PUNJAB STATE CIVIL SUPPLIES CORPORATION LTD. AND ANR. Vs M/S. ATWAL RICE AND GENERAL MILLS
Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Case number: C.A. No.-008943-008943 / 2017
Diary number: 51 / 2015
Advocates: J S WAD AND CO Vs
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No.8943 OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) No.1552/2015)
Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. & Anr. ...Appellant(s)
VERSUS
M/s Atwal Rice & General Mills Rep. by its Partners ….Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.
1) Leave granted.
2) This appeal is filed against the final judgment
and order dated 17.10.2014 passed by the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil
Revision No. 3602 of 2013 whereby the High Court
dismissed the revision petition filed by the
appellants herein and affirmed the order dated
03.11.2012 passed by Additional District Judge,
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Jalandhar in Execution SR. No. 37 of 2010 by
which the execution petition relating to arbitration
award dated 01.06.2001 was dismissed.
3) In order to appreciate the short controversy
involved in this appeal, few relevant facts need
mention infra.
4) The appellant is a State owned Corporation
engaged in supply of civil commodities in the State
of Punjab. Respondent No. 1 is a partnership firm
whose partners are respondent Nos. 2 to 4. The firm
is engaged in the business of running a rice Mill in
Jalandhar.
5) On 01.01.1996, the appellant and Respondent
No.1 entered into an agreement. In terms of this
agreement, the appellant was to give their paddy to
the respondents, who were to process the paddy in
their Rice Mill and the resultant rice produced after
processing paddy were to be delivered to the Food
Corporation of India (FCI) for and on behalf of the
appellant by the respondents. Since the agreement
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was in relation to processing of paddy and then
supply of rice to public at large through FCI, the
time was made the essence of the agreement so that
the concerned departments would be able to supply
the rice in time to public at large.
6) It is the case of the appellant that the
appellant delivered 62944 bags weighing 40790
quintals of fine variety of paddy and 90303 bags
weighing 58696.95 quintals of IR 8 variety of paddy
to the respondents for processing and converting
into Rice for being supplied to the FCI. The
respondents duly acknowledged the receipt of paddy
from the appellant on 27.11.1995 and 06.12.1995.
7) The respondents, however, could only process
and deliver to the FCI 27950.75 quintals of fine
variety rice and 22955.32 quintals of IR - 8 variety
of rice till 30.06.1996. Thereafter the respondents
could deliver 710.00 quintals of fine variety of rice
and 14441.04.200 quintals of IR -8 variety of rice
in 1075 bags after 30.06.1996.
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8) Since the respondents failed to process and
deliver the full quantity of rice in terms of
agreement to the FCI much less within the time
framed, it caused money losses to the appellant in
addition to sustaining the damages due to
non-delivery of the rice. According to the appellant,
since the respondents committed breach of the
agreement because they were not able to perform
their part of the agreement, the appellant became
entitled, in terms of the agreement, to recover from
the respondents (1) 1½ times economic cost of
balance paddy, (2) the cost of balance bags and
sales tax @ 4.4% thereon, besides TDS on income
tax @ 2.34%, and (3) other recovery.
9) The agreement contained an arbitration clause
for resolving all disputes arising between the parties
in relation to the agreement. The appellant
accordingly gave notice to the respondents
requesting them for referring the disputes, which
had arisen between them to the Arbitrator. The
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respondents acceded to the appellant's request and
accordingly the disputes were referred to the sole
Arbitrator-one Mr. O. P. Garg. The arbitrator
embarked upon the reference made to him by the
parties. The parties filed their respective claims and
adduced evidence in support of their stand.
10) On 01.06.2001, the Arbitrator delivered a
reasoned award. The Arbitrator allowed the
appellant's claim in part and accordingly passed a
money award for Rs.1024847.15 with interest
payable at the rate of 21% w.e.f. 01.01.1999 till
realization in appellant's favour and against the
respondents.
11) The respondents, felt aggrieved of the award,
filed an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) and questioned its legality
and correctness before the Additional District
Judge, Jalandhar. By order dated 04.06.2009, the
Additional District Judge dismissed the application
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and upheld the award. The respondents, as the
records indicate. though claimed to have filed
appeal in the High Court but did not pursue the
appeal and hence the order dated 04.06.2009 of the
Additional District Judge and, in consequence, the
award dated 01.06.2001 became final and attained
finality.
