REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos.1269-1270  OF 2019 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) Nos. 21402-21403 OF 2015

PYARELAL                                                                  .... APPELLANT         

Versus

SHUBHENDRA PILANIA (MINOR) THROUGH NATURAL GUARDIAN (FATHER) SHRI PRADEEP KUMAR PILANIA & ORS.      ....RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DR  DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

1 Leave granted.  

2  The  appeals  in  the  present  case  arise  from two  orders  dated  13

November 2014 and 2 March 2015 of the Rajasthan High Court in exercise of

its revisional jurisdiction. By an order dated 13 November 2014, the learned

Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  allowed  the  revision  petition  filed  by  the

respondents.  The challenge was to an order dated 26 August 2013 of the

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Additional Civil  Judge (Junior Division),  Sikar rejecting the objection to the

jurisdiction of the civil court to try the suit filed by the appellant. The appellant

filed a petition for review before the High Court.  The learned single Judge

dismissed the petition on 2 March 2015.  

3 The family tree of the appellant is depicted below: Bholu (deceased)

Mangalram (deceased)             Rukma Devi (wife, deceased) Bhagwan Singh (R3) Kushali Devi  Pradeep Kumar (R2)  Shubhendra (R1)  

Pyarelal (Appellant) Amrita (R7) Shanti (R8) Kamla (R9) Santosh (R10)

The Sub-Registrar and Tehsildar are respondent Nos. 4 and 5 respectively.

4 The appellant alleged that on the death of Mangalram and Rukma Devi,

the agricultural  land in  question devolved upon respondent  No.  3  and his

sister Kushali Devi (mother of the Plaintiff) in equal shares. Kushali Devi died

intestate  and  her  share  devolved  upon  her  children  –  the  appellant  and

respondent Nos. 7 to 10 in equal measure. The appellant and respondent

Nos. 7 to 10 claim to be in possession of their share in the suit property. The

appellant alleged that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 colluded with the Sarpanch of

the village and got the name of respondent No. 3 recorded as the owner of

the land belonging to the appellant and respondent Nos. 7 to 10. Thereafter,

respondent Nos. 2 and 3 registered a gift deed dated 10 February 2011 in

favour of respondent No. 1.

5 On  13  March  2012,  the  appellant  filed  a  civil  suit1 against  the

respondents praying that the gift deed dated 10 February 2011 be declared

void to the extent of the share claimed by the appellant and that respondent

1  62/2012

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Nos. 1 to 5 be restrained from alienating the suit property. Respondent Nos. 1

to 3 filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 151 of the

Code of Civil  Procedure 19082 contending that the appellant, who is not a

recorded khatedar of the suit land, had filed a suit before the revenue court for

the declaration of his  khatedari right and the suit preferred by the appellant

before  the  Trial  court  was  liable  to  be  dismissed.  In  reply,  the  appellant

admitted that a suit had been filed before the revenue court for the declaration

of his khatedari right but contended that the civil court had jurisdiction to grant

the relief sought.

6 On 26 August, 2013, the Trial court dismissed the application, taking

the view that any conclusion on the question of jurisdiction can only be drawn

after framing preliminary issues and recording evidence of the parties. The

objections were dismissed by Trial court with the following observations:  “6.  So far  as  present  application is  concerned,  in  the said application, the first  ground taken by the defendants is that the plaintiff and the defendant Nos. 7 to 10 are not recorded kashtkar of the disputed land and they have already filed suit in the revenue court for getting their khatedari right declared. Therefore, civil courts have no jurisdiction to try the present suit.

