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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6726-6727  OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.20763-764 OF 2007)  

Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors.  …. Appellants

v.

Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. ...Respondents   

 J U D G M E N T   

K. S. Radhakrishnan, J

 Leave granted.

2. We  are,  in  these  appeals,  concerned  with  the  question  

whether a suit  filed by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee  

under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act,  

1882 (for short “the PSCC Act”), as amended by the Maharashtra

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Act  No.XIX  of  1976  (for  short  “1976  Amendment  Act”)  is  

maintainable before a Small Causes Court, Mumbai.  .

3. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in  Ramesh  

Dwarikadas Mehra v.  Indirawati  Dwarika  Das Mehra (AIR  

2001  Bombay  470)  held  that  a  suit  by  a  licensor  against  a  

gratuitous  licensee  is  not  tenable  before  the  Presidency  Small  

Causes Court under Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act, and it should  

be filed before the City Civil Court or the High Court depending  

upon the valuation.  The Division Bench held that the expression  

“licensee” used in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act has the same  

meaning as in Section 5 (4A) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and  

Lodging  House  Rates  (Control)   Act,  1947  (in  short  “the  Rent  

Act”).  Further it was held that the expression “licensee” as used  

in  Section  5(4A)  does  not  cover  a  gratuitous  licensee.   The  

Division  Bench in  that  case  rejected  the  ejectment  application  

holding  that  the  Small  Causes  Court  at  Bombay  lacked  

jurisdiction.

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4. In Bhagirathi Lingawade and others v. Laxmi Silk Mills,   

in  an  unreported  judgment  of  the  Bombay  High  Court dated  

03.09.1993,  another  Division Bench of  the Bombay High Court  

expressed the view that Section 5(4A) and Section 13(1) of the  

Rent Act, 1947 are not at all relevant in interpreting the scope  

and ambit of Section 41 of the PSCC Act, under which suit was  

filed.

5. The  Full  Bench  of  the  Bombay  High  Court,  which  is  the  

Judgment under appeal,  reported in 2007 (5)  Maharashtra Law  

Journal 341, answered the question in the affirmative overruling  

the  Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra  case (supra),  the legality  of  

which is the question, that falls for our consideration.

FACTUAL MATRIX

6. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 along with other plaintiffs (who are  

now deceased) filed a suit L.E. and C. No.430/582 of 1978 under  

Section  41  of  the  PSCC  Act  before  the  Small  Causes  Court,  

Bombay against the appellants (original defendants) for recovery

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and vacant possession of one bed room in Flat No.16, Ram Mahal,  

Churchgate,  Mumbai  and  also  for  other  consequential  reliefs.  

Plaintiffs  submitted  that  the  defendants  were  in  use  and  in  

occupation of the above premises as their guest-house and so far  

as hall and kitchen are concerned, family members of the plaintiff  

and  defendants  were  using  it  as  common  amenities.   The  

plaintiffs also claim that they are in occupation of another bed-

room in the suit flat and no monetary consideration was charged  

by them from the defendants for exclusive use and occupation of  

one bed-room and joint use of the hall and kitchen as common  

amenities.   Permission  granted  to  the  defendants  to  use  the  

premises was later revoked and since they did not vacate the suit  

flat and continued to hold possession wrongfully and illegally, suit  

was filed for eviction.

7. The Small Causes Court decreed the suit on 07.02.1997 and  

ordered eviction of the appellants with a specific finding that they  

are  gratuitous  licensee.   The  appellants  preferred  an  appeal  

before  the  Appellate  Bench of  Small  Causes  Court,  which  was  

dismissed on 05.04.2003.  Against that order both the appellants

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and  respondents  filed  writ  petitions  before  the  High  Court,  

Bombay  and  the  respondents’  writ  petition  was  for  claiming  

mesne profits.

8. The  Defendants  questioned  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Small  

Causes Court,  Mumbai  to  entertain and try the suit  before the  

learned  Single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  of  Bombay,  placing  

reliance  on  the  judgment  of  the  Division  Bench  in  Ramesh  

Dwarkadas Mehra’s  case (supra)  contending that  the licence  

created  by  the  plaintiffs  in  favour  of  the  defendants  was  

gratuitous,  i.e.  without  consideration,  hence  the  suit  is  not  

maintainable in that Court.  Learned Single Judge vide his order  

dated  16.01.2006  referred  the  matter  to  a  larger  bench.  

Consequently, a Full Bench was constituted.  

9. The Full  Bench of  the Bombay High Court  formulated the  

following questions for its consideration:

(i) Whether  the  expression  “Licensee”  used  in  section  41(1)  in  Chapter  VII  of  PSCC  Act,  not  having  been  defined  therein,  would  derive  its  meaning  from  the  expression  “licensee”  as  used  in  sub-section  (4A)  of  section 5 of the Rent Act and/or whether the expression  “licensee” used in section 41(1) of PSCC Act is a term of

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wider import so as to mean and include a “gratuitous  licensee” also?

(ii) Whether  a  suit  by  a  “licensor”  against  a  “gratuitous  licensee” is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause  Court under section 41 of PSCC Act?

Both the above mentioned questions, as already indicated, were  

answered by the Full Bench in the affirmative, the correctness of  

otherwise  of  those  findings  is  the  issue  that  falls  for  our  

consideration.    

  Arguments

10. Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel appearing for the  

appellants,  submitted  that  the  Full  Bench  was  in  error  in  

overturning a well-reasoned judgment of the Division Bench of the  

High Court in Ramesh Dwarkadas Mehra’s case and contended  

that  the  licence  created  by  the  plaintiffs  in  favour  of  the  

defendants  was  admittedly  gratuitous  and  hence  a  suit  for  

eviction of such a licensee is not maintainable in a Small Causes  

Court.   Further,  it  was  pointed  out  that  the  intention  of  the  

Legislature was that the “licence” contemplated in Section 41 of

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PSCC Act must take its colour from Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act  

1947, which specifically excludes a gratuitous licensee,  hence,  

such a suit is maintainable only before a competent civil court.  