12) The respondents did not pay the awarded
amount to the appellants and, therefore, the
appellant filed Execution Petition No.37/2010 under
Section 36 of the Act before the Additional District
Judge, Jalandhar for enforcement of the award
against the respondents. The respondents on being
served filed reply to the execution application and
raised certain factual objections purporting to be
under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). The
respondents also filed one application praying
therein for a direction to the appellant to produce
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the statement of accounts and the transactions
done pursuant to the agreement in question.
13) By order dated 03.11.2012, the Executing
Court upheld the objections raised by the
respondents and, in consequence, dismissed the
appellant's execution application. It was held that
the respondents having paid a sum of Rs.3,37,885/-
towards decreetal amount to the appellant, the
award/decree in question stood satisfied fully and
hence the execution application filed by the
appellant is liable to be dismissed. It was,
accordingly, dismissed.
14) The appellant, felt aggrieved, filed revision
being Civil Revision No. 3602 of 2013 before the
High Court. By impugned order, the High Court
dismissed the revision and upheld the order of the
Executing Court. It is against this order, the
appellant(claimant) has filed this appeal by way of
special leave before this Court.
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15) Heard Mr. Ashish Wad, learned counsel for the
appellant and Mr. Abhishek Vikas, learned counsel
for the respondents.
16) Having heard learned counsel for the parties
and on perusal of the record of the case, we are
constrained to allow the appeal and set aside the
impugned order.
17) Sections 35 and Section 36 of the Act as it
stood at the relevant time are relevant for this
appeal. It reads as under :
“35. Finality of arbitral awards. Subject to this Part an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.
36. Enforcement - Where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired, or such application having been made, it has been refused, the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) in the same manner as if it were a decree of the Court.”
18) Section 35 gives finality to every arbitral award
and makes the award binding on the parties and all
persons claiming under them. So far as Section 36
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is concerned, it deals with execution of the award. It
says that once the Court dismisses the application
filed under Section 34 of the Act or if no such
application is made and time has expired for
making such application, the award shall be
enforced as if it is a decree of the Court and the
enforcement of the award shall be under the Code.
19) In other words, the arbitral award has been
given the status of a decree of the Civil Court and,
therefore, it is enforced like a decree of the Civil
Court by applying the provisions of Order 21 of the
Code and all other provisions, which deal with the
execution of the decree of the Civil Court.
20) Coming to the facts of the case, we find that
firstly, the award is under the Act; Secondly, the
award was challenged under Section 34 by the
respondents before the Additional District Judge
but the challenge failed vide order dated 03.11.2012
of the Additional District Judge, Jalandhar; Thirdly,
the order dated 03.11.2012 attained finality
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because the matter was not pursued by the
respondents in appeal to the High Court; Fourthly,
the award, in consequence, also attained the finality
by virtue of Sections 35 and 36 of the Act; Fifthly,
the award was and continues to be binding on the
appellant and the respondents; Sixthly, the award
acquired the status of a decree of the civil court by
virtue of Section 36 of the Act; Seventhly, the award
has to be enforced for recovery of the awarded
amount from the respondents like a decree of the
civil court under the Code.
21) It is a well-settled principle of law that the
executing Court has to execute the decree as it is
and it cannot go behind the decree. Likewise, the
executing Court cannot hold any kind of factual
inquiry which may have the effect of nullifying the
decree itself but it can undertake limited inquiry
regarding jurisdictional issues which goes to the
root of the decree and has the effect of rendering the
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decree nullity (see- Kiran Singh & Ors. vs. Chaman
Paswan & Ors., AIR1954 SC 340).
22) Let us now see the nature of the objections
raised by the respondents in execution proceedings
with a view to find out as to whether they or anyone
out of them were legally sustainable and which,
according to the respondents, resulted in fully
satisfying the award/decree in their favour and
rightly found acceptance by the Courts below for so
holding.
23) The respondents in their application filed
under Section 47 of the Code contended that firstly,
the award being vague, it is incapable of execution
for recovering any sum awarded therein from the
respondents; Secondly, the Arbitrator has failed to
specify the rates at which the interest were to be
charged; Thirdly, the Arbitrator did not mention the
words "per annum" to qualify the rate of interest,
i.e.,21% awarded; Fourthly, the Arbitrator awarded
simple interest whereas the appellant had claimed
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compound interest which is not permissible; Fifthly,
the Arbitrator was not competent to award pendent
lite and future interest; Sixthly, mandatory consent
of the Managing Director of the
appellant-Corporation was not obtained by the
Arbitrator for awarding interest at the rate of 21%;
Seventhly, the calculations made by the appellant in
their execution application is wrong being excessive
in nature; Eighthly, no notice of execution
application was served on the respondents because
the application was filed beyond two years from the
date of award; Ninthly, the execution application is
not maintainable because the respondents have
filed appeal before the High Court against the order
rejecting their application under Section 34 of the
Act.
