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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6640 OF 2019 (@ SLP(C) No. 30046 OF 2017)

Prahlad Raut          ….Appellant

Versus

All India Institute of Medical Sciences       ….Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Indira Banerjee, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appeal is against a judgment and order dated

24.07.2017 of the  Delhi  High  Court,  allowing  Writ  Petition

(Civil) No. 5977 of 2016 filed by the respondent, and setting

aside the order dated 29.02.2016 passed by the Principal

Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal at New Delhi,

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whereby the learned Tribunal had allowed Original

Application (O.A.) No.3381 of 2013 filed by the appellant

challenging an order dated 6.1.2000 removing the appellant

from the service of the respondent.  

3. The appellant was appointed by the respondent as

Bearer on 09.02.1972 and was promoted to the post of

Steward on 15.10.1987. He was elected as an executive

member of the Cooperative Society known as AIIMS

Cooperative, Thrift and Credit Society, hereinafter referred to

as “Cooperative Society”, run by the respondent, and became

its treasurer.

4. On or about 5.3.1991, a First Information Report being

FIR No.91 of 1991 under Sections 406/420/

468/471/477A/120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC),

hereinafter referred to as the first FIR,  was registered against

the  appellant  at the  Defence  Colony  Police  Station  at  New

Delhi, allegedly for causing loss to the tune of Rs.5 Lakhs to

the Cooperative Society by forging the signatures of its

members.

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5. The appellant was arrested on 05.06.1991 and was in

custody till 12.06.1991.   By reason of his detention for more

than 48 hours, the appellant was, by an order dated 7.8.1991,

placed under deemed suspension in terms of Rule 10(2) of the

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)

Rules, 1965, hereinafter referred to as “CCS (CCA) Rules” and

subsistence allowance was paid to him.

6. While the appellant was under suspension, another FIR

No.868 of 1991 under Sections 356/379/411 of the IPC,

hereinafter referred to as the second FIR, was registered

against the appellant at the Connaught Place Police Station at

New Delhi, allegedly for snatching a bag containing cash of

Rs.290/­  and  two  lottery tickets from one  Jai  Ram son of

Chimma Ram. Criminal proceedings commenced in

pursuance of the second FIR.  By a judgment and order dated

15.9.1993, the appellant was convicted by the Metropolitan

Magistrate Delhi under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code.

7. Admittedly, the  second FIR was registered against the

appellant while he was under suspension.   On behalf of the

respondent, it has been contended that the respondent had no

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knowledge of the second FIR or of the  judgment and order

dated 15.09.1993, of conviction of the appellant under Section

379 of the IPC, for about 7 years.  

8. On  16.09.1993, the respondent  had  been released  on

probation of good conduct for a period of one year, on

condition  of furnishing  a  personal  bond and one  surety  of

Rs.5,000/­.  These orders were apparently concealed from the

respondent.

9. It is the case  of the respondent, that the respondent

came to know about the second FIR and the conviction of the

appellant pursuant thereto, after about 7 years, after which

the respondent was removed from service by a memorandum

dated  6.1.2000 issued  under  Rule 19(i) of the  CCS (CCA)

Rules.  The said Memorandum is extracted hereinbelow:­

“Whereas Shri Prahlad Raut, Steward (under suspension) from 5.6.1991 on charge of embezzling and mis­ appropriation in view of F.I.R. No.91 dated 3.3.1991 under Section 406/420/468/471/477­A and 120­B IPC

And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was later on charge for an offence of theft  of  a  bag  in public  place,  he had been convicted by the Court of Shri D.K. Saini, Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi under section 356/379/411 IPC vide judgment dated 16.9.1993.  

As whereas it is considered that the conduct of the said Shri Prahlad Raut which had held to his conviction is such

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as to render his further retention in the service of the Institute undesirable.  

And whereas Shri Prahlad Raut was given an opportunity to offer his written explanation.  

And whereas the said Shri Prahlad Raut has given a written explanation which has been duly considered by the undersigned.  

Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by the Rule 19 (1) of the C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rule 1965 the undersigned removes the said Shri Prahlad Raut from the service of the Institute from the date of the  conviction  i.e. 16.9.1993.  

Shri Prahlad Raut therefore  is directed to deposit the subsistence allowance as received by him from the A.I.I.M.S. beyond 16.9.1993.”

10. By the said memorandum dated 6.01.2000, issued under

Rule 19(i)  of  the CCS (CCA) Rules, the respondent removed

the appellant from service with retrospective effect from

16.9.1993, being the date of his conviction, pursuant to the

second FIR, and directed him to refund the subsistence

allowance received by him from 16.9.1993 onwards.

11. Rule 19 of the CCS(CCA) Rules is set out hereinbelow for

convenience:

“19. Special procedure in certain cases Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 14 to Rule 18­

(i)  where any penalty is imposed on a  Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or

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(ii) where the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in  writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or (iii) where the President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the  State, it is not expedient to hold  any inquiry in the manner provided in these rules.

The Disciplinary Authority may consider  the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit:

[Provided that the Government servant may be given an opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be Imposed before any order is made in a case under Clause (i):

Provided further that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation  is  necessary, [and  the  Government  servant has been given an opportunity of representing the advice of the Commission,]  before any orders are made in any case under this rule.]”

12. The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 indicates compliance

of the requisites for imposition of penalty under Rule 19(i) of

the CCS(CCA) Rules.   It is a matter of record that the

appellant was convicted of offence under Section 379 of the

Indian Penal Code for committing theft at a public place. The

said memorandum reveals that the conduct of the appellant of

committing theft in a public place, while under suspension on

the serious charge of embezzlement and misappropriation, for

which he was convicted under Section 379 of the Indian Penal

Code was duly considered. On such consideration the

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concerned authority  found retention of  the appellant  in the

service of the respondent to be undesirable.

13. The appellant has apparently been given an opportunity

of  hearing.  The memorandum dated 6.1.2000 records that

the appellant had submitted a written explanation which had

duly been considered before removing the appellant from the

service of the respondent, from the date of his conviction.

14. According to the appellant, aggrieved by the said

decision, the appellant appealed to the President of the

respondent, to which there was no response.  The respondent

claims that the appeal was rejected in the same year, that is,

in 2000.  However, no order of rejection is traceable.   

15. Over a decade after the appellant  was removed from

service, he entered into a settlement with the  respondent, in

terms whereof  he  compensated  the  respondent for the loss

caused by him to the Cooperative Society.  As a consequence

of the compromise, the first FIR, that is, FIR No. 91 of 1991

was quashed by the High Court of Delhi on 2.11.2012.

Thereafter, the appellant  made a  representation demanding

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Pension, Gratuity and Provident Fund with interest from the

respondent. This is not in dispute.  

16. The appellant has also alleged that he made a request to

the respondent for withdrawal and/or cancellation of the

Memorandum dated 6.1.2000, to which there was no

response.  

17. On or about 24.7.2013, that is, over thirteen years after

the issuance of the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000, removing

the appellant from service of the respondent, with

retrospective effect from the date of his conviction, the

appellant filed Original Application No.3381 of 2013 before the

learned Tribunal, challenging the Memorandum dated

6.1.2000.

18. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,  1985,

which prescribes the period of limitation for filing an

application in an Administrative Tribunal provides:  

“21. LIMITATION.­  (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,­

(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub­section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;

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(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub­section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained in sub­section (1), where­

(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and

(b)  no proceedings for the redressal of  such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall  be entertained by the Tribunal  if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub­section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub­section (1) or sub­section (2), an  application  may  be  admitted  after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub­ section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub­section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not  making the application within such period.”

