09 April 2012
Supreme Court
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PREMJI NATHU Vs STATE OF GUJARAT

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: C.A. No.-003430-003430 / 2012
Diary number: 35827 / 2011
Advocates: RASHMIKUMAR MANILAL VITHLANI Vs HEMANTIKA WAHI


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  3430    OF 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No.34815/2011)

Premji Nathu … Appellant

Versus

State of Gujarat and another … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

G.S. SINGHVI, J.

1. Whether the application submitted by the appellant under Section 18(1)  

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’) was barred by time and  

Civil  Judge  (Senior  Division),  Junagadh  (hereinafter  described  as  the  

‘Reference Court’) rightly refused to entertain his prayer for enhancement of  

the compensation determined by the Special Land Acquisition Officer is the  

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question which arises for consideration in this appeal filed against judgment  

dated 16.8.2011 of the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court.

2. The appellant’s land was acquired by the State Government along with  

other  parcels  of  land  for  implementation  of  Mendarda  –  Amrapur  Road  

Scheme.   Notification  under  Section  4(1)  was  issued  on  4.3.1982  and  the  

declaration under Section 6(1) was published on 7.10.1982.  The Special Land  

Acquisition  Officer  determined  the  amount  of  compensation  at  the  rate  of  

Rs.110/- per Are for irrigated land and Rs.80/- per Are for non-irrigated land.    

3. After passing of the award, the Collector issued notice to the appellant  

under Section 12(2), which was received by him on 22.2.1985.  Similar notices  

were received by the other landowners on 22.2.1985 and 23.2.1985.  As the  

copy of  the  award was not  annexed with  the  notice,  the  appellant  obtained  

certified copy thereof through his Advocate and then submitted an application  

dated 8.4.1985 to the Collector for making a reference to the Court for award of  

higher compensation with solatium and interest.  The reference made by the  

Collector in the appellant’s case was registered as LR Case No.1/2000.  The  

references made at the instance of the other landowners were registered as LR  

Cases Nos.2/2000 to 15/2000.  In their claim petitions, the appellant and other  

landowners pleaded that their land had irrigation facilities; that they were taking  

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crops of groundnut, wheat, fodder etc. and they are entitled to compensation at  

the  rate  of  Rs.1500/-  per  Are.   In  the  reply  filed  on  behalf  of  the  State  

Government,  it  was  pleaded  that  the  Special  Land  Acquisition  Officer  had  

correctly fixed market value of the acquired land after taking into consideration  

the location, type and fertility of the acquired land.  It was also pleaded that the  

landowners are not entitled to higher compensation because they had accepted  

the award without any protest.

4. It is not clear from the record whether in the reply filed on behalf of the  

State  Government,  an  objection  was  taken  to  the  maintainability  of  the  

applications filed by the appellant and other landowners on the ground that the  

same were barred by time but the Reference Court did frame an issue in that  

regard.  This is evident from the tenor of the issues framed by the Reference  

Court, which are extracted below:

“ 1) Whether  applicant  proves  that  the  compensation  awarded is inadequate ?  How much ?

2) What additional compensation, if any, he is entitled to ?

3) Whether this application is in time ?

4) Whether this court has jurisdiction to try this reference  case ?

5) Whether this reference case is barred by S. 25 of L.A.  Act. ?

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6) Whether  the  applicants  have  accepted  the  awarded  amount without raising any objection ? If  

yes, what is the effect ?

7) Whether the applicant is entitled to get the amount of  solatium & interest?  

8) What order ?”

5.  After considering the oral and documentary evidence produced by the  

parties,  the  Reference  Court  concluded  that  the  landowners  are  entitled  to  

Rs.450 per Are for the irrigated land and Rs.280 per Are for non-irrigated land  

with an additional amount of Rs.2 per square meter, but declined relief to the  

appellant  and other  landowners on the ground that  the applications filed by  

them were beyond the time specified in Section 18(2)(b) of the Act.

