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REPORTABLE  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5804 OF 2015  

(Arising out of SLP (C) No.19819 of 2013) PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN (D) BY LRS. & ORS.                             …APPELLANTS

Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR.                 …RESPONDENTS

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5806-5807 OF 2015

(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.31624-31625 of 2014)                     AND

   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5808-5810 OF 2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.3482-3484 of 2015)

J U D G M E N T V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Leave granted in all the special leave petitions.

2. Challenge in the appeal arising out of SLP No. 19819 of

2013  is  arising  out  of  the  impugned  judgment  and  order

dated 05.03.2013 passed in Misc. First Appeal No.32157 of

2012 (LAC) by the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at

Gulbarga  (filed  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated

29.09.2012 of Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Gulbarga,

Reference Court in LAC No. 943 of 1997) whereby, the High

Court  upheld  the  quantum  of  compensation  awarded  by  the

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Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) and declined to interfere

with  the  same  and  dismissed  the  appeal  filed  by  the

appellants.

3. Challenge  in  the  appeals  arising  out  of  the  SLP

Nos.31624-31625 of 2014 is preferred against the judgment

and order dated 22.09.2014 passed in Review Petition No.

2537 of 2013 in MFA No. 32157 of 2012 (filed by the KIADB)

and Writ Petition No. 100860 of 2013 (filed by the Company)

of  the  Karnataka  High  Court,  Gulbarga  Bench  whereby  the

High Court has remanded the matter to the Reference Court

for reconsideration of the case.

4. Challenge  in  the  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP

Nos.3482-3484 of 2015, filed by the Karnataka Industrial

Area Development Board is arising out of the judgment and

order  dated  22.09.2014  passed  by  the  High  Court  of

Karnataka, Gulbarga bench, in Review Petition No. 2537 of

2013 in MFA No. 32157 of 2012, Misc. First Appeal No. 30702

of 2013  and writ petition No. 100860 of 2013, whereunder

the  High  Court  was  pleased  to  dispose  of  the  above

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mentioned appeal and petitions by remitting the matter to

the Reference Court to give an opportunity of hearing to

the beneficiary and incidentally to the petitioner therein

(the allottee Company). The said appeals were filed by the

KIADB as it was aggrieved of certain observations made in

the judgment, while remanding the case, which affects the

merits of the case.

5. This is the most pathetic case of a land owner, and

after his death his legal heirs, who have been made to

litigate the case for more than three decades to get just

and reasonable compensation, after having lost their land

in  the  acquisition  proceedings  at  the  instance  of  the

Karnataka  Industrial  Areas  Development  Board  (in  short

‘KIADB’)  which  was  their  only  source  of  income  and

livelihood,  which  right  to  livelihood  is  a  fundamental

right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of

India as held by this Court Constitution Bench in the case

of  Olga Tellis & Ors.  v.  Bombay Municipal Corporation &

Ors.1 The matter has been pending before the courts for

1   (1985) 3 SCC 545

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more than three decades. The appellant-landowners have been

crying  for  justice  for  enforcement  of  their  legitimate

right of getting just and reasonable compensation under the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the L.A. Act”). The

land in the instant case has been acquired by the State

Government of Karnataka in exercise of its power of eminent

domain under Section 28 of the Karnataka Industrial Areas

Development Act, 1966 (in short ‘the KIAD Act’) at the

instance of KIADB. The said acquisition of land had been

done  by  the  State  Government  for  the  purpose  of

establishment of industries in the land vide notifications

under  Section  28(1)  and  28(4)  of  the  KIAD  Act.  By  an

earlier notification issued by the State Government under

Section  3  of  the  KIAD  Act,  the  land  involved  in  these

proceedings had also been included in the an Industrial

Area.  The KIAD Act provides for securing the establishment

of industrial area in the State of Karnataka with a view to

promote  the  establishment  and  orderly  development  of

industries therein after formation of Industrial Estate in

the acquired land.

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    The relevant facts which are required for the purpose

of considering the rival legal contentions urged on behalf

of  the  parties  in  these  appeals  are  stated  in  brief

hereunder.

6. The  appellant  (since  deceased),  represented  by  his

legal representatives was the absolute owner of the land

bearing survey No. 306/9/1, measuring 5 acres 20 guntas at

Malkhed  village  in  Sedam  Taluka,  Gulbarga  District,

Karnataka. It is claimed that on 12.2.1981, the predecessor

of M/s Rajashree Cement Works, a unit of M/s Ultra Tech

Cement Ltd. (originally a unit of India Rayon & Industries

Ltd.) made a proposal to the State of Karnataka-respondent

to set up a cement manufacturing plant and applied for

acquisition and allotment of 1187 acres and 5 guntas of

land towards setting up of a factory, residential colony

etc at Malkhed, Gulbarga. This fact is not supported by the

original land acquisition record of the government produced

before this Court by the State government’s counsel.

7. The  state  government  issued  preliminary  notification

dated 18.06.1981 under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act for

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acquisition of land measuring 1187.15 acres in favour of

the KIADB which included the land of the appellants. The

notification also stated that the acquisition of land was

for the purpose of establishment of industries. The State

Government on 24.11.1981 issued declaration as contemplated

under section 28(4) of the KIAD Act. The state government

on 03.12.1981 issued notices upon the interested parties

under Section 28(6) of the KIAD Act.  

8. The Special Deputy Commissioner, Gulbarga, vide award

dated 28.05.1982 fixed the market value of the acquired

land  at  Rs.1700/-  per  acre  along  with  other  statutory

payments  such  as  15%  solatium  and  statutory  interest

payable on the compensation amount.

9. On 07.06.1990, the state government took possession of

the acquired land from the landowner and transferred the

same  to  the  KIADB  which  in  turn,  allotted  the  same  in

favour of the Company as per the provisions of the KIAD Act

and relevant provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas

Development Board Regulations, 1969 (hereinafter the “KIADB

Regulations”). The  appellants  received  the  compensation

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under protest and made an application on 20.06.1982 to the

Special Deputy Commissioner to make reference of the award

to  the  Reference  Court  for  enhancement  of  compensation

under  Section  18(1)  of  the  L.A.  Act.  The  reference

application  filed  by  the  appellants  before  the  Deputy

Commissioner under Section 18(3) of the Act dated 12.4.1991

was numbered as Misc. Petition No.101 of 1991. The Special

Deputy  Commissioner,  vide  supplementary  awards  dated

30.12.1992 and 02.01.1993 granted solatium at the rate of

30% in view of the provisions under the Land Acquisition

(Amendment) Act (No.68 of 1984). The reference papers were

sent by the Land Acquisition Officer to Principal Civil

Judge (Sr. Divn.), Gulbarga, was registered as LAC No. 943

of 1997.  The learned judge refused to condone the delay of

the application filed by the appellants under Section 18(3)

of  the  L.A.  Act  on  the  ground  that  the  date  of  first

application  had  been  interpolated.  A  Civil  Revision

Petition was filed by the appellants before the High Court

against the order of the Principal Civil Judge, which was

dismissed by the learned single judge of the Karnataka High

Court vide order dated 21.08.2003.

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10. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants filed an appeal

before this Court being Civil Appeal No.3244 of 2005. This

Court  set  aside  the  order  of  the  Reference  Court  and

remanded the case to it with a direction to re-decide the

application of the appellants on merits and to re-determine

the  market  value  of  the  acquired  land  and  award

compensation accordingly. This Court further held that the

Reference Court erred in holding that the petition of the

appellants was barred by limitation as the award could be

said to have been passed only on 07.06.1990, the date on

which the state government took possession of the acquired

land and compensation was offered to the appellants. It was

further held by this Court that the Deputy Commissioner did

not have the jurisdiction to pass the award in the first

place  on  28.05.1982,  as  all  the  acquisition  proceedings

with respect to the notifications of the state government

dated  24.11.1981  had  been  stayed  by  the  learned  single

Judge of the Karnataka High Court vide an interim order

dated  05.03.1982  in  Writ  Petition  Nos.  9356  to  9361  of

1982, filed by the appellants and other land owners  who

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were affected by the acquisition of land and the interim

order was operating on the date of passing of the award

referred to supra, which fact was neither noticed by the

Reference Court nor by the High Court.

11. Accordingly, the amended claim petition was filed by

the appellant (since deceased) before the Reference Court

after  remand  order  passed  by  this  Court  seeking

compensation at the rate of Rs.2,50,000/- per acre before

the Principal Civil Judge, Gulbarga, who relied upon the

judgment  and  order  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court  dated

27.02.2005 in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No.

213 of 2005, which had relied upon the sale deeds of the

sites carved out in Sy. No.389 at the rate of Rs.7.5/- per

sq. feet.   The reference of the Sy. No.414/2 of the same village according to which the sale deed had been executed

at the rate of Rs.13/- per sq. feet in the year 1985-1986

was  also  relied  on,  on  the  basis  of  which  the  learned

Principal  Civil  Judge  allowed  the  claim  petition  of  the

appellants in part and enhanced the compensation awarded

initially from Rs.1,700/- per acre of land to Rs.1,37,000/-

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per acre of land after re-determination of the market value

of  the  land  and  awarded   the  other  statutory  benefits

payable to the owners under the provisions of the L.A. Act

vide order dated 29.09.2012 passed in LAC No. 943 of 1997.

12. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order of Reference

Court  passed  in  LAC  No.  943  of  1997,  the  appellants

preferred MFA No. 32157 of 2012 before the Karnataka High

Court, Gulbarga Bench. The State Government, through KIADB

belatedly preferred MFA 30702 of 2013 before the High Court

after the dismissal of the above Miscellaneous appeal of

the appellants seeking for enhancement. The learned single

Judge of the High Court held that the Reference Court while

fixing the market value of the acquired land had taken into

consideration the fact that it has got the Non-Agricultural

(NA) potential and had also deducted charges towards the

waiting period as well as development charges at the rate

of  30%  and  had  re-determined  the  market  value  of  the

acquired land at Rs.1,37,000/- per acre.   Therefore, the

learned single Judge of the High Court has held that the

same did not call for its interference   and accordingly

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dismissed the appeal of the appellants vide judgment and

order dated 05.03.2013.

 13. Aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment  and  order,  the

appellants-land  owners  filed  the  present  appeal  arising

out of special leave petition No. 19819 of 2013 before this

Court  seeking  for  enhancement  of  compensation  after  re-

determination of the market value of the land on the basis

of the award passed  by the High Court in MFA No. 3796 of

2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 on the ground that

on an examination of Ext. P.5, which is the village map of

the land, it becomes abundantly clear that the land covered

in the award passed in the Cross Objection NO. 213 of 2005

is  comparable  to  the  land  of  the  appellants  which  were

acquired by the State Government for industrial development

at the instance of KIADB.

 14. While the matter was yet to be heard by this Court, the

respondent-State  through  KIADB  filed  Review  Petition

No.2537 of 2013 before the High Court in MFA No.32157 of

2012.  It  had  also  filed  belated  MFA  No.  30702  of  2013

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against  the  judgment  and  Award  passed  by  the  Reference

Court in LAC No. 943 of 1997 M/s Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.

through  its  Unit  M/s.  Rajashree  Cement  Ltd.  filed  Writ

Petition  No.  100860  of  2013  before  the  High  Court  on

19.03.2013  questioning  the  correctness  of  the  award  of

compensation passed in favour of the land owners on the

ground that they are the necessary party to the reference

proceedings before the Reference Court and they were not

notified in the said proceedings. The learned single Judge

set aside the judgment and award order of the Reference

Court by allowing the above writ petition and directed it

to  afford  an  opportunity  of  hearing  to  the  alleged

beneficiary-Company to participate in the proceedings and

to decide the matter on merits in accordance with law after

affording opportunity to the Company.

15. Aggrieved by the supplementary awards passed by the

Special  Deputy  Commissioner  dated  30.12.1992  and

02.01.1993, the Company filed Writ Petition  No. 8707 of

1993  before  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  challenging  the

legality and validity of the same. The learned single judge

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held that after the amendment in the L.A. Act, the land

owners  were  entitled  for  30%  of  solatium  and  additional

benefits  under  Sections  23(1-A),  23(2)  and  28  for  the

reason that the acquisition proceedings in the case were

pending as on 30.04.1982 in respect of the lands as no

award had been passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner on

or before 30.04.1982. The learned single judge further held

that  the  Special  Deputy  Commissioner  was  justified  in

passing a supplementary award, awarding benefits under the

above  said  provisions  of  the  L.A.  Act.  Hence,  it  was

concluded  by  the  learned  single  judge  that  the  Company

cannot  have  any  grievance  as  against  the  supplementary

awards and dismissed the Writ Petition.

16. Being aggrieved, the Company filed Writ Appeal No. 4321

of 1998 before the Division Bench of the Karnataka High

Court  for  setting  aside  the  order  of  dismissal  dated

17.06.1998  passed  in  the  writ  petition  by  the  learned

single judge. The learned Division Bench allowed the appeal

of the Company and set aside the supplementary awards dated

30.12.1992  and  02.01.1993  of  the  Special  Deputy

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Commissioner by judgment and order dated 29.05.2000 holding

that  since  the  appellants  had  entered  into  an  agreement

with the State Government and KIADB as well as the Company

as regards the compensation, the initial award had attained

finality and thus, the Special Deputy Commissioner did not

have the jurisdiction to pass the supplementary awards. The

Division Bench further held that the said land had been

allotted by KIADB in favour of the Company and that the

Special  Deputy  Commissioner  had  no  power  to  pass

supplementary  awards  when  no  reference  was  pending.

However, the rejection order passed in the reference case

by the Reference Court  affirmed by the High Court in the

above Civil Revision Petition was set aside by this Court

in the Civil Appeal No.3244 of 2005 vide its judgment and

order  dated  27.04.2011.  Thereafter,  the  Reference  Court

re-determined the market value of the acquired land of the

appellants-landowners as directed by this Court in which

proceedings the state government through KIADB was a party.

17. The learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellants

Ms. Kiran Suri has contended that the Company need not be

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party to the proceedings as it is not the beneficiary of

the acquired land in terms of the provisions of the KIAD

Act  and  L.A.  Act  to  be  party  in  the  proceedings  for

determination  of  the  market  value  of  the  acquired  land

before the Reference Court.  

18. The learned senior counsel has further contended that

the  State  Government  through  KIADB  should  not  have  been

allowed to file either MFA or writ petition after the same

matter had already been decided by the High Court at the

instance of the appellants. In support of her above legal

submission  she  has  placed  reliance  upon  the  decision  of

this Court in the case of Ramchandra Dahdu Sonavane (dead)

by LRs and Ors. v. Vithu Hira Mahar (dead) by LRs. And Ors2

on  the  question  of res  judicata wherein  this  Court  has

observed that once the matter which was the subject matter

of lis stood  determined  by  a  competent  court,  no  party

thereafter can be permitted to reopen it in a subsequent

litigation.  Such  rule  was  brought  into  the  statute  book

with  a  view  to  bring  such  litigation  to  an  end  whose

ultimate  purpose  is  to  harass  the  other  party.  It  is

2  (2009) 10 SCC 273

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further contended by the learned senior counsel that the

matter is concluded by the High Court in the MFA filed by

the appellants and as such the question of reviewing the

judgment and order passed by it does not arise unless there

is an error apparent on the face of the record. She has

placed reliance on the case of Hari Das v. Usha Rani Banik3.

Reliance has also been placed on the decision in the case

of Ballarpur  Industries  Ltd  &  KIADB  v. Civil  Judge4 in

support of the contention that the lessee/ allottee need

not be a party to the proceedings either before the Land

Acquisition  Collector  or  before  the  Reference  Court  as

provided under Section 20 (c) of the L.A. Act, 1894.

19. Referring to the Review Petition and the appeal filed

by the State of Karnataka, represented by KIADB before the

High Court, it is further contended by the learned senior

counsel on behalf of the appellants that at the relevant

point of time when the matter was decided in MFA of the

appellant/owners by the High Court at the instance of the

land owners, no appeal was filed by the KIADB questioning

the correctness of the re-determination of the market value 3  (2006) 4 SCC 78 4  (ILR) 1987 KAR 3445

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of the acquired land and the award passed by the Reference

Court, which has been confirmed by the High Court holding

that  the  market  value  of  the  land  of  the  owners  at

Rs.1,37,000  per  acre.  The  same  could  not  have  been

interfered with by the High Court in the writ petition as

the  Company  is  not  entitled  to  challenge  the  award  by

filing writ petition. The belated MFA filed by the KIADB

was rightly dismissed by the High Court. It was further

contended by the learned senior counsel that neither the

review petition filed by the KIADB nor the Writ Petition

filed by the Company should have been entertained by the

High Court as the same was not maintainable for more than

one reason. Firstly, the Company had no  locus standi to

challenge the award passed by the Reference Court in the

Writ Petition, when the remedy of appeal was provided to

the aggrieved party  viz. to the State Government and the

KIADB. Secondly, the High Court had rightly rejected the

review petition and belated Misc. First Appeal filed by the

KIADB after disposal of the MFA filed by the landowners

seeking for enhancement of compensation.

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20. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

on  behalf  of  the  appellants  that  the  High  Court  has

committed a serious error in law by remanding the matter

back to the Reference Court to give an opportunity to the

Company  without  recording  the  specific  finding  as  to

whether the Company is a beneficiary of the acquired land

either under the provisions of KIAD Act or the L.A. Act. It

is  further  submitted  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  on

behalf  of  the  appellants  that  this  specific  issue  was

raised before the High Court, the same was not answered and

therefore,  there  is  no  question  of  remanding  the  matter

back to the Reference Court without recording the finding

with valid and cogent reasons.

21. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of appellants that the High Court has

committed a serious error in law in remanding of matter to

the Reference Court after about 33 years of initiation of

acquisition  proceedings  in  a  casual  manner  without

examining  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  KIAD  Act,  L.A.