19. The pleadings of the appellant, in his application before

the  Tribunal  with regard to limitation,  are  extracted herein

below :­

"3  Limitation  The application is within the period of limitation as prescribed in Section 21 of the A.T. Act, 1985. Moreover, the applicant challenges a per se  illegal  order of removal  from

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service with retrospective effect as well as his pension/GPF is withheld and thus are continuing wrongs.”

20. Along with O.A. No.3381 of 2013 the appellant had filed

an application seeking condonation of delay and an affidavit

stating that the application for condonation of delay had been

filed in exercise of abundant caution and to comply  with

procedural requirements.

21. In the application for condonation of delay, it was

contended that (i) the order of removal with retrospective effect

being void ab initio,  the law of limitation would not apply; (ii)

Delhi High Court had quashed the first FIR by an order dated

2.11.2012 and this order gave rise to a fresh cause of action;

(iii) the respondent had filed an appeal dated 21.01.2013 to

the Appellate Authority, seeking review of the order of

removal, to which there had been no response; (iv) the

appellant had continuing cause of action as

pension/provident fund amount had illegally been withheld;

(v) the appellant being 67 years of age, had retired from

service, and was in a state of penury.

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22. By an order dated 29.2.2016, the learned Tribunal set

aside the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000 and granted all the

benefits to the appellant. The Learned Tribunal held:­

“11. Having considered the matter, we are of the firm view that the OA was filed within the period of limitation.  It is not a matter of dispute that the punishing authority has retrospectively removed the applicant from service with effect from 16.09.1993, that being the date of his conviction in a criminal case by means of impugned order dated 06.01.2000.   Such orders are illegal, void ab initio and can be challenged at  any  time.  The Hon’ble  Apex Court in a celebrated judgment in the case of  State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Syed Qamarali  1967(I) SLR 228, which was subsequently followed in many decisions, has authoritatively ruled that the order of dismissal having been made in breach of  mandatory provision of the rules,  such order of dismissal had, therefore, no legal existence and it was not necessary for the respondents to have the order set aside  by  the  court.  The  defence  of limitation  which  was based only on contention that the order has to be set aside by a court before it became invalid must, therefore, be rejected.

12. Not only that, the applicant claimed that he has filed the appeal on 23.02.2000 (Annexure A­5 Colly) to the Appellate Authority which was received by the office of the President, AIIMS, on 25.02.2000. Subsequently, he moved a representation dated 21.01.2013 (Annexure A­6 Colly) claiming all the consequential benefits by ignoring the impugned removal order.

13. The contesting respondents have neither specifically denied nor produced any cogent record even to indicate that applicant has not filed any appeal (Annexure A­5 Colly)/representation (Annexure A­6 Colly) or the same were decided by the Appellate Authority.  Moreover, the applicant has claimed all consequential benefits along with amount of pension and other emoluments along with interest, which to our mind, is recurring and continuing cause of action.

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14. Thus, seen from any angle, it cannot possibly be said that the OA filed by the applicant is barred by limitation as contrary urged on behalf of respondents.   Hence, it is held that the main OA filed by the applicant is within the prescribed period of limitation and the crux of law laid down in Syed Qamarali  (supra) is fully applicable in the present case.

15. Once it is held that the main OA has been filed within the period of limitation,  learned counsel  for applicant then contended with some amount of vehemence that there is no provision of law/rules that the applicant can retrospectively be removed from his service with effect from 16.09.1993, the date of his conviction, that too, simply on the ground of his conviction in a criminal case by the impugned order dated 06.01.2000 by the competent authority.”

23. Aggrieved by the order dated 29.2.2016 passed by the

learned Tribunal, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 5977

of 2016, which has been allowed by the High Court of Delhi by

the judgment  and order  dated 24.7.2017  impugned  in this

appeal.

24. We have heard  Ms.  Meenakshi Arora, learned senior

counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant and Mr.

Dushyant Parashar, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent and perused the documents on record.

