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REPORTABLE  

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (C) No. 157 OF 2013

Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan                                        …..Petitioner

VERSUS

Union of India & Ors.                                            …..Respondents

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. The instant writ petition has been preferred, by an organisation  

dedicated to the welfare of inter-state migrants, in the nature of public  

interest  seeking  exercise  of  this  court’s  extraordinary  jurisdiction  

under  Article  32  of  the  Constitution  of  India,  1950  (hereinafter  

referred to as  the ‘Constitution’)  to remedy the concerns that  have  

arisen because of “hate speeches”, through the following prayers:

a. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus declaring hate/derogatory speeches  made  by people representatives/political/religious leaders on  religion, caste, region and ethnic lines are violative of  Articles 14 (Equality before Law), 15 (Prohibition of

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discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste or  place  of  birth),  16  (Equality  in  matters  of  public  employment),  19  (Protection  of  certain  rights  regarding freedom of speech etc.), 21 (Protection of  Life  and  Personal  Liberty)  of  Fundamental  Rights  read  with  Article  38  of  the  Directive  Principles  of  State  Policy  and  Fundamental  Duties  under  Article  51-A(a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (i) & (j) of the Constitution  and merits stringent pre-emptory action on part of the  Central and State governments;  

b. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus declaring hate/derogatory speeches  made  on the lines of religion, caste, race and place of birth  (region) to be an act against the Union of India which  undermines the unity and integrity of the country and  militates against non-discrimination and fraternity;  

c. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus declaring that  “Fraternity”  forms part  of  “Basic Structure” of the Constitution;

d. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus directing mandatory suo motu registration  of  FIR  against  authors  of  hate/derogatory  speeches  made on the lines of religion, caste, race and place of  birth (region) by the Union and State Governments, in  the  alternative,  constitution  of  a  committee  by  the  Union  of  India  in  consultation  with  this  Court  for  taking  cognizance  of  hate/derogatory  speeches  delivered within the territory of India with the power  to  recommend  initiation  of  criminal  proceeding  against the authors;

e. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  mandatory  imposition  of  “gag  order”  restraining  the  author  of  hate/derogatory  speeches made on the lines of religion, caste, race and  place  of  birth  (region)  from  addressing  the  public  anywhere within the territory of India till the disposal  

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of the criminal proceeding initiated against him as a  necessary  pre-condition  for  grant  of  bail  by  the  Magistrate;

f. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  speedy  disposal  of  criminal  proceedings  against  authors  of  hate/derogatory  speeches made on the lines of religion, caste, race and  place of birth (region) within a period of 6 months;  

g. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  suspension  of  membership  of  authors of hate/derogatory speeches made on the lines  of religion, caste, race and place of birth (region) from  the Union/State Legislature and other elected bodies  till the final disposal of the criminal proceedings;  

h. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  termination  of  membership  of  authors of hate/derogatory speech made on the lines  of religion, caste, race and place of birth (region) from  the Union/State Legislature and other elected bodies if  found guilty;  

i. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  de-recognition  of  the  political  party of  authors of hate/derogatory speech made on  the  lines  of  religion,  caste,  race  and  place  of  birth  (region) by the Election Commission of India where  the author is heading the political party in exercise of  power  vested  inter-alia under  Article  324  of  the  Constitution read with Sections 29A(5), 123(3) of the  Representation of the People Act,  1951 and Section  16A  of  the  Election  Symbols  (Reservation  and  Allotment) Order, 1968;

j. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus  directing  the  Union  of  India  to  have  concurrent  jurisdiction  to  prosecute  authors  of  hate/derogatory speeches in addition to the States in  terms of the mandate of Articles 227, 355 read with  

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Article 38 of the Constitution which merit  stringent  pre-emptory  action  on  part  of  the  Central  Government;  

k. Issue appropriate writ, order, decree in the nature of  mandamus directing the Union of India and respective  States  to  enforce  Fundamental  Duties  under  Article  51-A (a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (i) & (j) of the Constitution  by  taking  proactive  steps  in  promoting  national  integration  and  harmony  amongst  the  citizens  of  India;

l. Issue such other appropriate writ or direction that may  be deemed to be just and equitable in the facts and  circumstances  of  the  case  and  in  the  interest  of  justice.”  

2. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing  

on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that the reliefs sought by the  

petitioner is in consonance with the scheme of our Constitution as the  

“hate  speeches”  delivered  by  elected  representatives,  political  and  

religious leaders mainly based on religion, caste, region or ethnicity  

militate  against  the  Constitutional  idea  of  fraternity  and  violates  

Articles 14, 15, 19, 21 read with Article 38 of the Constitution and  

further is in derogation of the fundamental duties under Article 51-A  

(a), (b), (c), (e), (f), (i), (j) of the Constitution and therefore  warrant  

stringent  pre-emptory  action  on  the  part  of  Central  and  State  

Governments.  The existing law dealing with the subject matter is not  

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sufficient  to  cope  with  the  menace  of  “hate  speeches”.  

Hate/derogatory speech has not  been defined under  any penal  law.  

Accolade is given to the author of such speeches and they also get  

political  patronage.  In such fact-situation,  this Court  cannot remain  

merely a silent spectator, rather has to play an important role and issue  

guidelines/directions in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the  

Constitution which are necessary for the said purpose as the existing  

legal  frame  work  is  not  sufficient  to  control  the  menace  of  “hate  

speeches”.  Therefore, this Court should grant aforesaid reliefs.   

3. Shri  Sidharth  Luthra,  learned  ASG,  Shri  Rajiv  Nanda,  Shri  

Gaurav Bhatia, learned AAG for the State of U.P., Ms. Asha Gopalan  

Nair, Shri Gopal Singh, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Shri C.D. Singh, and all  

other standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respective States,  

have submitted that there are various statutory provisions dealing with  

the  subject  matter  and  the  issue  involved  herein  is  a  question  of  

enforcement of the said statutory provisions and any person aggrieved  

can put the law into motion in such eventualities.   

Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned ASG, has further submitted that  

the issue of decriminalisation of politics as part of electoral reforms is  

under consideration before this Court in Writ Petition (C) No. 536 of  

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2011 and in the said matter, this Court had framed certain issues and  

referred  the  matter  to  the  Law Commission  of  India  to  study  the  

subject  with  regard  to  the  Representation  of  People  Act,  1951  

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “R.P.Act”)   and  may  make  appropriate  

suggestions  (report)  to  the  Government  of  India  vide  order  dated  

16.12.2013 and, thus, Shri Luthra has suggested that in case there is  

some deficiency in law, this Court should not act as super-legislature,  

rather make a recommendation to the Law Commission to undertake  

further study and submit its report to the Government of India for its  

consideration/acceptance.   

4. Ms.  Meenakshi  Arora,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the Election Commission of India, has submitted that there  

are  various  provisions  like  Section  29A(5)  & (7)  of  the  R.P.  Act  

empowering the Commission to  examine the documents filed by a  

political party at the time of its registration and the application so filed  

must be accompanied by its constitution/rules which should contain a  

specific provision to the effect that the association/body would bear  

true  faith  and  allegiance  to  the  Constitution  of  India  as  by  law  

established  and  to  the  principles  of  socialism,  secularism  and  

democracy and that they would uphold the sovereignty, integrity and  

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unity  of  India.   However,  it  has  been  suggested  that  Election  

Commission  does  not  have  the  power  to  deregister/derecognise  a  

political  party  under  the  R.P.  Act  once  it  has  been  registered.   A  

registered  political  party  is  entitled  to  recognition  as  a  State  or  

national  party  only  upon  fulfilling  the  conditions  laid  down  in  

paragraph  6A  or  6B  of  the  Election  Symbols  (Reservation  and  

Allotment) Order, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as “Symbols Order”).  

The Election Commission in exercise of its powers under Paragraph  

16A of Symbols Order,  can take appropriate action against a political  

party on its failure to observe model code of conduct or in case the  

party fails to observe or follow the lawful directions and instructions  

of  the  Election  Commission.  The model  code  of  conduct  provides  

certain guidelines inter-alia that no party or candidate shall indulge in  

any  activity  which  may  aggravate  existing  differences  or  create  

mutual  hatred  or  cause  tension  between  two  different  castes  and  

communities, religious or linguistic and no political party shall make  

an appeal  on the basis  of  caste  or  communal  feelings for  securing  

votes.   It  further  provides  that  no  religious  place  shall  be  used as  

forum for election propaganda.  However, the Election Commission  

only has power to control hate speeches during the subsistence of the  

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code of conduct and not otherwise.   

