REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1758              OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5412 of 2008)

RAGHUVANSH DEWANCHAND BHASIN — APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR. — RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

D.K. JAIN, J.:

Leave granted.

2. This  appeal,  by special  leave,  is  directed  against  the judgment  and  

order  dated  26th November  2007,  rendered  by  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature at Bombay, in                                   CRL. W.P.  

No.1086/2002.  By the impugned judgment, while allowing the writ  

petition filed by the appellant, alleging harassment on account of his  

arrest  on  the  strength  of  a  non-bailable  warrant,  which  had  been  

cancelled, the High Court has directed the delinquent police officer to

pay by way of costs to the appellant an amount of  `2,000/- from his  

own account.  

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts material for  adjudication of the  

present case, may be stated thus:

Some time in the year 2000, one, Mr. Prem Harchandrai filed a  

complaint, being C.C. No. 163/P/2000, against the appellant, a practicing  

Advocate, under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short  

“the IPC”), in relation to some incident alleged to have taken place in the  

‘Radio Club’ at Mumbai, considered to be a club for the elite. When at a  

preliminary stage,  the case came up for hearing before the Additional  

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 7th August, 2002, finding the appellant  

to  be  absent,  the  Court  issued  a  non-bailable  warrant  against  him  

returnable  on  31st October,  2002.  The  warrant  was  forwarded  to  the  

Colaba Police Station for execution. However, on 12th August, 2002, on  

appellant’s putting in an appearance before the Court, the warrant was  

cancelled.  

4. On 15th August, 2002, the complainant approached the Colaba Police  

Station and insisted on the arrest of the appellant in pursuance of the  

said non-bailable warrant. Thereupon, respondent No. 2, who at that  

point of time was posted as an Inspector of Police at the Colaba Police  

Station,  directed  a  constable  to  accompany  the  complainant,  and  

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execute the warrant. When the appellant was sought to be arrested, he  

informed  the  constable  that  the  said  warrant  had  already  been  

cancelled.  However,  as  he  could  not  produce  any  documentary  

evidence relating to cancellation of warrant, the appellant was arrested  

before a public gathering which had assembled at the Radio Club, in  

connection with the Independence day celebrations.  He was produced  

before  the  duty  Magistrate  at  about  2  P.M.,  the  same  day.  The  

Magistrate  directed  the  release  of  the  appellant.  It  appears  that  the  

appellant  obtained the necessary confirmation about  cancellation  of  

the warrant on the next day i.e. 16th August 2002 and produced the  

same before respondent No. 2 on the same day. Alleging  malafides  

and humiliation at the hands of respondent No. 2, in collusion with the  

complainant,  the  appellant  approached  the  High  Court,  inter-alia,   

praying  for  suitable  disciplinary  action  against  respondent  No.2;  

adequate  compensation;  damages  and  costs  by  the  said  respondent  

from his own pocket.

5. As aforesaid, the High Court, vide impugned judgment has allowed  

the writ petition, inter alia, observing thus :

“We therefore, find that there was no justification for issuance of  non-bailable  warrant  on  7th August,  2002  merely  because  the  petitioner had remained absent in Criminal Case No. 163/P/2000  (sic) by the Metropolitan Magistrate.  The Magistrate could have  issued either a notice or a bailable warrant depending upon the  

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facts revealed from the records.  Once the warrant was cancelled  on  12th August,  2002,  it  was  necessary  for  the  Court  to  immediately  communicate  the  same  to  the  concerned  Police  authority so that no inconvenience could have been caused to the  person against whom the warrant was initially issued.   Once the  warrant was sought to be executed  on holiday and the concerned  police  officer  was  categorically  informed that  the  warrant  had  already been cancelled and the police officer being fully aware of  the circumstances and nature of the case in which warrant had  been issued, it was necessary for the police officer to ascertain  and  to  find  out  whether  the  warrant  which  was  sought  to  be  executed was still enforceable or had already been cancelled and  not to rush to execute the warrant in those circumstances and that  too  on  a  holiday.   Having  produced  the  necessary  documents  confirming the cancellation of the warrant much prior to the  date  on which it was sought to be (sic) enforced, it was the duty of the  police officer to tender the necessary apology to the petitioner  for executing  such warrant on the holiday,  and the concerned  officer having failed to tender the apology it apparently shows  that he had not performed his duty in the manner he was required  to  perform as  a  responsible  police  officer.   Even the  affidavit  filed by the respondent No. 2 nowhere discloses any repentance  for having executed the warrant which was already cancelled.  It  is a clear case of unnecessary interference with the liberty of a  citizen.”