Learned senior counsel also pointed out that it is an established  

position  of  law  that,  under  Section  9  of  the  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure, 1908, the jurisdiction of a Civil Court cannot be ousted  

unless such an ouster is expressed or clearly implied and such a  

provision  has  to  be  strictly  construed.     Shri  Sorabjee  also  

submitted that Section 41 of the PSCC Act, as initially enacted,  

used the expression “permission” and not “licence”, despite the  

Easements Act, 1882, which is indicative of the legislative intent  

that  Section 52 of  the Easements  Act,  not  being  pari  materia,  

ought not be relied on in determining the scope and meaning of  

the term “licensee” in Section 41 of PSCC Act.   

11. Shri Sorabjee also pointed out that, till 1976, the PSCC Act  

continued  to  use  the  expression  “permission”  and  the  1976  

Amendment  to  the  PSCC  Act  was  inspired  only  by  1973  

Amendment to the Rent Act 1947.  Further, it was also submitted  

that  1976  Amendment  was  specifically  made  to  PSCC  Act  to  

harmonize  it  with  the  Rent  Act  1947.    Shri  Sorabjee  also

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submitted that Section 41 of the PSCC Act, by virtue of the 1976  

Amendment, was completely reworded to specifically reflect the  

language used in  Section 28 of the Rent Act 1947 so as to make  

it  pari materia.  In other words, it was submitted that, after the  

1976 Amendment, the Rent Act 1947 and PSCC Act, are cognate  

and  pari materia  statutes which form part of the same system.  

Learned senior counsel pointed out that the statutes dealing with  

the same subject matter or forming part of the same system are  

pari materia statutes.   Reference was made to the judgments of  

this  Court  reported  in  Mansukhlal  Dhanraj  Jain  v.  Eknath  

Vithal Ogale (1995) 2 SCC 665, R v. Herrod (1976) 1 All ER 273  

(CA)  and  Ahmedabad  Pvt.  Primary  Teachers  Assn.  V.   

Administrative Officer and Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 755.     

12. Shri Sorabjee also submitted that the Statement of Objects  

and Reasons of 1976 Amendment proceeds on the premise that  

the “licence” contemplated by Section 41 of PSCC Act is a non-

gratuitous one which provides that, under the existing law, the  

licensor had to go to different Courts for recovery of possession  

and  licence  fee  and  that  the  intention  of  the  Legislature  was  

always to confine the jurisdiction of the Small  Causes Court to

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eviction  proceedings  and  proceedings  for  the  recovery  of  

rent/licence fee, not to evict a gratuitous licensee.  Shri Sorabjee  

also  submitted  that  the  expression  “licence”  contemplated  in  

Section 41 of PSCC Act does not include a gratuitous licensee,  

which is also in consonance with the principle of Nocitur a sociis,  

which  provides  that  words  must  take  colour  from  words  with  

which they are associated.  In support of this contention, reliance  

was placed on the judgment of this Court in  Ahmedabad Pvt.  

Primary Teachers Assn.’s case.     

13. Shri  Sorabjee  also  submitted  that  the  respondents  have  

proceeded on a wholly incorrect premise that the Rent Act 1947  

only  protects  the  licensees  who  were  in  possession  on  

01.02.1973.   It  was  pointed  out  that  by  virtue  of  1973  

Amendment  to  the Rent  Act  1947,  protection was given to  all  

“licensees” defined in Section 5(4A).   It was also submitted that  

certain licensees were given the status of deemed tenants under  

Section  15A and that  only  those licensees  who had subsisting  

license on 01.02.1973 were given the status of deemed tenants.  

Learned senior counsel pointed out that if all the licensees were  

deemed tenants, there would not have been any need to insert

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the  word “licence”  in  various  provisions  of  the  Act.    Learned  

senior  counsel  also  pointed  out  that  these  aspects  were  

overlooked by  the  judgment  in  appeal,  unsettling  the  law  laid  

down  by  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  in  Ramesh  

Dwarkadas Mehra’s case (supra).   

14. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the respondents,  submitted that the Full  Bench of the Bombay  

High Court is right in holding that the expression “licensee” used  

in Section 41(1) of PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the  

expression “licensee” as defined in Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act  

1947 and that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) of  

PSCC Act is a term of wide import so as to mean and include a  

gratuitous licensee.  Learned senior counsel also submitted that  

the argument of the appellants that the Rent Act 1947 is  pari  

materia  with Section 41 of PSCC Act or same system statute, is  

totally  misconceived.    Shri  Naphade  also  submitted  that  the  

“licence”  contemplated  in  Section  41(1)  of  PSCC  Act  be  

considered as licence, as defined in Section 52 of the Easements  

Act.   Shri Naphade also pointed out that though Section 41(1) of  

PSCC Act, as originally enacted, refers to occupation of premises

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with permission, such permission means permission as referred to  

in Section 52 of the Easements Act which is a contemporaneous  

statute,  i.e.  Easements  Act,  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  and  

Section 41 of PSCC Act.    In support  of that  principle, learned  

senior counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in  

National  &  Grindlays  Bank  Ltd.  v.  The  Municipal   

Corporation of Greater Bombay (1969) 1 SCC 541 and  Tata  

Engineering and Locomotive  Company Ltd.  v.  The Gram  

Panchayat, Pimpri Wachere (1976) 4 SCC 177.

15. Shri Naphade also submitted that the expression “licensor”  

or  “licensee” or  “landlord” and “tenant” used in  Section 41 of  

PSCC Act, as amended by the Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976,  

relate to “immoveable property” and Section 52 of the Easements  

Act  which  defines  a  “licence”  has  a  inseparable  connection  to  

immoveable property and property law.   Learned senior counsel  

pointed out that the expression “licensee” is used as an antithesis  

to  the  concept  of  tenant  and,  therefore,  the  licensee  under  

Section 41(1) must mean a person having a licence as defined in  

Section 52 of the Easements Act.  Shri Naphade also submitted  

that  the  Maharashtra  Act  of  1976 made necessary  changes in

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Chapter VII of PSCC Act which contained Sections 41 to 49 and by  

virtue  of  the  amendment,  the  pecuniary  restriction  on  the  

jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court placed by Section 18 has  

been removed to speed up the proceedings for eviction and to  

avoid multiplicity of proceedings.   The Legislature also intended  

that all cases of licensees and tenants should be tried only by the  

Small Causes Court under Section 41(1) of PSCC Act.

16. Before  considering  the  rival  contentions  raised  by  the  

counsel on either side and the reasoning of the Full Bench, it is  

necessary  to  examine  the  historical  settings  of  the  various  

legislations.  

