REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2688 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 15904 of 2010)

P. Seshadri                                          … Appellant  

VERSUS

S. Mangati Gopal Reddy & Ors.             …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  the  

judgment  of  the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  at  

Hyderabad  rendered  in  Writ  Petition  No.  24124  of  

2009 dated 28th April,  2010 whereby the High Court  

set  aside  the  extension  granted  to  the  appellant  as  

officer  on  Special  Duty  in  the  establishment  of  

Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanam (hereinafter referred  

to as “the Temple”) till 1st August, 2011.

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3. The aforesaid order has been passed in a writ petition  

styled as a public interest litigation by               S.  

Mangati  Gopal  Reddy  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  

“respondent No.1”).  Respondent No. 1 claims to be an  

agriculturist  and  a  staunch devotee  of  Lord  

Venkateswara since his childhood.  In Paragraph 2 of  

the affidavit in support of the writ petition, respondent  

No.1, in order to establish his locus standi to file the  

public interest litigation stated as under:-   

“I am an Agriculturist.  I am a staunch devotee  of Lord Venkateswara since my childhood.  I  regularly visit the temple to offer my prayers to  God.  I also have donated to the temple as per  my capacity.  I am a citizen of this country and  a  Hindu  by  religion.  I  am  a  native  and  a  resident  of  Tirupathi.   I  have  come to  know  certain  misdeeds,  discrepancies,  Mismanagement of the T.T.D. Funds by some  vested interests. As a citizen of India and also  as a staunch devotee of Lord Venkateswara, it  is  my bounden duty  to  bring  the  said facts,  which  have  come  to  my  knowledge,  to  the  notice of this Honourable Court for appropriate  directions  of  this  Honourble  Court.   I  also  submit that I have no personal interest in filing  the above writ affidavit nor I have any enmity  with the persons whose details are furnished  hereunder  and  against  the  persons  certain  

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directions  are  sought  in  this  Writ  Petition.  This Writ  Petition is  being filed in the larger  interest of the public.”

4. He  has  further  pleaded  that  the  Temple  was  

established  as  a  result  of  Tirumala  Tirupathi  

Devasthanam  Act,  1932  (in  short  ‘TTD  Act’).   The  

aforesaid Act was followed in 1933 by a special Act in  

1951 whereby the administration of  the Temple was  

under the control of the Andhra Pradesh Government.  

According to respondent No.1, since the enactment of  

the  Hindu Charitable  and Religious Institutions Act,  

1989, the management and administration vests in the  

Board called “TTD Board”  constituted under  Section  

96 of the aforesaid Act.  

5.  It  was further  the  case  of  the  respondent  that  the  

management  and  administration  of  the  Temple  is  

controlled by the statutory provisions of the 1989 Act  

and  the  rules  made  thereunder.  However,  the  

responsible  officers  of  the  TTD Board have acted in  

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violation of the rules framed under the aforesaid Act.  

He  further  stated  that  certain  discrepancies  and  

misdeeds  have  been  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  

Andhra  Pradesh  High  Court  by  way  of  various  writ  

petitions.  The writ petition was filed to bring to the  

notice  of  the  Court  various  misappropriations  and  

embezzlement  of  funds.   There  is  an  ongoing  

controversy with regard to embezzlement of funds and,  

in particular, loss of 300 gold dollars each weighing 5  

gms. since August, 2008.  It was further the case of  

the respondent that the actions of the appellant have  

been doubted in the case of missing gold dollars as he  

was  Bokkasam  Incharge  and  Parpathedar  of  the  

Temple. His  name  was  primarily  mentioned  in  the  

reports  of  two  IPS  officers,  who  had  conducted  two  

separate vigilance reports. These reports categorically  

recommended  that  the  appellant  should  not  be  

continued in office.  In spite of such recommendations  

of  the  vigilance  officer,  the  appellant  had  been  

continued in service.  

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6. According to respondent No.1, the appellant retired on  

31st July,  2006.  Since then, he has been given five  

years  extension  in  the  Temple.   According  to  the  

respondent,  the  services  of  the  appellant  have  been  

extended for  ulterior  motives.   Respondent  makes  a  

grievance that the services of the appellant have been  

extended as if there is no other suitable person in the  

Temple  or  elsewhere  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  

appellant.   The  respondent  further  alleges  that  the  

services of the appellant were extended on a number of  

occasions,  vide  order,  viz;  No.  Roc  No.  

