08 March 2018
Supreme Court
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PRAHLAD SHANKARRAO TAJALE Vs THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA THRU IS SECRETARY (REVENUE)

Bench: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL, HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE
Judgment by: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K. AGRAWAL
Case number: C.A. No.-002601-002601 / 2018
Diary number: 37146 / 2017
Advocates: CHANDER SHEKHAR ASHRI Vs


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 2601  OF 2018 (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.35629 of 2017)  

Pralhad Shankarrao Tajale  & Ors.  ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

State of Maharashtra through its Secretary (Revenue) & Anr.        …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  final

judgment  and  order  dated  18.07.2017  passed  by

the  High Court  of  Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Civil

Application No.120 of 2016 in Rejected Case No.149

of 2016 in Rejected Case No.148 of 2016 whereby

the Single Judge of  the High Court dismissed the

appellants’ application on the ground of delay.

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3) In  order  to  appreciate  the  short  question

involved in the appeal, few facts need mention infra.

4) The  appellants  herein  were  the  Writ/Review

Petitioners before the High Court in the proceedings

out of which this appeal arises.  On 28.08.2012, the

appellants  filed  a  petition  being  Writ  Petition

No.8516 of 2012 before the High Court of Bombay

questioning therein the legality and correctness of

the  order  dated  14.05.2012  passed  by  the  State

Minister for Revenue (MH).  It was in relation to a

certain  land  dispute  whereby  the  appellants’

revision application was dismissed.    

5) On 27.11.2012, the Single Judge of the High

Court dismissed the appellants’ writ petition.  The

appellants felt aggrieved and filed intra court appeal

(L.P.A.No.33 of 2013) before the Division Bench.  

6) By order dated 22.03.2014, the Division Bench

permitted the appellants to withdraw the intra court

appeal  and  granted  them  liberty  to  file  review

petition before the Single Judge against the order by

which their writ petition was dismissed.

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7) The  appellants  accordingly  filed  review

application  (Review  Application  No.3330/2015  in

W.P.No.8516/2012) on 17.04.2014.  The appellants

also  filed  application  for  condonation  of  delay  in

filing the Review application.  

8) According  to  the  Registry  of  the  High Court,

the Review Application had some defects in its filing.

The appellants were, therefore, directed to cure the

defects  so  that  the  Review  Application  could  be

listed for orders before the appropriate Bench.  

9) As  the  appellants  did  not  cure  the  defects

pointed out by the Registry of the High Court, the

Review Application was listed before  the Registrar

(Judicial-1) on 19.10.2015 for passing appropriate

orders in filing the Review Application.

10) The Registrar, by his order dated 19.10.2015

further granted four weeks’ time to the appellants to

cure the defects and at the same time directed that

failing to cure the defects will result in refusing the

registration  of  the  Review  Application,  i.e.,  it  will

result in rejection of the Review application.

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11) Felt aggrieved by the order dated 19.10.2015

passed  by  the  Registrar,  the  appellants  filed  an

application being Civil  Application No.120 of 2016

and  prayed  therein  for  setting  aside  of  the  order

dated 19.10.2015 passed by the Registrar and for

restoration  of  Review  Application  No.  St.  3330  of

2015, which was dismissed due to non-compliance

of  the  Registrar's  mandatory  order  dated

19.10.2015.

12) By  impugned  order,  the  Single  Judge

dismissed the appellants’ application essentially on

the ground of delay, which has given rise to filing of

the present appeal by way of  special leave by the

Writ/Review petitioners in this Court.

13) On  05.03.2018,  we  requested  Ms.  Deepa  M.

Kulkarni,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of

Maharashtra, who was present in Court, to accept

notice on behalf of the Respondent-State to enable

us  to  dispose  of  the  appeal  finally  on  that  day

having  regard  to  the  short  issue  involved  in  the

appeal.  Learned counsel, on our request, accepted

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the notice on behalf of the respondent-State.

14) Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we

are inclined to allow the appeal and while  setting

aside of the impugned order, we restore the review

Application No. (St. 3330/2015) for its hearing by

the appropriate Bench in accordance with law.

15) Paras  8,  12  and  13  of  the  impugned  order,

which deal with the issue, read as under:  

“8.  In  Review  Petition,  office  raised objections on 14th July, 2015.  On 1st June, 2015 as the Applicants failed to remove all office objections, Section Officer made noting that all office objections are not removed on 14th July,  2015.   Thereafter  the  matter appeared  before  the  learned  Registrar (Judicial-I)  on 15th July,  2015,  19th August, 2015,  21st September,  2015  and  19th October, 2015.  No one appeared on behalf of Applicants before the Registrar (Judicial-I) for removal  of  office  objections.   Hence,  the Registrar (Judicial-I) passed conditional order on  19th October,  2015  granting  four  weeks time to remove all  office objections,  failing which, matter will stand rejected.

12.  As the Applicants failed to disclose the sufficient cause for delay, I am of the opinion that Applicants have not made out any case for allowing the Civil Application.

13. Hence, Civil Application stand rejected.”

16) This case reminds us of the apt observations

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made  by  the  learned  Judge  of  this  Court,  Vivian

Bose J.,  in Sangram Singh vs. Election Tribunal

Kotah  &  Anr.,  AIR  1955  SC  425.  His  Lordship,

speaking for  the Bench,  in his distinctive  style  of

writing  with  subtle  power  of  expression  reminded

the Courts as to how the code of procedure should

be construed in the context of rights of the parties

to the  lis,  which affects their lives and properties.

His Lordship reminded that procedural laws should

not be construed like a penal provision to punish

the parities as far as possible. The following is the

classic passage, which is always followed for doing

substantial justice to the parties to the lis:  

“A code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate  justice  and further  its  ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties;  not  a  thing  designed  to  trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections  that  leaves  no  room  for reasonable  elasticity  of  interpretation should  therefore  be  guarded  against (provided  always  that  justice  is  done  to both sides)  lest  the very means designed for the furtherance of  justice be used to frustrate  it.  Our  laws  of  procedure  are grounded on a principle of natural justice which  requires  that  men  should  not  be condemned unheard, that decisions should not  be  reached  behind  their  backs,  that

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proceedings  that  affect  their  lives  and property  should  not  continue  in  their absence  and  that  they  should  not  be precluded from participating in them. Of course,  there  must  be  exceptions  and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and  subject  to  that  proviso,  our  laws  of procedure  should  be  construed,  wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.”  

17) In  our  opinion,  keeping  in  view  the

aforementioned  observations  and  further  having

regard to the nature of controversy involved in the

case,  the  High Court  should  have  been liberal  in

taking a view in the matter and accordingly should

have condoned the delay and granted the appellants

one  more  opportunity  to  cure  the  defects.  The

interest of justice demanded one more opportunity

to the appellants to comply with the orders of the

Registry.  

18) As a consequence, the appeal succeeds and is,

accordingly,  allowed.   The  impugned  order  is  set

aside.

19) The delay in filing the application filed by the

appellants  before  the  High  Court  is  hereby

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condoned. The appellants are granted one month’s

time as an outer limit to cure the defects pointed

out by the Registry in their Review Application.  

20) On curing the  defects by the appellants,  the

Review Application be placed before the appropriate

Bench for passing orders in accordance with law.  

              ………...................................J. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

                              ...……..................................J.          [S. ABDUL NAZEER]

New Delhi; March 08, 2018  

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