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

PSCC Act:

17. The PSCC Act came into force on 01.07.1882.   In that year,  

the Transfer of Property Act as well as the Easements Act was  

also enacted.   Under the PSCC Act, Small Causes Courts were  

established in Calcutta, Madras, Ahmedabad and Bombay and the  

PSCC Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating

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to Courts of Small Causes established in the Presidency Towns.  

Small Causes Court was conferred with the jurisdiction to try all  

suits of a civil nature where value of the subject matter did not  

exceed Rs.10,000/-  as per Section 18,  subject  to exceptions in  

Section 19 of PSCC Act.  Small Causes Courts, at that time, were  

treated as a Civil Courts in the hierarchy of the Courts.    Chapter  

VII of PSCC Act, as it stood prior to the Maharashtra Amendment  

Act,  1976,  contained  Sections  41  to  46  conferring  limited  

jurisdiction of recovery of possession of immoveable property on  

Small  Causes  Court  giving  summary  remedy  for  recovery  of  

possession  of  immoveable  property  of  the  prescribed  value.  

Section 41 of PSCC Act then stood as follows:

“41. Summons  against  persons  occupying  property without leave.- When any person has had  possession  of  any  immovable  property  situate  within  the local limits of the Small Cause Court’s jurisdiction  and of which the annual value at a rack-rent does not  exceed  two  thousand  rupees,  as  the  tenant,  or  by  permission,  or  another  person,  or  of  some  person  through whom such other person claims,

and such tenancy or permission has determined or  been withdrawn,

and such tenant or occupier or any person holding  under  or  by  assignment  from him (hereinafter  called  the  occupant)  refuses  to  deliver  up  such  property  in

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compliance with a request made to him in this behalf  by such other person,

such  other  person  (hereinafter  called  the  applicant)  may apply to  the Small  Cause Court  for  a  summons  against  the  occupant,  calling  upon  him  to  show cause, on a day therein appointed, why he should  not be compelled to deliver up the property.

18. Proceedings  at  that  time  were  initiated  by  filing  an  

application,  not  a suit.   Even the Bombay Rent  Act,  1939 and  

Bombay Rent Act, 1944, did not give exclusive jurisdiction to any  

Court.    Legislative history indicates that in respect of premises  

having  annual  rack  rent  up  to  Rs.2,000/-,  the  proceedings  for  

recovery of possession between landlord and tenant were to be  

filed in Small Causes  Court under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act and  

in  case  where  the  annual  rack  rent  exceeded  Rs.2,000/-,  the  

recovery suits were to be filed in the Original Side of the High  

Court.

19. Bombay Rent Act 1947 also brought lot of changes to the  

Rent  Act  of  1939  and  1944  and  Section  28  of  the  1947  Act  

provided that exclusive jurisdiction was conferred on the Small  

Cause  Court  in  respect  of  all  the  suits  between  landlord  and  

tenant relating to recovery of rent or possession irrespective of

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value of the subject-matter.  Suits between landlord and tenant  

pending on the original side of the High Court were transferred to  

the Presidency Small Cause Courts, Mumbai and were to be tried  

under  the  provisions  of  the  Rent  Act.   Even  landlords  were  

prohibited from recovering any amount in excess of standard rent  

which was pegged down at the level of rent in September, 1940  

or on the date of first letting.  Even the landlord's right of evicting  

tenant was also severely curtailed and the landlords could recover  

possession only on proof of grounds of eviction enumerated under  

the Rent Act,  therefore,  they started letting out their  premises  

under  an  agreement  of  leave  and  license.   Proceedings  for  

recovery of possession against the licensee though started filing  

suits  under  Section  41  of  the  Small  Cause  Courts  Act,  the  

defendants  in  those  cases  starting  denying  that  there  were  

licensees but tenants and that the agreement of leave and licence  

was sham and bogus and hence not binding.  Even the findings  

rendered by the Small Cause Court in exercise of its jurisdiction  

under Section 41 on the question of tenancy was not final and the  

aggrieved party had a right to file a regular suit for declaration of  

the title resulting in multiplicity of the proceedings.  Chapter VII of

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the PSCC Act was later amended by the Maharashtra Act No. XLI  

of 1963.  The object of the Amendment in a nutshell is as follows:

“In view of the fact that the provisions of Section  47 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 are  abused by the parties in an application under Section  41 and the litigation is protracted on account of parties  in certain cases claiming the right to be tried under the  Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control  Act,  1947,  the  Act  deletes  sections  45  to  47  of  the  Presidency  Small  Cause  Courts  Act,  1882  and  empowers  the  Small  Cause  Court  to  decide  as  a  preliminary issue the question whether an occupant is  entitled to the protection of the Rent Control Act and to  lay down that only one appeal can be preferred against  the order and no further appeal can lie.  New Section 49  provides that recovery of possession shall be a bar to a  suit  in  any  court  except  on  the  basis  of  title  to  the  immovable property other than as title.”

20. Section 42A which provided that if in an application made  

under  Section  41,  the  occupant  raises  a  defence  that  he  is  a  

tenant  within  the  meaning  of  Bombay  Rent  Act,  1947  then  

notwithstanding anything contained in that Act, the question shall  

be decided by the Small Cause Court as a preliminary issue.  The  

question  of  filing  civil  suits  against  licensee  even  after  the  

introduction of Section 42A depended upon the value of subject  

matter.

Bombay Rent Act

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21. Bombay Rent Act, 1925 was repealed by the Bombay Rent  

Protection Act, 1939.  Both the Acts did not contain any special or  

separate definition of “license” nor did they deal with “licensees”.  

In the year 1944, Bombay Rent, Hotel and Lodging House Rates  

(Control) Act 1944 was enacted followed by the 1947 Act.  Rent  

Act,  1947  also  did  not  deal  with  expressions  “license”  or  

“licensee” and their rights and there were widespread attempts to  

evade the rigour of the rent control legislation by entering into  

“leave  and  licence”  agreements  in  order  to  prevent  rampant  

evasion.    Bombay Rent Act was amended in the year 1973 to  

bring  “licensees”  within  the purview of  the  Rent  Act,  1947 by  

adding Section 5(4A) and Section 15A.  