5. The  Law  Commission  of  India  has  prepared  a  consultation  

paper  and  studied  the  matter  further  on  various  issues  including  

whether the existing provisions (Constitutional or Statutory) relating  

to disqualification to contest elections need to be amended?

The Law Commission had earlier in its 1998 recommendations  

emphasised  on  the  need  to  strengthen  the  provision  relating  to  

disqualification and in  view thereof,  it  has  been submitted by Ms.  

Arora that it is only for the legislature to amend the law and empower  

the Election Commission to perform a balancing act in following the  

mandate of the relevant Constitutional and statutory provisions.  

6. The  Supreme  Court  of  Canada  in  Saskatchewan  (Human  

Rights  Commission)  v.  Whatcott  2013  SCC  11,  succeeded  in  

bringing  out  the  “human  rights”  obligations  leading  to  control  on  

publication of “hate speeches” for protection of human rights defining  

the expression “hate speech” observing that the definition of “hatred”  

set out in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor, (1990) 3  

SCR 892, with some modifications, provides a workable  approach to  

interpreting  the  word  “hatred”  as  is  used  in  legislative  provisions  

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prohibiting hate speech. Three main prescriptions must be followed.  

First, courts must apply the hate speech prohibition objectively. The  

question courts must ask is whether a reasonable person, aware of the  

context  and circumstances, would view the expression as exposing  

the protected group to hatred. Second, the legislative term “hatred” or  

“hatred or contempt” must be interpreted as being restricted to those  

extreme  manifestations  of  the  emotion  described  by  the  words  

“detestation”  and  “vilification”.  This  filters  out  expression  which,  

while repugnant and offensive, does not incite the level of abhorrence,  

delegitimisation  and  rejection  that  risks  causing  discrimination  or  

other harmful effects. Third, tribunals must focus their analysis on the  

effect of the expression at issue, namely whether it is likely to expose  

the targeted person or group to hatred by others. The repugnancy of  

the ideas  being expressed is  not  sufficient  to  justify  restricting the  

expression, and whether or not the author of the expression intended  

to incite hatred or discriminatory treatment is irrelevant. The key is to  

determine the likely effect of the expression on its audience, keeping  

in  mind  the  legislative  objectives  to  reduce  or  eliminate  

discrimination.  

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7. Hate  speech is  an effort  to  marginalise  individuals  based on  

their membership in a group. Using expression that exposes the group  

to hatred, hate speech seeks to delegitimise group members in the eyes  

of the majority, reducing their social standing and acceptance within  

society.  Hate  speech,  therefore,  rises  beyond  causing  distress  to  

individual group members. It can have a societal impact. Hate speech  

lays the groundwork for later,  broad attacks on vulnerable that can  

range  from  discrimination,  to  ostracism,  segregation,  deportation,  

violence and, in the most extreme cases, to genocide. Hate speech also  

impacts a protected group’s ability to respond to the substantive ideas  

under  debate,  thereby  placing  a  serious  barrier  to  their  full  

participation in our democracy.    

8. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edn. defines the expression ‘hate  

speech’ as under:  

“Speech  that  carries  no  meaning  other  than  the  expression of hatred for some group, such as a particular  race,  especially  in  circumstances  in  which  the  communication is likely to provoke violence.”

9. In Ramesh v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 775, while dealing  

with the subject, this Court observed:  

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“..that the effect of the words must be judged from the  standards  of  reasonable,  strong-minded,  firm  and  courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating  minds,  nor  of  those who scent  danger  in  every hostile  point of view.”