BG/10949/2006 dated 31st July, 2006 for a period of  

two  years,  Roc       No.  BG/10949/2007  dated  5th  

August  2008,  for  a  period  of  two  years  from  2nd  

August,  2007  to  1st August,  2009  and  Roc  No.  

P1/308/Sri TT/ml/2009 dated                   1st August,  

2009 for  a  further  period  of  two  years  i.e.  from 2nd  

August, 2009 to 1st August, 2011.   

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7. The  respondent  claimed  that  these  extensions  were  

wholly  illegal  and arbitrary  exercise of  power  by the  

TTD Board.  These allegations were made relying on  

the recommendations made by B.V. Ramana Kumar,  

IPS, the then Chief Vigilance and Security Officer.  In  

his  report  dated  28th July,  2008  initiation  of  

disciplinary  action  for  major  penalty  has  been  

recommended against the appellant. This report was  

deliberately  ignored  by  the  TTD  Board  and  the  

appellant  continued  to  enjoy  the  patronage  of  the  

Board.   

8. The writ petition came up for hearing before the High  

Court on 9th November, 2009.  Whilst issuing notice in  

the  writ  petition,  the  High  Court  made  an  interim  

order which was as follows:-

“ …………And it is further ordered that there  shall be interim suspension of the proceedings  bearing  Roc.  No.  P1/308/Sri/TT/Tml/2009,  dated  01-08-2009  of  the  Tirumala  Tirupathi  Devasthanams, Tirupathi, which was issued in  pursuance  of  Resolution  No.  178  dated:  

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28.07.2009 of  the  TTD Board,  extending  the  service of Sri P. Seshadri (retired employee) i.e.  Respondent  No.4  from  02-08-2009  to  01-08-2011.”

9. This order was challenged by the appellant in      SLP  

(C) No.30517 of 2009.  This Court stayed the operation  

of the aforesaid order passed by the High Court.  On  

4th December, 2009, this Court disposed of the special  

leave petition with the following order:-

“Heard both sides.   

The  petitioner  has  challenged  the  ad-interim  order passed by the High Court of Judicature  of  A.P.  whereby  extension  of  service  of  the  petitioner  was terminated.   When the matter  was  mentioned  before  this  Court  on  24.11.2009,  we  had  granted  stay  of  the  impugned order passed by the High Court. As  it  is  a  service  matter,  the  High  Court  is  requested  to  dispose  of  the  petition  pending  before  it  at  an  early  date  at  least  within  a  period of two months.  Till such time, the order  passed by this Court on 24.11.2009 will be in  operation.     The  Special  Leave  Petition  is  disposed  of  accordingly.”

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10. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the High Court heard  

the  writ  petition  and allowed the  same by  its  order  

dated 28th April, 2010 in the following terms:-

“Sri P. Seshadri—respondent 4, Parpathyadar  in the establishment of the Tirumala Tirupathi  Devasthanams—respondent  3  retired  on  superannuation  on  31.07.2006.  He  was  accorded extension in three spells and the last  one has the effect of extending his service as  Officer on Special Duty till  01.08.2011 which  has  become  subject  matter  of  this  public  interest  litigation.   Rule  13  of  the  Tirumala  Tirupathi  Devasthanams  Employees  Service  Rules, 1989 reads thus:

“The person or persons appointed in  Tirumala  Tirupathi  Devasthanams  on  re-employment  basis  after  superannuation shall in no case be  continued beyond the completion of  the age of sixty years.”

Admittedly, respondent 4 has crossed the age  of  sixty  years.   On  that  count  the  learned  counsel  for  respondent  4—beneficiary  of  the  order  has  not  joined  issue.   That  being  so,  prohibition  in  the  rule  supra  against  his  continuation  is  manifest.   Situated  thus  he  cannot  be  continued  anymore.   We  direct  respondent 3 accordingly. Settled”

11.It is this order which is challenged by the appellant in  

the present appeal.   

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12.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.   

13. Mr. Narsimha submits that the writ petition ought to  

have  been  dismissed  at  the  threshold  by  the  High  

Court and controversy pertaining to a service matter  

which could not be filed in a writ petition styled as a  

public  interest  litigation.     In  support  of  the  

submission, the learned counsel relied on the following  

judgments of this Court:-  Dr  .    Duryodhan Sahu and    

Ors. Vs.  Jitendra Kumar Mishra1,  Gurpal Singh Vs.  