Act, Regulations and the law laid down by this Court in

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this regard. It is impermissible in law for the High Court

to entertain a non maintainable Writ Petition filed by the

Company  which is an allottee, and it has no right under

the provisions of the L.A. Act to get impleaded as a party

either in the reference proceedings or avail appeal remedy

provided under Section 54 of the L.A. Act against the award

passed by the Reference Court as it has no right under the

provisions of the L.A. Act to question the correctness of

the award with regard to the re-determination of quantum of

compensation as it is governed by the terms and conditions

of the order of allotment and lease deed executed by it

when the law on this aspect is clear with regard to the

right of the Company as it is an allottee and therefore,

the Writ Petition filed by it questioning the correctness

of award passed by the Reference Court is not maintainable

in law and the order of remand passed by the High Court in

exercise  of  its  extraordinary,  discretionary  and

supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India, is void ab initio in law as the Writ

Petition proceedings before the High Court are not at all

maintainable in law. Further, the order of remand passed by

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the High Court without even deciding the legal right of the

Company  which  was  claimed  by  it  stating  that  it  is  a

beneficiary even though it is admittedly a lessee of the

acquired  land,  which  was  allotted  in  its  favour  by  the

KIADB on the market value of the acquired land as per the

provisions  of  the  KIAD  Act  and  Regulations.  The  letter

dated  07.04.1982  relied  upon  by  the  state  government

clearly shows that the KIADB had intimated the Indian Rayon

Corporation Ltd., that the land to an approximate extent of

971.07 acres has been decided to be allotted in favour of

the Company on lease cum sale basis for a period of 21

years. One of the conditions at No.14 of the above said

letter shows that the KIADB, on being satisfied that the

land is not being put to use for the purpose for which it

was  asked  for  will  be  free  to  re-enter  upon  and  take

possession of the whole or that part of the land which has

not been put to proper use by the Company. It is further

submitted by the learned senior counsel that the agreement

dated  30.03.2005  entered  between  KIADB  and  the  Company

relied on by the Company shows that the Company had applied

for grant of lease of 27 acres 21 guntas of land including

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that of the landowners and the lease of the same is made by

KIADB in favour of the Company for a period of 21 years

which  is  independent  from  the  acquisition  proceedings

initiated by the State Government at the instance of the

KIADB in the case on hand. It is submitted that all the

documents produced by the Company, which are relied upon

would show that either the acquired land of the owners is

for  industrial  development  and  that  the  Company  is  the

lessee  of  the  lands  acquired  in  favour  of  KIADB.  The

material documents produced in these proceedings either by

the state government or KIADB to assume the fact that the

acquisition of the land is made at the behest of and at the

expense of the Company is not factually correct. This fact

is evident from the acquisition notifications issued by the

state government under the provisions of the KIAD Act. On

the contrary, as per the acquisition notifications it is

acquired in favour of the KIADB for the formation of an

Industrial Estate in the Industrial Area. Therefore, the

Company cannot assert that it is either a beneficiary of

the  acquisition  of  land  or  a  person  interested  for  the

purposes of KIAD Act or L.A. Act to give an opportunity for

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it  to  participate  in  the  proceedings  to  determine  the

market value of the acquired land either before the Special

Deputy Commissioner or Reference Court to pass an award,

awarding just and reasonable compensation in favour of the

appellants in respect of their acquired land.

22. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

on behalf of the appellants that as per Section 29 of the

KIAD  Act,  where  any  land  is  acquired  by  the  State

Government, it shall pay for such acquisition cost of the

acquired land in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

The  notifications  issued  by  the  state  government  under

Sections 28(1) & 28(4) of the KIAD Act would clearly show

that the land is acquired by the state government not in

favour  of  any  particular  Company  but  for  KIADB  for

establishing industries in the industrial area as notified

by the state government under Section 3 of the KIAD Act.

Therefore, there is no specific role of the Company to take

part in the proceedings either before the Land Acquisition

Officer  or  the  Reference  Court  for  the  purpose  of

determining just and reasonable compensation of the land

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payable to the land owners.

23. Further,  the  learned  senior  counsel  has  vehemently

contended that the High Court committed an error in law by

applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of DDA

v. Bhola Nath Sharma5, to the facts of the case on hand. In

that case, the acquisition of the land covered was at the

instance  of  the  DDA,  and  the  DDA  was  asked  to  pay  the

compensation  amount  determined  in  respect  of  the

acquisition  of  the  land  in  favour  of  the

respondent-landowners therein. In the facts of the present

case, the acquisition of land was not at the instance of

the Company but at the instance of the KIADB which fact is

evident from the acquisition notifications issued by the

state government for the purpose of formation of industrial

estate  to  establish  industries  in  the  industrial  area

already declared by the KIADB.  

24. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

on behalf of the appellant-owners that the High Court has

erred in not following the law laid down by the Division

5  (2011) 2 SCC 54

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Bench of the High Court in the case of Ballarpur Industries

v. Court of Civil Judge6, wherein it was held by the court

as under:   

“28. Provisions of Ss. 29 and 30 provide for the determination of compensation in respect of the land  acquired.  Payment  of  compensation  is  in accordance with the provisions of the Act. See. 29(2) contemplate determination of compensation by  agreement  between  the  State  Government  and the  person  to  be  compensated.  Before  such  an agreement is arrived at between the Government and the person to be compensated, the Act does not  require  the  KIADB  to  be  a  party  to  the negotiations or to the agreement. No provision of the Act contemplates a tripartite discussion or agreement in this regard. Similarly, no other private person like the Company has a say in this matter.

29. It is only when such an agreement cannot be reached, State Government has to refer the case to the 'Deputy Commissioner' for determination of  the  amount  of  compensation.  On  receipt  of reference,  the  Dy.  Commissioner  has  to  issue notice under S. 29(4) on the owner or occupier of the land and on all persons known or believed to be interested herein to appear before him and state  their  respective  interests  in  the  said land. Here, again, no provision to notify the KIADB or the Company is contemplated.”                (emphasis laid by this Court)

6  ILR 1987 Kar 3445

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25. Further, it is contended by the learned senior counsel

on behalf of the appellants that this Court issued notice

and permitted Dasti in SLP No.19819 of 2013 arising out of

the judgment and order passed  by the High Court in MFA

32157 of 2012 vide order dated 11.07.2013. This Court has

also  additionally  mentioned  in  the  said  order  that  the

notice shall indicate that this Court is likely to grant

leave,  set  aside  the  impugned  order  and  enhance  the

compensation awarded by the Reference Court.  

26. On the other hand, Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor

General and Mr. Mohan Parasaran, the learned senior counsel

on behalf of the respondents-KIADB contended that the High

Court having set aside the award passed by the Reference

Court on the ground that the Company has claimed to be the

beneficiary of the acquired land is neither a party in the

reference  proceedings  nor  heard  and  therefore,  the

Reference Court must decide the matter afresh as directed

by the High Court in the order of remand passed by it with

regard  to  the  compensation  of  the  acquired  land  to  be

awarded after hearing all the interested parties including

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26

the Company. Further, it is urged that the High Court has

erred in holding that compensation awarded by the Reference

Court in favour of the land owners is just and proper.   27. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

on behalf of the respondents that the Reference Court has

not taken into account and considered the sales statistics

of the similar lands during the relevant period to that of

acquired  land  which  were  produced  at  the  time  of

re-determination of the market value of the land. The High

Court has erred in not noticing the fact that the amount of

compensation awarded by the Reference Court is 1000 times

more than the value indicated in the sales statistics. It

is further contended by them that the High Court erred in

not considering the application filed under Order 41 Rule

27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for production of

the certified copies of the sale deeds of the land in the

vicinity of the acquired land during the relevant period

and  to  show  that  the  compensation  re-determined  by  the

Reference Court in respect of the land of the appellants is

exorbitant and unconscionably on the higher side.

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28. On  the  basis  of  the  rival  legal  contentions,  the

following points would arise for our consideration:

1) Whether  the  allottee  Company  (M/s  Ultra  Tech Cement Ltd.) is either a beneficiary or interested person entitled for hearing before determination of the  market  value  to  award  just  and  reasonable compensation in respect of the acquired land of the appellants either before the Deputy Commissioner or Reference Court? 2) Whether the Writ Petition filed by the allottee Company before the High Court is maintainable in law? 3) Whether the order of remand allowing the Writ Petition of the allottee Company to the Reference Court is legal and valid? 4) Whether the owners of the land are entitled for the enhanced compensation?  5) If so, what award?

29. The point Nos.1, 2 and 3 are answered together as they

are inter-related by assigning the following reasons:  

    It is an undisputed fact that the acquisition of land

of the appellants was acquired along with the lands of the

other owners at the instance of the KIADB by the state

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government in exercise of its power under Section 28 of the

KIAD  Act  in  favour  of  the  KIADB  for  the  purpose  of

formation of industrial estate in the Industrial Area to

establish industries at Sedam Taluk, Gulbarga District.

30.   Section 28 (1) of the KIAD Act, envisages that if, at

any time, the State Government is of the opinion that any

land is required for the purpose of development by KIADB or

for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this

Act, it may by notification, give notice of its intention

to acquire such land. The Land Acquisition Officer after

considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner of the

land and by any other person interested therein and after

giving such owner and person an opportunity of being heard,

may pass such orders as it may deem fit for acquiring the

land  for  establishment  of  industries.   When  the  state

government is satisfied that any land should be acquired

for the purpose specified in the notification issued under

Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act, and after such orders passed

by the State government as per Section 28(3) of the KIAD

Act  are  passed,  the  state  government  shall  issue  the

declaration notification in the official Gazette to that

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effect as per Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act declaring the

land mentioned in the notification under section 28 (1) of

the Act to be acquired in favour of the KIADB for the

purpose of industrial development by it.

