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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 10080-10081 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 12042-12043 of 2011)

Raghbir Singh Sehrawat ..Appellant(s)

Versus

State of Haryana and others ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. More than 16 decades ago, John Stuart Mill wrote: “land differs from other  

elements of production, labour and capital in not being susceptible to infinite increase.  

Its extent is limited and the extent of the more productive kinds of it more limited still.  

It is also evident that the quantity of produce capable of being raised on any given  

piece  of  land  is  not  indefinite.   These  limited  quantities  of  land,  and  limited  

productiveness of it, are the real limits to the increase of production”.

4. In  1947,  the  first  Prime  Minister  of  India  Pt.  Jawahar  Lal  Nehru  said  

“everything  else  can  wait,  but  not  agriculture”.   In  its  fifth  and  final  report,  the  

National  Commission  on  Farmers  headed  by Dr.  M.S.  Swaminathan  observed  that  

prime farmland must be conserved for agriculture and should not be diverted for non-

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agricultural purposes, else it would seriously affect availability of food in the country  

where 60% population still depends on agriculture and people living below poverty  

line are finding it difficult to survive.   

5. Unfortunately, these words of wisdom appear to have become irrelevant for  

the State apparatus which has used the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 (for  short,  'the  

Act’) in last two decades for massive acquisition of the agricultural land in different  

parts  of  the  country,  which has  not  only adversely impacted  the  farmers,  but  also  

generated huge litigation adjudication consumes substantial time of the Courts.  These  

appeals filed against orders dated 17.5.2010 and 19.11.2010 of the Division Bench of  

the Punjab and Haryana High Court is one of many such cases which the landowners  

are compelled to file with the hope that by Court’s intervention they will be able to  

save their land.  

6. The appellant purchased 8 Kanals 4 Marlas land in village Jatheri, District  

Sonepat  in  1984  and  is  cultivating  the  same.   He  claims  to  have  constructed  a  

boundary wall and is growing different crops.  His land is surrounded by agricultural  

fields, factories and residential houses.  In the south of his land, there is a canal and a  

school.

7. By Notification dated 22.6.2006 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act, the  

Government  of  Haryana proposed  the  acquisition  of  3813  Kanals  17  Marlas  (476  

Acres 5 Kanals 17 Marlas) land situated at villages Badhmalik, Badkhalsa, Jatheri,  

Liwan,  Pritampura  and  Rai,  Tehsil  and  District  Sonepat  for  the  development  of

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Industrial Sector 38, Sonepat. The  appellant  filed  objections  under  Section  

5A(1) and pleaded that his land may not be acquired because the same was being used  

for agricultural purposes and was the only source of income for his family. The other  

landowners also submitted their respective objections.  District Revenue Officer-cum-

Land Acquisition Collector, Sonepat (for short, 'the Land Acquisition Collector’) is  

said to have heard the objectors on 29.10.2006 and made recommendations for the  

acquisition  of  some parcels  of  land and for  release  of  some other  parcels  of  land  

specified in Notification dated 22.6.2006.    Thereafter, the State Government issued  

declaration under Section 6 (1), which was notified on 20.6.2007 for the acquisition of  

216 Acres 7 Kanals and 11 Marlas land.  As a sequel to this, the Land Acquisition   

Collector passed award dated 28.11.2008.  

8. The appellant challenged the acquisition of his land in Writ Petition No.8441  

of 2009 on several grounds including the following:

(i) that the notification issued under Section 4(1) had not been published as per  

the requirement of the statute,

(ii) that he was not given opportunity of hearing in terms of Section 5A(2),

(iii) that land of large number of persons had been excluded from acquisition  

at the stage of Section 6 declaration but his land was not released and, in  

this manner, he had been discriminated,  

(iv) that  there was no justification to acquire his  land, which was the only  

source of livelihood for him and his family,  

(v)     that he was not served with notice in terms of Section 9 (3), and

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(vi) that the declaration issued under Section 6(1) was not published as per  

the requirement of Section 6(3).  