10. Given  such  disastrous  consequences  of  hate  speeches,  the  

Indian  legal  framework  has  enacted  several  statutory  provisions  

dealing with the subject which are referred to as under:

Sl.No. Statute Provisions 1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 Sections 124A, 153A,  

153B,  295-A,  298,  505(1), 505(2)

2. The  Representation  of  People  Act,  1951

Sections 8, 123 (3A),  125

3. Information  Technology  Act,  2000  &  Information  Technology  (Intermediaries  guidelines)  Rules,  2011

Sections  66A,  69,  69A Rule  3(2)(b),  Rule  3(2)(i)

4. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Sections 95, 107, 144,  151, 160

5. Unlawful  Activities  (Prevention)  Act, 1967

Sections  2(f),  10,  11,  12

6. Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 Section 7 7. Religious Institutions (Prevention of  

Misuse) Act, 1980 Sections 3 and 6

8. The  Cable  Television  Networks  (Regulation)  Act,  1995  and  The  Cable  Television  Network  (Rules),  1994

Sections 5,6,11,12,16,  17, 19, 20 & Rules 6  & 7

9. The Cinematographers Act, 1952 Sections 4, 5B, 7

11. In  addition  thereto,  the  Central  Government  has  always  

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provided  support  to  the  State  Governments  and  Union  Territory  

administrations in several ways to maintain communal harmony in the  

country  and  in  case  of  need  the  Central  Government  also  sends  

advisories in this regard from time to time.  However, in such cases,  

as police and public order being a State subject under the 7th Schedule  

of Constitution, the responsibility of registration and prosecution of  

crime including those involved in hate speeches, primarily rests with  

the respective State Governments.   

12. The Central Government has also issued revised guidelines to  

promote communal harmony to the States and Union Territories in  

2008  which  provides  inter-alia that  strict  action  should  be  taken  

against anyone inflaming passions and stroking communal tension by  

intemperate and inflammatory speeches and utterances.   

The “Guidelines On Communal Harmony, 2008” issued by the  

Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India seek to prevent and  

avoid  communal  disturbances/riots  and  in  the  event  of  such  

disturbances occurring,  action to control  the same and measures to  

provide  assistance  and  relief  to  the  affected  persons  are  provided  

therein including rehabilitation.   The detailed guidelines  have been  

issued  to  take  preventive/remedial  measures  and  to  impose  

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responsibilities  of  the  administration  and  to  enforce  the  same.  

Various modalities have been formulated to deal with the issue which  

have been emphasised on participation of the stake holders.     

13. So far as the statutory provisions, as referred to hereinabove,  

are concerned, Section 124A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter  

referred to as the ‘IPC’)  makes sedition an offence punishable, i.e.,  

when any person attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or attempts  

to  excite  disaffection  towards  the  Government  established  by  law.  

(Vide: Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955)  

14. Sections 153A and 153B  IPC makes any act which promotes  

enmity between the groups on grounds of religions and race etc. or  

which are prejudicial to national integration punishable. The purpose  

of enactment of such a provision was to “check fissiparous communal  

and  separatist  tendencies  and  secure  fraternity  so  as  to  ensure  the  

dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation”.  Undoubtedly,  

religious freedom may be accompanied by liberty of  expression of  

religious opinions together with the liberty to reasonably criticise the  

religious beliefs of others, but as has been held by courts time and  

again, with powers come responsibility.   

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15. Section 295A IPC deals with offences related to religion and  

provides for a punishment upto 3 years for speech, writings or signs  

which are made with deliberate and malicious intention to insult the  

religion or the religious beliefs of any class of citizens.  This Court in  

Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 620, has upheld the  

Constitutional validity of the section.   

16. Likewise Section 298 IPC provides that any act with deliberate  

and malicious intention of hurting the religious feelings of any person  

is punishable.  However, Section  295A  IPC  deals  with  far  more  

serious offences.   

Furthermore,  Section  505(2)  IPC  provides  that  making  

statements that create or promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between  

different  classes  of  society  is  a  punishable  offence  involving  

imprisonment upto three years or fine or both.   

17. The Protection of Civil Rights Act 1955, which was enacted to  

supplement the constitutional mandate of abolishing ‘untouchability’  

in  India,  contains  provisions  penalizing  hate  speech  against  the  

historically marginalised ‘dalit’ communities.  Section 7(1)(c) of the  

Act  prohibits  the  incitement  or  encouragement  of  the  practice  of  

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‘untouchability’ in any form (by words, either spoken or written, or by  

signs  or  by  visible  representations  or  otherwise)  by  any person or  

class of persons or the public generally. Similarly, intentional public  

humiliation  of  members  of  the  ‘Scheduled  Castes’  and ‘Scheduled  

Tribes’  is penalized under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled  

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.  