7. In this context, the defendants cited Rukmani v Bhola and others  (SB  Civil  Misc.  Appeal  No.  553/1993)  dated 20.12.2011, while plaintiff cited DNJ 2013(1) Rajasthan 358. In  the  citation  of  the  defendants,  though the  Hon’ble  High Court has set this principle that if the relief of declaring any document ineffective and void is sought for and in pith and substance,  the  suit  is  related  with  khatedari rights,  then revenue court would have jurisdiction to try the suit because until  and unless  revenue  court  has  not  declared  khatedari rights,  the  civil  court  cannot  declare  the  document  void. Though  in  the  citation  cited  by  the  defendants  as  stated above, the suit  must be related for the declaration of basic khatedari rights, then only the jurisdiction is vested unto the revenue court, but if we carefully peruse the said citation then in that case the trial court has framed issues on the basis of pleadings of  the plaint  and written statement of  the parties and  thereafter  recording  evidence  of  the  parties  on  the

2 “The Code”

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preliminary issue, the suit has been returned back for filing in the concerned court in view of Order VII Rule 11 CPC. In the present case, issues are yet to be framed. The plaintiff  has pleaded in the plaint that his mother has one half share in the suit  land hence on this point any conclusion can be drawn only after framing a preliminary issue and recording evidence of the parties.”

7 Respondent  Nos.  1  to  3  challenged  the  order  of  the  Trial  court  in

revision under Section 115 of the Code. The Rajasthan High Court allowed

the  revision  by  its  judgement  dated  13  November  2014.  Relying  on  the

averments in the plaint, the High Court held that the suit was barred by the

provisions of  the Rajasthan Tenancy Act,  1955.3 The High Court  observed

thus:  “Apparently  and looking to the prayer of  the plaintiff  in  the Trial court, it can easily be said that the suit was triable only by the revenue court under the provisions of Section 88 and Section 207 of the Act of 1955 and hence it can further be said that the suit from the averment in the plaint appears to be barred under the provisions of the Act of 1955 and the suit should  have  been  rejected  on  that  count  alone  under  the provisions of Order VII Rule 11(d) of Code of Civil Procedure and hence the order dated 26.8.2013 passed by Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) No.2, Sikar in Civil Suit No.62/2012 B.T. No.20/12  deserves  to  be  quashed  and  set  aside  which  is hereby quashed and set aside.”

The review petition preferred by appellant was dismissed.

8 Assailing  the  decision  of  the  High  Court,  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant urged the following submissions:  (i)  The relief claimed in the suit  is not covered under Section 207 and the

Third  Schedule  of  the Tenancy Act  and a civil  court  has jurisdiction  to

decide the existing dispute; and  (ii) A suit before a civil court is maintainable even though a suit for declaring

khatedari rights has been filed before the revenue court.  

3 Tenancy Act

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9 On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has urged the

following submissions:

i) The jurisdiction of a civil court is barred in respect of suits and applications

of the nature specified in the Third Schedule of the Tenancy Act;  ii) A civil  court  has  no  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  suit  or  proceeding  with

respect to any matter arising under the Tenancy Act or the Rules made

under it, provided that a remedy by way of a suit, application or appeal or

otherwise is provided in the Act; and  iii) The issue of jurisdiction travels to the root of or to the inherent lack of

jurisdiction.

10 These submissions fall for our consideration.

11 Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides thus:

 “9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred - The Courts shall  (subject  to  the  provisions  herein  contained)  have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

Explanation I - A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that  such  right  may  depend  entirely  on  the  decision  of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.

Explanation  ll  -  For  the  purposes  of  this  section,  it  is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.”

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Section  9  empowers  civil  courts  to  try  all  suits  of  a  civil  nature  unless

expressly or impliedly barred by any statute.

12 Section 256 of the Tenancy Act provides thus:

“256.  Bar  to  jurisdiction  of  civil  courts —  (i)  Save  as otherwise provided specifically by or under this Act, no suit or proceeding  shall  lie  in  any  civil  court  with  respect  to  any matter arising under this Act or the rules made thereunder, for which  a  remedy  by  way  of  suit,  application,  appeal  or otherwise is provided therein.

(2)  Save  as  aforesaid  no  order  passed  by  the  State Government or by any revenue court or officer in exercise of the  powers  conferred  by  this  Act  or  the  rules  made thereunder, shall be liable to be questioned in any civil court.”

Section 256 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts, save as otherwise provided

under the Tenancy Act. Civil courts are expressly barred from trying a suit or

proceeding with respect  to  matters arising under the Tenancy Act  or rules

made under it  for which a remedy by way of a suit,  application, appeal or

otherwise is provided in the Tenancy Act.  

13 Section 207 of the Tenancy Act provides thus:  

“207. Suits and applications cognizable by revenue court only—  

(1)  All  suits  and applications of  the nature specified in  the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.