9. In the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents,  it was averred  

that the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) were duly published; that the  

appellant was given opportunity of personal hearing and that after issue of declaration  

under Section 6(1), the Land Acquisition Collector passed the award. It was further  

averred that possession of the acquired land had been taken and delivered to Haryana  

State Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSIIDC) on 28.11.2008.  

10. The appellant  filed rejoinder  affidavit  and reiterated  that  the  notifications  

issued under  Sections  4(1) and 6(1) had not  been duly published;  that  he was not  

given opportunity of hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector; that notice had not  

been  served  upon  him as  per  the  mandate  of  Section  9(3).  He  also  pleaded  that  

possession  of  land  was  still  with  him  and  the  paper  possession  taken  by  the  

respondents was inconsequential.  

11. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine the grounds on which  

the appellant challenged the acquisition of his land and dismissed the writ petition by  

relying upon the judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay  

v. Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (1996) 11 SCC 501,  

Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698, C. Padma v. Deputy  

Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 SCC 627, Municipal Council,

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Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48 and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v.   

State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695, wherein it has been held that once the award is  

passed and possession taken, the acquired land will be deemed to have vested in the  

Government and the High Court cannot entertain the writ petition filed for quashing  

the acquisition proceedings.  

12. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court in SLP(C) No.26631 of  

2010  but  withdrew  the  same  with  liberty  to  seek  review  of  the  impugned  order.  

Thereafter, he filed Review Application No.321 of 2010.  He relied upon the judgment  

of this Court in NTPC Limited v. Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC 339 and pleaded that  

possession  of  the  acquired  land cannot  be  treated  to  have  been taken because  the  

procedure laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not  

been followed. He also pleaded that paper possession taken by the respondents does  

not have any sanctity in the eye of law and physical possession of land was still with  

him.  The Division Bench rejected the review application by observing that the order  

dismissing the writ petition does not suffer from any error apparent.  However, the  

date of filing the writ petition mentioned in paragraph (1) of order dated 17.5.2010  

was corrected from 27.3.2010 to 27.3.2009.   

13. Shri  Neeraj  Jain,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellant  argued  that  the  

view taken by the High Court on the issue of maintainability of the writ petition is  

clearly  erroneous  and  the  impugned  orders  are  liable  to  be  set  aside  because  

possession taken by the respondents was only on papers and the same did not result in  

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vesting of land in the State Government.  Learned senior counsel further argued that  

the  acquisition  of  the  appellant’s  land  is  liable  to  be  quashed  because  the  Land  

Acquisition Collector had made recommendations under Section 5A(2) without giving  

him  opportunity  of  hearing.   He  submitted  that  the  official  to  whom  the  Land  

Acquisition Collector had entrusted the task of serving the notice had not performed  

his duty and submitted false report showing delivery of notice to the appellant and his   

wife.   Shri Jain referred to the typed and xerox copies of notices dated 2.11.2006  

issued to S/Shri Madan Lal s/o. Shri Jagdish, Ram Singh s/o. Chhote Lal, Jai Bhagwan  

s/o. of Hoshiar Singh, Mukhtar Singh s/o. Lakhi Ram, Rajender Singh s/o. Hoshiar  

Singh, Mohinder Singh s/o. Swarup Singh, the appellant  and his wife Smt. Moorti  

Devi and pointed out that while other addressees acknowledged the receipt of notices  

by putting their signatures, the notices shown as duly served upon the appellant and  

his wife do not contain their signatures acknowledging the receipt thereof.  Learned  

senior  counsel  also  invited  our  attention  to  Annexure  R-3  filed  with  the  counter  

affidavit of the respondents to show that the name of the appellant’s wife has been   

shown as Moorti  Devi widow of Raghbir  though he is  very much alive.   He then  

pointed out that the signatures appended against  the appellant’s name in the list  of   

objectors, who are said to have appeared before the Land Acquisition Collector on  