22. Statement of Objects and Reasons of Maharashtra Act 19 of  

1973 reads as follows:

“It is now notorious that the Bombay Rents, Hotel and  lodging  House  Rates  Control  Act,  1947,  is  being  avoided by the expedient of giving premises on leave  and  license  for  some  months  at  a  time;  often  renewing from time to time at a higher license fee.  Licensees are thus charged excessive license fees’ in  fact, several times more than the standard rent, and  have no security of tenure, since the licensee has no  interest in the property like a lessee.  It is necessary

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to  make  provision  to  bring  licensees  within  the  purview of the aforesaid Act.  It is therefore provided  by Cl.14 in the Bill that persons in occupation on the  1st day of  February 1973 (being a  suitable  anterior  date) under subsisting licenses, shall for the purposes  of the act,  be treated as statutory tenants and will  have all  the protection that a statutory tenant has,  under the Act.  It is further provided in Cl. 8 that in  the case of  other  licenses,  the charge shall  not  be  more  than  a  sum equivalent  to  standard  rent  and  permitted  increases,  and  a  reasonable  amount  for  amenities and services.  It  is also provided that no  person  shall  claim  or  receive  anything  more  as  license  fee  or  charge,  than  the  standard  rent  and  permitted increases, and if he does receive any such  excessive amounts, they should be recoverable from  the licensor.” (Emphasis supplied)

23. Section 15-A introduced in the said Act stated that a person  

as on 1st February, 1973 in occupation of any premises or any part  

of which is not less than a room as licensee under a subsisting  

agreement of leave and license, he shall on that day deemed to  

have become tenant of the landlord for the purpose of Bombay  

Rent Act, 1947 in respect of the premises or part thereof in his  

occupation.  The definition of the expression “tenant” in Section  

5(11)  was  also  amended  to  include  such  licensee  as  shall  be  

deemed  to  be  the  tenant  by  virtue  of  Section  15A.   The  

expression  “licensee” was  also  inserted by  Sub-section (4A)  in  

Section  5  which  provided  that  a  person  in  occupation  of  the

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premises or of such part thereof which is not less than a room, as  

the case may be, in a subsisting agreement for license given only  

for  a  license  fee  or  charge  but  excluded  from  its  sweep  a  

gratuitous licensee.    

Maharashtra Act XIX of 1976

24. Maharashtra  Act  XIX  of  1976  made  drastic  changes  in  

Chapter VII of PSCC Act by which Chapter VII was substituted for  

the original Chapter VII (Sections 41 to 49).  Under Chapter VII of  

the 1976 Amendment, the proceedings for recovery of possession  

under  Section  41  no  more  remained  summary  and  they  were  

given status of regular suits.  For easy reference, we may refer to  

both  sub-sections  (1)  and  (2)  of  Section  41,  which  reads  as  

follows:  

41. Suits  or  proceedings  between  licensors  and  licensees  or  landlords  and  tenants  for  recovery  of  possession of immovable property and licence fees or  rent, except to those to which other Acts apply to lie in  Small Cause Court.- (1) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  elsewhere  in  this Act or in any other law for the time being in force,  but  subject  to  the  provisions  of  sub-section  (2),  the  Court of Small Causes shall have jurisdiction to entertain  and try all suits and proceedings between a licensor and

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licensee, or a landlord and tenant relating the recovery  of  possession  of  any  immovable  property  situated  in  Greater  Bombay,  or  relating  to  the  recovery  of  the  licence fee or charges or rent therefor, irrespective of  the  value  of  the  subject-matter  of  such  suits  or  proceedings. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to  suits or proceedings for the recovery of possession of  any immovable property or of licence fees or charges of  rent  thereof,  to  which  the  provisions  of  the  Bombay  Rents,  Hotels  and  Lodging  House  Rates  Control  Act,  1947, the Bombay Government Premises (Eviction) Act,  1955,  the  Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  Act,  the  Bombay Housing Board Act, 1948 or any other law for  the time being in force, applies.  

25. The  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  of  the  1976  

Amendment is also relevant and same is extracted hereunder:

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“  STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS   

At present in Greater Bombay, all suits and proceedings  between a landlord and tenant relating to recovery of  possession of premises or rent, irrespective of the value  of the subject matter lie in the Court of Small Causes,  Bombay under Section 28 of the Bombay, Rent, Hotel  and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.  Under that  section, suits and proceedings for the recovery of the  license fee between a licensor and licensee as defined  in  that  Act  also  lie  in  the  Court  of  Small  Causes,  irrespective of the value of the subject matter.  Under  Chapter VII of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act,  1882  an  application  can  be  made  by  a  licensor  for  recovery of possession of premises, of which the annual  value at a rack rent does not exceed three thousand  rupees.   If  the  rack  rent  exceeds  three  thousand  rupees, the licensor has to take proceedings in the City  Civil Court where the rack rent does not exceed twenty  five thousand rupees and for higher rents in the High  Court.  Similarly, for recovery of license fees to which  the provisions of the Bombay Rent Control Act do not  apply, the licensor has to seek his remedy in the Small  Causes Court, the City Civil Court or the High Court, as  the case may be, according to the value of the subject  matter.  Under the existing law, the licensor has to go  to  different  Courts  for  recovery  of  possession  of  premises and license fees and if the plea of tenancy is  raised by the defendant and succeeds, the matter has  again to go to the Small Causes Court.  Similarly, where  proceedings on the basis of tenancy are started in the  Small  Causes  Court  and  subsequently  the  plea  of  license is  taken and succeeds,  the  plaint  is  returned  and has to be represented to the City Civil Court or the  High  Court  as  the  case  may  be,  depending  on  the  valuation.  Thus, there is unnecessary delay, expense  and hardship caused to the suitors by going from one  Court  to  another  to  have  the  issue  of  jurisdiction

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decided.  Moreover, Chapter VII of the Presidency Small  Causes  Courts  Act  envisages  applications  which  culminate in orders and are always susceptible of being  challenged by separate suits on title where relationship  is admittedly not between a landlord and tenant. 2. In  order  to  avoid  multiplicity  of  proceedings  in  different Courts and consequent waste of public time  and  money  and  unnecessary  delay,  hardship  and  expense  to  the  suitors,  and  to  have  uniformity  of  procedure,  it  is  considered  expedient  to  make  the  required  supplementary  provisions  in  the  Presidency  Small  Causes  Court  Act,  so  that  all  suits  and  proceedings  between  a  landlord  and  tenant  or  a  licensor  and  licensee  for  recovery  of  possession  of  premises  or  for  recovery  of  rent  or  license  fee,  irrespective of the value of the subject matter should  go to and be disposed of by the Small Causes Court,  either under that Act or the Rent Control Act. 3. The Bill is intended to achieve these objects.”