6. The appellant and three other landowners challenged the judgment of the  

Reference  Court  by filing appeals  under  Section 54 of  the  Act  which were  

dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide judgment dated  

16.8.2011, who relied upon the judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in  

Special  Land Acquisition  Officer,  Himatnagar  v.  Nathaji  Kacharaji,  2001(3)  

GLH 312 and held that the applications filed by the appellant and other land  

owners were barred by time.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the application filed by his  

client was within the period prescribed under Section 18 (2)(b) of the Act and  

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the Reference Court and the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed  

serious error by refusing to enhance the compensation by erroneously thinking  

that the application made on 8.4.1985 was barred by time.  He submitted that 5th  

and 6th April,  1985 were holidays and,  as  such,  the application filed by the  

appellant on 8.4.1985 could not have been treated as barred by time.  Learned  

counsel further submitted that due to hyper-technical approach adopted by the  

Reference  Court  and  the  learned  Single  Judge,  the  landowners  have  been  

rendered remediless.

8. Shri Preetesh Kapur, learned counsel for the respondents produced copy  

of the calendar of Gujarat for 1985 to show that 5 th April was holiday being  

Good Friday but 6th April was a working day and argued that if the period of six  

weeks is counted from the date of receipt of the notice issued under Section  

12(2), the conclusion recorded by the Reference Court and the learned Single  

Judge that the applications filed by the appellant and other landowners were  

beyond the time prescribed under Section 18(2)(b) of the Act cannot be faulted.

9. We have considered the respective arguments and carefully perused the  

record. Sections 12 and 18 of the Act, which have bearing on the decision of  

this appeal read as under:  

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“12. Award of Collector when to be final. - (1) Such award  shall  be  filed  in  the  Collector's  office  and  shall,  except  as  hereinafter  provided,  be  final  and  conclusive  evidence,  as  between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they  have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the  true area and value of the land, and the apportionment of the  compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to  such of the persons interested as are not present personally or  by their representatives when the award is made.

18. Reference to Court.- (1) Any person interested who has  not  accepted  the  award  may,  by  written  application  to  the  Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector  for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to  the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation,  the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the  compensation among the persons interested.

(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection  to the award is taken:

Provided that every such application shall be made,-

(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the  Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks  from the date of the Collector's award;

(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice  from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2), or within  six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever  period shall first expire.”  

10. An analysis of the above reproduced provisions shows that by virtue of  

Section 12(1), an award made by the Collector is treated final and conclusive  

evidence  of  the  true  area  and  value  of  the  land  and  apportionment  of  the  

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compensation  among the persons  interested.   In terms of  Section 12(2),  the  

Collector is required to give notice of his award to the interested persons who  

are not present either personally or through their representatives at the time of  

making  of  award.   Section  18(1)  provides  for  making  of  reference  by  the  

Collector to the Court for the determination of the amount of compensation etc.  

Section 18(2) lays down that an application for reference shall be made within  

six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award, if at the time of making of  

award the person seeking reference was present or was represented before the  

Collector. If the person is not present or is not represented before the Collector,  

then the application for reference has to be made within six weeks of the receipt  

of  notice  under  Section  12(2)  or  within  six  months  from  the  date  of  the  

Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.  

11. The  reason  for  providing  six  months  from the  date  of  the  award  for  

making an application seeking reference, where the applicant did not receive a  

notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, while providing only six weeks from the  

date  of  receipt  of  notice  under  Section  12(2)  of  the  Act  for  making  an  

application  for  reference  where  the  applicant  has  received  a  notice  under  

Section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a notice under Section 12(2) of the  

Act is received, the landowner or person interested is made aware of all relevant  

particulars of the award which enables him to decide whether he should seek  

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reference or not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know that an award has  

been made, he would require further time to make enquiries or secure copies so  

that he can ascertain the relevant particulars of the award.  What needs to be  

emphasised is that along with the notice issued under Section 12(2) of the Act,  

the land owner who is not present or is not represented before the Collector at  

the time of making of award should be supplied with a copy thereof so that he  

may effectively exercise his right under Section 18(1) to seek reference to the  

Court.