29.10.2006 are not  that  of the appellant  and someone had forged the signatures to  

show his presence.   Learned senior counsel submitted that notice under Section 9(3)  

was  not  served  upon  the  appellant  before  passing  of  award  dated  28.11.2008  and  

physical possession of the acquired land is still with him.  In support of this argument,   

Shri  Jain  relied  upon  the  entries  contained  in  the  copy  of  Girdawari/Record  of

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cultivation of village Jatheri, Tehsil and District Sonepat for the years 2001 to 2010,  

which  have  been  placed  on  record  as  Annexure  P-20.   Learned  senior  counsel  

emphasized that  the High Court  failed to notice that  the respondents  had prepared  

false record showing delivery of possession of the acquired land to HSIIDC and this  

has caused serious prejudice to the appellant.  In the end, Shri Jain argued that release   

of more than 50% of land proposed to be acquired is clearly indicative of total non-

application of mind by the concerned functionaries of the State and the entire exercise   

undertaken by them for the acquisition of land is liable to be nullified on the ground of  

violation of the mandate of Sections 4, 5A, 6 and 9 of the Act and, in any case, there is   

no justification for uprooting persons like the appellant, whose livelihood is dependent  

on small parcels of land or who have constructed residential houses or have set up   

small industrial units by spending lifetime earnings.

14. Learned  counsel  for  the  respondents  supported  the  impugned  orders  and  

argued  that  even  though  the  appellant  may  not  have  been  given  opportunity  of  

personal hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector, he cannot question the acquisition  

proceedings because possession of the acquired land has already been taken by the  

competent  authority and handed over  to  HSIIDC.  Learned counsel  submitted  that  

minor discrepancies in the list containing signatures of the objectors, who appeared  

before the Land Acquisition Collector on 29.10.2006, cannot lead to an inference that   

the concerned officer had not given opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant  

and his  wife.   He further  submitted that  the Land Acquisition  Collector  had made  

recommendations  after  giving  due  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  objectors  and the

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declaration  under  Section  6(1)  was  issued  by  the  State  Government  after  duly  

considering  the  recommendations  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  and  this  is  

evinced from the fact  that  various parcels of land on which residential  houses  and  

factories were existing on the date of Section 4(1) notification were not included in the  

declaration issued under Section 6(1).  Learned counsel invited our attention to Part   

Layout Plan of Sector 38 (Phase II), which has been placed on record as Annexure R-1  

along with affidavit dated 12.8.2011 of Shri Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior Manager  

(IA), HSIIDC to show that the acquired land has already been utilised for development  

of industrial estate and plots have been allotted to entrepreneurs, who are desirous of  

setting up industries.   He submitted that HSIIDC has taken up development of the  

acquired land at an estimated cost of rupees fifty eight crores and submitted that the  

acquisition of the appellant’s land may not be quashed at this stage because 24 meter  

wide road has already been constructed through his land.     

15.  We have considered the respective submissions and carefully scrutinized the  

record.

16. Since  the  appellant  has  been  non  suited  by  the  High  Court  only  on  the  

ground that possession of the acquired land had been taken by the concerned officers   

and the same will be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from all   

encumbrances, we think that it will be appropriate to first consider this facet of his  

challenge to the impugned orders.   In the writ  petition filed by him, the appellant  

categorically averred that physical possession of the acquired land was with him and

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he  has  been  cultivating  the  same.  This  assertion  finds  support  from  the  entries  

contained in Girdawari/Record of cultivation, Book No.1, village Jatheri, Tehsil and  