26. We  may,  on  the  basis  of  the  above  legal  and  historical  

settings, examine the exact intent of the Legislature in inserting  

the expressions “licensor” and “licensee” in Section 41(1) of the  

PSCC Act by the 1976 Amendment and also whether all disputes  

between licensors and licensees are intended to be tried only by  

the  Small  Causes  Courts.    Before  embarking  upon  such  an  

exercise,  we  have  to  deal  with  the  basic  principles  of

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interpretation  of  the  expressions  which  figures  in  the  Statutes  

under consideration.

Golden Rule

27. Golden-rule is  that  the words of  a statute must be  prima  

facie  be  given  their  ordinary  meaning  when  the  language  or  

phraseology  employed  by  the  legislature  is  precise  and  plain.  

This,  by  itself  proclaims  the  intention  of  the  legislature  in  

unequivocal terms,  the same must be given effect to and it  is  

unnecessary  to  fall  upon  the  legislative  history,  statement  of  

objects  and reasons,  frame work  of  the  statute  etc.   Such  an  

exercise  need  be  carried  out,  only  when  the  words  are  

unintelligible, ambiguous or vague.   

28. It is trite law that if the words of a Statute are themselves  

precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to  

expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense.  The  

above principles have been applied by this Court in several cases,  

the judgments of which are reported in Chief Justice of Andhra  

Pradesh and Others v. L.V.A. Dixitulu and Others (1979) 2

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SCC 34, Kehar Singh and Others v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR  

1988 SC 1883,  District  Mining Officer and Others v.  Tata  

Iron  and  Steel  Co.  and  Another  (2001)  7  SCC  358,  

Gurudevdatta  VKSSS  Maryadit  and  Others  v.  State  of   

Maharashtra and Others AIR 2001 SC 1980, State of H.P. v.  

Pawan Kumar  (2005) 4 SCC 350 and  State of Rajasthan v.  

Babu Ram (2007) 6 SCC 55.

29. Section 41(1), as such, came up for consideration before this  

Court  in  Mansukhlal  Dhanraj  Jain’s  case  (supra).    While  

interpreting the said provision, the Court stated that the following  

conditions  must  be  satisfied  before  taking  the  view  that  

jurisdiction of regular competent civil court is ousted:

(i) It must be a suit or proceeding between the licensee  

and licensor; or  

(ii) between a landlord and a tenant

(iii) such suit or proceeding must relate to the recovery of  

possession of any property situated in Greater Bombay;  

or

(iv) relating to the recovery of the licence fee or charges or  

rent thereof.   

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30. We are primarily concerned with the condition nos. (i) and  

(iii) and if we hold that both the above conditions are satisfied,  

then Small Causes Courts will  have the jurisdiction to entertain  

the suit  in question,  provided the expression “licensee” means  

and include “gratuitous licensee” also.  In that context, we have  

also  to  examine  whether  the  expression  “licensee”  in  Section  

41(1)  of  the  PSCC Act  would  mean  only  “licensee”  within  the  

meaning of sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act 1947.

31. Let us, in this context, make a brief reference to Sub-section  

(2) of Section 41 of the PSCC Act, which states, nothing contained  

in  Sub-section  (1)  shall  apply  to  suit  or  proceeding  for  the  

recovery of possession of any immovable property or of licence  

fee or charges or rent thereof,  to which provisions of Rent Act  

1947 apply.   A plain reading of this sub-section shows that the  

provisions of sub-section shall not apply to suit or proceeding for  

recovery of possession of any immovable property or licence fee  

to which Rent Act 1947 apply, meaning thereby, if the provisions  

of Sub-section (4A) and Sub-section (11) of Section 5 read with  

Section 15A of the Rent Act 1947 are attracted, the provisions of

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Sub-section (1) of Section 41 of the PSCC Act cannot be resorted  

to to institute a suit between the licensor and licensee, relating to  

recovery  of  licence  fee,  therefore,  if  a  licensee  is  covered  by  

Section 15A read with Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act 1947, the suit  

under Section 41(1) would not be maintainable.  Section 41(1),  

therefore, takes in its compass “licensees” who do not fall within  

the ambit of Section 5(4A) read with Section 5(11) and Section  

15A of the Rent Act 1947.

32. Gratuitous  licensee,  it  may be noted,  does not  fall  within  

Section 5(4A) read with Sections 5(11) and 15A of the Rent Act  

1947.   The provisions  of  Section 41(1)  also  do not  specifically  

exclude a gratuitous licensee or makes any distinction between  

the  licensee  with  material  consideration  or  without  material  

consideration.   Further, it may also be noted that Section 28 of  

the Rent Act 1947 do not confer jurisdiction on the Small Causes  

Court to entertain a suit against a gratuitous licensee.  Section 28  

read with Section 5(4A) would show that a party who claims to be  

a gratuitous licensee is not entitled to any protection under the  

Rent Act 1947.   

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PARI MATERIA:

33. Viscount Simonds in A.G. v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus  

of Hanover (1957) 1 All ER 49, conceived the above mentioned  

principle  to  be  a  right  and  duty  to  construe  every  word  of  a  

statute in its context and used the word “context” in its widest  

sense, including “other statutes in  pari materia”.  Earlier, same  

was the view taken in  R. v. Loxdale (1758) 97 ER 394 stating  

that  when there  are  different  statutes  in  pari  materia,  though  

made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each  

other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system  

and as  explanatory  to  each other.      This  Court  in  State of  

Punjab  v.  Okara  Grain  Buyers  Syndicate  Ltd.  Okara  AIR  

1964  SC  669  held  that  when  two  pieces  of  legislation  are  of  

different scopes,  it cannot be said that they are in pari materia.  