12. In Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 1961 SC  

1500, this Court  was called upon to decide whether the expression ‘date of  

award’ is to be interpreted with reference to the time when the award is signed  

by the Collector or from the date the affected party comes to know about the  

same and held as under:

“Therefore,  if  the award made by the Collector  is  in law no  more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the  owner of the property then the making of the award as properly  understood must involve the communication of the offer to the  party  concerned.  That  is  the  normal  requirement  under  the  contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under  the  Act  cannot  be  reasonably  excluded.  Thus considered the  date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to  the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered  by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the  question as to when it was known to the party concerned either  actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the  literal and mechanical construction of the words ‘the date of the  

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award’  occurring  in  the  relevant  section  would  not  be  appropriate.

There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion.  If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the  Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to  be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects  the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all  decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that  the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The  knowledge  of  the  party  affected  by  such  a  decision,  either  actual  or constructive,  is an essential  element which must be  satisfied before the decision can be brought into force.  Thus  considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in  the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing  it  in  the  Office  of  the  Collector;  it  must  involve  the  communication of the said award to the party concerned either  actually  or  constructively  .   If  the  award is  pronounced in the  presence of the party whose rights are affected by it it can be  said  to  be  made  when  pronounced.  If  the  date  for  the  pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and  it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced  the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if  the  said  party  is  not  actually  present  on  the  date  of  its  pronouncement.  Similarly if  without notice of the date of  its  pronouncement  an  award  is  pronounced  and  a  party  is  not  present  the  award  can  be  said  to  be  made  when  it  is  communicated to the party later.  The knowledge of the party  affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an  essential  requirement  of  fair  play  and  natural  justice  the  expression  ‘the  date  of  the award’  used in  the proviso  must  mean the date when the award is either communicated to the  party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In  our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the  words  ‘from  the  date  of  the  Collector's  award’  used  in  the  proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way.”

(emphasis supplied)

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13. In  State  of  Punjab  v.  Qaisar  Jehan  Begum,  AIR 1963  SC 1604,  the  

principle laid down in Harish Chandra’s case was reiterated and it was held:  

“It  seems clear  to us that  the ratio of the decision in  Harish  Chandra case is that the party affected by the award must know  it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will  run from the date of that knowledge.  Now, knowledge of the  award does  not  mean  a  mere  knowledge of  the  fact  that  an  award  has  been  made.  The  knowledge  must  relate  to  the  essential contents of the award. These contents may be known  either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated  to a party under Section 12(2) of the Act,  the party must  be  obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award  whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in  court either personally or through his representative when the  award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he  knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme  of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean  knowledge of the essential contents of the award.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. In Bhagwan Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2010) 3 SCC 545, this Court  

interpreted Section 18 and laid down the following propositions:

“(i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested  (or  his  authorised  representative),  he  has  to  make  the  application within six weeks from the date of the Collector's  award itself.

(ii)  If  the  award  is  not  made  in  the  presence  of  the  person  interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the  application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of  the notice from the Collector under Section 12(2).

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(iii)  If  the  person  interested  (or  his  representative)  was  not  present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the  notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make  the  application  within  six  months  of  the  date  on  which  he  actually or constructively came to know about the contents of  the award.

(iv) If a person interested receives a notice under Section 12(2)  of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt  of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for  six months for making the application on the ground that the  date of receipt of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act was the  date of knowledge of the contents of the award.”

The Court then held:

“When a person interested makes an application for reference  seeking  the  benefit  of  six  months'  period  from  the  date  of  knowledge, the initial onus is on him to prove that he (or his  representative) was not present when the award was made, that  he did not receive any notice under Section 12(2) of the Act,  and that he did not have the knowledge of the contents of the  award  during  a  period  of  six  months  prior  to  the  filing  the  application for reference. This onus is discharged by asserting  these facts on oath. He is not expected to prove the negative.  Once  the  initial  onus  is  discharged  by  the  claimant/person  interested, it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to establish  that  the  person  interested  was  present  either  in  person  or  through his representative when the award was made, or that he  had received a notice under Section 12(2) of the Act, or that he  had knowledge of the contents of the award.