18. Section 123(3) of the R.P. Act, provides inter-alia that no party  

or  candidate  shall  appeal  for  vote  on the  ground of  religion,  race,  

caste, community, language etc.  

Section 125 of the R.P.Act further restrains any political party  

or  the  candidate  to  create  feelings  of  enmity  or  hatred  between  

different  classes  of  citizens  of  India  by  making  such  an  act  a  

punishable offence.

19. Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil  

& Political  Rights,  1966 (ICCPR) restrains advocacy of  

national,  racial  or  religious  hatred that  may result  in  

incitement  for  discrimination,  hostility  or  violence  

classifying it as prohibited by law.  

Similarly  Articles  4  and  6  of  the  International  

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Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms of  Racial  

Discrimination, 1965 (lCERD) prohibits the elements of  

hate speech and mandates the member states to make  

a  law prohibiting any kind of  hate speech through a  

suitable framework of law.  

20. Thus,  it  is  evident  that  the Legislature  had already provided  

sufficient  and effective remedy for  prosecution  of  the  author,  who  

indulge in  such activities.   In  spite  of  the above,  petitioner  sought  

reliefs  which tantamount  to  legislation.  This  Court  has  persistently  

held that our Constitution clearly provides for separation of powers  

and the court merely applies the law that it gets from the legislature.  

Consequently,  the Anglo-Saxon legal  tradition has insisted that  the  

judges  should  only  reflect  the  law  regardless  of  the  anticipated  

consequences,  considerations  of  fairness  or  public  policy  and  the  

judge is  simply  not  authorised  to  legislate  law.  “If  there  is  a  law,  

Judges can certainly enforce it, but Judges cannot create a law and  

seek to enforce it.” The court cannot re-write, re-cast or reframe the  

legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate.  

The very  power  to  legislate  has  not  been conferred  on the  courts.  

However, of lately, judicial activism of the superior courts in India  

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has raised pubic eyebrow time and again.  Though judicial activism is  

regarded as the active interpretation of an existing provision with the  

view of enhancing the utility of legislation for social  betterment in  

accordance  with  the  Constitution,  the  courts  under  its  garb  have  

actively  strived  to  achieve  the  constitutional  aspirations  of  socio-

economic  justice.  In  many  cases,  this  Court  issued  various  

guidelines/directions to  prevent  fraud upon the statutes,  or  when it  

was found that certain beneficiary provisions were being mis-used by  

the undeserving persons,  depriving the legitimate claims of eligible  

persons. (See: S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 1982 SC  

149; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1984  

SC 802;  Union of India & Anr. v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR  

1992 SC 96;  Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association &  

Ors. v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 268; Vishaka & Ors. v. State  

of  Rajasthan  & Ors.,  AIR  1997  SC 3011;  Divisional  Manager,  

Aravali Golf Club & Anr. v. Chander Hass & Anr., (2008) 1 SCC  

683; and  Common Cause (A Regd. Society) v. Union of India &  

Ors., (2008) 5 SCC 511).  

21. While explaining the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution,  

in Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, (1995) 6 SCC 614, this Court  

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held as under:  

“Their Lordships decisions declare the existing law but   do not enact any fresh law, is not in keeping with the   plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141   of  the  Constitution,  for  the  Court  is  not  merely  the   interpreter of the law as existing, but much beyond that.   The Court as a wing of the State is by itself a source of   law. The law is what the Court says it is.”

22. Be that as it may, this Court has consistently clarified that the  

directions have been issued by the Court only when there has been a  

total vacuum in law, i.e. complete absence of active law to provide for  

the  effective  enforcement  of  a  basic  human right.  In  case  there  is  

inaction on the part of the executive for whatsoever reason, the court  

has stepped in, in exercise of its constitutional obligations to enforce  

the law. In case of vacuum of legal regime to deal with a particular  

situation the court may issue guidelines to provide absolution till such  

time  as  the  legislature  acts  to  perform its  role  by  enacting  proper  

legislation to cover the field. Thus, direction can be issued only in a  

situation where the will  of  the elected legislature has not  yet  been  

expressed.