31. As can be seen from the facts of the case on hand, in

the notification under Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act, the

purpose specified by the State Government for acquisition

of the land of the appellants and other land owners is for

establishment  of  industries  by  the  KIADB.   Further,  it

should also be remembered that in terms of the Act, the

ownership of the land after acquisition by publication of

the notification under Section 28(4) of the KIAD Act shall

absolutely vest in the State Government under Section 28(5)

of the Act and the same will be free from all encumbrances.    32. The State Government thereafter may by issuing notice

in writing, order any person who may be in possession of

the land to surrender or deliver possession of the land

thereof in its favour or any person duly authorised by it

within 30 days of the service of the notice. As per Section

28(7) of the KIAD Act, if any person refuses or fails to

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comply with the order made under sub-Section (5), then the

state government or any officer authorised by it in this

behalf may take possession of the land from either owner or

interested  person.  Section  28(8)  of  the  KIAD  Act,  in

express terms states that where the land has been acquired

by  the  state  government  for  the  KIADB,  the  state

government, after it has taken possession of the land from

either owner or interested person may transfer the land to

the  KIADB  for  the  purpose  for  which  the  land  has  been

acquired by it.

33. Further, the provision under Section 29 of the KIAD Act

speaks  of  the  compensation  payable  in  relation  to  the

acquired land to either owners or interested persons of

such land and that the State Government shall pay such

compensation in respect of the acquired land in accordance

with the provisions of the KIAD Act.  Section 30 of the

KIAD Act states that the provisions of the L.A. Act shall

mutatis mutandis apply in respect of holding enquiry and to

pass an award of compensation by the Deputy Commissioner by

determining the market value of the land. The case may be

referred to the Reference Court for the apportionment of

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the compensation payable to such person or persons if there

is  any  dispute  regarding  claims  and  the  payment  of

compensation in respect of the acquired land under Chapter

VII  of  the  KIAD  Act.  In  view  of  the  above  statutory

provisions of the KIAD Act, the provisions of Sections 11,

18 and 30 of the L.A. Act are applicable for the purpose of

determination of just and reasonable compensation of the

acquired land payable to the land owners either by the

Deputy Commissioner or Reference Court.

34. Further,  it  is  necessary  for  us  to  examine  Section

32(2)  of  the  KIAD  Act,  which  provides  that  any  land

transferred in favour of the KIADB by the State Government,

developed by or under the control and supervision of the

KIADB shall be dealt with by it in accordance with the

Regulations  framed  by  it  after  approval  by  the  state

government  and  as  per  directions  given  by  the  state

government  in  that  behalf.  Section  40  of  the  KIAD  Act

confers  power  upon  the  state  government  to  frame  Rules

after previous publication by way of notification.  

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35. Further, Section 41 of the KIAD Act confers power upon

the KIADB by notification to make regulations consistent

with the Act and the rules made thereunder to carry out the

purposes of the Act with the previous approval of the State

Government.  Section 41 (2) (b) of the KIAD Act is most

relevant for the purpose of this case, which states that

the KIADB can frame regulations laying down the terms and

conditions under which it may dispose of the land acquired

in its favour by the State Government under the provisions

of Section 28(1) and (4) of the KIAD Act.  

36. Further, it is also important in this case to refer to

the  relevant  provisions  under  the  KIADB  Regulations.

Regulation  4  under  Chapter  II  of  the  KIADB  Regulations

prescribes  the  form  of  application  to  be  filed  and

submitted by the applicant for the allotment of land or

shed  in  an  Industrial  Area.  It  also  provides  that  the

application shall be made to the Executive Member of the

KIADB in the prescribed form (Form-I) obtained from it in

duplicate along with an earnest money. This proviso was

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inserted  by  notification  dated  13.09.2002,  w.e.f.

03.10.2002.

37. Regulation 5 of the KIADB Regulations pertains to the

manner of disposal of land/shed in each Industrial Area or

part  thereof,  whether  by  lease,  lease-cum-sale,  sale,

auction-sale, auction-lease, assignment or otherwise.  It

also provides that in each case, the KIADB will also have

the discretion to decide the detailed conditions in such

agreement which shall be binding on the applicant.

38. Regulation 7 of the KIADB Regulations provides for the

KIADB to notify the availability of land, the manner of

disposal, the last date for submission of applications and

such other particulars as the KIADB may consider necessary

in each case, by giving wide publicity through newspapers

having circulation in and outside the state of Karnataka,

and  invite  applications  from  industrialists  or  persons

intending to start industries in the Industrial Area.  

39. Regulation 9 of the KIADB Regulations provides for the

KIADB to register all the applications which are complete

in order in the Register maintained in Form 2 and grant

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receipts for all sums received as application fee, initial

deposit or other deposits.

40. Regulation 10 of the KIADB Regulations provides that

the KIADB after being satisfied that the person, firm or

Company  who  makes  an  application  is  likely  to  start

production within a reasonable period, and is not one which

is  declared  obnoxious  under  Regulation  14,  may  make  an

allotment in his/their favour thereafter.  Clause (b) of

the Regulation 10 of the KIADB Regulations empowers the

KIADB  to  constitute  sub-committees  for  considering  the

applications for allotment of plots and also delegate its

power to the Executive Member of the Board; if necessary

for the purpose of allotment of industrial plant/ shed.

Clause (c) of the Regulation 10 of the KIADB Regulations

empowers Executive Member to notify such applicant to whom

an allotment is made and to execute the agreement in Form 3

or 4 or 5 as the case may be with such modification as may

be required in each case on such date, time and place.

Clause  (d)  of  Regulation  10  of  the  KIADB  Regulations

provides that failure to execute the agreement or to pay

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the sums demanded by the Executive Member as per notice

given under Regulation 10 (c) will render the allottee to

have deemed to have declined the allotment;  Clause (e) of

Regulation 10 grants the discretion to the KIADB or the

Executive Member with the authority  of the KIADB to grant

extension  of  time  for  complying  with  the  terms  of  the

notice  issued  under  Regulation  10  (c)  with  or  without

payment of interest at nine per cent on the sums payable to

the KIADB in terms of the said notice for the extended

period.

41. The  aforesaid  provisions  of  the  KIAD  Act  and  KIADB

Regulations make it abundantly clear that the acquisition

of the agricultural land in the notified Industrial Area

vide notifications issued under Section 28(1) and (4) of

the KIAD Act, empowers the State Government to acquire the

land for the purpose of industrial development by the KIADB

after the acquired land possession is transferred in its

favour by the State Government.

42. Sections 29 and 30 of the KIAD Act read with Sections

11, 18 and 30 of the L.A. Act would clearly mandate that

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both the state government and the KIADB are liable, jointly

or severally, to pay the compensation to the owners or

interested persons of the acquired land. The market value

of the acquired land is required to be determined by the

Reference Court by applying the provisions of Section 18 of

the L.A. Act, after passing an award as provided under

Section 11 and notifying the same to the landowners or

interested persons under Section 12(2) of the L.A. Act if

the owners are not satisfied with either the compensation

awarded by the Deputy Commissioner or with regard to the

area of acquisition of land.

43. A careful reading of the regulations referred to supra

make it abundantly clear that the land acquired shall be

disposed off by the KIADB by inviting applications from the

eligible applicants, notifying the availability of land,

prescribing the manner of such disposal and fixing the last

date  for  submitting  applications  and  giving  such

particulars  as  it  may  consider  absolutely  necessary  by

publishing it in the newspapers having wide circulation in

and outside the state of Karnataka.  

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44. In the appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 31624-31625

of 2014, it has been specifically mentioned in Annexure

P-1, that the lands specified in the schedule mentioned in

the notification are required for the development by the

KIADB for the establishment of the industries therein.  In

exercise of powers conferred by sub-Section (1) of Section

28 of the KIAD Act, the state government had given notice

to the landowners of its intention to acquire the said land

in favour of industrial development by the KIADB.

45. Clause  1  of  Annexure  P-5,  which  is  a  copy  of  the

agreement made between KIADB and M/S Rajshree Cements reads thus:

“An agreement made at Gulbarga the Second day of April,  2005  between  the  Karnataka  Industrial Area  Development  Board  having  its  office  at Kapnoor 1st Stage Industrial Area Humnabad Road Gulbarga  represented  by  Sr.  G.H.  SREEDHARA, Deputy  Development  Officer  hereinafter  called the  ‘lessor’  (which  term  shall  wherever  the context so permits, and include its successors in  interest)  of  the  one  part  M/s.  Rajashree Cement, Aditya Nagar, Malkhed, represented) by Sri  Sunil  Kothari  Vice-President  (F&C) hereinafter  called  the  ‘lessee’  (which  term shall wherever the context so permits, mean and include  his/her/its  heirs,  executor, administrators,  assignee  and  legal representatives) of the other part....

