Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6976-6980  of 2013

Popat Bahiru Govardhane Etc.                                        …Appellants

Versus

Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.                    …Respondents

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These  appeals  have been preferred against  the judgment  and  

order  dated  25.1.2012  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Bombay in Writ  Petition Nos.  2140-44 of  2009, wherein the High  

Court  has  upheld  the  judgment  of  the  Land  Acquisition  Collector  

rejecting the application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition  

Act,  1894  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  `the  Act’)  on  the  ground  of  

limitation.  

Page 2

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:

A. The land of the appellants stood notified under Sections 4 and 6  

of the Act in 1994-95.  Award in respect of the said land was also  

made on 14.12.1995.  

B. Appellants did not file applications under Section 18 of the Act  

rather some other “interested persons” whose land was also covered  

by the same notification under Section 4 of the Act filed references  

and one such reference, i.e. L.A.R. No. 314 of 1999 was decided on  

3.4.2006.  

C. For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A of the  

Act,  counsel  for  the  appellants  applied  for  a  certified  copy  of  the  

Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the said award was  

ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was obtained by learned counsel  

for the appellants only on 3.6.2006. Application for re-determination  

of  the  amount  of  compensation  was  filed  on  18.7.2006  by  the  

appellants, on the basis of the said Court’s award.  

D. The  Special  Land  Acquisition  Collector  vide  order  dated  

22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground that the same  

was filed with a delay of 4 days.   

2

Page 3

E. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged the said order before the  

High Court.  The same stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and  

order dated 25.1.2012.  

Hence, these appeals.  

3. Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  

the  appellants   has  submitted   that  Section  28-A  of  the  Act  was  

inserted by amendment in 1987 and being a beneficial legislation it  

should   be  interpreted  liberally  and  period of  limitation  should  be  

considered and determined on all equitable grounds.  It is well-neigh  

possible for any person to file an appeal without having knowledge of  

the order/award and therefore, the limitation should be counted from  

the date of acquisition of knowledge of the Court award. More so, the  

delay was only of two days and certainly not of four days. In order to  

fortify his  case  Shri  Gaurav Agarwal  has placed reliance upon the  

judgments of this Court in Bhagwan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. &  

Ors., AIR 2010 SC 1532; and Premji Nathu v. State of Gujarat &  

Anr., AIR 2012 SC 1624.

4. Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the  

respondents,  has  opposed  the  appeal  contending  that  personal  

3

Page 4

inconvenience or hardship of an individual cannot be a consideration  

for interpreting statutory provisions in case the language of the statute  

is  plain  and  unambiguous.   It  is  to  be  given  only  strict  literal  

interpretation.  In the instant case, there is no ambiguity so far as the  

statutory  provisions  are  concerned.   Therefore,  limitation  is  to  be  

taken  as  prescribed under  the  statute.   In  support  of  her  case  Ms.  

Madhavi Divan has placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court  

in Tota Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 280; Union of  

India & Ors. etc. v. Mangatu Ram etc., AIR 1997 SC 2704; State  

of A.P. & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2949; Des  

Raj (deceased by L.Rs.)  & Anr. v.  Union of India & Anr.,  AIR  

2004  SC  5003;  and  State  of  Orissa  & Ors.  v.  Chitrasen  Bhoi,  

(2009) 17 SCC 74.  

5.     We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the records.  

The sole question for the consideration of the court is whether  

limitation  for  filing  the  application  for  re-determination  of  the  

compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from  

the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court’s  

award on the basis of which such application is being filed.  

4

Page 5

6. Though,  there  is  nothing  on  record  to  substantiate  the  

appellants’ claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the Court’s  

award  only  on  17.7.2006  and  immediately  took  steps  to  file  

application for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act.   

7. The  issue  involved  herein  is  no  more  res-integra.   The  

appellants’  case before the High Court as well as before us has been  

that the limitation would commence from the date of acquisition of  

knowledge  and  not  from the  date  of  award.  Though,  Shri  Gaurav  

Agarwal, learned counsel for the appellants, has fairly conceded that  

there is no occasion for this Court to consider the application of the  

provisions  of  the Limitation Act,  1963 (hereinafter  called the ‘Act  

1963’) inasmuch as the provisions of Section 5 of the said Act.   

8. Section 28A of the Act reads as under:

“28-A.  Redetermination of the amount of compensation   on the basis of the award of the court.—(1) Where in an  award under this Part, the court allows to the applicant  any  amount  of  compensation  in  excess  of  the  amount  awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons  interested  in  all  the  other  land  covered  by  the  same  notification under Section 4 sub-section (1) and who are  also  aggrieved  by  the  award  of  the  Collector  may,  notwithstanding that they had not made an application to  the Collector under Section 18, by written application to  the Collector  within three months from the date of the   award  of  the  court require  that  the  amount  of  

5

Page 6

compensation payable to them may be redetermined on  the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the  court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months  within  which  an  application  to  the  Collector  shall  be  made  under  this  sub-section,  the  day  on  which  the  award  was  pronounced and  the  time  requisite  for  obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.”

(Emphasis added)

9. In  Raja  Harish  Chandra  Raj  Singh  v.  Deputy  Land  

Acquisition Officer & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1500, this  Court  dealt  

with the issue of limitation while dealing with an application under  

Section 18 of the Act, and it was observed therein that unless a party  

had  knowledge  of  the  order,  the  question  of  approaching  the  

appropriate forum challenging the order, does not arise. Therefore, it  

is the date of the knowledge from which the limitation would start.  