State of Punjab and Ors.  2  , Neetu Vs. State of Punjab  

&  Ors.3 and  Divine  Retreat  Centre Vs.  State  of  

Kerala  &  Ors.  4    He  further  submitted  that  in  any  

event,  the petition was not filed by respondent No.1  

bonafide.   It  has  been  filed  at  the  behest  of  some  

persons, who are the hidden forces pursuing the writ  

petition.  Last but not the least, it is the submission of  

1 (1998) 7 SCC 273 2 (2005) 5 SCC 136 3 (2007) 10 SCC 614 4 (2008) 3 SCC 542

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Mr. Narsimha that the High Court judgment deserves  

to be set aside on the short ground that it is based on  

a complete misinterpretation of the Tirumala Tirupathi  

Devasthanams  Employees  Service  Rules,  1989.  

According to the learned senior counsel, the aforesaid  

rules would not be applicable to the petitioner as his  

service has been extended only on contractual basis.  

Mr.  Guntur  Prabhakar,  counsel  for  the  Temple,  

respondent No.4 has supported the submissions made  

by Mr. Narsimha.  He has also relied on the judgment  

of Neetu’s case (supra).  

14.  Mr.  Atul  Pandey,  appearing  for  respondent  No.1  

submitted that the services of the appellant had been  

extended arbitrarily for extraneous consideration.  The  

Board is going out of the way to protect the appellant,  

who  is  involved  in  serious  embezzlement  of  Temple  

property.  He submits that the extensions have been  

given,  in spite of the recommendations made by the  

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Chief  Vigilance  and  security  officer,  B.V.  Ramana  

Kumar, IPS.

15.We  have  considered  the  submissions  made  by  the  

learned  counsel.   In  our  opinion,  it  is  not  at  all  

necessary to make any observations with regard to the  

ongoing controversy between different groups/parties  

with regard to the management of  the affairs of  the  

Temple.   It  is  also  not  necessary  to  make  any  

observations  with  regard  to  the  involvement  or  

otherwise of the appellant in any activities which may  

invite either adverse comments or disciplinary actions.  

From the pleadings of the parties, it appears to us that  

there  is  a  serious  dispute  with  regard  to  the  

management and the administration of the affairs of  

the  Temple.   Admittedly,  separate  proceedings  are  

pending in different Courts of competent jurisdiction  

with  regard  to  those  issues.   In  our  opinion,  those  

proceedings  cannot  be confused or  merged with  the  

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subject  matter  of  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  

respondent No.1.  

16. It is not disputed that the appellant was in the service  

of  the  Temple  for  many years.   He  retired from the  

service of the Temple on 31st July, 2006.  It appears  

from  the  records  that  Board  of  Trustees  in  its  

Resolution No.151 dated 5th/6th May, 2006 resolved to  

utilize the services of the appellant on contract basis  

for  a period of two years initially.   An order to that  

effect  was  duly  passed  by  the  Board  on  31st July,  

2006.  It appears that subsequent Resolution No.263  

was passed on               25th July, 2007, giving further  

extension to the  appellant  for  a period of  two years  

from 2nd August,  2007 to         1st August,  2009.  

Again,  the  services  of  the  appellant  have  been  

extended for a period of two years through Resolution  

No.178  dated  28th July,  2009.   The  reason  for  

continuing the services of the appellant are stated in  

the Resolution itself, which are as under:-

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1. With  his  vast  experience  and  profound  knowledge in the day to day affairs in Sri.  Tirumala Temple, particularly during festive  and special occasion, his services are very  much  required  for  successful  and  timely  conduct of fairs and festivals.

2. He  is  well  versed  with  the  procedures  of  various  sevas  that  are  being performed in  Sri. Tirumala Temple.

3. His  services  are  vastly  utilized  during  Kalyanamasthu  programs  organized  throughout the country.  He could able to  conduct the programs successfully to keep  up the gallery of the institution.

4. Apart from all his role in extending honours  to  various  Matadhipathies/Peetadhipathies  visiting Srivari Temple is commendable and  he  is  maintaining  a  good rapport  with  all  the  Swamijis,  Matadhipathies  and  Peetadhipathies which is much essential for  the religious institutions like TTD.

5. Besides, he is available round the clock for  all  the  365  days  in  a  year  for  the  administration to organize various programs  like  Bhajagovindam,  Kalyanam  being  conducted  outside  and  other  religious  activities.”