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NOW  IT  IS  HEREBY  AGREED  BETWEEN  THE  PARTIES HERETO as follows: 1.In consideration of the sum of Rs. 65,704.00

paid by the lessee to the lessor as premium and of the rent hereby      reserved and of the covenants and agreements on the part of the lessee  hereinafter  contained  the  lessor hereby demise unto the lessee all that piece of  land  known  as  Sy.  Nos.  306,    Sy.  Nos. 306/9/1,  306/10/J  of  Malkhed  (J)  village Sedam Taluk and Sy. Nos. 323/1, 324/1, 325/1 of Diggaon village Chittapur Taluk District Gulbarga  containing   by  admeasurements  27 acres  21  Guntas   or  thereabouts  and  more fully  described  in  the  first  schedule hereunder written and delineated on the plan annexed hereto and thereon surrounded by a red colour boundary line together with the buildings and erections now or at any time hereafter  standing  and being thereon and together  with  all  rights,  easements  and appurtenances thereto  belonging except  and reserving  unto  the  lessor  all  mines  and minerals in and under the said land, or any, part thereof to hold the land and premises hereinbefore  expressed  to  be  there  by demised  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the ‘demised premises’) unto the lessee for the terms of 21 years computed the the 31st day of  March,  2005  unless  the  lease  is determined earlier under clause – 4 hereof PAYING  therefore  yearly,  during  the  said term unto the lessor at the office of the Executive  Member  or  as  otherwise  required the yearly rent of R.100/-  the said rent to be paid over a period of 21 years without any deductions whatsoever on the 31st day of March month in each and every year. Provided always that in case any payment is not made on the date on which day it becomes

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due amount in shall be charged interest at 18% per annum or such rates as may be fixed by the lessor from time to time the due date to the date of payment.”

   (Emphasis laid by this court) 46. The said lease deed is executed between the parties

viz. KIADB and the Company with such terms and conditions

as  mentioned  under  Clauses  5  (a)  and  (b)  which  are

extracted hereunder:

“5(a) The premium indicated in clause I of this agreement represents the tentative cost of land. In the event of lessor incurring the payment of amounts to the land owners over and above the awards made by the acquiring authority by virtue of awards passed by the competent court of law or in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (amendment)  Act,  1984  in  respect  of  demised premises or any part thereof the same shall be met by the lessee within one month from the date of  receipt  of  communication  signed  by  the Executive or any other officer authorized by the lessor.   Further,  in  the  event  of  lessor incurring the payment amounts to the land owners for the Malkies and structures existing on the demised premises, the same shall be met by the lessor within one month from the date of receipt of communication signed by the Executive Member or any other officer authorised by the lessor.  b) As soon as it may be convenient the lessor will fix the price of the demised premises at which  it  will  be  sold  to  the  lessee  and communicate it to the lessee and decision of the lessor in this regard will be final and binding, on, the lessee.  The lessee shall pay the balance of  the  value  of  the  property,  if  any  after adjusting the premium and the total amount of

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rent paid by the lessee and earnest money deposit within  one  month  from  the  date  of  receipt  of communication signed by the lessor or any other officer authorised in this behalf by the lessor. On the other hand, if any sum is determined as payable by the lessor to the lessee after the adjustment  as  aforesaid,  such  sum  shall  be refunded  to  the  lessee  before  the  date  of execution of the sale deed.”

(Emphasis laid by this court)

47. On a careful examination of the aforesaid clauses of

the lease agreement executed between the parties in respect

of the land of the appellants, it becomes manifestly clear

that the said agreement is executed by the KIADB in favour

of the Company after allotment of land was made in favour

of the Company as provided under Regulation 10 (a) and (c)

of  the  KIADB  Regulations  respectively  by  following  the

procedure of inviting applications and submission of the

applications  by  the  interested  parties  along  with  the

required deposits towards the cost of the land. Further,

Clauses 5 (a) and (b) of the lease agreement referred to

supra, would clearly state that the premium indicated in

Clause (1) of the lease agreement represents the tentative

cost of the land and in the event of the lessor incurring

payment of amounts to the land owners over and above the

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awards made by the acquiring authority  by virtue of the

award passed by the competent court of law or in view of

the  provisions  of  the  L.A.  Act  in  respect  of  demised

premises or any part thereof, the same shall be met by the

lessee within one month from the date of receipt of the

communication signed by the Executive Member or any other

officer authorised by the lessor. Clause 5(b) also makes

similar provision to that effect between the lessor and the

lessee.

48. From a careful reading of the aforesaid clauses of the

lease agreement along with the provision Section 32(2) of

the KIAD Act and Regulation Nos. 4, 7, 10 (b), (c) and (d)

of the KIADB Regulations, it is clear that the Company is

only the lessee by way of allotment of the land as the same

has  been  allotted  by  the  KIADB  in  its  favour  and  has

executed the lease deed in its favour in respect of the

allotted land.

49. In  view  of  the  aforesaid  documents,  namely,  the

notifications issued under Section 28(1) and 28(4) of the

KIAD  Act  by  the  State  Government,  it  can  be  safely

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concluded by us that the acquisition of the land involved

in  these  proceedings  is  for  the  purpose  of  industrial

development by the KIADB in the Sedam Taluk.  Therefore,

the beneficiary of the acquired land is only the KIADB but

not the Company as claimed by it. A reading of Section 28

(5) of the KIAD Act makes it clear that the land which is

acquired  by  the  State  Government  statutorily  vests

absolutely with it. After following the procedure provided

under Sections 28 (6) and (7) of the KIAD Act, the state

government takes possession of the acquired land from the

owners/person/persons who are in possession of the land and

transfers  the  same  in  favour  of  the  KIADB  for  its

development  and  disposal  of  the  same  in  accordance  with

Regulation  10(a)  of  the  KIADB  Regulations,  referred  to

supra.

50. In the instant case, a perusal of the provisions of the

lease agreement executed between the parties referred to

supra and Regulation 10 clauses (a), (c), (d) and (e) of

the  KIADB  Regulations  make  it  abundantly  clear  that  the

Company is only the allottee-lessee of the acquired land

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and as per Clauses 5(a) and (b) of the lease agreement

referred  to  supra,  the  premium  indicated  in  the  lease

agreement in respect of the allotted land in its favour

represents  the  tentative  cost  of  the  land.  It  has  been

further specified in the lease agreement that in the event

of the lessor incurring the payment of amounts to the land

owners  over  and  above  the  awards  made  by  the  acquiring

authority by virtue of awards passed by the competent court

of law in view of the provisions of the Land Acquisition

(Amendment) Act, 1984 in respect of demised premises or any

part thereof, the same shall be met by the lessee within

one month from the date of receipt of communication signed

by the Executive Member or any other officer authorized by

the lessor.  In view of the above conditions of the lease

agreement, neither the KIADB nor the Company can contend

that  the  acquisition  of  the  land  involved  in  these

proceedings is in favour of the lessee Company. Therefore,

the  Company  is  neither  a  beneficiary  nor  an  interested

person as claimed by them in terms of Section 2(11) of the

KIAD Act or under Section 3 (b) of the L.A. Act as per

which, “person interested” includes all persons claiming an

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interest  in  compensation  to  be  made  on  account  of  the

acquisition of land under the KIAD Act and that a person

shall  be  deemed  to  be  interested  in  the  land  if  he  is

interested  in  an  easement  affecting  the  land.  It  is

necessary to examine Section 3(b) read with Section 9 of

the L.A. Act, which deals with notice to persons interested

and Section 11, which deals with enquiry and award to be

passed  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner/  Land  Acquisition

Officer.   51. A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions of the

L.A. Act, KIAD Act and the KIADB Regulations would clearly

go to show that the Company is neither a beneficiary, nor

an  interested  person  in  the  land  as  on  the  date  of

acquisition of the land, as the land was acquired by the

state government in favour of KIADB who is the beneficiary

and it has allotted in favour of the Company after the

acquired land was transferred in its favour by the State

Government  and  executed  the  lease  agreement  referred  to

supra.

52. The strong submissions made by learned senior counsel

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on behalf of the respondents Dr A.M.Singhvi and Mr. Basava

Prabhu Patil,  in interpreting the aforesaid provisions of

Sections 3(b),9,11 and 20(b) read with Section 54 of the

L.A.  Act  are  totally  misplaced  and  misconceived  for  the

reason  that  the  Company  cannot  be  considered  as  “person

interested”  to  claim  interest  in  the  compensation  to  be

made to the owners on account of the acquisition of the

land of the appellants/owners and other landowners.   53. Further strong reliance has been placed by the learned

senior counsel on behalf of the Company upon Section 3(f)

(viii)  of  the  L.A.  Act,  as  amended  by  the  Karnataka

legislature by Act No.17 of 61 to show that the Company is

an ‘interested person’ in the proceedings of determination

of the market value of the acquired land and passing of an

award. Section 3 (f) (viii) includes the provision of land

for acquisition in favour of a company- a) where the land

is needed for the construction of some work, and such work

is likely to prove substantially useful to the public; or

b)  where  the  land  is  needed  by  a  building  co-operative

society or corporation for the construction of houses. The

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said  contention  of  the  learned  senior  counsel  is  wholly

misconceived  as the said provision has no application to

the fact situation.  