Actual or constructive knowledge of the contents of the award  can be established by the Collector by proving that the person  interested had received or drawn the compensation amount for  the  acquired  land,  or  had  attested  the  mahazar/panchnama/proceedings  delivering  possession  of  the  acquired land in  pursuance  of  the acquisition,  or  had filed a  case challenging the award or had acknowledged the making of  

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the award in any document or in statement on oath or evidence.  The person interested, not being in possession of the acquired  land and the name of the State or its transferee being entered in  the revenue municipal records coupled with delay, can also lead  to an inference of constructive knowledge.  In the absence of  any such evidence  by the Collector,  the claim of  the person  interested  that  he  did  not  have  knowledge  earlier  will  be  accepted, unless there are compelling circumstances not to do  so.”

15. In the light of the above, it is to be seen whether the conclusion recorded  

by the Reference Court, which has been approved by the High Court that the  

application filed by the appellant was barred by time is legally sustainable.  A  

careful reading of the averments contained in paragraph 2 of the application  

filed by the appellant under Section 18(1) shows that the notice issued by the  

Collector under Section 12(2) was served upon him on 22.2.1985. Thereafter,  

his advocate obtained certified copy of the award and filed application dated  

8.4.1985 for making a reference to the Court.  This implies that copy of the  

award had not been sent to the appellant along with the notice and without that  

he could not have effectively made an application for seeking reference. On  

behalf  of  the  State  Government,  no  evidence  was  produced  before  the  

Reference Court to show that copy of the award was sent to the appellant along  

with the notice. Unfortunately, while deciding issue No.3, this aspect has been  

totally ignored by the Reference Court which mechanically concluded that the  

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application filed on 8.4.1985 was beyond the time specified in Section 18(2)(b).  

The learned Single Judge of the High Court also committed serious error by  

approving the view taken by the Reference Court, albeit without considering the  

fact  that  the  notice  issued  by  the  Collector  under  Section  12(2)  was  not  

accompanied by a copy of the award which was essential for effective exercise  

of right vested in the appellant to seek reference under Section 18(1).

16. In the result,  the appeal  is allowed.  The impugned judgment and the  

award passed  by the Reference Court  are  set  aside and the  respondents  are  

directed to pay enhanced compensation to the appellant at the rate of Rs.450 per  

Are for the irrigated land and Rs.280 per Are for non-irrigated land with an  

additional amount of Rs.2 per square meter.  The appellant shall also be entitled  

to  other  statutory  benefits  like  solatium  and  interest.  The  respondent  shall  

calculate the amount payable to the appellant and make payment within three  

months from today.    

17. Although, the other landowners are not shown to have prosecuted the  

matter further except that three of them filed appeals under Section 54 of the  

Act, we are convinced that this is a fit case in which the Court should exercise  

power under Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the respondents to pay  

enhanced compensation, solatium etc. even to those who did not file appeals  

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before the High Court and/or have not approached this Court by filing petitions  

under  Article  136 of  the  Constitution.  This  approach  is  consistent  with  the  

judgments of this Court in - B. N. Nagarajan v. State of Mysore (1966) 3 SCR  

682, Bhupinderpal Singh and others v. State of Punjab and others (2000) 5 SCC  

262, Nilabati Behera (Smt) Alias Lalita v. State of Orissa and others (1993) 2  

SCC 746 and B. Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh 1985  

(Supp) SCC 432. Therefore, we direct that the other landowners shall also be  

paid enhanced compensation and other statutory benefits within three months  

from today.

…..……….....……..….………………….…J.               [G.S. SINGHVI]

…………..………..….………………….…J.      [SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

New Delhi, April  09, 2012.     

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