bundle.  

The  investigating  agency  sent  the  dead  body  for  post-

mortem to  the  General  Hospital,  Sirsa  and  arrested  the  

accused  on  22.1.2003.   During  the  investigation  the  

appellant suffered disclosure statement, Exh. P. EE, to the  

effect  that  he  had  taken  Het  Ram  to  the  tea  stall  and  

thereafter to his ‘Nohra’ on a false pretext, where he had  

caused a blow with a knife on the neck of Het Ram about  

10.00 P.M. on 18.01.2003.  Het Ram tried to escape but he  

chased him and when the deceased fell down in front of the  

house of Mahender Singh, he inflicted several blows with  

the  knife  on  the  chest  and  the  waist  region  of  the  

deceased. Being unable to drag the dead body back to his  

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courtyard, he took the help of his father for the disposal of  

the body. The blanket worn by the deceased was burnt in  

the  courtyard  of  the  appellant.   Thereafter,  the  

bloodstained clothes of the appellant and the knife were  

recovered by the police from the pit of latrine on the basis  

of the statement of the accused-appellant. The parcels of  

bloodstained  earth,  bloodstained  clothes  of  the  accused  

and  the  deceased,  the  seized  knife  and  other  materials  

were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban,  

for examination and the report, Exhibit P.RR, was received  

by the prosecution.  During the investigation, statement of  

Sukha, PW-7, was recorded on 21.1.2003 wherein he had  

stated that the deceased was murdered by the appellant as  

the appellant was suspicious that the deceased had illicit  

relationship with his wife.  Similar statement was also made  

by  Nanak,  PW-9.   The  investigating  officer  recorded  

statement of number of witnesses and after completing the  

investigation, placed the chargesheet against the accused-

appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 302  

and 201 read with Section 34 IPC.  The co-accused, Krishan  

Kumar, was chargesheeted for the offence under Sections  

201 read with Section 34 IPC.   After the chargesheet was  

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laid,  the  competent  court  committed  the  matter  to  the  

court of Session for trial.  The accused pleaded not guilty  

and claimed to be tried.   

3. The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges  

levelled against the accused persons examined as many as  

13 witnesses.  The principal witnesses are Dr. N.K. Mittal,  

PW-1,  who had conducted the post-mortem on the dead  

body of  the deceased,  Sukha,  PW-7,  Subhash,  PW-8,  the  

brother of the deceased and the informant, Nanak, PW-9,  

Mahender,  PW-10,  who  had  seen  the  deceased  and  the  

appellant having tea together in the tea stall and Kalawati,  

PW-11,  mother  of  the  deceased  who  had  witnessed  the  

deceased leaving the house in the company of the accused-

appellant.

4. The accused persons in their  statements u/s 313 of  

the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (CrPC)  denied  the  

allegations  and  pleaded  false  implication.   They  claimed  

that  accused-Raja  was  neither  married  to  anyone  nor  

addicted  to  opium and,  therefore,  the  alleged motive  to  

commit the murder of Het Ram was totally baseless.  They  

further denied having made any disclosure statements to  

the police and stated that the police had planted articles to  

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create evidence against the accused.  The accused persons  

chose not to adduce any evidence in their defence.  

5. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the material  

brought on record, came to hold that the whole case rested  

on circumstantial evidence and the prosecution had been  

able  to  establish  the  chain  in  completeness  against  the  

accused persons and accordingly convicted the appellant  

and his  father  and sentenced them,  as  has  been stated  

hereinbefore.   Being  dissatisfied,  the  appellant  and  his  

father had preferred the criminal appeal wherein the High  

Court  had  affirmed  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  the  

appellant  but  as  far  as  his  father,  Krishan  Kumar,  is  

concerned, while maintaining the conviction, modified the  

sentence of Krishan Kumar imposed by the trial Judge and  

restricted  it  to  the  period  already  undergone  without  

interfering with the quantum of fine.  The present appeal  

has  been  preferred  by  Raja  assailing  his  conviction  and  

sentence.  