24) The respondents (judgment debtors) also filed
one application seeking direction against the
appellant to produce the entire record of the case
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including the accounts relating to the transactions
done pursuant to the agreement in question.
25) It is pertinent to mention here that the
executing Court did not decide any of the objections
(nine) set out above but confined its inquiry to one
statement of accounts filed by the respondents,
which according to them, was given to them by the
appellant. The executing Court, on perusal of the
account statement, held that a sum of
Rs.3,37,885/- was paid by the respondents to the
appellant on 29.08.2011 which, as per the
statement, was credited in appellant's account and
hence such payment having been made has resulted
in fully satisfying the decree in question and,
therefore, the respondents are not liable to pay any
amount towards decree in question. It is essentially
with this factual finding, the executing Court came
to a conclusion that the award/decree stood fully
satisfied and hence no recovery of any awarded
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amount can be made and, therefore, dismissed the
appellant's execution application.
26) It is apposite to reproduce the finding of the
executing Court hereinbelow because it is this
finding which was upheld by the High Court by
impugned order giving rise to filing of this appeal by
special leave.
“8. I have thoroughly considered the contentions of the learned counsel for both the parties and have gone through the documents as referred to by the learned counsel for both the parties. It is clear that statement of account was supplied by the decree holder department itself to the judgment debtor, copy of which has been placed on file and even it is not denied by the decree holder. This statement of account dated 29.08.2011 shows that as on 29.08.2011, a sum of Rs.3,37,885/- was outstanding to be paid by the judgment debtor to the decree holder as per this statement of account supplied by the decree holder. Nor corresponding to the other document, i.e., certificate issued by Punjab National Bank, said amount of Rs.3,37,885/- was paid by the judgment debtor and was credited in the account of the decree holder M/s Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Jalandhar. The plea of the learned counsel for the decree holder that the other statement of account, which shows that a sum of Rs.8,86,248/- is to be repaid may be considered, is not acceptable for the reason that the statement of account supplied by the decree holder department itself shows that the judgment debtor was given said
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statement of account on 29.8.2011 and this statement of account is admitted to have been issued by the decree holder itself. The statement of account as relied upon by the counsel for the decree holder does not mention any date. More so, it is not justified by the decree holder as to how the amount of Rs.8,86,248/- has swollen to the amount of Rs.3495,886.15 paise regarding which the present execution is filed. On the other hand, the statement of account dated 29.8.2011 shows that a sum of Rs.3,37,885/- was found to be due against the judgment debtor, which was paid by the judgment debtor and deposited in the account of the decree holder and this fact is clear from the certificate given by the concerned bank. Hence, considering all these documents, it is clear that whatever money was due to be paid by the judgment debtor to the decree holder as per statement of account supplied by the decree holder itself, has been paid by the judgment debtor and as such award regarding which the present execution has been filed stands fully satisfied. Resultantly, objections filed by the judgment debtor are accepted and the execution petition stands dismissed. Whatever property belonging to the judgment debtor, which has been attached in the present execution is ordered to be released henceforth. File be consigned to the record room.”
27) We are constrained to observe that the
executing Court and the High Court either did not
understand the controversy or if understood,
miserably failed to decide the same in accordance
with law. Indeed, both the orders clearly show the
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total non-application of mind by the two Courts
because both the Courts neither set out the facts
much less properly nor dealt the issues arising in
the case and nor applied the principle of law which
governs the controversy.
28) Both the orders are, therefore, wholly perverse,
illegal and without jurisdiction. This we say for more
than one reason as detailed by us hereinbelow.
29) In the first place, none of the objections (nine)
raised by the respondents were decided by the
executing Court or/and the High Court. Indeed,
they were not even referred to in the orders. If the
objections had been raised by the judgment debtor
under Section 47 of the Code challenging the decree
then it was necessary for the executing Court to
deal with the objections and record its finding one
way or other in accordance with law. Secondly,
assuming that these objections were to be decided
then also, in our opinion, none of them had any
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merit whatsoever and they simply deserved rejection
at the outset.
30) Thirdly, all the objections referred above ought
to have been raised by the respondents before the
Arbitrator or/and Additional District Judge under
Section 34 of the Act but certainly none of them
could be allowed to be raised in execution once the
award became final and attained finality as decree
of the Civil Court.