54. The acquisition of land under the provisions of the

L.A. Act in favour of a Company the mandatory procedure as

provided under part VII of the L.A. Act and Rules must be

adhered to, that is not the case in the acquisition of land

involved in these proceedings as the acquisition of land is

under the provisions of KIAD Act and therefore the reliance

placed  upon  the  provision  of  Section  3(f)(viii)  of  the

Karnataka L.A. Amended Act of 17/1961 is not applicable to

the  facts  of  the  case  on  hand  and  therefore,  the  said

provision cannot be made applicable to the case on hand.   55. The definition of “public purpose” under the L.A. Act

cannot be imported to the acquisition of land by the State

Government  for  the  industrial  development  under  the

provision  of  KIAD  Act  as  the  words  ‘Development’,

‘Industrial Area’ and ‘Industrial Estate’ have been clearly

defined under sub-Sections(5), (6) and (7) of Section 2 of

the KIAD Act which reads thus :-

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“(5)Development with its grammatical variations means the carrying out of levelling, digging, building,  engineering,  quarrying  or  other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material change in any building or land,  and  includes  re-development;  and  ‘to develop’ shall be construed accordingly;

(6)Industrial area means any area declared to be an industrial area by the State Government by notification which is to be developed and where industries  are  to  be  accommodated;  and industrial  infrastructure  facilities  and amenities  are to be provided and includes an industrial estate;

(7)Industrial estate means any site selected by the State Government where factories and other buildings are built for use by any industries or class of industries.

  56. Reliance has also been placed by the learned senior

counsel upon Sections 3(b), 9 and 20(b) of the L.A. Act,

which provisions deal with service of notice to all persons

interested in the possession of the acquired land except

such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to

receive payment of compensation awarded for the purpose of

holding an enquiry by the Special Deputy Commissioner for

determination of compensation of the acquired land. None of

the above provisions of the L.A. Act supports the case of

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either the KIADB or the Company. Therefore, the contention

urged on their behalf that the Company is an interested

person  in  the  acquired  land  for  determination  of

compensation  to  be  paid  to  the  landowners  for  their

acquired land is wholly untenable and therefore, the same

cannot be accepted by this Court.    57. The reliance placed upon the provisions of Sections 50

(1) and (2) of the L.A. Act, also are not applicable to the

case on hand for the reason that Section 50 of the L.A. Act

applies to the acquisition of land in favour of a Company

by  the  State  Government  by  following  the  mandatory

procedure contemplated under Part VII of the L.A. Act and

relevant  Rules  framed  for  that  purpose.  Therefore,  the

claim made by the Company that it has got every right to

participate  in  the  proceedings  for  determination  and

re-determination of the market value of the acquired land

and award of compensation passed by the Land Acquisition

Officer  or  Deputy  Commissioner  or  before  the  Reference

Court or the Appellate Court is wholly untenable in law and

therefore, the submissions made on behalf of the Company

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cannot be accepted and the same is rejected.

58. Further, both the learned senior counsel on behalf of

KIADB  and  the  Company  have  placed  reliance  on  various

decisions rendered by this Court in support of their above

respective  legal  submissions  that  the  Company  is  an

interested  person  and  therefore  it  has  got  right  to

participate in the proceedings before the Reference Court

for determination of compensation before passing the award

either by Land Acquisition Officer or Deputy Commissioner

or the Reference Court at the instance of the owner or any

other interested person. These include judgments rendered

by this Court in the cases of U.P Awas Evam Vikas v. Gyan

Devi, (1995) 2 SCC 326, Himalayan Tiles and Marble Pvt Ltd

v. Francis Victor (1980) 3 SCC 223, and P Narayanappa and

anr  v. State of Karnataka & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 578 and

other decisions which are not required to be mentioned in

this judgment as they are all reiteration of the law laid

down in the above cases.    

The reliance placed on the various decisions of this

Court by both the learned senior counsel on behalf of the

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KIADB and the Company, is misplaced as none of the said

judgments relied upon are applicable to the fact situation

in the present case for the reason that those cases dealt

with  reference  to  the  acquisition  of  land  under  the

provisions of the L.A. Act, either in favour of the Company

or Development Authorities, whereas in the case on hand,

the acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the

KIAD Act for industrial development by the KIADB. Further

the original acquisition record in respect of the acquired

land involved in the proceedings by the learned standing

counsel on behalf of the State of Karnataka as per our

directions  issued  vide  our  orders  dated  17.11.2014  and

24.3.2015, do not disclose the fact that the acquisition of

lands  covered  in  the  acquisition  notifications  are  in

favour of the Company. Thus, the acquisition of land in

favour  of  the  KIADB  is  abundantly  clear  from  the

preliminary  and  final  notifications  issued  by  the  state

government  and  thereafter  following  the  procedure  under

sub-Sections (6) and (7)  of Section (28) of the KIAD Act,

it took possession of the acquired land from the owners who

were in possession  of the same and was transferred in

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favour of the KIADB for its disposal for the purpose for

which lands were acquired as provided under Section 32(2)

of the KIAD Act read with the Regulations referred to supra

framed by the KIADB under Section 41(2) (b) of the KIAD

Act. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the judgments of

this Court by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the

Company and the KIADB, are wholly inapplicable to the fact

situation and do not support the case of the Company. In

view of the foregoing reasons recorded by us on the basis

of  the  acquisition  notifications  issued  by  the  State

Government under the statutory provisions of the KIAD Act

and therefore, we have to answer the point nos.1, 2 and 3

in favour of the landowners holding that the Company is

neither  the  beneficiary  nor  interested  person  of  the

acquired land, hence, it has no right to participate in the

Award proceedings for determination of the market value and

award the compensation amount of the acquired land of the

appellants. Hence, the Writ Petition filed by the Company

questioning  the  correctness  of  the  award  passed  by  the

Reference Court which is affirmed by the High Court is not

at all maintainable in law. On this ground itself, the Writ

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Petition filed by the Company should have been rejected by

the High Court instead it has allowed and remanded the case

to the Reference Court for re-consideration of the claims

after  affording  opportunity  to  the  Company  which  order

suffers from error in law and therefore the same is liable

to be set aside.

59. Further,  the  learned  Judge  of  the  High  Court  has

erroneously held that the allottee Company is a beneficiary

of the acquired land of the appellants, which finding of

the learned Judge is not correct both on facts and in law.

The findings and reasons recorded by the High Court in the

impugned  judgment  in  allowing  the  Writ  Petition  and

quashing the award of the Reference Court and remanding it

back to the Reference Court and allowing the Company to

participate  in  the  proceedings  for  re-determination  of

compensation for the acquired land is wholly impermissible

in law and the same are in contravention of the provisions

of the KIAD Act, L.A. Act, the KIADB Regulations and the

lease agreement, which has been executed by the KIADB in

favour of the Company and therefore, the impugned judgment

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and order is liable to be set aside by allowing the appeals

of the owners.   60. Further, the learned single Judge of the High Court has

further  committed  an  error  in  law  in  not  appreciating

Section 54 of the L.A. Act, which provision provides the

right to appeal to the land owners, or state government and

beneficiaries of the acquired land but not to the Company

which is the lessee.  When the company does not have the

right to file an appeal against the award it also has no

right to file a writ petition. The KIADB has filed the

belated appeal after disposal of the appeal filed by the

appellants by the High Court and against which award it has

filed the present appeal questioning the correctness of the

same  and  prayed  for  enhancement  of  compensation  and  the

said appeal is being disposed of by this common judgment

after  adverting  to  the  rival  legal  contentions  urged  on

behalf of the parties. The High Court has rightly dismissed

the belated appeal filed by the KIADB.

61. Therefore, the appeal filed by KIADB questioning the

order  of  remand  passed  in  the  Writ  Petition  and  Review

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Petition is liable to be set aside. The appeal has been

filed by the KIADB as it is aggrieved of the findings and

certain observation recorded against them by the High Court

and it has got reasonable apprehension that the Reference

Court may not appreciate the facts and evidence that may be

produced  before  it.  For  the  reasons  stated  above,  the

appeal filed by the KIADB has no merit and they have become

unnecessary  hence,  the  same  are  liable  to  be  dismissed.

Accordingly, we dismiss the same.  

Answer  to  Point  Nos.  4  &  5  regarding  enhancement  of Compensation  

62. Since  the  appeals  arising  out  of  S.L.P.  Nos.

31624-31625  are  allowed  and  the  appeals  arising  out  of

S.L.P.  Nos.  3482-3484  of  2015  filed  by  the  State  of

Karnataka  through  Special  Deputy  Commissioner,  Gulbarga,

wherein it has sought to set aside certain findings in the

impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  02.09.2014  passed  in

Review Petition No. 2537 of 2013 filed in MFA No. 32157 of

2012 and Writ Petition No. 100860 of 2013 passed by the

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learned Judge, are dismissed, we are required to consider

the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 19819 of 2013 filed

by the appellants as they are aggrieved by the inadequate

compensation awarded by the Reference Court, which has been

upheld by the High Court.