6. We have heard Mr. M.M. Kashyap, learned counsel for  

the appellant and Mr. Vikas Sharma, learned counsel for the  

State.

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7. As  the  factual  matrix  would  show,  the  case  of  the  

prosecution  entirely  hinges  on  circumstantial  evidence.  

When a case rests on circumstantial  evidence,  the Court  

has to be satisfied that the circumstances from which an  

inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently  

and firmly established; those circumstances should be of a  

definite tendency unerringly pointing towards  guilt of the  

accused;  the  circumstances,  taken  cumulatively,  should  

form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the  

conclusion that within all human probability the crime was  

committed  by  the  accused  and  none  else;  and  the  

circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must  

be  complete  and  incapable  of  explanation  of  any  other  

hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such  

evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the  

accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. [See  

Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P.1]

8. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab2, it has been  

laid down that:  

“..…  the  circumstances  from  which  the  conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully  proved  and  those  circumstances  must  be  

1  1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 2  1995 Supp (4 SCC 259

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conclusive in nature to connect the accused with  the  crime.  All  the  links  in  the  chain  of  events  must be established beyond a reasonable doubt  and  the  established  circumstances  should  be  consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of  the  accused  and  totally  inconsistent  with  his  innocence.  In  a  case  based  on  circumstantial  evidence,  the  court  has  to  be  on  its  guard  to  avoid the danger of  allowing suspicion to take  the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to  avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional  considerations, howsoever strong they may be,  to take the place of proof.”

9. From the aforesaid it is clear as day that the Court is  

required to evaluate the circumstantial evidence to see that  

the  chain  of  events  have  been  established  clearly  and  

completely  to  rule  out  any  reasonable  likelihood  of  the  

innocence of  the accused.   Needless to say whether  the  

chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each  

case  emanating  from  the  evidence  and  no  universal  

yardstick should ever be attempted [See Ujjagar Singh v.  

State of Punjab3].

10. In the instant case, the circumstances that have been  

established by the prosecution are that the deceased had  

accompanied the accused–appellant, being called by him,  

from his house in the early part of the evening on the date  

of occurrence.  The mother of the deceased, Kalawati, PW-

3  (2007) 13 SCC 90

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11,  has  deposed  in  that  regard.   Thereafter,  from  the  

material brought on record, it is clearly revealed that the  

appellant was seen at the tea stall with the deceased.  The  

said fact has been deposed by Mahender,  PW-10.   Thus,  

from  the  aforesaid  evidence,  two  facts  are  established,  

namely, the accused and the deceased had left the house  

of the deceased and were seen taking tea together at the  

tea stall.   It  is  submitted by the learned counsel  for  the  

appellant  that  the  last  seen  theory  as  advanced  by  the  

prosecution is not acceptable inasmuch as the owner of the  

tea stall has not been examined.  When the testimony of  

the  aforesaid  two  witnesses  deserve  acceptance  and  

receive  corroboration  from  the  other  evidence  on  the  

record, no adverse inference should be drawn because of  

non-examination of the tea stall owner, who, as has been  

submitted by the learned counsel  for  the appellant,  is  a  

material  witness.   It  is  well  settled  in  law  that  non-

examination of  a  material  witness is  not  a mathematical  

formula for discarding the weight of the testimony available  

on  record,  if  the  same  is  natural,  trustworthy  and  

convincing  [See  State of  H.P.  v.  Gian  Chand4].   That  

4  (2001) 6 SCC 71

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apart,  he  was  not  such  a  witness  who  alone  was  the  

competent  witness  to  depose  about  a  fact  and  his  non-

examination  would  really  destroy  the  version  of  the  

prosecution.