(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognizance of any such suit  or application or of any suit  or application based on a  cause of  action  in  respect  of  which  any  relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.

Explanation.— If  the  cause of  action is  one in  respect  of which  relief  might  be  granted  by  the  revenue  court,  it  is immaterial  that  the  relief  asked  for  from  the  civil  court  is greater  than,  or  additional  to,  or  is  not  identical  with,  that which the revenue court could have granted.”

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Section 207 of the Tenancy Act states that no court other than a revenue court

shall take cognizance of suits and applications of the nature specified in the

Third Schedule. Such suits can be heard and determined by a revenue court

which has exclusive jurisdiction. The explanation clarifies that if the cause of

action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue court,

then it is immaterial that a relief sought from the civil court is greater than, in

addition to or not identical to the relief sought from the revenue court. Where a

suit is of a nature specified in any of the provisions of the Third Schedule, the

bar under Section 256 is attracted and the revenue courts  have exclusive

jurisdiction to try the suit.  

14 In Bank of Baroda v Moti Bhai4, a two judge Bench of this Court dealt

with the question of jurisdiction under Sections 207 and 256 of the Tenancy

Act. A bank had sanctioned a demand loan facility to the respondent for which

the respondent executed a promissory note and a simple mortgage in favour

of the bank. On his failure to repay the loan, the Bank instituted a suit in the

civil court for recovery. The respondent raised a preliminary objection that the

suit was essentially one for enforcing the mortgage and that the revenue court

had the exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the suit by reason of the provisions

contained in the Tenancy Act. The Trial court dismissed the objection. Allowing

the  revision  filed  by  the  respondent,  the  High  Court  held  that  that  the

mortgage deed in respect of agricultural lands formed an essential part of the

cause of action. Upon an analysis of Sections 207 and 256 of the Tenancy

4 (1985) 1 SCC 475

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Act, a two judge Bench of this Court set aside the judgment of the High Court

with the following reasons: “5.  A combined  reading  of  these  two  sections  would show that the jurisdiction of civil courts is barred only in respect of suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule to the Act and in respect of suits or applications  based  on a  cause  of  action  in  respect  of which any relief could be obtained by means of a suit or application of the nature specified in the Third Schedule. The civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain a suit or proceeding with respect to any matter arising under the Act  or  the  Rules  made  thereunder,  provided  that  a remedy  by  way  of  a  suit,  application  or  appeal  or otherwise is provided in the Act.

A loan given by a Bank to  an agriculturist,  which is  in  the nature  of  a  commercial  transaction,  is  outside  the contemplation  of  the  Act  and  can,  by  no  stretch  of imagination,  be said to  be in  respect  of  any matter  arising under the Act… The business of the Bank, in so far as lending transactions  are  concerned,  is  not  to  lend  moneys  on mortgages but the business is to lend moneys.

8. On the question of jurisdiction, one must always have regard to the substance of the matter and not to the form of the suit. If  the matter  is  approached from that  point  of view, it  would be clear that, primarily and basically, the suit filed by the Bank is one for recovering the amount which is due to it from the respondents on the basis of the promissory note executed by respondent 1 and the guarantee given by respondents 2 and 3.”  

(Emphasis supplied)

Section 207 read with Section 256 of the Tenancy Act bars the jurisdiction of

the civil courts in respect of suits and applications of the nature specified in

the Third Schedule to the Act. The question before us is whether the relief

claimed by the appellant can be granted exclusively by a revenue court under

the provisions of the Tenancy Act.

15 Section 88 of the Tenancy Act provides thus:

“88. Suits for declaration of right:-

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(1) Any person claiming to be a tenant or a co-tenant may sue for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in such joint tenancy.

(2) A tenant of Khudkasht may sue for a declaration that he is such a tenant.

(3) A sub-tenant may sue the person from whom he holds for declaration that he is a sub-tenant.

(4) A landholder other than a State Government may sue a person claiming to be a tenant or co-tenant of a holding or a tenant of Khudkasht or a sub-tenant for a declaration of the right of such person.”