The Court observed :

“.....The knowledge of the party affected by the award,   either  actual  or  constructive,  being  an  essential   requirement  of  fairplay  and  natural  justice  the   expression…….In  our  opinion,  therefore,  it  would  be   unreasonable……..where  the  rights  of  a  person  are   affected by any order and limitation is prescribed for the   enforcement  of  the  remedy  by  the  person  aggrieved   against the said order by reference to the making of the   said  order,  the making of  the  order  must  mean either   actual or constructive communication of the said order   to the party concerned…”

6

Page 7

10. This Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Mangatu Ram & Ors.  

(supra); and Tota Ram v. State of U.P. & Ors.   (supra), dealt with  

the  issue  involved  herein  and  held  that  as  the  Land  Acquisition  

Collector is not a court and acts as a quasi judicial authority while  

making the award, the provisions of the Act 1963 would not apply  

and, therefore, the application under Section 28A of the Act, has to be  

filed within the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 28A  

of the Act.   The said provisions require that  an application for  re-

determination  is  to  be  filed  within  3  months  from the  date  of  the  

award of the court.  The proviso further provides that the period of  

limitation is to be calculated excluding the date on which the award is  

made and the time requisite for obtaining the copy of the award.   

11. In State of A.P. & Anr. v. Marri Venkaiah & Ors.  (Supra),  

this  Court  reconsidered  the  aforesaid  judgments  including  the  

judgment in  Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) and held that  

the statute provides limitation of 3 months from the date of award by  

the court excluding the time required for obtaining the copy from the  

date of award.  It has no relevance so far as the date of acquisition  

of knowledge by the applicant is concerned.  In view of the express  

language of the statute, the question of knowledge did not arise and,  

7

Page 8

therefore, the plea of the applicants that limitation of 3 months would  

begin  from  the  date  of  knowledge,  was  clearly  unsustainable  and  

could not be accepted.  The Court also rejected the contention of the  

applicants  that  a  beneficial  legislation  should  be  given  a  liberal  

interpretation observing that whosoever wants to take advantage of  

the beneficial legislation has to be vigilant and has to take appropriate  

action  within  time  limit  prescribed  under  the  statute.  Such  an  

applicant  must  at  least  be  vigilant  in  making  efforts  to  find  out  

whether the other land owners have filed any reference application  

and if so, what is the result thereof.  If that is not done then the law  

cannot help him.   The ratio of the judgment in Raja Harish Chandra  

Raj Singh  (supra) was held to be non-applicable in case of Section  

28-A of the Act.  The Court observed:  

“…….In that case, the Court interpreted the proviso to   Section  18  of  the  Act  and  held  that  clause  (a)  of  the   proviso was not applicable in the said case because the   person making the application was not present  or was   not represented before the Collector at the time when he   made his award. The Court also held that notice from the   Collector  under  Section  12(2)  was  also  not  issued,   therefore, that part of clause (b) of the proviso would not   be  applicable.  The  Court,  therefore,  referred  to  the   second  part  of  the  proviso  which  provides  that  such   application can be made within six months from the date   of the Collector’s award. In the context of the scheme of   Section 18 of the Act, the Court held that the award by   

8

Page 9

the Land Acquisition Officer is an offer of market price   by the State for purchase of the property. Hence, for the  said  offer,  knowledge,  actual  or  constructive,  of  the   party  affected  by  the  award  was  an  essential   requirement of fair play and natural justice. Therefore,   the second part of the proviso must mean the date when   either the award was communicated to the party or was   known by him either actually or constructively.

The aforesaid  reasoning  would  not  be  applicable   for interpretation of Section 28-A because there is no  question of issuing notice to such an applicant as he is   not a party to the reference proceeding before the court.   The award passed by the court cannot be termed as an   offer for market price for purchase of the land. There is   no  duty  cast  upon  the  court  to  issue  notice  to  the   landowners  who  have  not  initiated  proceedings  for   enhancement  of  compensation  by  filing  reference   applications; maybe, that their lands are acquired by a   common notification issued under Section 4 of the Act.   As against  this,  under  Section 18 it  is  the duty  of  the   Collector to issue notice either under Section 12(2) of the   Act at the time of passing of the award or in any case the   date to be pronounced before passing of the award and if   this  is  not  done  then  the  period  prescribed  for  filing   application under Section 18 is six months from the date   of the Collector’s award.”                       (Emphasis  added)

A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in  Des Raj (supra)  

and Chitrasen Bhoi (supra).  

12. In view of above, there is no occasion for us to consider the  

judgments cited at the bar on behalf of the appellants in support of its  

case. More so, the said judgments have been delivered by this Court  

while dealing with the applications under Section 18 of the Act.  If  

9

Page 10

there are directly applicable precedents on the issue, the same have to  

be followed rather than to search for a new interpretation unless it is  

established  that  the  earlier  judgments  require  reconsideration.   The  

suggestion  of  reconsideration has  specifically  been rejected by this  

Court in Marri Venkaiah (supra).  

13. It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  law  of  limitation  may  

harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its  

rigour  when  the  statute  so  prescribes.  The  Court  has  no power  to  

extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds.  The statutory  

provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party  

but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the  

same.  The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is  

hard  but  it  is  the  law”,  stands  attracted  in  such a  situation.  It  has  

consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to  

be considered while interpreting a statute.  “A result flowing from a  

statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore  

that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its  

operation.”

10

Page 11

(See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR  

1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma  

& Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30)   

In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none of the  

submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable.   

14. As the matters are squarely covered by the above referred to  

judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit.  The cases do not  

warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.  

….………………..........J.  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

…...................................J.                                                          (S.A. BOBDE)  

NEW DELHI;

August 22, 2013

11