11. Another reason for acceptance of the last seen theory  

is  that the brother of the deceased,  Subhash,  PW-8,  has  

testified that he had enquired from the accused as regards  

the  whereabouts  of  the  deceased,  for  the deceased had  

accompanied the accused and at that juncture the accused  

had replied that at the tea stall a Sikh boy came and the  

deceased went with him.  As per the prosecution case, the  

deceased  and  the  accused  are  co-villagers.   In  his  

statement recorded under Section 313 CrPC, the accused-

appellant  totally  denied  to  have  accompanied  the  

deceased.   Learned trial  Judge and the High Court  have  

placed reliance on the evidence of the mother,  Kalawati,  

PW-11, the brother, Subhash, PW-8 and Mahender, PW-10.  

The cumulative reading and apposite  appreciation of  the  

said  evidence  proves  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the  

deceased was last seen with the accused.   

12. Another circumstance that has been proven is about  

the recovery of knife, blood-stained clothes and the ashes  

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of the burnt blanket.  The seizure witnesses Sukha, PW-7  

and Nanak, PW-9 have proven the seizure.  It is submitted  

by the learned counsel  for  the appellant  that  police had  

recorded  the  confessional  statement  of  the  accused-

appellant at the police custody and thereafter, as alleged,  

had recovered certain things which really do not render any  

assistance to the prosecution, for the confession recorded  

before the police officer is  inadmissible.   That apart,  the  

accused had advanced the plea that the articles and the  

weapon  were  planted  by  the  investigating  agency.   To  

appreciate the said submission in proper perspective, we  

may profitably reproduce a passage from State of U.P. v.  

Deoman Upadhyaya5:

“The  expression,  ‘accused  of  any  offence’  in  Section 27, as in Section 25, is also descriptive  of  the  person  concerned  i.e.  against  a  person  who is accused of an offence, Section 27 renders  provable certain statements made by him while  he was in the custody of a police officer. Section  27 is founded on the principle that even though  the  evidence  relating  to  confessional  or  other  statements made by a person, whilst he is in the  custody  of  a  police  officer,  is  tainted  and  therefore  inadmissible,  if  the  truth  of  the  information  given  by  him  is  assured  by  the  discovery of a fact,  it  may be presumed to be  untainted  and  is  therefore  declared  provable  insofar as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby  discovered.  Even  though  Section  27  is  in  the  

5  AIR 1960 SC 1125

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form of a proviso to Section 26, the two sections  do not necessarily deal with the evidence of the  same character. The ban imposed by Section 26  is against the proof of confessional statements.  Section  27  is  concerned  with  the  proof  of  information whether it amounts to a confession  or  not,  which  leads  to  discovery  of  facts.  By  Section  27,  even  if  a  fact  is  deposed  to  as  discovered  in  consequence  of  information  received,  only  that  much of  the information is  admissible  as  distinctly  relates  to  the  fact  discovered.”

13. In  State of Maharashtra v.  Damu6,  while dealing  

with the fundamental facet of Section 27 of the Evidence  

Act, the Court observed that the basic idea embedded in  

the  said  provision  is  the  doctrine  of  confession  by  

subsequent events, which is founded on the principle that if  

any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength of  

any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery  

is a guarantee that the information supplied by the prisoner  

is  true.  It  further  stated  that  the  information  might  be  

confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but if it results in  

discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information and,  

therefore, the legislature permitted such information to be  

used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to  

the minimum.

6  (2000) 6 SCC 269

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14. Thus,  if  an  accused  person  gives  a  statement  that  

relates  to  the  discovery  of  a  fact  in  consequence  of  

information received from him is admissible.  The rest part  

of the statement has to be treated as inadmissible.   In view  

of  the  same,  the  recovery  made  at  the  instance  of  the  

accused-appellant  has  been rightly  accepted by  the  trial  

Court as well as by the High Court, and we perceive no flaw  

in it.  