6. Thus, having failed to get the desired relief from the High Court, the  

appellant is before us in this appeal.

7. Arguing the case in person, it was strenuously urged by the appellant  

that having regard to the nature of offence alleged against him, in the  

first place, the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate erred in law  

in  issuing  non-bailable  warrant  in  a  routine  manner,  without  

application of mind, merely because the appellant had failed to appear  

in court on 7th August 2002.  It was asserted that  since neither Section  

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70 nor Section 71 of the Code  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short  

“the  Code”)  uses  the  expression “non-bailable”  a  Magistrate  is  not  

authorised  to  issue  non-bailable  warrant  of  arrest  even  when  an  

accused fails to appear in the court.  It was submitted that having held  

that the respondent No.2 was guilty of misconduct,  the High Court  

failed to punish the said respondent under Sections 342 and 345 of the  

IPC.  It was argued that the misconduct of respondent No.2 was so  

high that he should have been forthwith suspended from his job and  

ordered to be tried in a competent criminal court.  According to the  

appellant, the direction of the High Court asking respondent No.2 to  

pay an amount of  `2,000/- by way of cost  to the appellant was no  

justice at all and if a strict action is not taken against such delinquent  

officers, they will continue to disregard the orders of the courts with  

impunity.   

8. Per contra,  Mr. Jay Savla, learned counsel appearing for respondent  

No.2  submitted  that  since  the  appellant  was  unable  to  furnish  any  

document or order to establish that non-bailable warrant issued against  

him by the court had been cancelled, the police authorities were left  

with no option and in fact were duty bound to execute the same.  It  

was also urged that, as per the prevalent practice, whenever any non-

bailable  warrant  is  cancelled  by  the  court,  either  memo  or  order  

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addressed to the Senior Inspector of Police of the concerned police  

station is issued and forwarded directly to the concerned police station  

with a direction to return the said warrant to the court.   But in the  

present case no such memo or order in writing had been received at  

the  police  station  on  or  before  15th August  2002,  when  it  was  

executed.  Learned counsel submitted that the said respondent having  

performed his duty bona fide and in good faith, in pursuance of order  

issued by the court having jurisdiction,  the said respondent had not  

committed any illegal act warranting any action against him.

9. It  needs  little  emphasis  that  since  the  execution  of  a  non-bailable  

warrant directly involves curtailment of liberty of a person, warrant of  

arrest  cannot  be  issued  mechanically,  but  only  after  recording  

satisfaction  that  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  case,  it  is  

warranted.  The  Courts  have  to  be  extra-cautious  and careful  while  

directing  issue  of  non-bailable  warrant,  else  a  wrongful  detention  

would amount to denial of constitutional mandate envisaged in Article  

21  of  the  Constitution  of  India.   At  the  same  time,  there  is  no  

gainsaying that the welfare of an individual must yield to that of the  

community.  Therefore, in order to maintain rule of law and to keep  

the society in functional harmony, it is necessary to strike a balance  

between  an  individual’s  rights,  liberties  and  privileges  on  the  one  

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hand, and the State on the other.  Indeed, it is a complex exercise.  As  

Justice Cardozo puts it “on the one side is the social need that crime  

shall be repressed.  On the other, the social need that law shall not be  

flouted by the insolence of office.  There are dangers in any choice.”  