31) In other words, having regard to the nature of
objections, it is clear that such objections were not
capable of being tried in execution proceedings to
challenge the award. It is for the reason that they
were on facts and pertained to the merits of the
controversy, which stood decided by the Arbitrator
resulting in passing of an award. None of the
objections were in relation to the jurisdiction of the
Court affecting the root of the very passing of the
decree. If the executing Court had probed these
objections then it would have travelled behind the
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decree, which was not permissible in law. An
inquiry into facts, which ought to have been done in
a suit or in an appeal arising out of the suit or in
proceedings under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be
held in execution proceedings in relation to such
award/decree.
32) Fourthly, and apart from what is held above,
by no stretch of imagination, the award/decree
could be held fully satisfied on alleged making of the
payment of Rs.3,37,885/- by the respondents to
the appellant. This factual finding to say the least is
perverse to its extreme.
33) It is not in dispute that the awarded principal
sum even without interest was for Rs.10,24847.15.
In these circumstances, we are at loss to
understand as to how and on what basis, the
executing Court could ever come to a conclusion
that the entire money decree which was admittedly
for more than Rs.10 lacs could be held fully
satisfied against making of so-called payment of
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Rs.3,37,885/- by the respondents to the appellant
assuming that such payment was held to had been
made.
34) Order 21 Rule 1 of the Code prescribes the
modes of paying money under the decree. Sub-
clause(a) provides that the decreetal money has to
be deposited in Court or by postal money order or
through Bank. Clause(b) provides that amount, if
paid out of court, then it has to be by postal money
order or through Bank or by any mode where
payment is evidenced in writing. If the payment is
made under clause(b) then clause(c) prescribes the
procedure as to how the money has to be paid and
what details are required to be given by the
judgment debtor in support of making payment.
35) Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code deals with the
cases where the judgment debtor makes the
payment of decreetal amount either full or part out
of the Court to the decree holder. Sub-clause(1)
empowers the decree holder to apply to the
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executing Court to get the amount received from the
judgment debtor certified from the Court and it is
only when the Court certifies the amount to have
been paid, it can be adjusted against the decreetal
sum. Clause(2) empowers the judgment debtor to
apply to the executing Court and get the
certification done by the Court of the amount paid
by them to the decree holder after notice to the
decree holder. Rule 2(A) provides that no payment
made by the judgment debtor shall be adjusted
unless he ensures compliance of sub clause (a) or
(b) or (c). Rule 3 provides that if the Court does not
certify the payment made by the judgment debtor
then such payment shall not be recognized by any
Court executing the decree for the purpose of giving
adjustment to the judgment debtor against the
decretal amount.
36) Keeping in view the mandatory requirements of
Order 21 Rules 1 and 2 relating to payment of
decretal dues made by the judgment debtor and
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applying the said provisions to the undisputed facts
of this case, we have no hesitation in holding that
the sum of Rs.3,37,885/- which the respondents
claimed to have paid to the appellant towards the
decretal sum and which found acceptance to the
two Courts below could never have been regarded as
the payment made by the respondents to the
appellant in conformity with the requirements of
either Rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 21. It is not in
dispute that such payment was never certified by
the Court as contemplated under Rule 2 of Order 21
at the instance of respondents or at the instance of
the appellant. Indeed, there was neither any
evidence to prove the factum of payment except one
copy of the statement which also remained
unproved nor any evidence was led to prove the
certification done by the Court as required under
Order 21 Rule 2 so as to recognize making of such
payment by the respondents to the appellant.
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37) We are, therefore, of the considered opinion
that firstly, the execution application filed by the
appellant (decree holder) for execution of the
award/decree dated 01.06.2001 was maintainable
and it should have been so held; Secondly, no
amount was paid by the respondents to the
appellant pursuant to the award/decree so as to
enable the executing Court to record its full
satisfaction in accordance with the provisions of
Order 21 Rules 1 and 2 and lastly, all objections
raised by the respondents under Section 47 of the
Code against the award/decree are liable to be
rejected as being wholly devoid of any merits. We,
accordingly, hold so against the respondents.
38) In view of foregoing discussion, the appeal
succeeds and is allowed with cost quantified at
Rs.25,000/- payable by the respondents to the
appellant. The impugned order and the order of the
executing Court dated 03.11.2012 are set aside.
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39) As a consequence thereof, the executing Court
is directed to issue warrant for recovery of the entire
awarded decretal amount against the respondents
after verifying and calculating the decretal amount
till date in terms of award/decree.
40) Let this be done within one month.
………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]
……..................................J. [R. BANUMATHI]
New Delhi; July 11, 2017