17. Pursuant  to  the  aforesaid  Resolution,  the  Board  

passed a formal order on 1st August, 2009 extending  

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the services of the appellant till  1st August, 2011 on  

contract basis on payment of monthly remuneration at  

last  pay  drawn.   The  High  Court  has  nullified  the  

Resolution  dated  21st July,  2009  and  the  

consequential order dated 1st August, 2009 holding the  

same  to  be  contrary  to  Rule  13  of  the  1989  rules.  

Undoubtedly, Rule 13 provides that re-employment of  

any employee after superannuation shall in no case be  

beyond the completion of age of 60 years.  The High  

Court,  however,  failed to notice that the 1989 Rules  

have no application to engagements made on contract  

basis  or  when  services  of  government  servants  or  

employees  of  other  organizations  are  utilized  on  

deputation.  Rule 2 of the aforesaid Rules provides as  

under:-

“2.  They  shall  apply  to  every  employee  of  Tirumala  Tirupathi  Devasthanams  except  to  the  officers  or  staff  taken  on  contract  basis  and officers or staff taken on deputation from  the  Government  or  other  organization.”

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18. A perusal of the aforesaid Rule leaves no manner of  

doubt that the aforesaid Rules apply to every employee  

“except to the officers or staff taken on contract basis  

and  officers  or  staff  taken  on  deputation  from  the  

Government or other organizations”.  In other words,  

officers or staff who are appointed on contract basis or  

are taken on deputation from the Government or other  

organizations  form  a  separate  class  and  are  not  

covered by the aforesaid Rules.  The High Court, in our  

opinion, was in error, in relying on Rule 13 to nullify  

the appointment of the appellant.   

19. The High Court  has committed a serious error in  

permitting respondent No.1 to pursue the writ petition as  

a public interest litigation. The parameters within which  

Public Interest Litigation can be entertained by this Court  

and the High Court, have been laid down and reiterated  

by this Court in a series of cases. By now it ought to be  

plain and obvious that this Court does not approve of an  

approach  that  would  encourage  petitions  filed  for  

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achieving  oblique  motives  on  the  basis  of  wild  and  

reckless allegations made by individuals, i.e., busybodies;  

having  little  or  no  interest  in  the  proceedings.  The  

credentials, the motive and the objective of the petitioner  

have  to  be  apparently  and  patently  aboveboard.  

Otherwise  the  petition is  liable  to  be dismissed at  the  

threshold.   

20. The High Court ought to have satisfied itself  with  

regard  to  the  credentials  of  respondent  No.1  before  

entertaining  the  writ  petition,  styled  as  public  interest  

litigation. Even a cursory perusal of Paragraph 2 of the  

affidavit filed in the High Court by the respondent No.1  

would  clearly  show  that  the  respondent  No.1  has  no  

special  concern  with  the  extension  granted  to  the  

appellant.  Respondent No.1 had merely pleaded that he  

moved  the  writ  petition  as  he  is  a  devotee  of  Lord  

Venkateswara.  He is an agriculturist by profession.  The  

appellant has failed to supply any specific particulars as  

to how he is  in possession of  any special  information.  

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The  controversy  with  regard  to  the  management  and  

administration of the Temple’s properties and funds have  

been deliberately mixed up with the extension granted to  

the  appellant  by  the  TTD  Board.   It  is  an  admitted  

position  that  different  proceedings  are  pending  with  

regard  to  the  management  controversy  of  the  Temple  

Trust.  The aforesaid controversy had no relevance to the  

extension  granted  to  the  appellant.   The  writ  petition  

seems  to  have  been  actuated  by  some  disgruntled  

elements. He has also failed to show as to how and in  

what manner he represents the public interest.  

21.    This Court in the case of (DR.)     B. Singh   Vs. Union  

of India & Ors.  5   quoted with approval the definition of  

public interest as stated in the report of Public Interest  

Law, USA, 1976 by the council for Public Interest Law set  

up  by  the  Ford foundation  in  USA.   In  the  aforesaid  

report, the definition of public interest is given as under:-

5 (2004) 3 SCC 363

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‘Public  interest  law  is  the  name  that  has  recently  been  given  to  efforts  which  provide  legal  representation  to  previously  unrepresented  groups  and  interests.  Such  efforts  have  been  undertaken  in  the  recognition that ordinary marketplace for legal  services  fails  to  provide  such  services  to  significant segments of the population and to  significant  interests.  Such  groups  and  interests include the proper environmentalists,  consumers,  racial  and  ethnic  minorities  and  others.’  