25. Ms. Arora submitted that the learned Tribunal had

rightly set aside the order of removal on the ground that the

same could  not  have  been  passed  with retrospective effect

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from 16.9.1993. Furthermore, a mere conviction in a criminal

case could not,  as held by  the  learned Tribunal, justify  an

order  under  Rule 19,  which  postulates satisfaction  by the

Disciplinary Authority, for reasons to be recorded in writing,

that the conduct of the employee, which had led to his

conviction in the criminal trial, was such that the punishment

should be imposed.

26. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had filed the

Original Application before learned Tribunal within limitation,

which is also supported by the  non obstante  clause in sub­

Section (3) of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,

1985.

27. Sub­Section (3) of Section 21 has no application in the

facts and circumstances of this case, since the appellant

contended and the learned Tribunal accepted that the Original

Application had been filed within  limitation. It  was not the

case of the appellant that there was sufficient cause for the

delay of about thirteen years beyond the period of limitation in

filing the Original Application. Nor has the Tribunal arrived at

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any finding that there was good and sufficient cause for the

delay of about thirteen years, in filing the Application.

28. Sub­Section (3) of Section 21 is attracted when there is

sufficient cause for the delay in filing an appeal beyond the

period of limitation.  The finding of the learned Tribunal that

the Original Application had been filed within limitation, as

argued by the appellant, is patently erroneous and has rightly

not been accepted by the High Court. It  is well settled that

successive representations do not save limitation and

certainly does not justify delay of about thirteen years in

approaching the Tribunal.   The judgment  of the Division

Bench of the Punjab and  Haryana  High  Court  in  Sardar

Singh v. Union of India1 was rendered in the special facts

and circumstances of the case, where the claim of a soldier for

payment of disability pension was being denied only on the

ground that the disability was not attributable to, or

aggravated by, military service.

29. In support  of  her  argument that the learned Tribunal

was right in entertaining and allowing the Original

1 1991 SCC Online P&H 1943

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Application, Ms. Arora cited  Union of India and Others v.

Tarsem Singh2 where this Court held :­

“7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy  is sought  by  an application to the  Administrative Tribunal).  One of the  exceptions to the  said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on  which the continuing  wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim  will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties.  But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay  would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. …..”  

30. The proposition of law laid down by this Court in

Tarsem Singh  (supra) is unexceptionable.   It is well settled

that where there is a continuing wrong in relation to a service

related  claim, relief  may  be  granted  notwithstanding  delay,

provided the granting of the relief does not unsettle matters

settled and affect third parties.   The judgment was, however,

2 (2008) 8 SCC 648

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rendered in the context of discretionary relief in proceedings

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for which there

is no limitation prescribed.  Where the cause of action is not a

continuing one the High Courts refuse monetary claim on the

ground of delay, specially arrears.  In this context it would be

pertinent to refer to the concluding part of Paragraph (7) and

Paragraph (8) of the judgment of this Court in Tarsem Singh

(supra) extracted hereinbelow:

“7. ……….Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite  of  delay  as it  does  not  affect the rights  of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery  of  arrears  for  a past  period  is concerned,  the principles relating to recurring/successive  wrongs  will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.

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8. In this case, the delay of sixteen years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to sixteen years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to  have granted  interest  on arrears  in such circumstances.”

31. Ms. Arora argued that the appellant had not been paid

pension, gratuity and general provident fund even though the

appellant had completed service of over 20 years from 1972 to

1993. The appellant  had otherwise, actually completed 28

years of service.   Ms. Arora also attacked the direction on the

appellant, in the Memorandum dated 6.1.2000, to return the

subsistence allowance with effect from 16.9.1993.    

32. Removal under Rule 19(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965

entails the consequence of forfeiture of retiral benefits such as

pension. The order of 6.01.2000 necessarily had to be

challenged before  the  learned Tribunal  within  the period of

limitation or alternatively the appellant would have to show

sufficient cause for the delay in filing the Original Application

beyond the period prescribed by limitation.   The question of

entitlement, if at all, of the appellant to gratuity and provident

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fund, notwithstanding his removal by the Memorandum dated

6.01.2000 was  neither raised  before  nor  considered by the

learned Tribunal.  Nor  was  the  question considered by  the

High Court.  The question cannot be raised at the stage of this

appeal.

