01 July 2014
Supreme Court
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PRITAM CHAUHAN Vs STATE(GOVT. OF NCT DELHI)

Bench: SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,RANJAN GOGOI
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001272-001272 / 2014
Diary number: 34936 / 2013
Advocates: MOHD. IRSHAD HANIF Vs


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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL  NO.       1272                        OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl) No. 9353 OF 2013)

PRITAM CHAUHAN        ...    APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

STATE (GOVT. OF NCT DELHI)        ...  RESPONDENT (S)  

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant had been convicted under Section 307 IPC by  

the learned Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi in Sessions Case  

No.28/2000 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  

three years alongwith fine.  In appeal, the High Court of Delhi had  

altered the conviction of the appellant to one under Section 326 IPC  

with  consequential  modification  of  the  sentence  to  rigorous  

imprisonment for a period of two years.  The High Court, further

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directed  the  appellant  to  pay  a  sum  of  Rs.  50,000/-  as  

compensation to the victim, Sunder Singh, under the provisions of  

Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  Aggrieved by the  

aforesaid conviction and the sentence imposed, the appellant has  

filed the present appeal.

3. We have heard Mr. Mohd. Hanif Rashid, learned counsel for the  

appellant and Mr. Mohan Jain, learned Addl. Solicitor General for the  

State.

4. The culpability of the appellant for the criminal acts attributed  

to him need not be gone into in the present appeal inasmuch as the  

arguments  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  had  centred  around  the  

quantum of sentence to be imposed and, in fact, the notice issued  

by this Court on 06.12.2013 was on the limited point of sentence.

5. Notwithstanding the limited notice issued i.e. on the question  

of sentence which would have required the Court to proceed on the  

basis that  the conviction of  the appellant  under Section 326 IPC  

need not be disturbed, we have considered the arguments made on  

behalf of the appellant on the question as to whether the facts of  

the case required alteration of the conviction of the appellant to one  

under Section 324 IPC as the issue of a lesser sentence was sought  

to be canvassed on that basis also.

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6. Whether the culpability of the accused would fall under Section  

324 or 326 of the IPC would depend on as to whether the injuries  

suffered by the victim amount to ‘simple hurt’ or ‘grievous hurt’ as  

defined by the relevant provision of the Penal Code.  The evidence  

of PW-2, Dr. Naresh Chander Gaur, the Orthopaedic Surgeon who  

examined the victim on the day of the incident indicates that the  

victim had suffered two wounds at the back of his left forearm 9 x 5  

cm. over the middle 1/3rd and 6 x 4 cm. distal 1/3rd left forearm with  

deep extensive damage to most of muscles and the back of left  

forearm.  Apart from the above, there was another wound 4 x 1 cm.  

on the palm of the right hand.  According to PW-2 the victim had  

undergone  surgery  on  19.5.1999  in  the  course  of  which  both  

wounds on left  forearm were explored and all  the muscles  were  

found to be damaged which were repaired.  Furthermore, according  

to PW-2 the digital nerve of the right index finger was cut which was  

also repaired.  PW-2 has specifically stated that the above injuries  

are grievous in nature and were  caused by a sharp edged weapon  

(knife)  which fact  is  borne out  from the testimony of  the victim  

himself, examined as PW-3, duly corroborated by the eyewitnesses  

PW-4 Babli and PW-5 Umesh.  Over and above, there is the evidence  

of PW-1,       Dr. Sudha Kanojia, who had first examined the victim  

Sunder Singh, to the effect that the injuries sustained by the victim

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were not simple injuries.  In view of the above evidence on record it  

is difficult to hold that the injuries sustained by the victim due to  

the assault committed by the accused does not fall under 8th clause  

of Section 320 IPC, which, inter alia, defines ‘grievous hurt’ as “any  

hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during   

the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow   

his  ordinary  pursuits”.  The  conviction  of  the  appellant  under  

Section 326 IPC, therefore, will not require any correction.

7. The  punishment  contemplated  under  Section  326  IPC  is  

imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a  

term which may extend to ten years, along with fine.  In a recent  

pronouncement  of  this  Court  in  Gopal  Singh  vs. State  of  

Uttarakhand1 it  has  been  held  that  the  “principle  of  just  

punishment” is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal  

offence.  The wide discretion that is vested in the Courts in matters  

of sentencing must be exercised on rational parameters in the light  

of  the  totality  of  the  facts  of  any  given  case.   The  doctrine  of  

proportionality has to be invoked in the context of the facts in which  

the crime had been committed, the antecedents of the accused, the  

age of the accused and such other relevant factors.  In the present  

case, considering that the accused-appellant had gone to his house  

1  (2013) 7 SCC 545

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to  fetch a knife  and,  thereafter,  had given repeated blows to the  

victim resulting in multiple grievous injuries, we are of the view that  

the  sentence  of  two  years  rigorous  imprisonment  is  just  and  

adequate and will not require any modification.  The submission of  

the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant is willing to  

pay  higher  compensation  under  Section  357  IPC  also  cannot  be  

accepted  inasmuch  as  the  provisions  of  Section  357  operate  

independently  of  the  specific  penal  provisions  of  the  Code  under  

which the court is required to sentence an offender.

8. In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any merit in  

this appeal.  It is accordingly dismissed.  The accused shall serve out  

the remaining part of the sentence imposed by the High Court and  

affirmed by the present order.

……..……………........………………………J. [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

……..……………........………………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

NEW DELHI, JULY 1, 2014.