District Sonepat (years 2001 to 2010).  A reading of these entries shows that during  

those years crops of wheat, paddy and chari were grown by the appellant and at the  

relevant time, i.e. the date on which possession of the acquired land is said to have  

been taken and delivered to HSIIDC, paddy crop was standing on 5 Kanals 2 Marlas  

of land.  The respondents have not questioned the genuineness and correctness of the   

entries  contained in the Girdawaris.   Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve or  

discard the same.  That apart, it is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any  

evidence  has  been  produced  before  this  Court  to  show  that  the  appellant  had  

unauthorisedly taken possession of the acquired land after 28.11.2008. It is also not  

the  pleaded  case  of  the  respondents  that  the  appellant  had  been  given  notice  that   

possession of the acquired land would be taken on 28.11.2008 and he should remain  

present at the site.  Therefore, Rojnamcha Vakyati prepared by Sadar Kanungo and  

three Patwaris showing delivery of possession to Shri Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior  

Manager (IA), HSIIDC, Rai, which is a self serving document, cannot be made basis  

for  recording a finding that  possession of the acquired land had been taken by the  

concerned  revenue  authorities.   The  respondents  have  not  produced  any  other  

evidence to show that actual possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had  

been taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he was present at the site when  

possession  of  the  acquired  land was  delivered  to  the  Senior  Manager  of  HSIIDC.  

Indeed, it is not even the case of the respondents that any independent witness was   

present at the time of taking possession of the acquired land.  The Land Acquisition  

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Collector and his subordinates may claim credit of having acted swiftly inasmuch as  

immediately after  pronouncement  of the award,  possession of  the acquired land of  

village  Jatheri  is  said  to  have  taken  from the  landowners  and handed  over  to  the  

officer of HSIIDC but keeping in view the fact that crop was standing on the land, the  

exercise undertaken by the respondents showing delivery of possession cannot but be  

treated as farce and inconsequential.  We have no doubt that if the High Court had  

summoned the relevant records and scrutinized the same, it would not have summarily  

dismissed the writ petition on the premise that possession of the acquired land had  

been taken and the same vested in the State Government.

17. The legality of the mode and manner of taking possession of the acquired  

land has been considered in a number of cases.  In Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M. D.  

Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700,  Untwalia, J. referred to provisions of Order 21 Rules 35,  

36, 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure and opined that delivery of symbolic   

possession should be construed as delivery of actual possession of the right, title and  

interest of the judgment-debtor.  His Lordship further observed that if the property is  

land over which there is no building or structure, then delivery of possession over the  

judgment-debtor’s property becomes complete and effective against him the moment  

the delivery is effected by going upon the land.    The learned Judge went on to say:

“When a public notice is published at a convenient place or near the land  to be taken stating that the Government intends to take possession of the  land, then ordinarily and generally there should be no question of resisting  or impeding the taking of possession. Delivery or giving of possession by  the owner or the occupant of the land is not required. The Collector can  enforce the surrender of the land to himself under Section 47 of the Act if  impeded in taking possession. On publication of the notice under Section  9(1) claims to compensation for all interests in the land has to be made; be

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it the interest of the owner or of a person entitled to the occupation of the  land. On the taking of possession of the land under Section 16 or 17(1) it  vests  absolutely  in  the  Government  free  from all  encumbrances.  It  is,  therefore, clear that taking of possession within the meaning of Section 16  or 17(1) means taking of possession on the spot. It is neither a possession  on paper nor a ‘symbolical’ possession as generally understood in civil  law. But the question is what is the mode of taking possession? The Act is   silent on the point. Unless possession is taken by the written agreement of  the party concerned the mode of taking possession obviously would be for  the authority to go upon the land and to do some act which would indicate  that the authority has taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of  a  declaration  by  beat  of  drum  or  otherwise  or  by  hanging  a  written  declaration on the spot that the authority has taken possession of the land.  The presence of the owner or the occupant of the land to effectuate the  taking of possession is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under  Section 9(1) of the Act is required. When possession has been taken, the  owner or the occupant of the land is dispossessed.  Once possession has  been taken the land vests in the Government.”

Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta, J., who constituted the majority did  

not agree with Untwalia, J. and observed as under :  

“We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take  possession  of  the  land  acquired  by it  under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests in the  land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking  ‘symbolical’  possession  in  the  sense  understood  by  judicial  decisions  under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper  be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting  of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the  land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of  the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land  admits of. There can be no hard-and-fast rule laying down what act would  be sufficient  to constitute  taking of possession of land. We should not,  therefore,  be taken as laying down an absolute  and inviolable  rule that  merely going on the spot and making a declaration by beat  of drum or  otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking of possession of land in  every case.  But here, in our opinion, since the land was lying fallow and  there was no crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tahsildar in  going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose of determining  what part was waste and arable and should, therefore, be taken possession  of  and  determining  its  extent,  was  sufficient  to  constitute  taking  of  possession.  It appears that  the appellant  was not  present  when this was

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done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of the owner or the occupant of the  land is not necessary to effectuate the taking of possession. It is also not  strictly necessary as a matter of legal requirement that notice should be  given to the owner or the occupant of the land that possession would be  taken at a particular time, though it may be desirable where possible, to  give  such  notice  before  possession  is  taken  by the  authorities,  as  that  would eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive transaction  of  taking of mere paper possession,  without  the occupant  or the owner  ever coming to know of it.”

18. In Banda Development  Authority, Banda v. Moti  Lal  Agarwal and others  

(2011) 5 SCC 394, the Court referred to the judgments in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v.   

M. D. Bhagwat (supra),  Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State  

of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212,  P. K.  Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka (2005) 12 SCC  

489, NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta (supra), Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of  NCT  

of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501 and culled out the following propositions:

“(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act would constitute  taking of possession of the acquired land. (ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State authority concerned  to go to the spot and prepare a panchnama will ordinarily be treated as  sufficient to constitute taking of possession. (iii) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/structure exists,   mere going on the spot by the authority concerned will, by itself, be not   sufficient  for taking possession.  Ordinarily, in such cases,  the authority  concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the building/structure  or  the  person  who  has  cultivated  the  land  and  take  possession  in  the  presence  of  independent  witnesses  and  get  their  signatures  on  the  panchnama.  Of  course,  refusal  of  the  owner  of  the  land  or  building/structure may not lead to an inference that the possession of the  acquired land has not been taken. (iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not be possible for  the acquiring/designated authority to take physical possession of each and  every parcel of the land and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession  is taken by preparing appropriate document in the presence of independent  witnesses and getting their signatures on such document. (v)  If  beneficiary of  the  acquisition  is  an  agency/instrumentality  of  the  State and 80% of the total compensation is deposited in terms of Section

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17(3-A) and substantial portion of the acquired land has been utilised in  furtherance of the particular public purpose, then the court may reasonably  presume that possession of the acquired land has been taken.”

  19. If the appellant’s case is examined in the light of the propositions culled out  

in Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, we have no  

hesitation to hold that possession of the acquired land had not been taken from the  

appellant on 28.11.2008, i.e. the day on which the award was declared by the Land  

Acquisition  Collector  because  crops  were  standing  on  several  parcels  of  land  

including  the  appellant’s  land  and  possession  thereof  could  not  have  been  taken  

without giving notice to the landowners.  That apart, it  was humanly impossible to  

give notice to large number of persons on the same day and take actual possession of  

land comprised in various survey numbers (total measuring 214 Acres 5 Kanals and 2  

Marlas).  

20.  In view of the above discussion, we hold that the record prepared by the  

revenue authorities showing delivery of possession of the acquired land to HSIIDC  

has no legal sanctity and the High Court committed serious error by dismissing the  

writ  petition on the specious ground that possession of the acquired land had been  

taken and the same vested in the State Government in terms of Section 16.   