33. The question of retrospective discharge and removal

cannot be raised after lapse of thirteen years.  Whether  the

judgment of this Court in Union Bank of India and Others

vs. C.G. Ajay Babu and Another3  cited by Ms. Arora, at all

has any application, cannot be examined at the stage of this

appeal.

34. As recorded by the High Court, as early as on 5.03.1991,

FIR No.91 (the first FIR) had been registered against the

appellant who had been elected Executive  Member of the

Cooperative Society.  That FIR, as observed above, was under

Sections 406/420/468/471/477A/120B of the IPC for

causing, as Treasurer, pecuniary loss to the tune of Rs.5

lakhs to the Society, by forging signatures of its members.

3. (2018) 9 SCC 529

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35. The appellant was arrested on 5.06.1991 and had

remained in custody till 12.06.1991. By an order dated

7.08.1991 the appellant was placed under deemed suspension

from the date of his arrest i.e., 5.06.1991 and paid

subsistence allowance. The High Court has very rightly taken

note of the fact that the first FIR had been quashed pursuant

to a settlement between the parties in terms  whereof the

appellant paid an amount of Rs.2 lakhs and another amount

of Rs.2,46,130/­ by way of bankers’ cheque, by way of

compensation for the loss caused to the Cooperative Society.

36. The judgment and order under appeal records that the

appeal filed by the appellant to the President, AIIMS  was

rejected in 2000.   However, a copy of the rejection order is not

available and was not brought on record.

37. Be that as it may, the order of dismissal dated 6.1.2000

under Rule 19(i)of CCS(CCA) Rules, 1985 was challenged on

2013 after almost 13 years. Even assuming that the appeal

was never decided, the cause of action for filing an application

before the Tribunal would have arisen on expiry of six months

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from the date of filing the appeal, in view of Section 20(2)(b) of

the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 set out hereinbelow:­

“20. Application not to be admitted unless other   remedies exhausted:

(2) For the purposes of sub­section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances;­ (a) ….. (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.”

The application to the Tribunal would have to be filed within

the period of limitation as prescribed in Section 21(1)(b) of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, which would start running from

the  date  of expiry  of six  months from  the  date  of filing  of

appeal.  The contention of the appellant that the quashing of

the first FIR gave rise to a fresh cause of action is completely

misconceived.  

38. In  S.S. Rathore vs. State of  Madhya Pradesh4, a

Constitution Bench of this Court held:­

“21. It is  appropriate  to notice  the provision regarding limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub­section (1) has prescribed a period of one year for  making of the application and power of

4. (1989) 4 SCC 582

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condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub­section (3). The civil court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not  be  invocable  in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58.  

22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.”

39. In our considered opinion, the High Court rightly

declined to accept the finding of the Tribunal that the O.A.

was within the period of limitation.

40.  The learned Tribunal opined that the O.A. had been filed

within limitation, relying on a judgment of this Court in State

of Madhya Pradesh vs. Syed Qamarali5  and held that

orders such as the order of removal of  the appellant which

were illegal or  void ab initio  could be challenged at any time.

As such orders had no legal existence, it was not necessary for

the respondent to  have the order set aside  by  Court.  The

5 (1967) 1 SLR 228

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learned Tribunal has misconstrued the law laid down by this

Court in Syed Qamarali (supra).

41. The High Court rightly found that, in  Syed Qamarali

(supra) the suit challenging the order of termination, which

was held to be invalid, had been filed within the prescribed

period of limitation of six years under Article 120 of the

Limitation Act, 1908 which was the residuary article.  In Syed

Qamarali’s  case the appeal had been rejected on 9.04.1947

and the suit filed on 8.12.1952. The period of six years has

been reduced to three years under Article 113 of the

Limitation Act, 1963.