In Shah & Co., Bombay v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC  

1877, this Court held that the Rent Act 1947 and the Bombay  

Land Requisition Act, 1948 were not held to be the acts in  pari  

materia, as they do not relate to the same person or thing or to  

same class of persons of things.

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34. “Pari materia” words, it is seen, are used in Section 28 of the  

Bombay Rent Act, 1947 and Section 41(1) of PSCC Act referring to  

the  nature  of  suits  in  both  the  provisions  would  indicate  that  

those  provisions  confer  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  Small  Causes  

Court meaning thereby it alone can entertain suits or proceedings  

relating to recovery or possession of the premises.  Section 28 of  

the Bombay Rent Act deals with the suits only between landlord  

and tenant  and between licensor  and licensee relating only  to  

recovery of licence fee or charge  while Section 41 of the PSCC  

Act  deals  with  such  suits  between  licensor  and  licensee  also.  

Where  the  premises  are  not  governed  by  the  Rent  Act,  the  

provisions of Section 41 of the PSCC Act would apply, at the same  

time where the premises are governed by the provisions of Rent  

Act, the provisions of Section 28 would be attracted.   

35. When we look  at  both  the  provisions,  it  is  clear  that  the  

nature  of  such  suits  as  envisaged by  both  the  sections  is  the  

same.   In  this  connection,  a  reference  may  be  made  to  the  

judgment  of  this  Court  in  Mansukhlal  Dhanraj  Jain’s  case  

(supra) wherein this court has dealt with a question whether the  

suit  filed by the plaintiff  claiming the right to possess the suit

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premises as a licensee, against defendant alleged licensor who is  

said to be threatening to disturb the possession of the plaintiff –  

licensee without following due process of law is cognizable by the  

Court of Small Causes Bombay as per Section 41(1) of the PSCC  

Act or whether it is cognizable by City Civil Court, Bombay?  This  

Court while dealing with that question held that the Court of Small  

Cause have jurisdiction and that in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act  

and Section 28 of the Bombay Rent Act, 1947, pari materia words  

are used, about the nature of the suits in both these provisions,  

for  conferring  exclusive  jurisdiction  on  Small  Causes  Courts.  

Paragraphs 17 and 18 of that judgment would make it clear that  

in that case this Court only observed that some expressions in  

Section  28  of  the  Rent  Act  only  are  pari  materia with  the  

expressions employed in Section 41(1) of the Small Cause Court  

and  not  stated  that  the  PSCC  Act  and  the  Rent  Act  are  pari  

materia statutes.    

36. We may in this respect refer to Section 51 of the Rent Act  

which provides for the removal of doubt as regards proceedings  

under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act which states that for removal of  

doubt, it is declared that unless there is anything repugnant in the

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subject or context references to suits or proceedings in this Act  

shall include references to proceedings under Chapter VII of the  

PSCC  Act  and  references  to  decrees  in  this  Act  shall  include  

references to final orders in such proceedings.  The Full Bench of  

the  Bombay  High  Court,  in  our  view,  is  right  in  holding  that  

Section 51 of the Rent Act will have to be read with Section 50.  

The Court  rightly  noticed that  on the  date  when the  Rent  Act  

came into force, there were two types of proceedings for recovery  

of  possession  pending  in  two  different  courts  in  the  City  of  

Bombay, that is proceedings under Chapter VII were pending in  

the  Small  Causes  Court  and  also  suits  were  pending  on  the  

original  side of the High Court.   Section 50 provides that suits  

pending in any court which also includes the High Court shall be  

transferred to and continued before the courts which would have  

jurisdiction to try such suits or proceedings under the Rent Act  

and shall be continued in such Courts as the case may be and all  

provisions of the Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder shall  

apply to all such suits and proceedings.  In other words, the suits  

pending  in  the  High  Court  would  be  transferred  to  the  Small  

Causes  Court  and would  be  heard  and tried  there  and all  the

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provisions of the Rent Act and the Rules made thereunder would  

apply to such suits.  Section 50 also provided that all proceedings  

pending in the Court of Small Cause under Chapter VII shall be  

continued in that court and all provisions of the Rent Act and the  

Rules made thereunder shall apply to such proceedings.  Pending  

proceedings  under  Chapter  VII  were  to  be  continued  as  

proceedings under the Rent Act and all provisions and the Rules  

under the Rent Act were to apply to such proceedings.

37. Section 51 in that context states that references to suits or  

proceedings under the Rent Act shall  include references to the  

proceedings under Chapter VII of the PSCC Act and references to  

decrees in the Rent Act shall include references to final order in  

such proceedings.  When we make a comparative analysis of the  

abovementioned provisions, it is not possible to hold that the Rent  

Act and Chapter VII of the PSCC Act are pari materia statutes.  

Noscitur a sociis   Principle   

38. The Latin maxim “noscitur a sociis”  states this  contextual  

principle, whereby a word or phrase is not to be construed as if it

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stood  alone  but  in  the  light  of  its  surroundings  -  Bennion  on  

Statutory Interpretation, Fifth Edition.  A-G Prince Ernest Augustus  

of Hanover [1957] AC 436, Viscount Simonds has opined that “a  

word or phrase in an enactment must always be construed in the  

light of the surrounding text.  “….words and particularly general  

words, cannot be read in isolation; their colour and their content  

are derived from their context.”   Noscitur a sociis is merely a rule  

of construction and it cannot prevail in cases where it is clear that  

the wider words are intentionally used by the legislature in order  

to  make the scope of  the defined word correspondingly wider.  

The above principle has been applied in several judgments of this  

Court like The State of Bombay and Others v. The Hospital   

Mazdoor Sabha and Others [AIR 1960 SC 610, (1960) 2 SCR  

866] Bank of India v. Vijay Transport and Others, [AIR 1988  

SC 151, (1988) 1 SCR 961],  M/s Rohit Pulp and Paper Mills  

Ltd.  v.  Collector  of  Central  Excise,  (1990)  3  SCC  447,  

Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 8 SCC 191, M/s  

Brindavan  Bangle  Stores  &  Ors.  v.  The  Assistant  

Commissioner of Commercial Taxes & Another, (2000) 1 SCC  

674 etc.