Be  that  as  it  may,  it  is  for  the  court,  which  is  clothed  with  the  

discretion to  determine whether  the  presence of  an accused can be  

secured by a bailable or non-bailable  warrant,  to strike the balance  

between  the  need  of  law  enforcement  on  the  one  hand  and  the  

protection of the citizen from highhandedness at the hands of the law  

enforcement agencies on the other. The power and jurisdiction of the  

court to issue appropriate warrant against an accused on his failure to  

attend  the  court  on  the  date  of  hearing  of  the  matter  cannot  be  

disputed.  Nevertheless, such power has to be exercised judiciously  

and  not  arbitrarily,  having  regard,  inter-alia,  to  the  nature  and  

seriousness of the offence involved; the past conduct of the accused;  

his age and the possibility of his absconding. (Also See: State of U.P.   

Vs. Poosu & Anr.1).  

10. In  Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr.  Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.2,  

a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court cautioned that before  

issuing  non-bailable  warrants,  the  Courts  should  strike  a  balance  

1 (1976) 3 SCC 1 2 (2007) 12 SCC 1  

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between  societal  interests  and  personal  liberty  and  exercise  its  

discretion cautiously. Enumerating some of the circumstances which  

the Court should bear in mind while issuing non-bailable warrant, it  

was observed:

“53. Non-bailable warrant should be issued to bring a person  to  court  when  summons  or  bailable  warrants  would  be  unlikely to have the desired result. This could be when:

• it  is  reasonable  to  believe  that  the  person  will  not  voluntarily appear in court; or

• the police authorities are unable to find the person to  serve him with a summon; or

• it is considered that the person could harm someone if  not placed into custody immediately.

54. As far as possible,  if  the court  is  of the opinion that  a  summon will suffice in getting the appearance of the accused  in the court, the summon or the bailable warrants  should be  preferred.  The   warrants   either  bailable  or  non-bailable  should  never  be  issued  without  proper scrutiny of facts and complete application of mind,  due to the extremely serious consequences and ramifications  which ensue on issuance of warrants. The court must very  carefully examine whether the criminal complaint or FIR has  not been filed with an oblique motive.

55. In complaint cases, at the first instance, the court should  direct  serving of the summons along with the copy of the  complaint. If the accused seem to be avoiding the summons,  the  court,  in  the  second  instance  should  issue  bailable  warrant.  In  the  third  instance,  when  the  court  is  fully  satisfied that the accused is avoiding the court’s proceeding  intentionally,  the  process  of  issuance  of  the  non-bailable  warrant should be resorted to. Personal liberty is paramount,  therefore, we caution courts at the first and second instance  to refrain from issuing non-bailable warrants.”

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11.We  deferentially  concur  with  these  directions,  and  emphasize  that  

since these directions flow from the right to life and personal liberty,  

enshrined in Articles 21 and 22(1) of our Constitution, they need to be  

strictly complied with.  However, we may hasten to add that these are  

only broad guidelines and not rigid rules of universal application when  

facts and behavioral patterns are bound to differ from case to case.  

Since discretion in  this  behalf  is  entrusted with  the  court,  it  is  not  

advisable  to  lay  down  immutable  formulae  on  the  basis  whereof  

discretion  could  be  exercised.   As  aforesaid,  it  is  for  the  court  

concerned to assess the situation and exercise discretion judiciously,  

dispassionately and without prejudice.

12.Viewed in this perspective, we regret to note that in the present case,  

having regard to nature of the complaint against the appellant and his  

stature in the community and the fact that admittedly the appellant was  

regularly attending the court proceedings, it was not a fit case where  

non-bailable warrant should have been issued by the Additional Chief  

Metropolitan  Magistrate.   In  our  opinion,  the  attendance  of  the  

appellant could have been secured by issuing summons or at best by a  

bailable warrant.  We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the  

High Court that in the facts and circumstances of the case, issuance of  

non-bailable warrant was manifestly unjustified.  