42. On the other hand, in the State of  Punjab and Others

vs. Gurdev Singh6  referred to and relied upon by the High

Court, this Court held:­  

"8.  But  nonetheless the impugned dismissal  order  has at least a de facto operation unless and until it is declared to be void or nullity by a competent body or court. In Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council [1956 AC 736, 769 : (1956) 1 All ER 855, 871] Lord Radcliffe observed: (All ER p. 871)  

“An order, even if not made in good faith, is still an act capable of legal consequences. It bears  no  brand  of invalidity on its forehead. Unless the necessary proceedings are taken at law to establish the cause of

6 (1991) 4 SCC 1

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invalidity and to get it quashed or otherwise upset, it will remain as effective for its ostensible purpose as the most impeccable of orders.”  

9. Apropos to this principle, Prof. Wade states [See Wade: Administrative Law, 6th edn., p. 352] : “the principle must be equally true even where the ‘brand’ of invalidity”  is plainly visible; for there also the order can effectively be resisted in law only by obtaining the decision of the court. Prof. Wade sums up these principles: [ Ibid.]

“The truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case  the  ‘void’  order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order  may be  void for  one  purpose  and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another.

10. It will be clear from these principles,  the party aggrieved by the invalidity of the order has to approach the court for relief of declaration that the order against him is inoperative and not binding upon him. He must approach the court within the prescribed period of limitation. If the statutory time limit expires the court cannot give the declaration sought for.”

43. In this case the order of removal was passed on

6.01.2000. The respondent had filed an appeal on 23.02.2000

Even assuming, as contended by the appellant that the appeal

was not disposed of, the limitation started running upon

expiry of six months from 23.2.2000, that is, around

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23.8.2000.   The Original Application was patently barred by

limitation, there being delay of 13 years in approaching the

learned Tribunal. Such inordinate delay could not have been

condoned.

44. The High Court rightly held that the law of limitation is

founded on public policy.  The object of limitation is to put a

quietus on stale and dead disputes.  A person ought not to be

allowed to agitate his claim after a long delay.   There can be

no doubt that when retiral benefits are withheld without

cause, there would be a continuing cause of action.  However,

when retirement benefits are withheld by way of disciplinary

action, the order  would necessarily have to be challenged

within the  period  of limitation  or alternatively there  would

have to be sufficient cause for the delay. Once there is

cessation  of employer­employee relationship  by  an  order  of

termination, the cause of action would necessarily arise when

the order of termination is passed. The forfeiture of

pensionary benefits by reason of a punitive order of

termination is not a continuing cause of action.

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45. We are unable to accept Ms Arora’s submission that this

Court take a sympathetic view of the plight of the appellant

considering that the first FIR  was quashed and after the

conviction pursuant to the second FIR the appellant was

released on probation of good conduct after which there was

no further complaint against him.

46. It is reiterated, at the cost of repetition that the first FIR

was quashed pursuant to a settlement between the appellant

and the respondent in terms whereof the appellant

compensated the pecuniary loss caused by him to the

Cooperative Society.   The FIR was not quashed on the ground

that the same did not disclose any offence or was otherwise

frivolous, vexatious or harassive.   While under suspension in

contemplation of disciplinary proceedings for misconduct

related to the first FIR, the appellant committed theft of a bag

containing money at a public place for which he was convicted

under Section 379 of the IPC.   It cannot be said that absolute

penury led him to commit the offence as argued by Ms. Arora

since the appellant was receiving subsistence allowance while

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under suspension. Any sympathy for the appellant would, in

our view, be completely misplaced.  

47. The judgment and order of the High Court under appeal

does not  call for  any  interference.  The appeal is, therefore,

dismissed  and the judgment  and  order  of the  High  Court,

under appeal is affirmed.

.................................J.                                     (R. BANUMATHI)

..................................J       (INDIRA BANERJEE)

AUGUST 27, 2019 NEW DELHI