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39. We find the expression “licensee” in Section 41 of the PSCC  

Act  has  been  used  to  fully  achieve  the  object  and  purpose  

especially of 1976 Amendment Act and legislature has used clear  

and  plain  language  and  the  principle  noscitur  a  sociis is  

inapplicable when intention is clear and unequivocal.  It is only  

where the intention of the legislature in associating wider words  

with words of a narrow significance is doubtful or otherwise not  

clear,  the  rule  of  Noscitur  a  Sociis can be applied.   When the  

intention of the legislature in using the expression ‘licensee’ in  

Section  41(1)  of  the  PSCC  Act  is  clear  and  unambiguous,  the  

principle of Noscitur a Sociis is not to be applied.

Contemporenea Expositio

40. Contemporenea Expositan is the best and most powerful law  

and it is a recognized rule of interpretation.  Reference may be  

made to the judgments of this Court in National and Grindlays  

Bank  Ltd.  v.  The  Municipal  Corporation  of  Greater,   

Bombay (1969)  1  SCC  541  and  The  Tata  Engineering  and

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Locomotive Company Ltd. v. Gram Panchayat (1976 ) 4 SCC  

177.

41. We notice in the instant case that the concept of licence and  

lease were dealt with by contemporary statutes - Indian Easement  

Act, Transfer of Property Act and Section 41 of the PSCC Act and,  

as already indicated, all those statutes were enacted in the year  

1882.  Therefore, Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act could not have  

been contemplated any other meaning of the term “occupation  

with  permission”  but  only  the  permission  as  contemplated  by  

Section  52  of  the  Indian  Easements  Act.   The  PSCC  Act  is  a  

procedural law and as already indicated, the expression “licensor”  

and “licensee” or “landlord” and “tenant” used in Section 41 of  

the PSCC Act (as amended by Maharashtra Act No. XIX of 1976)  

relate  to  immovable  property  and  Section  52  of  the  Indian  

Easements  Act  which  defines  a  licence  has  an  inseparable  

connection to immovable property and property law.  Legislature  

was well aware of those contemporaneous statutes, that was the  

reason, why the expression licence as such has not been defined  

in  the  PSCC  Act  with  the  idea  that  the  expression  used  in  a  

contemporaneous statutes would be employed so as to interpret

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Section 41 of the PSCC Act.  Above-mentioned principle, in our  

view, would apply to the instant case.   

Licensor – Licensee

42. The  PSCC  Act,  as  already  indicated,  does  not  define  the  

expression “licensor” and “licensee”.  Both these expressions find  

a place in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act.  Section 41(1) confers  

jurisdiction on Court of Small Causes to entertain and try all the  

suits  and  proceedings  between  a  “licensor”  and  a  “licensee”  

relating to recovery of possession of any immovable property or  

relating to recovery of licence fee.  Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act  

defines  the  term  “licensee”  so  also  Section  52  of  the  Indian  

Easement Act, 1882.  Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent  

Act provides that  “licensee” means a person who is in occupation  

of  the  premises  or  such  part  as  the  case  may  be,  under  a  

subsisting  agreement  for  licence  given  for  a  “licence  fee  or  

charge”.  The definition of “licensee” under sub-section (4A) of  

Section 5 is both exhaustive as well as inclusive.  But it is relevant  

to  note  that  the  licensee  under  sub-section  (4A)  must  be  a  

licensee  whose  licence  is  supported  by  material  consideration

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meaning thereby a gratuitous licensee is not covered under the  

definition of licensee under sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the  

Rent Act.

43. Let us now examine the definition of “licence” under Section  

52 of  the Indian Easement Act  which provides that  where one  

person  grants  to  another,  or  to  a  definite  number  of  other  

persons,  a  right  to  do,  or  continue  to  do,  in  or  upon  the  

immovable property of the grantor, something which would, in the  

absence of such right be unlawful and such right does not amount  

to easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a  

licence.  This Court in State of Punjab v. Brig. Sukhjit Singh  

(1993) 3 SCC 459 has observed that “payment of licence fee is  

not an essential attribute for subsistence of licence.  Section 52,  

therefore,  does  not  require  any  consideration,  material  or  non  

material to be an element, under the definition of licence nor does  

it  require  the  right  under  the  licence  must  arise  by  way  of  

contract or as a result of a mutual promise.

44. We  have  already  referred  to  Section  52  of  the  Indian  

Easement Act and explained as to how the legislature intended

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that expression to be understood.  The expressions “licensor” and  

“licensee”  are  not  only  used  in  various  statutes  but  are  also  

understood and applied in various fact situations.  The meaning of  

that expression “licence” has come up for consideration in several  

judgments.   Reference  may  be  made  to  the  judgment  of  this  

Court  in  C.M.  Beena  and  Anr.  v.  P.N.  Ramachandra  Rao  

(2004)  3  SCC  595,  Sohan  Lal  Naraindas  v.  Laxmidas  

Raghunath Gadit (1971) 1 SCC 276,  Union of India (UOI) v.  

Prem  Kumar  Jain  and  Ors. (1976)  3  SCC  743,  Chandy  

Varghese and Ors. v. K. Abdul Khader and Ors.  (2003 ) 11  

SCC 328.

45. The expression “licensee” has also been explained by this  

Court in Surendra Kumar Jain v. Royce Pereira (1997) 8 SCC  

759.   In  P.R.  Aiyar’s  the  Law  Lexicon,  Second  Edition  1997,  

License has been explained as “A license in respect to real estate  

is defined to be an authority to do a particular act or series of acts  

on another’s land without possessing any estate therein”.  The  

word  “licensee”  has  been explained in  Black’s  Law Dictionary,  

Sixth Edition to mean a person who has a privilege to enter upon  

land arising from the permission or consent, express, or implied,

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of the possessor of land but who goes on the land for his own  

purpose rather than for any purpose or interest of the possessor.  

Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Sixth Edition,  

Vol.  2  provides  the  meaning  of  word  “licensee”  to  mean  a  

licensee  is  a  person  who  has  permission  to  do  an  act  which  

without such permission would be unlawful.   

46. We  have  referred  to  the  meaning  of  the  expressions  

“licence” and “licensee” in various situations rather than one that  

appears in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act only to indicate  

that the word licence is not popularly understood to mean that it  

should  be  on  payment  of  licence  fee,  it  can  also  cover  a  

gratuitous licensee as well.  In other words, a licensor can permit  

a  person  to  enter  into  another’s  property  without  any  

consideration, it can be gratuitous as well.