22. This Court in the case of  Neetu Vs.  State of Punjab  

(Supra)  emphasized  the  need to  ensure  that  public  

interest litigation is not misused to unleash a private  

vendetta against any particular person.  In Paragraph  

7, it is observed as follows:-

“When a  particular  person is  the  object  and  target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has  to be careful to see whether the attack in the  guise  of  public  interest  is  really  intended  to  unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or  some other mala fide object.”

23. Similar observations had been made by this Court in  

the case of Ashok Kumar Pandey Vs. State of West  

Bengal.  6    We  may  reiterate  here  the  observations  

made in Paragraph 12 herein, which are as follows:- 6 (2004) 3 SCC 349

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“Public  interest  litigation  is  a  weapon  which  has  to  be  used  with  great  care  and  circumspection  and  the  judiciary  has  to  be  extremely  careful  to  see  that  behind  the  beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private  malice,  vested  interest  and/or  publicity- seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an  effective  weapon  in  the  armory  of  law  for  delivering  social  justice  to  citizens.  The  attractive  brand  name  of  public  interest  litigation  should  not  be  used  for  suspicious  products  of  mischief.  It  should  be  aimed  at  redressal  of  genuine  public  wrong  or  public  injury  and  not  publicity-oriented  or  founded  on  personal  vendetta.  As  indicated  above,  court  must  be  careful  to  see  that  a  body of  persons  or  a  member  of  the  public,  who  approaches the court is acting  bona fide and  not  for  personal  gain  or  private  motive  or  political  motivation  or  other  oblique  consideration.  The  court  must  not  allow  its  process  to  be  abused  for  oblique  considerations.  Some  persons  with  vested  interest  indulge  in  the  pastime  of  meddling  with judicial process either by force of habit or  from  improper  motives.  Often  they  are  actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap  popularity.  The  petitions  of  such  busybodies  deserve to be thrown out by rejection at  the  threshold,  and  in  appropriate  cases,  with  exemplary costs.”

24. This  Court  again  in  the  case  of  Divine  Retreat  

Centre (Supra) reiterated  that  public  interest  

litigation can only be entertained at the instance of  

bonafide litigants.  It cannot be permitted to be used  

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by  unscrupulous  litigants  to  disguise  personal  or  

individual  grievances  as  public  interest  litigations.  

The facts placed on record in the present proceeding  

would clearly indicate that the appellant has not come  

to Court with clean hands.   He has failed to establish  

his credential  for moving the writ petition as public  

interest litigation.  In our opinion, the High Court has  

failed to examine the matter in its correct perspective.  

The writ petition was undoubtedly moved by motives  

other  than  what  was  stated  in  the  writ  petition.  A  

perusal of the affidavit in support of the writ petition  

would  clearly  show that  the  writ  petition  had been  

filed by the petitioner at the instance of some other  

persons who are hiding behind the veil.  In paragraph  

8 of the affidavit, respondent No. 1 states:

“Sri P. Seshadri who retired on 31.7.2006, has  been given 5 years extension in the TTD. It is  ununderstandable  whether  there  is  no  other  suitable person in the T.T.D. or elsewhere to  perform the duties of Sri. P. Seshadri which he  was doing or whether he is  so indispensable  that he should be given extension for 5 years.  The T.T.D. has not bothered to fill up the said  

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post of Par Pathedar till now, and have chosen  to extend the services of Sri P.Seshadri again  and  again,  vide  Board’s  proceedings  roc.No.BG/10949/2006 dated 31.7.2006.”   

In view of the above, we are unable to accept that the  

petitioner  is  the  actual  moving  spirit  behind  the  writ  

petition.

25. In the case of Gurpal Singh (Supra), this Court again  

emphasized that the Court must not allow its process  

to  be  abused  for  oblique  considerations  by  masked  

phantoms who monitor at times from behind.   

26.Respondent  No.1  had  failed  to  satisfy  any  of  the  

criteria which would have enabled him to move the  

High Court  by way of  a public  interest  litigation.  A  

pure and simple service matter has been deliberately  

disguised as a public interest litigation at the instance  

of  some  disgruntled  employees  who  were  perhaps  

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hopeful  of occupying the seat presently occupied by  

the appellant.  