23. Further,  the  court  should  not  grant  a  relief  or  pass  

order/direction which is not capable of implementation.  This Court in  

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State of U.P. & Anr. v. U.P. Rajya Khanij Vikas Nigam Sangarsh  

Samiti & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 675, has held as under:   

“48. To us, one of the considerations in such matters is   whether an order passed or direction issued is suscepti- ble of implementation and enforcement, and if it is not   implemented whether appropriate proceedings including   proceedings for wilful disobedience of the order of the   Court can be initiated against the opposite party. The di- rection issued by the High Court falls short of this test   and  on  that  ground  also,  the  order  is  vulnerable.”  (Emphasis added)  

24. Judicial review is subject to the principles of judicial restraint  

and must not become unmanageable in other aspects.   (Vide:  King  

Emperor  v.  Khwaja  Nazir  Ahmed,  AIR  1945  PC  18;  State  of  

Haryana & Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors. v., AIR 1992 SC 604;  

and  Akhilesh  Yadav  Etc.  v.  Vishwanath  Chaturvedi,  (2013)  2  

SCC 1).

25. It  is  desirable  to  put  reasonable  prohibition  on  

unwarranted actions  but  there  may arise difficulty  in  

confining the prohibition to some manageable standard  

and in doing so, it may encompass all sorts of speeches  

which needs to be avoided .  For a long time the US  

courts were content in upholding legislations curtailing  

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“hate speech” and related issues.  However, of lately,  

the courts have shifted gears thereby paving the way  

for myriad of rulings which side with individual freedom  

of speech and expression as opposed to the order of a  

manageable society.  [See:  Beauharnais v. Illinois,  343 U.S.  

250  (1952);  Brandenburg  v.  Ohio,  395  U.S.  444    (1969);  and  

R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)].

26. In view of the above, the law can be summarised to the effect  

that if any action is taken by any person which is arbitrary, unreason-

able or otherwise in contravention of any statutory provisions or penal  

law, the court can grant relief keeping in view the evidence before it  

and considering the statutory provisions involved.  However, the court  

should not pass any judicially unmanageable order which is incapable  

of enforcement.  

27. As  referred  to  herein  above,  the  statutory  provisions  and  

particularly  the  penal  law  provide  sufficient  remedy  to  curb  the  

menace of “hate speeches”.  Thus, person aggrieved must resort to the  

remedy provided under a particular statute. The root of the problem is  

not the absence of laws but rather a lack of their effective execution.  

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Therefore, the executive as well as civil society has to perform its role  

in enforcing the already existing legal regime. Effective regulation of  

“hate  speeches”  at  all  levels  is  required  as  the  authors  of  such  

speeches can be booked under the existing penal law and all the law  

enforcing agencies must ensure that the existing law is not rendered a  

dead letter. Enforcement of the aforesaid provisions is required being  

in consonance with the proposition “salus reipublicae suprema lex”  

(safety of the state is the supreme law).  

28. Thus,  we  should  not  entertain  a  petition  calling  for  issuing  

certain directions which are incapable of enforcement/execution. The  

National Human Rights Commission would be well within its power  

if  it  decides  to  initiate  suo-motu  proceedings  against  the  alleged  

authors of hate speech.  

However,  in  view of  the  fact  that  the  Law Commission  has  

undertaken the study as to whether the Election Commission should  

be conferred the power to de-recognise a political party disqualifying  

it  or  its  members,  if  a  party  or  its  members  commit  the  offences  

referred  to  hereinabove,  we  request  the  Law  Commission  to  also  

examine the issues raised herein thoroughly and also to consider, if it  

deems  proper,  defining  the  expression  “hate  speech”  and  make  

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recommendations  to  the  Parliament  to  strengthen  the  Election  

Commission to curb the menace of  “hate  speeches” irrespective of  

whenever made.  

With these observations, the writ petition stands disposed of.  

  A copy of the judgment be sent to the Hon’ble Chairman of  

Law Commission of India.  

…………………………….J.                                                                          (Dr. B.S.  

CHAUHAN)

…………………………….J.                                                                          (M.Y.  

EQBAL)

…………………………….J.                                                                          (A.K.  

SIKRI)                                                                     

New Delhi, March 12, 2014.   

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