47. We  have  already  indicated  the  expression  “licence”  as  

reflected in the definition of licensee under sub-section (4A) of  

Section 5 of the Rent Act and Section 52 of the Indian Easement  

Act are not  pari  materia.   Under sub-section (4A) of Section 5,  

there  cannot  be  a  licence  unsupported  by  the  material

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consideration whereas under Section 52 of the Indian Easement  

Act payment of licence fee is  not  an essential  requirement for  

subsistence of licence.  We may indicate that the legislature in its  

wisdom has not defined the word “licensee” in the PSCC Act.  The  

purpose  is  evidently  to  make  it  more  wide  so  as  to  cover  

gratuitous licensee as well with an object to avoid multiplicity of  

proceedings in different courts causing unnecessary delay, waste  

of money and time etc.  The object is to see that all suits and  

proceedings between a landlord and a tenant or a licensor and a  

licensee for recovery of possession of premises or for recovery of  

rent or licence fee irrespective of the value of the subject matter  

should go to and be disposed of by Small Cause Court.  The object  

behind bringing the licensor and the licencee within the purview  

of  Section  41(1)  by  the  1976  Amendment  was  to  curb  any  

mischief  of  unscrupulous  elements  using  dilatory  tactics  in  

prolonging the cases for recovery of possession instituted by the  

landlord/licensor  and  to  defeat  their  right  of  approaching  the  

Court for quick relief and to avoid multiplicity of litigation with an  

issue of jurisdiction thereby lingering the disputes for years and  

years.

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48. We may in this connection also refer to the judgment of this  

Court in Km. Sonia Bhatia v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1981) 2  

SCC 585,  wherein  this  Court  was concerned with  the ambit  of  

expression  “transfer”  and  “consideration”  occurring  in  U.P.  

Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act.  Both the expressions  

were not defined in the Act.  In such circumstances, this Court  

observed  that  the  word  “transfer”  has  been  used  by  the  

legislature in general sense of the term as defined in the Transfer  

of Property Act.  This Court also observed that the word “transfer”  

being  a  term  of  well  known  legal  significance  having  well  

ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to  

define the term “transfer” separately.  The ratio laid down by the  

apex court in the above-mentioned judgment in our view is also  

applicable  when  we  interpret  the  provisions  of  the  PSCC  Act  

because the object  of  the Act  is  to  suppress  the mischief  and  

advance the remedy.   

49. The interpretation of the expressions licensor and licensee  

which we find in Section 41(1), in our view, is in tune with the

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objects and reasons reflected in the amendment of the PSCC Act  

by  the  Maharashtra  Act  (XIX)  of  1976  which  we  have  already  

extracted in the earlier part of the judgment.  The objects and  

reasons as such may not be admissible as an aid of construction  

to the statute but it can be referred to for the limited purpose of  

ascertaining the conditions prevailing at the time of introduction  

of  the  bill  and  the  extent  and  urgency  of  the  evil  which  was  

sought to be remedied.  The legal position has been well settled  

by the judgment of this Court in M.K. Ranganathan and Anr. v.   

Government of Madras and Ors.  AIR 1955 SC 604.  It is trite  

law that the statement of objects and reasons is a key to unlock  

the  mind  of  legislature  in  relation  to  substantive  provisions  of  

statutes  and  it  is  also  well  settled  that  a  statute  is  best  

interpreted when we know why it  was enacted.   This  Court  in  

Bhaiji v. Sub Divisional Officer, Thandla and Ors.  (2003) 1  

SCC 692 stated that the weight of the judicial authority leans in  

favour  of  the  view that  the  statement  of  objects  and  reasons  

cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling  

statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which  

it  plainly  covers.   Applying  the  above-mentioned  principle,  we

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cannot restrict the meaning and expression licensee occurring in  

Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act to mean the licensee with monetary  

consideration as defined under Section 5(4A) of the Rent Act.

ONE UMBERALLA POLICY

50. We  are  of  the  considered  view  that  the  High  Court  has  

correctly noticed that the clubbing of the expression “licensor and  

licensee” with “landlord and tenant” in Section 41(1) of the PSCC  

Act and clubbing of causes relating to recovery of licence fee is  

only  with  a  view to  bring  all  suits  between  the  “landlord  and  

tenant” and the “licensor and licensee” under one umberalla to  

avoid unnecessary delay, expenses and hardship.  The act of the  

legislature was to bring all suits between “landlord and tenant”  

and “licensor and licensee” whether under the Rent Act or under  

the PSCC Act under one roof.  We find it difficult to accept the  

proposition that the legislature after having conferred exclusive  

jurisdiction  in  one Court  in  all  the  suits  between  licensee  and  

licensor should have carved out any exception to keep gratuitous  

licensee alone outside its jurisdiction.  The various amendments  

made  to  Rent  Act  as  well  the  Objects  and  Reasons  of  the

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Maharashtra  Act  XIX  of  1976  would  clearly  indicate  that  the  

intention  of  the  legislature  was  to  avoid  unnecessary  delay,  

expense and hardship to the suitor or else they have to move  

from  the  one  court  to  the  other  not  only  on  the  question  of  

jurisdiction but also getting reliefs.   

51. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also  

should  give  a  liberal  construction  and  attempt  should  be  to  

achieve  the  purpose  and  object  of  the  legislature  and  not  to  

frustrate  it.   In  such  circumstances,  we  are  of  the  considered  

opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is  

used in  general  sense of term as defined in  Section 52 of the  

Indian Easement Act.

52. We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles  

and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of  

the  PSCC  Act  would  take  a  gratuitous  licensee  as  well.   The  

reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed  

in the earlier part of the judgment.  Looking from all angles in our  

view the  expression  ‘licensee’  used  in  the  PSCC Act  does  not

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derive its meaning from the expression ‘licensee’ as used in Sub-

section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression  

“licensee”  used  in  Section  41(1)  is  a  term  of  wider  import  

intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well.   

53. We  are,  therefore,  in  complete  agreement  with  the  

reasoning  of  the  Full  Bench  of  the  High  Court.   In  such  

circumstances,  the  appeals  lack  merits  and  are,  therefore,  

dismissed.  There is no order as to costs.          

……………………………..J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

……………………………..J. (Dipak Misra)

New Delhi, August 13 , 2013