27. The High Court failed to notice that the writ petition  

was  not  maintainable  for  a  variety  of  reasons.   As  

noticed earlier, the High Court did not even care to  

examine  all  the  provisions  of  1989  rules  before  

concluding  that  the  appointment  of  the  respondent  

was contrary to Rule 13. The respondent had raised  

numerous  preliminary  objectives  with  regard  to  the  

maintainability  of  the writ  petition,  in particular,  at  

the instance of the respondent No.1.  The High Court,  

in  our  opinion,  committed  a  serious  error  in  not  

analyzing  all  the  relevant  provisions  of  the  1989  

Rules,  before  concluding  that  the  extension  in  the  

service granted to the appellant was contrary to Rule  

13.  This  Court  has,  on  numerous  occasions,  

emphasised the importance  of  recording reasons by  

the  High  Court  in  support  of  the  orders  passed  in  

exercise of its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article  

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226  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  Necessity  for  

recording  reasons  is  the  fundamental  to  the  

administration of justice. The recorded reasons would  

enable the parties to the litigation to know the factors  

which weighed with the court in determining the lis  

between  the  parties.  This  Court  in  the  case  of  

Vasudeo  Vishwanath  Saraf Vs. New  Education  

Institute & Ors.7 clearly indicated the bare essentials  

of an order passed by the High Court while  disposing  

of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution  

of India.  In paragraph 14, it is observed as follows :-

“14. It  is  a  cardinal  principle  of  rule  of  law  which  governs  our  policy  that  the  court  including  Writ  Court  is  required  to  record  reasons while  disposing  of  a  writ  petition  in  order to enable the litigants more particularly  the aggrieved party to know the reasons which  weighed  with  the  mind  of  the  court  in  determining  the  questions  of  facts  and  law  raised  in  the  writ  petition  or  in  the  action  brought.  This  is  imperative  for  the  fair  and  equitable  administration  of  justice.  More  so  when there is a statutory provision for appeal  to the higher court in the hierarchy of courts  in  order  to  enable  the  superior  court  or  the  appellate court to know or to be apprised of  the reasons which impelled the court to pass  

7 1986 (4) SCC 31

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the  order  in  question.  This  recording  of  reasons  in  deciding  cases  or  applications  affecting rights of parties is also a mandatory  requirement to be fulfilled in consonance with  the  principles  of  natural  justice.  It  is  no  answer at all to this legal position that for the  purpose  of  expeditious  disposal  of  cases  a  laconic order like “dismissed” or ‘rejected’ will  be made without passing a reasoned order or a  speaking order.  It  is  not,  however,  necessary  that the order disposing of a writ petition or of  a  cause  must  be a  lengthy  one  recording in  detail all the reasons that played in the mind  of the court in coming to the decision. What is  imperative is that the order must in a nutshell  record the relevant reasons which were taken  into consideration by the court in coming to its  final  conclusions  and  in  disposing  of  the  petition  or  the  cause  by  making  the  order,  thereby enabling both the party seeking justice  as well as the superior court where an appeal  lies to know the mind of the court as well as  the reasons for its finding on questions of law  and  facts  in  deciding  the  said  petition  or  cause.  In  other  words  fair  play  and  justice  demands that justice must not only be done  but must seem to have been done.”

The order passed by the High Court does not satisfy the  

bare minimum requirements as indicated above. In view  

of the above, we have no option but to allow the appeal  

and set aside the impugned judgment passed by the High  

Court.

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28. Before  parting,  we  may  notice  here  that  under  the  

Resolution No. 178 dated 28th July, 2007 services of  

the  appellant  have  been  extended  upto  1st August,  

2011.   We  are  informed  by  Mr.  Narsimha  that  his  

services  were  discontinued  immediately  upon  the  

judgment having been passed by the High Court on  

28th April,  2010.   Consequently,  the  appellant  has  

been denied the full benefit under the Resolution and  

the Order dated           1st August, 2009.  Since the  

aforesaid  benefit  has  been  denied  to  the  appellant  

without any fault on his part, we direct the Board to  

consider  whether the appellant  ought to be granted  

further extension to compensate for the loss of service  

since 28th April, 2010.   

29.With these observations, the appeal is allowed and the  

impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside.

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……………………………..J.                                                [B.Sudershan Reddy]

……………………………..J.   [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

New Delhi; March 29, 2011.

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