Sl. No. 5 of the Third Schedule provides thus:

“THE THIRD SCHEDULE Suits, Applications and Appeals under the Act

(See Sections 207, 214, 215 & 217)

S.  No.  

Section  of Act

Description of suit, application or appeal  

Period of limitation

Time  from  which  period  begins to run

Proper  Court Fees

Court/ Officer  competent  to dispose  of

5. 88 Suit for declaration of the plaintiffs  right :-

(i) as a tenant, or (ii) as a tenant of  

khudkasht, or (iii) as a sub-tenant, or (iv) for a share in a joint  

tenancy  

None One rupee Assistant  Collector  

         ”

Sl.  No. 5 in the Third Schedule read with Section 207 of the Tenancy Act

stipulates that a suit for the declaration of a right provided in Section 88 would

lie  before  a  revenue  court.  In  a  suit  where  the  relief  sought  for  is  the

declaration of the right stipulated in Section 88, Sections 207 and 256 read

with the Third Schedule bar the jurisdiction of civil courts and vest jurisdiction

exclusively with a revenue court.

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16 It  is  admitted  that  the  suit  property  is  agricultural  property  and  the

appellant has filed a suit before the revenue court for the declaration of his

khatedari rights.

17 Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code provides thus:

“11. Rejection of plaint. – The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-

(a) … (b) … (c) … (d) Where  the  suit  appears  from  the  statement  in  the

plaint to be barred by any law;”

A plaint shall be rejected where the suit appears from the averments made in

the plaint to be barred by any law. To determine whether the relief sought by

the  appellant  before  the  Trial  court  is  a  relief  that  may  be  granted  by  a

revenue court and is consequently barred under the provisions of the Tenancy

Act,  the prayer  in  the plaint  before the Trial  court  may be examined.  The

prayer reads thus:

“a) That the suit may be decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against defendants No. 1 to 3 and the gift deed executed and registered on 10.2.2011 at Book No. 1 Volume No. 737, Page No. 53,  Sr. No. 2011001797 in the Office of Sub Registrar Sikar may kindly be declared as exhibitory, illegal, ab-initio, void and ineffective and may be cancelled to the extent of ½ share  of  the  defendant  and  plaintiff  Nos.  7  to  10  in  the agricultural  land  comprised  Khasra  No.  395  Rakba  0.24 Hectare, Khasra No 395 Rakba 0.24 Hectare, Khasra No. 410 Rakba 0.87 Hectare situated in Village Ajeetpura, Tehsil and District Sikar and for putting a note to this effect on the gift deed;  a  copy  of  the  judgment  and  decree  may  kindly  be forwarded to the Sub Registrar, Sikar;  

(b) That defendant Nos. 1 to 5 may kindly be restrained not to transfer, mortgage, damage, sale or transfer the ½ share of the agricultural land which is in possession and cultivation of the plaintiff  and defendant  Nos.  7 to 10 out  of  the land of Khasra  No.  395 Rakba 0.24  Hectare  and Khasra  No.  410 Rakba 0.87 Hectare situated in village Ajeetpura, Tehsil and

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District Sikar described in the said gift deed and not to disturb their cultivatory possession and not to raise any construction thereon  and  not  to  mortgage,  gift,  transfer  or  create  any charge and not to transfer the same and not to register any mortgage deed and not to change the revenue records on the basis of the gift deed in question and further not to do such acts through his agents, servants and representatives etc. in any manner;  

(c)  That  cost  of  the  suit  may  be  granted  in  favour  of  the plaintiff and against the defendant Nos. 2 and 3;

(d) Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper be also passed in favour of the plaintiff.”

18 The appellant has prayed that the gift deed dated 10 February, 2011 be

declared void to the extent of the share claimed by the appellant and that

respondent  Nos.  1  to  5  be  restrained  from  alienating  the  share  of  the

appellant.  The  civil  court  may  decree  the  relief  prayed  only  if  it  is  first

determined that the appellant is entitled to khatedari rights in the suit property.