63. The Reference Court vide its judgment and order dated

29.09.2012 enhanced the compensation from Rs 1,700/- per

acre to Rs. 1,37,000/- per acre. The Reference Court relied

on the judgment and order of the Karnataka High Court dated

27.02.2005 in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No.

213 of 2005, which pertains to the same village, where the

lands  of  the  owners  were  acquired  for  establishment  of

industries under notification in the year 1988. The High

Court  in  the  said  case  questioned  the  correctness  of

determination of market value by the Reference Court at Rs.

5.7/- per sq. ft. in Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 filed

by the respondent-landowner in the said appeal. In arriving

at the market value of the land under acquisition, the said

compensation was made on the basis of the average of the

various  rates  covered  under  various  sale-deeds  under

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different  sites,  carved  out  from  the  lands  in  survey

numbers which lands are adjacent to the land covered in the

said MFA and Cross Objection, located at different places

and  sold  on  different  dates,  which  had  been  taken  at

Rs.6.33 per sq.ft.  The same had been escalated by 10% on

the  ground  that  the  date  of  preliminary  notification  in

that case was issued on 03.11.1988. The said sites under

the  said  sale-deeds  referred  to  above  were  sold  two  to

three years earlier. The High Court held that taking the

average  of  the  prices  of  different  sites  situated  at

different places and sold at different points of time is

not permissible in law. The High Court took the value of

the plot as would be the most beneficial to the claimant

which was Rs.7.5/- per sq.ft for land carved out of Sy. No.

389 and at Rs. 13/- per sq. ft for the land carved out of

Sy.  No.  414/2.  The  High  Court  enhanced  the  compensation

accordingly,  after  deduction  of  10%  towards  escalation

charges.   The Reference Court in the present case after taking

the  aforesaid  criteria  of  developmental  charges,

de-escalation charges and waiting period charges, awarded

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the compensation at Rs 7.5/- per sq.ft. in relation to the

land  of  the  appellants  in  the  present  case.  The

compensation was fixed at Rs.7.5 x 43,560 sq.ft. which came

to  Rs.3,26,700/-  after  giving  the  necessary  deduction

towards developmental charges was made at the rate of 25%

and 5% towards waiting period and expenses for conversion

i.e.  30%,  which  came  to  Rs.98,000/-  deducted  from

Rs.3,26,700/-.  This was determined as the market value of

the land as on the date of the preliminary notification

dated 03.11.1988 as in the MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross

Objection No. 213 of 2005. Since in the instant case, the

notification  was  issued  on  18.06.1981,  de-escalation

charges were deducted at the rate of 5% for 8 years, and an

award of Rs.1,37,000/- per acre  was arrived at in the

present  case  by  the  Reference  Court  as  compared  to

Rs.2,50,000/- per acre as demanded by the appellants, which

was upheld by the High Court.   64. The correctness of the same has been challenged by the

learned  senior  counsel  on  behalf  of  the  appellants

contending that the methodology adopted by the High Court

in determining the market value of the land covered in the

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MFA 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 by

deducting charges including developmental charges, waiting

period  charges,  de-escalation  and  conversion  expenses  is

arbitrary and unreasonable. The same could not have been

adopted by the High Court. 65. Mr.  Ranjit  Kumar,  the  learned  Solicitor  General

appearing on behalf of the respondent State placed reliance

on the decision of this Court in the case of Chandrashekar

and  Ors. v. Land  Acquisition  Officer  and  Another7,  and contends that the deduction to be made from the value of

the  acquired  land  to  be  kept  aside  for  providing

developmental  infrastructures  like  roads,  parks  etc  and

second component under the head of “development” should not

exceed  upper  benchmark  of  67%.  It  was  further  contended

that the deductions towards the de-escalation and waiting

charges  can  be  made  at  appropriate  rates  but  all  the

deductions put together should not exceed upper benchmark

of 75%. In the  Chandrashekar case referred to supra, the

High  Court  had  allowed  55%  under  the  heading  of

development, 10% under de-escalation and 5% under waiting

7  (2012) 1 SCC 390

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period which works out cumulatively to 70%. This Court had

held that it did not call for any interference which is

well within the upper benchmark of 75%. 66. It  is  further  contended  by  the  learned  Solicitor

General that the lands acquired by way of notification Sy.

No. 389 were acquired in 1988, which could not be compared

to the land in the instant case, which had been acquired by

way  of  notification  seven  years  earlier  in  1981.  It  is

further contended by him that the lands covered in this

case are situated at 4 kms away from the land in Sy. No.

414/2,  by  relying  on  the  village  map.  Hence,  it  is

contended by the learned Solicitor General that the same

could not have been taken by the Reference Court as the

criteria to re-determine the market value of the land of

the appellants in the award passed in respect of the land

covered  in  the  notification  of  1988.  Therefore,  it  is

submitted that the enhancement of compensation sought by

the appellants is without any basis, hence they are not

entitled for the same and prayed for the dismissal of the

appeal.  

67. It is further contended by the learned senior counsel

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on  behalf  of  the  KIADB  that  on  the  basis  of  the  sale

statistics, the sale deeds produced in this appeal along

with counter statements after collecting the same from the

Sub-Registrar’s office in relation to the lands which are

sold nearby to the acquired land should be applied for the

purpose  of  re-determination  of  the  market  value  of  the

acquired land. It is contended that if the said sale-deeds

are taken into consideration, the appellants are not even

entitled to the compensation of Rs.1,37,000/- awarded by

the Reference Court, which award is affirmed in the MFA

filed by the appellant landowners. Therefore, he prayed for

dismissal  of  the  appeal  of  the  landowners  seeking  for

enhancement. 68. The  learned  senior  counsel  Mr.  Mohan  Parasaran,

appearing  on  behalf  of  the  respondent  KIADB  in  the

connected  appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos.3482-3484 of

2015 has vehemently requested this Court, if this Court is

of the view to re-determine/enhance the compensation, then

it may confine it to the owners of the land involved in

this case only for the reason that the said benefit cannot

be extended to other land owners as a vast extent of land

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has  been  acquired  by  the  state  government  in  the  1981

notification along with the land of the owners herein for

the purpose of industrial development by the KIADB and will

have  serious  financial  implications  on  the  part  of  the

allottee  if  the  benefit  is  extended  to  all  land  owners

whose lands were acquired vide 1981 notification.

69. This Court at the time of issuing notice in the Civil

Appeal  arising  out  of  SLP  (c)  No.  19819  of  2013  has

indicated to the respondents that the owners are entitled

for enhancement of compensation and directed the Registry

of this Court to secure the original LAC record from the

Reference  Court.  We  have  heard  the  learned  counsel  on

behalf of the parties at length and perused the records

made available for our perusal.

70.  The statutory notifications of acquisition of land

would clearly go to show that the land of the appellants

was acquired way back in the year 1981 for the purpose of

establishment of industries The land of the appellants has

non-agricultural  potentiality,  which  fact  is  proved  from

the notifications published by the State Government under

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Sections  28(1)  and  (4)  of  the  KIAD  Act,  as  the  State

Government  specifically  mentioned  therein  that  the

acquisition  of  the  land  of  the  appellants  is  for  the

industrial  development  and  establishment  of  industries

which is for non agricultural and commercial purpose.  

71. Further,  the  land  which  has  been  covered  under

notification in 1988 is also adjacent to the residential

sites  which  were  formed.  The  land  owners  in  that  case

produced  the  sale  deeds  of  the  year  1986  and  1988

respectively,  which  was  2  years  and  2  months  earlier

respectively  to the notification issued in the year 1988

and some of which were two to three years earlier. Taking

the said relevant facts into consideration, the High Court

of Karnataka re-determined the compensation at Rs. 7.5/-

per sq. ft of land bearing Sy. No. 389 covered in award

passed in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213

of 2005 after giving deduction towards the developmental

charges,  de-escalation  and  conversion  charges.  The  same

method should be applied in the case on hand.

72. Further,  the  High  Court  ought  to  have  taken  into

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consideration  the  relevant  fact  that  though  the  final

notification for the land covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005

and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 was in the year 1988,

it was for the industrial development and the said land was

also leased in favour of the allottee Company by the KIADB

to be used for the industrial development. The land along

with the other lands covered in 1981 notification was also

acquired by the State Government for the purpose of the

industrial development and allotted to the Company for the

development of the industrial estate. Therefore, apart from

the fact that there was a gap of 7 years in which the lands

of the appellants were notified for acquisition to the land

covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213

of 2005, it is an admitted fact that there is similarity in

the nature of the land and the purpose for which they were

acquired.   73.  Keeping in mind that the land in question has got

non-agricultural  potentiality,  a  25%  deduction  towards

development charges and 5% deduction towards waiting period

for every year and expenses for conversion by the Reference

Court is definitely on the higher side. Hence, the same is

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required to be rejected, as it is erroneous and suffers

from error in law. Further, the reliance placed by the

learned Solicitor General on Chandrashekar’s case referred to supra is misplaced, as the case has no relevance to the

facts of the case on hand. The total amount of charges

deducted in that case were to the tune of 55%. In the

instant case, a 30% deduction was made towards development

and waiting charges. As per the survey conducted by the

state government, it is an undisputed fact that mineral is

available in the land and the Company is extracting the

same to be used as raw material for the manufacture of

cement in its factory. Therefore, though the land in the

present  case  is  a  short  distance  away  from  the  lands

covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005 and Cross Objection No. 213

of  2005,  both  have  been  acquired  for  the  purpose  of

industrial development and sought to be used for the same

purpose by the Company. The land of the appellants herein

along with other lands that was acquired vide notification

in 1981 have been allotted in favour of the Company for the

purpose of extracting the mineral of limestone which is the

raw  material  used  for  the  purpose  of  manufacturing  the

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cement used for the commercial purpose. Therefore, the land

of  the  appellants  is  acquired  for  the  non-agricultural

potentiality and the same is used for commercial purpose.