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13. We shall  now advert  to  a  more  anxious  point,  viz.  the  conduct  of  

respondent  No.2,  at  whose  direction  the  warrant  was  executed.   It  

needs no emphasis that any form of degrading treatment would fall  

within the inhibition of Article 21 of the Constitution.  In the present  

case, respondent No.2 was aware that the non-bailable warrant issued  

on account of failure on the part of the appellant to attend the court  

proceedings on 7th August 2002, was returnable only on 31st October  

2002.  Undoubtedly, respondent No.2 was duty bound to execute the  

warrant as expeditiously as possible but we are unable to fathom any  

justifiable  reason  for  the  urgency  in  executing  the  warrant  on  a  

National holiday, more so when it had been issued more than a week  

ago and even the complaint against the appellant was in relation to the  

offence  punishable  under  Section  324  of  the  IPC.   The  complaint  

related to the year 2000.  At the relevant time, the offence punishable  

under Section 324 of the IPC was a bailable offence.  It is apparent  

from the record that  the warrant  was executed at the behest  of the  

complainant  in  order  to  denigrate  and  humiliate  the  appellant  at  a  

public place, in public view, during the course of Independence day  

celebrations at Radio Club. We are convinced that respondent No.2, in  

collusion with the complainant, played with the personal liberty of the  

appellant  in  a  high  handed manner.   The unfortunate  sequel  of  an  

unmindful  action  on  the  part  of  respondent  No.2  was  that  the  

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appellant, a practicing Advocate, with no criminal history, remained in  

police  custody  for  quite  some  time  without  any  justification  

whatsoever and suffered unwarranted humiliation and degradation in  

front  of  his  fellow members  of  the  Club.   Regrettably,  he lost  his  

freedom though for a short while,  on the Independence day.   Here  

also,  we  agree  with  the  High  Court  that  respondent  No.2  did  not  

perform  his  duty  in  the  manner  expected  of  a  responsible  police  

officer.  As a  matter  of  fact,  being the  guardian of  the  liberty  of  a  

person,  a  heavy  responsibility  devolved  on  him to  ensure  that  his  

office was not misused by the complainant to settle personal scores.  

The so-called urgency or promptness in execution led to undesirable  

interference with the liberty of the appellant.  Such a conduct cannot  

receive a judicial imprimatur.  

14. That  takes  us  to  the  core  issue,  namely,  whether  the  appellant  is  

entitled  to  any  compensation  for  the  humiliation  and  harassment  

suffered by him on account of the wrong perpetrated by respondent  

No.2, in addition to what has been awarded by the High Court.  As  

aforesaid, the grievance of the appellant is that imposition of a fine of  

`2,000/- on respondent No.2 is grossly inadequate.  His prayer is that  

in addition to an adequate amount of compensation, respondent No.2  

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should also be prosecuted and proceeded against departmentally for  

his wrongful confinement.   

15.It is trite principle of law that in matters  involving infringement or  

deprivation  of  a  fundamental  right;  abuse  of  process  of  law,  

harassment  etc.,  the  courts  have  ample  power  to  award  adequate  

compensation to an aggrieved person not only to remedy the wrong  

done to him but also to serve as a deterrent for the wrong doer.   

16. In Rudul Sah  Vs. State  of  Bihar & Anr.3,  Y.V. Chandrachud,  CJ,  

speaking  for  a  Bench  of  three  learned  Judges  of  this  Court  had  

observed thus:

“One of the telling ways in which the violation of that  right  can reasonably  be prevented  and due compliance  with the mandate of Article 21 secured, is to mulct its  violators  in  the  payment  of  monetary  compensation.  Administrative sclerosis leading to flagrant infringements  of fundamental rights cannot be corrected by any other  method open to the judiciary to adopt.”

17. In  Bhim Singh, MLA  Vs.  State of  J & K & Ors.4,  holding illegal  

detention  in  police  custody  of  the  petitioner  Bhim  Singh  to  be  

violative of his rights under Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution,  

this  Court,  in  exercise  of  its  power  to  award  compensation  under  

Article  32, directed the State  to pay monetary compensation to the  

3  (1983) 4 SCC 141 4 (1985) 4 SCC 677

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petitioner.   Relying on  Rudal Sah  (supra), O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.  

echoed the following views:

“When a person comes to us with the complaint that he  has  been arrested  and imprisoned with  mischievous  or  malicious  intent  and  that  his  constitutional  and  legal  rights  were  invaded,  the  mischief  or  malice  and  the  invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his  being  set  free.  In  appropriate  cases  we  have  the  jurisdiction  to  compensate  the  victim  by  awarding  suitable monetary compensation”.