Under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, the jurisdiction to declare khatedari

rights vests exclusively with the revenue courts. Only after such determination

may the civil court proceed to decree the relief as prayed. The explanation to

Section 207 clarifies that if the cause of action in respect of which relief is

sought can be granted only by the revenue court, then it is immaterial that the

relief asked from the civil court is greater than, or in addition to or not identical

with the relief which the revenue court would have granted. In view of this

matter,  the civil  court  may not  grant  relief  until  the  khatedari rights  of  the

appellant have been decreed by a revenue court.

19 A claimant whose  khatedari rights have been decreed by a revenue

court is however on a different footing from a claimant whose khatedari rights

are pending adjudication by a revenue court. Where the khatedari rights are

yet to be decreed, a claimant must first approach the revenue courts. The

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relief to declare the gift deed void and to restrain respondents Nos. 1 to 5 from

interfering with or alienating the property vesting in a civil court may be sought

for in a suit by a claimant in whom khatedari rights have been decreed by a

revenue court.

20 In  Shri Ram  v A D J5,  a suit  was filed before the civil  court for the

cancellation of a sale deed of an agricultural land on the grounds of fraud and

impersonation. The defendant contended that the suit  is barred by Section

331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950

which reads thus: “331. Cognizance of suits etc. under this Act. – (1) Except as provided by or under this Act, no Court other than a Court mentioned in Column 4 of Schedule II shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908),  take  cognizance  of  any  suit,  application,  or proceedings  mentioned  in  Column  3  thereof  or  of  a  suit, application  or  proceedings  based  on  a  cause  of  action  in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application; …

Explanation.- If the cause of action is one in respect of which relief may be granted by the revenue Court, it is immaterial that  the  relief  asked  for  from  the  civil  Court  may  not  be incidental  to  that  which  the  revenue  Court  would  have granted.”

The question before this court was whether a recorded tenure-holder having

prima facie title in his favour and in possession was required to file a suit in

the revenue court,  or where the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain and

decide the suit seeking relief of cancellation of a void document. Upholding

the jurisdiction of civil court to try the suit, a two judge Bench of this Court

differentiated between a recorded tenure holder, and an unrecorded tenure

holder with the following observations:

5 (2001) 3 SCC 24  

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“7.  …we are  of  the  opinion  that  where  a  recorded  tenure holder having a prima facie title and in possession files suit in the civil court for cancellation of sale deed having obtained on the ground of fraud or impersonation cannot be directed to file a suit for declaration in the revenue court - reason being that in such a case, prima facie, the title of the recorded tenure holder is not under cloud. He does not require declaration of his title to the land. The position would be different where a person not being a recorded tenure holder seeks cancellation of sale deed by filing a suit in the civil court on the ground of fraud  or  impersonation.  There  necessarily  the  plaintiff  is required to seek a declaration of his title and, therefore, he may be directed to approach the revenue court, as the sale deed being void has to be ignored for  giving him relief  for declaration and possession.”

21 Though the above principles emerge in the context of the bar under

Section 331 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,

1950,  the logic of the judgment extends to the bar under Section 207 read

with Section 256 of the of the Tenancy Act.  A recorded khatedar stands on a

different footing compared to a claimant seeking a decree of their  khatedari

rights. A claimant seeking a decree of khatedari rights is barred from filing a

suit in the civil court prior to their khatedari right being decreed by a revenue

court when the relief sought for by the civil court includes a determination of

khatedari rights.

22 In the present case, the High Court has proceeded on the basis that the

suit seeking a declaration of the gift deed relating to disputed agricultural land

situated in Sikar as void and restraining Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 from transfer

or sale of the agricultural land before the civil court is squarely covered by the

bar to the jurisdiction of the civil court under the provisions of the Tenancy Act.

The claim of the appellant to  khatedari  rights is pending adjudication by a

revenue court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such a

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claim. The  appellant has no right to seek relief before the civil court without

first getting his khatedari rights decreed by the revenue court.

23 For the above reasons, we find that there is no merit in the challenge

preferred by the  appellant to the impugned judgment and order of the High

Court.  The  appeals  shall,  accordingly  stand  dismissed.  There  shall  be  no

order as to costs.

…..…….....……………………..........................J.                                    [UDAY UMESH LALIT]  

……..........……………………..........................J.                                               [Dr DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD]   NEW DELHI;  JANUARY 29, 2019.

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