Therefore, determining deductions towards de-escalation at

5% per year for 7 years and 10% towards waiting and other

incidental charges would justify the re-determination of

the market value of the land of the appellants. There is no

need to deduct the developmental charges as has been done

by the Reference Court and Appellate Court in respect of

the  land  covered  under  MFA  No.  3796  of  2005  and  Cross

Objection No. 213 of 2005 upon which strong reliance has

been  placed  by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the

appellants, for the reason that there is no development

activities  involved  in  respect  of  the  land  involved  in

these appeals, as the same is being used by the Company for

extraction of minerals from the land, which are used as a

raw material for the purpose of manufacturing cement and

also  for  development  of  infrastructure  of  its  factory.

Therefore, the enhancement of compensation at Rs.1,92,000/-

per acre as per the calculation below would be just and

reasonable.

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CALCULATION i. Per sq ft   = Rs.7.5/-  ii. Per acre = Rs.7.5 X 43,560 square feet=       Rs.3,26,700/- per  acre. iii. Incidental and other charges @ 10%= Rs.32, 670/- iv. After the above deduction =  Rs.2,94,030/- v. De-escalation charges = 5% for 7 years (5% x 7 x       2,94,030/- = Rs.1,02,910/- per acre(rounded off) vi. Compensation  =  Rs.  2,94,030/-  (-)  Rs.  1,02,910/-  =      Rs. 1,91,120/- vii.Final Compensation= Rs.1,92,000/- (rounded off)

74. It would be relevant to state here that compensation of

market value has to be determined notwithstanding the fact

that  the  date  of  the  notification  issued  under  Section

28(1)  of  the  KIAD  Act  has  not  been  taken  into

consideration,  but  the  criteria   for  determination  of

market  value  of  the  land  put  to  uses  to  which  it  is

reasonably capable of being put to in the future shall be

considered by the Court, as was held by  the Privy Council

in the case of  Raja Vyricherla  Narayana Gajapatiraju  v.

Revenue Divisional Officer, Vizagapatam8, wherein the law

on the subject has been succinctly laid down as under :

“The compensation must be determined therefore by reference  to  the  price  which  a  willing  vendor

8  AIR 1939 Privy Council 98

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might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser.  The  disinclination  of  the  vendor  to part with his land and the urgent necessity of the purchaser to buy must alike be disregarded. Neither  must  be  considered  as  acting  under compulsion. This is implied in the common saying that the value of the land is not to be estimated at its value to the purchaser. But this does not mean that the fact that some particular purchaser might desire the land more than others is to be disregarded. The wish of a particular purchaser, though not his compulsion, may always be taken into consideration for what it is worth. But the question of what it may be worth, that is to say, to what extent it should affect the compensation to  be  awarded  is  one  that  will  be  dealt  with later in this judgment. It may also be observed in passing that it is often said that it is the value of the land to the vendor that has to be estimated.  This,  however,  is  not  in  strictness accurate. The land, for instance, may have for the vendor a sentimental value far in excess of its "market value". But the compensation must not be increased by reason of any such consideration. The vendor is to be treated as a vendor willing to sell at "the market price", to use the words of Section 23 of the Indian Act.      It is perhaps desirable in this connection to  say  something  about  this  expression  "the market price". There is not in general any market for land in the sense in which one speaks of a market for shares or a market for sugar or any like commodity. The value of any such article at any particular time can readily be ascertained by the prices being obtained for similar articles in the market. In the ease of land, its value in general can also be measured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained in the past for  land  of  similar  quality  and  in  similar positions,  and  this  is  what  must  be  meant  in general by "the market value" in Section 23. But

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sometimes ii happens that the land to be valued possesses  some  unusual,  and  it  may  be,  unique features  as  regards  its  position  or  its potentialities. In such a case the arbitrator in determining its value will have no market value to guide him, and he will have to ascertain as best he may from the materials before him, what a willing vendor might reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser, for the land in that particular  position  and  with  those  particular potentialities.  For  it  has  been  established  by numerous authorities that the land is not to be valued merely by reference to the use to which it is being put at the time at which its value has to be determined [that time under the Indian Act being the date of the notification under Section 4  (1)],  but  also  by  reference  to  the  uses  to which it is reasonably capable of being put in the future.”

   (Emphasis laid by this Court)

The above position of law laid down by the Privy Council

has been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. In

view of the same, we are of the considered view that the

market value of the land covered in MFA No. 3796 of 2005

and Cross Objection No. 213 of 2005 has to be applied to

the land of the appellants in the present case for the

reason that in both the notifications as the required land

has been put to use for the industrial development by the

KIADB, and the lands have been allotted to the Company for

the purpose of extracting sand stone from the lands which

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is used as raw material for manufacture of cement and for

providing  infrastructure  of  the  Company.  However,  having

regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case,

considering the fact that acquisition of the land was made

in the year 1981, it would be just and proper to fix the

compensation  as  per  the  above  referred  calculation  at

Rs.1,92,000/- per acre, with all statutory benefits such as

solatium  at  30%  as  provided  under  Section  23  (2)  and

statutorily payable interest under Sections 23(1-A) and 28

of the L.A. Act, from the date of taking possession of the

land  till  the  date  of  payment.  The  appellants  are  also

entitled to costs throughout as provided under Section 27

of the L.A. Act. The Respondents are directed to pay the

compensation  to  the  appellants-landowners  as  directed

above, within eight weeks from the date of the receipt of

the  copy  of  this  judgment  and  award  after  proper

computation in the above terms.

(I) Accordingly, the appeals arising out of SLP

(C) Nos.31624-31625 of 2014 for setting aside

the judgment and order of remand passed by the

High Court in Writ Petition No. 100860 of 2013

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(filed by the Company) and the Review Petition

No. 2537 of 2013 (filed by KIADB) are allowed

and  set  aside  the  same  by  allowing  these

appeals.  (II)The  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)

Nos.3482-3484 of 2015 filed by the KIADB for

setting  aside  the  observations  and  findings

recorded in the judgment and order of remand

passed by the High Court at the instance of

KIADB and the Company are dismissed as it is

unnecessary in the light of the setting aside

of the  impugned judgment and order of remand

to the Reference Court by this Court.

(III) The  appeal  arising  out  of  SLP  (C)  No.

19819  of  2013  filed  by  the  landowners  for

enhancement  of  compensation  in  respect  of

their  acquired  land  is  allowed  as  clearly

mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of this

judgment i.e. enhancement of the compensation

amount  from  Rs.1,37,000/-  to  1,92,000/-  per

acre along with solatium at the rate of 30%

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under  Section  23  (2)and  statutorily  payable

interest under Sections 23 (1-A), 28 of the

L.A. Act upon the compensation awarded in this

appeal. The appellants are also entitled to

the  costs  of  the  proceedings  throughout  as

provided  under  Section  27  of  L.A.  Act.  The

memo of costs may be filed within three weeks

to prepare the decree.

I.A. No. 2 for impleadment of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. is

dismissed  as  not  maintainable,  however,  they  have  been

heard in the matter.   

                            ……………………………………………………………………J.    

                           [V.GOPALA GOWDA]

                          ……………………………………………………………………J.                                [C.NAGAPPAN] New Delhi, July 30, 2015

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ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment       COURT NO.2               SECTION IVA                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal  No(s).5804/2015 @ SLP(C) No.19819/2013 PEERAPPA HANMANTHA HARIJAN(D) BY LRS.& OR           Appellant(s)                                 VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA                                 Respondent(s)

WITH

Civil Appeal  No(s).5806-5807/2015 @ SLP(C) Nos. 31624-31625/2014 Civil Appeal  No(s).5808-5810/2015 @ SLP(C) Nos. 3482-3484/2015 Date : 30/07/2015 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of  JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)                      Dr. (Mrs.) Vipin Gupta,Adv.                                            Mr. Anup Jain,Adv. For Respondent(s)                      For M/s. Khaitan & Co.                      Mr. Abhijat P. Medh,Adv.                                                     UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following                              O R D E R

Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice  V.Gopala  Gowda  pronounced  the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.

Leave granted. The appeals arising out of SLP(C) Nos.31624-31625/2014

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are  allowed,  the  appeals  arising  out  of  SLP(C) Nos.3482-3484/2015 are dismissed and the appeal arising out of SLP(C)  No.19819/2013  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed Reportable Judgment.

I.A. No. 2 for impleadment of Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. is dismissed as not maintainable, however, they have been heard in the matter.   

Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

   (VINOD KR.JHA)                      (VEENA KHERA)   COURT MASTER              COURT MASTER

(Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)