21. The judgments on which reliance has been placed in the impugned order are  

clearly distinguishable.   In Municipal  Corporation of Greater  Bombay v. Industrial  

Development and Investment Company (P) Limited (supra), this Court reversed the  

judgment of the Bombay High Court which had quashed the acquisition of land under

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the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 read with the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and  

Town Planning Act, 1966.  This Court noted that the respondent had approached the  

High Court after a gap of four years’ and held:

“It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the  writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have  become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High  Court  has,  no  doubt,  discretionary  powers  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  to  quash  the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  and  declaration  under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into  pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was  taken,  the Court  should  not  have exercised  its  power to quash the award  which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising  the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created  in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the  High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the  learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches.”

Similar  view  was  expressed  in  C.  Padma  v.  Deputy  Secretary  to  the  

Government of Tamil Nadu (supra), Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (supra),  

Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra) and Swaika Properties  

(P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra).  In all the cases, challenge to the acquisition  

proceedings was negatived primarily on the ground of delay.  An additional  factor  

which influenced this Court  was that  physical  possession of the acquired land had  

been  taken  by the  concerned  authorities.   In  none  of  these  cases,  the  landowners   

appear  to  have  questioned  the  legality  of  the  mode  adopted  by  the  concerned  

authorities  for  taking possession of the acquired land.   Therefore,  these judgments   

cannot  be  relied  upon  for  sustaining  the  High  Court’s  negation  of  the  appellant’s  

challenge to the acquisition of his land.  

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22. The next issue which merits consideration is whether the acquisition of the  

appellant’s land is vitiated due to violation of Section 5A(2) and the rules of natural   

justice.   A careful scrutiny of record reveals that the Land Acquisition Collector had  

fixed 29.10.2006 as the date for hearing the objections.   He issued   notices dated  

2.11.2006 to inform the objectors that hearing will take place on 29.11.2006 at 11 a.m.  

in P.W.D. Rest House, Rai and asked them to appear either in person or through their   

agent. The notices were delivered to some of the landowners, who acknowledged the  

receipt thereof.  However, the notices issued to the appellant and his wife were not   

served  upon  them.   This  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  other  objectors  had  

acknowledged the receipt of notices by putting their signatures, the notices allegedly  

served upon the appellant and his wife do not bear their signatures and no explanation   

has  been  offered  by  the  respondents  about  this  omission.   The  Land  Acquisition  

Collector  proceeded to decide the objections  by assuming that  the notice has been  

delivered  to  all  the  objectors.   Not  only  this,  someone  in  the  office  of  Land  

Acquisition Collector forged the appellant’s signature to show his presence in P.W.D.  

Rest  House,  Rai  on  29.11.2006.   A  bare  comparison  of  the  signatures  appearing  

against the appellant’s name at serial No.90 (page 184 of the paper book) and those  

appearing  on  the  vakalatnama  and  affidavit  filed  in  support  of  the  special  leave  

petitions shows that there is no similarity in the two signatures.  Not only this, in the  

list, appended with Annexure R-3, the appellant’s wife has been shown as widow of  

Raghbir Singh.  It is impossible to believe that a woman who knows how to sign a  

document would put signatures against her name showing her as a widow despite the  

fact that her husband is alive. When  the  Court  pointed  out  to  the  learned

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counsel for the respondents that the signatures appearing against serial No. 90 at page  

8 of Annexure R-3 (page 184 of the paper book) do not tally with the signatures of the  

appellant  on  the  vakalatnama  and  the  affidavit  filed  in  support  of  special  leave  

petitions, the learned counsel expressed his inability to offer any explanation.  He also  

expressed  helplessness  in  defending  the  description  of  the  appellant’s  wife  Smt.  

Moorti Devi as widow of Raghbir Singh.