18. In Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita Behera Vs.  State of Orissa &  

Ors.5, clearing  the  doubt  and  indicating  the  precise  nature  of  the  

constitutional remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to  

award compensation for contravention of fundamental  rights,  which  

had arisen because of the observation that “the petitioner could have  

been  relegated  to  the  ordinary  remedy  of  a  suit  if  his  claim  to  

compensation was factually controversial” in Rudul Sah (supra), J.S.  

Verma, J. (as His Lordship then was) stated as under:

“It  follows  that  'a  claim  in  public  law  for  compensation' for contravention of human rights and  fundamental  freedoms,  the  protection  of  which  is  guaranteed  in  the  Constitution,  is  an  acknowledged  remedy for enforcement and protection of such rights,  and  such  a  claim based  on  strict  liability  made  by  resorting to a constitutional remedy provided for the  enforcement of a fundamental right is 'distinct from,  and  in  addition  to,  the  remedy  in  private  law  for  damages for the tort' resulting from the contravention  of  the  fundamental  right.  The  defence  of  sovereign  

5 (1993) 2 SCC 746

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immunity being inapplicable, and alien to the concept  of guarantee of fundamental  rights,  there can be no  question  of  such  a  defence  being  available  in  the  constitutional  remedy.  It  is  this  principle  which  justifies  award  of  monetary  compensation  for  contravention of fundamental rights guaranteed by the  Constitution, when that is the only practicable mode  of redress available for the contravention made by the  State or its servants in the purported exercise of their  powers, and enforcement of the fundamental right is  claimed by resort to the remedy in public law under  the Constitution by recourse to Articles 32 and 226 of  the Constitution. This is what was indicated in Rudul   Sah and is  the  basis  of  the subsequent  decisions  in  which compensation was awarded under Articles  32  and  226 of  the  Constitution,  for  contravention  of  fundamental rights.”

In the same decision, in his concurring judgment, Dr. A.S. Anand, J. (as  

His Lordship then was), explaining the scope and purpose of public law  

proceedings and private law proceedings stated as under:

“The  public  law proceedings  serve  a  different  purpose  than the private law proceedings. The relief of monetary  compensation,  as  exemplary  damages,  in  proceedings  under Article 32 by this Court or under Article 226 by the  High  Courts,  for  established  infringement  of  the  indefeasible  right  guaranteed  under  Article  21 of  the  Constitution is a remedy available in public law and is  based  on  the  strict  liability  for  contravention  of  the  guaranteed basic  and indefeasible  rights  of  the  citizen.  The purpose of public law is not only to civilize public  power but also to assure the citizen that they live under a  legal  system which  aims  to  protect  their  interests  and  preserve their rights. Therefore, when the court moulds  the  relief  by  granting  "compensation"  in  proceedings  under  Article  32 or  226 of  the  Constitution  seeking  enforcement or protection of fundamental rights, it does  so  under  the  public  law  by  way  of  penalising  the  

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wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public wrong  on the State which has failed in its public duty to protect  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizen.  The  payment  of  compensation in such cases is not to be understood, as it  is  generally  understood  in  a  civil  action  for  damages  under  the  private  law  but  in  the  broader  sense  of  providing relief by an order of making 'monetary amends'  under the public law for the wrong done due to breach of  public duty, of not protecting the fundamental rights of  the  citizen.  The  compensation  is  in  the  nature  of  'exemplary damages' awarded against the wrongdoer for  the breach of its public law duty and is independent of  the  rights  available  to  the  aggrieved  party  to  claim  compensation under the private law in an action based on  tort,  through  a  suit  instituted  in  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction or/and prosecute the offender under the penal  law.”