15. Another circumstance which has been taken note of  

by the High Court is that the blood-stained clothes and the  

weapon,  the  knife,  were  sent  to  the  Forensic  Science  

Laboratory.   The  report  obtained  from  the  Laboratory  

clearly shows that blood stains were found on the clothes  

and the knife.  True it is, there has been no matching of the  

blood group.  However, that would not make a difference in  

the facts of the present case.  The accused has not offered  

any explanation how the human blood was found on the  

clothes and the knife.  In this regard, a passage from John  

Pandian v. State7 is worth reproducing:

“The  discovery  appears  to  be  credible.  It  has  been accepted by both the courts below and we  find no reason to discard it.  This is apart  from  the  fact  that  this  weapon  was  sent  to  the  

7  (2010) 14 SCC 129

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forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it has been  found  stained  with  human  blood.  Though  the  blood  group  could  not  be  ascertained,  as  the  results  were  inconclusive,  the  accused  had  to  give  some  explanation  as  to  how  the  human  blood came on this weapon. He gave none. This  discovery  would  very  positively  further  the  prosecution case.”

In view of the aforesaid, there is no substantial reason  

not to accept the recovery of the weapon used in the crime.  

It is also apt to note here that Dr. N.K. Mittal, PW-1, has  

clearly  opined  that  the  injuries  on  the  person  of  the  

deceased could be caused by the knife and the said opinion  

has gone unrebutted.  

16. Another circumstance which needs to be noted is that  

Sukha, PW-7, a taxi driver, has deposed that on 18.1.2003  

about  11.00  p.m.  while  he  was  going  to  Fatehabad  for  

taking passengers, he saw a bullock cart parked in front of  

the house of the accused and certain persons were tying a  

bundle  in  a  “palli”.   On  query  being  made  by  him,  the  

accused persons told him that they are carrying manure to  

the fields.  Though, this witness has given an exaggerated  

version and stated differently about the time of arrest, yet  

his testimony to the effect that he had seen the accused  

with  a  bundle  in  “palli”  at  a  particular  place  cannot  be  

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disbelieved.  The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus”,  

is not applicable in India.  In  Krishna Mochi v. State of  

Bihar8, it has been held thus:   

“The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has  no application in India and the witnesses cannot  be branded as liars.  The maxim  falsus in uno,  falsus  in  omnibus (false  in  one  thing,  false  in  everything) has not received general acceptance  … nor has this maxim come to occupy the status  of the rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution.  All  that  it  amounts  to,  is  that  in  such  cases  testimony may be disregarded,  and not that it  must be disregarded.”

17. In  Yogendera v. State of Rajasthan9,  it has been  

ruled that the Court must assess the extent to which the  

deposition of a witness can be relied upon.  The court must  

make every attempt to separate falsehoods from the truth,  

and it must only be in exceptional circumstances, when it is  

entirely impossible to separate the grain from the chaff, for  

the same are so inextricably  intertwined,  that  the entire  

evidence  of  such  a  witness  must  be  discarded.   Thus  

viewed, the version of PW-7 to the extent that has been  

stated hereinabove is totally acceptable and credible.  

18. In  a  case  based on  circumstantial  evidence,  motive  

assumes great  significance  as  its  existence  is  an  

8  (2002) 6 SCC 81 9  (2013) 12 SCC 399

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enlightening factor in a process of presumptive reasoning  

[See  Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam and Anr. v. State   

of Andhra Pradesh10].  In the case at hand, it had come in  

the evidence that the accused-appellant was suspicious of  

the illicit relationship between the deceased and his wife.  

The accused has taken the plea that he was never married.  

It is noteworthy that the materials brought on record go a  

long way to show that after the death of his brother he had  

entered into the wedlock with his sister-in-law as per the  

tradition of the community, that is, ‘Kareva’ marriage.  The  

said  facet  of  evidence  has  really  not  been  assailed  or  

shaken.   Thus,  it  has  been  established  that  there  was  

suspicion  by  the  accused  that  the  deceased  was  having  

relationship with his brother’s wife and that had aroused his  

anger.  The said motive further strengthens the case of the  

prosecution.   

19.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid  analysis,  we  are  of  the  

considered  opinion  that  the  appeal  preferred  by  the  

appellant  is  totally  devoid  of  merit  and  is  accordingly  

dismissed.    

10  (1993) 2 SCC 684

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.............................J. (Dipak Misra)

..........................., J.                          (N.V. Ramana)   

New Delhi April 10, 2015

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