23. From what we have stated above, it is clear that the appellant had not been  

given opportunity of hearing as per the mandate of Section 5A(2).  The importance of  

Section 5A(2) was highlighted by this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973)  

2 SCC 337 in the following words:

“Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the Collector to  give  an  objector  an  opportunity  of  being  heard.  After  hearing  all  objections  and  making  further  inquiry  he  is  to  make  a  report  to  the  appropriate  Government  containing  his  recommendation  on  the  objections. The decision of the appropriate Government on the objections  is then final.  The declaration under Section 6 has to  be made after  the  appropriate Government is satisfied,  on a consideration of the report,  if  any,  made  by the  Collector  under  Section  5-A(2).  The legislature  has,  therefore,  made  complete  provisions  for  the  persons  interested  to  file  objections against  the proposed acquisition and for the disposal  of their  objections. It is only in cases of urgency that special powers have been  conferred on the appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions  of Section 5-A.”

In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, this Court observed:

“….it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man’s property is  a  serious  matter  and  the  smaller  the  man  the  more  serious  the  matter.  Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and  pre-emptive  of  arbitrariness,  and  denial  of  this  administrative  fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons. Save in  real  urgency  where  public  interest  does  not  brook  even  the

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minimum time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities  should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19), burke an enquiry  under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering process, pending for  years and suddenly exciting  itself  into  immediate  forcible  taking,  makes  a  travesty  of  emergency  power.”

In Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255, this  Court  

reiterated that  compliance with provisions of Section 5A is  sine qua non  for  valid  

acquisition and observed as under:

“The  decision  of  the  Collector  is  supposedly  final  unless  the  appropriate  Government  chooses  to  interfere  therein  and  cause  affectation, suo motu or on the application of any person interested  in  the  land.  These  requirements  obviously  lead  to  the  positive  conclusion that  the proceeding before the Collector  is  a blend of  public and individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to  be  interested,  in  the  land  is  to  be  served  personally  of  the  notification,  giving  him  the  opportunity  of  objecting  to  the  acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the objection is  to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that the enquiry into the  objection is to focus his individual cause as well as public cause.  That  at  the  time  of  the  enquiry,  for  which  prior  notice  shall  be  essential, the objector has the right to appear in person or through  pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and argument.”

24. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India v. Mukesh Hans (2004)   

8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7  

SCC 627, Anand Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) and Radhy Shyam v. State of U. P.  

(supra).

25. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules of natural justice  

have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5A with a view to ensure that before any  

person  is  deprived  of  his  land  by way of  compulsory  acquisition,  he  must  get  an

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opportunity  to  oppose  the  decision  of  the  State  Government  and/or  its  

agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land.  At the hearing, the  

objector  can  make  an  effort  to  convince  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  to  make  

recommendation against the acquisition of his land.  He can also point out that land  

proposed to be acquired is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification   

issued  under  Section  4(1).   Not  only  this,  he  can  produce  evidence  to  show that  

another piece of land is available and the same can be utilized for execution of the   

particular project or scheme.  Though, it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list   

of  the  grounds  on  which  the  landowner  can  persuade  the  Collector  to  make  

recommendations against the proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is  

that  the  Collector  should  give  a  fair  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  objector  and  

objectively  consider  his  plea  against  the  acquisition  of  land.   Only  thereafter,  he  

should make recommendations  supported by brief  reasons  as to  why the particular  

piece of land should or should not be acquired and whether or not the plea put forward  

by the objector merits acceptance.  In other words, the recommendations made by the  

Collector  must  reflect  objective  application  of  mind  to  the  objections  filed  by the  

landowners and other interested persons.  

26. Before  concluding,  we  deem it  necessary  to  observe  that  in  recent  past,  

various State Governments and their functionaries have adopted very casual approach  

in dealing with matters relating to the acquisition of land in general and the rural areas  

in particular and in a large number of cases, the notifications issued under Sections  

4(1) and 6(1) with or without the aid of Section 17 and the consequential actions have

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been nullified by the Courts on the ground of violation of the mandatory procedure  

and the rules of natural justice.  The disposal  of cases filed by the landowners and  

others  take  some  time  and  the  resultant  delay  has  great  adverse  impact  on  

implementation of the projects of public importance.  Of course, the delay in deciding  

such cases may not be of much significance when the State and its agencies want to  

confer benefit upon private parties by acquiring land in the name of public purpose.   