19.The power and jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts to grant  

monetary  compensation  in  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  respectively  

under  Articles  32 and 226 of  the  Constitution of  India to a victim  

whose  fundamental  rights  under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution  are  

violated  are  thus,  well-established.   However,  the  question  now is  

whether  on  facts  in  hand,  the  appellant  is  entitled  to  monetary  

compensation in addition to what has already been awarded to him by  

the High Court.  Having considered the case in the light of the fact-

situation stated above, we are of the opinion that the appellant does  

not deserve further monetary compensation.

20. It is true that the appellant not only suffered humiliation in the public  

gathering, and remained in judicial custody for some time but we feel  

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that for what he had undergone on 15th August 2002, some blame lies  

at his door as well. Being a practicing Advocate himself, the appellant  

was fully conversant with the court procedure and, therefore, should  

have procured a copy of memo/order dated 12th August 2002, whereby  

the  non-bailable  warrant  was  cancelled  by  the  court.   As  noticed  

above, admittedly, the appellant applied and obtained a copy of such  

order only on 16th August 2002. Though the conduct of respondent  

No.2 in arresting the appellant, ignoring his plea that the non-bailable  

warrant issued by the court in a bailable offence had been cancelled,  

deserves to be deplored, yet, strictly speaking the action of respondent  

No.2 in detaining the appellant on the strength of the warrant in his  

possession, perhaps motivated, cannot be said to be per se without the  

authority of law. In that view of the matter, in our opinion, no other  

action against respondent No.2 is warranted. He has been sufficiently  

reprimanded.

21.The last  issue  raised  that  remains  to  be  considered  is  whether  the  

Courts  can  at  all  issue  a  warrant,  called  a  “non-bailable”  warrant  

because no such terminology is found in the Code as well as in Form 2  

of the Second Schedule to the Code.  It is true that neither Section 70  

nor Section 71, appearing in Chapter VI of the Code, enumerating the  

processes to compel appearance, as also Form 2 uses the expression  

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like “non-bailable”. Section 70 merely speaks of form of warrant of  

arrest,  and ordains that  it  will  remain in force until  it  is  cancelled.  

Similarly Section 71 talks of discretionary power of Court to specify  

about the security to be taken in case the person is to be released on  

his arrest pursuant to the execution of the warrant issued under Section  

70 of the Code.  Sub-section (2) of Section 71 of the Code specifies  

the endorsements which can be made on a warrant.  Nevertheless, we  

feel  that  the  endorsement  of  the  expression  “non-bailable”  on  a  

warrant is to facilitate the executing authority as well as the person  

against  whom the  warrant  is  sought  to  be  executed  to  make  them  

aware as to the nature of the warrant  that has been issued.  In our  

view,  merely  because  Form No.2,  issued under  Section 476 of  the  

Code,  and  set  forth  in  the  Second  schedule,  nowhere  uses  the  

expression bailable or non-bailable warrant, that does not prohibit the  

Courts  from  using  the  said  word  or  expression  while  issuing  the  

warrant or even to make endorsement to that effect on the warrant so  

issued. Any endorsement/variation, which is made on such warrant for  

the benefit  of the person against whom the warrant is issued or the  

persons who are required to execute the warrant, would not render the  

warrant to be bad in law.  What is material is that there is a power  

vested in the Court to issue a warrant and that power is to be exercised  

judiciously depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.  

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Being so, merely because the warrant uses the expression like “non-

bailable” and that such terminology is not to be found in either Section  

70 or Section 71 of the Code that by itself cannot render the warrant  

bad  in  law.   The  argument  is  devoid  of  substance  and  is  rejected  

accordingly.  

22.In  view  of  the  aforegoing  discussion,  no  ground  is  made  out  

warranting our interference with the impugned judgment of the High  

Court.   We confirm the judgment and dismiss the appeal accordingly,  

but with no order as to costs.