It  if  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  appreciate  as  to  why  the  State  and  its  

instrumentalities resort to massive acquisition of land and that too without complying  

with the mandate of the statute.  As noted by the National Commission on Farmers,   

the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of planned development or industrial  

growth would seriously affect the availability of food in future.  After independence,  

the administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough investment in the rural   

areas  and  those  who  have  been  doing  agriculture  have  not  been  educated  and  

empowered  to  adopt  alternative  sources  of  livelihood.   If  land  of  such  persons  is  

acquired, not only the current but the future generations are ruined and this is one of  

the reasons why the farmers who are deprived of their holdings commit suicide.  It  

also appears that the concerned authorities are totally unmindful of the plight of those   

sections of the society, who are deprived of their only asset like small house, small  

industrial  unit  etc.   They do not  realise  that  having one’s own house  is  a lifetime  

dream of  majority  of  population  of  this  country.   Economically  affluent  class  of  

society can easily afford to have one or more houses at any place or locality in the  

country but other sections of the society find it extremely difficult to purchase land  

and construct house.  Majority of people spend their lifetime savings for building a

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small house so that their families may be able to live with a semblance of dignity.  

Therefore, it is wholly unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive such persons of  

their  houses  by  way  of  the  acquisition  of  land  in  the  name  of  development  of  

infrastructure or industrialisation.  Similarly, some people set up small industrial unit  

after seeking permission from the competent authority.  They do so with the hope of  

generating additional income for their family.  If the land on which small units are  

established is acquired, their hopes are shattered.  Therefore, before acquiring private  

land the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities should, as far as possible, use land  

belonging to the State for the specified public purposes.  If the acquisition of private  

land becomes absolutely necessary, then too, the concerned authorities must strictly  

comply with the relevant statutory provisions and the rules of natural justice.

27. In the result, the appeals are allowed.  The impugned orders are set aside.  As a  

corollary to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the acquisition of  

his land is declared illegal and quashed.  The appellant shall get cost of Rs.2,50,000/- from  

the respondents.   

………………….………………J. (G.S. Singhvi)

....……………….…………………J. (Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya)

New Delhi, November 23, 2011.   

ITEM NO.1A           COURT NO.6             SECTION IVB

           S U P R E M E   C O U R T   O F   I N D I A                          RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS                      Civil Appeals Nos......./2011 @ Petition(s)  for  Special  Leave  to  Appeal  (Civil)  No(s).12042- 12043/2011

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(From  the  judgement  and  order(s)  dated  17/05/2010  in  CWP  No.8441/2009 and order dated 19/11/2010 in RA No.321/2010 in CWP  No.8441/2009 of The HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH)

RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT                            Petitioner(s)

                VERSUS

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.                           Respondent(s)

[HEARD  BY  HON'BLE  G.S.SINGHVI  AND  HON'BLE  SUDHANSU  JYOTI  MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]

Date: 23/11/2011  These Petitions were called on for Judgment today.

For Petitioner(s) Dr. Kailash Chand,Adv.(Not present)

For Respondent(s) Mr. Ravindra Bana,Adv. Nos.1 to 3

Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi pronounced the judgment  of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr.Justice  Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya.

Delay condoned.

Leave granted.

For the reasons recorded in the Reportable Judgment which  is  placed  on  the  file,  the  appeals  are  allowed.  The  impugned orders are set aside.  As a corollary to this, the  writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the  acquisition of his land is declared illegal and quashed.  The  appellant  shall  get  cost  of  Rs.2,50,000/-  from  the  respondents.

(Parveen Kr. Chawla) Court Master

(Phoolan Wati Arora) Court Master

[Signed Reportable judgment is placed on the file]