23.However, before parting with the judgment, we feel that in order to  

prevent such a paradoxical situation, we are faced with  in the instant  

case,  and to check or obviate  the possibility of misuse of an arrest  

warrant, in addition to the statutory and constitutional requirements to  

which reference has been made above, it would be appropriate to issue  

the following guidelines to be adopted in all cases where non-bailable  

warrants are issued by the Courts:-  

(a) All  the  High Court  shall  ensure  that  the  Subordinate  Courts use printed and machine numbered Form No.2  for issuing warrant of arrest and each such form is duly  accounted for;

(b) Before  authenticating,  the  court  must  ensure  that  complete particulars of the case are mentioned on the  warrant;

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(c) The presiding Judge of the court (or responsible officer  specially  authorized  for  the  purpose  in  case  of  High  Courts)  issuing  the  warrant  should  put  his  full  and  legible  signatures  on  the  process,  also  ensuring  that  Court seal bearing complete particulars of the Court is  prominently endorsed thereon;

(d) The  Court  must  ensure  that  warrant  is  directed  to  a  particular  police  officer  (or  authority)  and,  unless  intended  to  be  open-ended,  it  must  be  returnable  whether executed or unexecuted, on or before the date  specified therein;

(e) Every  Court  must  maintain  a  register  (in  the  format  given below),  in  which each warrant  of  arrest  issued  must be entered chronologically and the serial number  of  such  entry  reflected  on  the  top  right  hand  of  the  process;

(f) No  warrant  of  arrest  shall  be  issued  without  being  entered  in  the  register  mentioned  above  and  the  concerned  court  shall  periodically  check/monitor  the  same  to  confirm  that  every  such  process  is  always  returned to the court with due report and placed on the  record of the concerned case;

(g) A register similar to the one in clause (e) supra shall be  maintained at the concerned police station. The Station  House  Officer  of  the  concerned  Police  Station  shall  ensure that each warrant of arrest issued by the Court,  when received is duly entered in the said register and is  formally  entrusted  to  a  responsible  officer  for  execution;  

(h) Ordinarily, the Courts should not give a long time for  return  or  execution  of  warrants,  as  experience  has  shown that warrants are prone to misuse if they remain  in control of executing agencies for long;

(i) On  the  date  fixed  for  the  return  of  the  warrant,  the  Court  must  insist  upon  a  compliance  report  on  the  action taken thereon by the Station House Officer of the  

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concerned Police Station or the Officer In-charge of the  concerned agency;

(j) The report on such warrants must be clear, cogent and  legible and duly forwarded by a superior police officer,  so  as  to  facilitate  fixing  of  responsibility  in  case  of  misuse;

(k) In  the  event  of  warrant  for  execution  beyond  jurisdiction of the Court issuing it, procedure laid down  in Sections 78 and 79 of the Code must be strictly and  scrupulously followed; and

(l) In the event of cancellation of the arrest warrant by the  Court, the order cancelling warrant shall be recorded in  the  case  file  and  the  register  maintained.   A  copy  thereof  shall  be  sent  to  the  concerned  authority,  requiring  the  process  to  be  returned  unexecuted  forthwith. The date of receipt of the unexecuted warrant  will  be entered in the aforesaid registers.   A copy of  such order shall also be supplied to the accused.  

Format of the Register

S. No.  

The  number  printed on  the form  used

Case title and  particulars

Name &  particulars of  the person  against whom  warrant of  arrest is  issued  (accused/ witness)

The officer/ person to  whom  directed

Date of  judicial  order  directing  Arrest  Warrant to  be issued

Date  of  issue

Date of  cancellat ion, if  any

Due  date of  return  

Report  returned  on

The action  taken as  reported

Remarks

24.We expect and hope that all the High Courts will issue appropriate  

directions  in  this  behalf  to  the  Subordinate  Courts,  which  shall  

endeavour to put into practice the aforesaid directions at the earliest,  

preferably within six months from today.

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.……………………………………                    (D.K. JAIN, J.)  

                             .…………………………………….                    (H.L. DATTU, J.)

NEW DELHI; SEPTEMBER 9, 2011. RS

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