16 March 1982
Supreme Court
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P.P. ENTTERPRISES ETC. ETC. Vs UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ETC.

Bench: MISRA,R.B. (J)
Case number: Writ Petition (Civil) 3846 of 1981


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PETITIONER: P.P. ENTTERPRISES ETC. ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT16/03/1982

BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) BENCH: MISRA, R.B. (J) FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA

CITATION:  1982 AIR 1016            1982 SCR  (3) 510  1982 SCC  (2)  33        1982 SCALE  (1)184

ACT:      Sugar (Control)  order 1966,  clause 5  read with order No. G.S.R.  410C  E/Ess.  Com./Sugar  dated  14-7-1980-order prescribing maximum quantity of sugar (Vacuum Pan Sugar) and Khandsari (open  Pan Sugar)  to be  kept in  stock,  whether violative of  Articles 14  and 19(1)(g)  of the Constitution and also  ultra vires section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955.

HEADNOTE:      In exercise  of powers  conferred by  section 3  of the Essential Commodities  Act, 1955,  Sugar Control  order 1966 was  issued   by  the   Government  of  India,  Ministry  of Agriculture Clause  5 of  that order  empowered the  Central Government to  issue directions,  inter alia,  to recognised dealers regarding production, maintenance of stock, storage, sale, grading, packing, making weighment, disposal, delivery and distribution of sugar.      By order  No. GSR-410-E/Ess. Com/Sugar dated 14-7-1980, the Central  Government issued directions to the effect that no recognised  dealer shall  keep in  stock at  any time (a) Vacuum pan  sugar in  excess of,  (i) in  Calcutta and other extended area  recognised  dealers  who  import  sugar  from outside West Bengal, 3500 quintals; other recognised dealers 250 quintals;  (ii) in other places in cities and towns with a population  of one  lakh or  more 250  quintals and with a population of  less  than  one  lakh  100  quintal  and  (b) Khandsari  (open   pan  sugar)   250  quintals.  Further  no recognised dealer  shall hold  any stock of vacuum pan sugar or khandsari (open pan sugar) for a period exceeding 10 days from the  date of  receipt by  him of such stock of sugar or khandsari.      The  recognised   dealers,  there-fore,   assailed  the constitutional validity  of the said order on three grounds: (I) the  impugned order  is not  covered by section 3 of the Essential  Commodities  Act  and  is  ultra  vires  (2)  the impugned order  imposes  unreasonable  restrictions  on  the right of  the petitioners  to carry on their trade and so it is violative  of Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution: (3) the impugned  order is  also violative  of Article 14 of the Constitution for  two reasons: (a) the petitioners have been singled out  for hostile  treatment from  other  dealers  of

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sugar at  Calcutta: (b)  the impugned  order is unreasonable and impracticable.      Dismissing the petitions, the Court ^      HELD: 1,  The order  dated 14-7-1980 is not ultra vires section 3  of  the  Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955.  The expression "to secure their equitable 511 distribution and  availability  at  fair  prices",  is  wide enough to cover the impugned  order Likewise, the expression "storage and distribution" used in clause (d) of sub-section (2) of  section 3  of the  essential Commodities  Act,  1955 should be given a liberal construction to give effect to the legislative intent  of public  welfare.  Sugar,  which  term includes khandsari,  is an  essential commodity and over the years it  has become  a  scarce  commodity.  In  the  public interest it became essential to pass the order to secure its equitable distribution  and availability  at fair prices. To that end it became ’necessary to prevent hoarding and black- marketing. [515 F-H, 516 A-E]      2. Restrictions  put by  the impugned  order can  by no means be  said to be unreasonable. It is only regulatory and not prohibitory.  The direction  enjoined recognized  dealer not to  keep sugar  in stock  at any  time in  excess of the quantity specified  therein. It  only seeks  to regulate the limit of storage of sugar and does not prohibit its storage. By the  Impugned order  the  Central  Government  sought  to prevent  hoarding   and  black-marketing,   and  to   ensure equitable distribution  and availability  of sugar  at  fair prices in the open market.[516 E, 519 D]      A person  has a right to carry on any occupation, trade or business  and the  only restriction  on  this  unfettered right is  the authority  of tho State to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions  under clause  (6).  The  expression reasonable  restrictions’   signifies  that  the  limitation imposed on a person in eojoyment of that right should not be arbitrary or  of an excessive nature beyond what is required in the  interest of  the public.  No cut and dry test can be applied to each individual statute impugned, nor an abstract standard or  general pattern  of reasonableness  can be laid down as  applicable in  all cases. The Supreme Court in each case has  to strike  a proper  balance between  the  freedom guaranteed by  Article 19  (1) (g)  and the  social  control permitted by clause (6) of Article - 19. [516 B-D]      State of  Mysore v.  H. Sanjeeviah,  [1967] 2  SCR 360, explained and distinguished.      M/s. Laxmi  Khandsari &  Ors. v.  State of U.P. & Ors., [1981] 2 SCC 609, followed.      3. The  order is  not violative  of Article  14 of  the constitution. The  fixation of  limits for  storing sugar in Calcutta and  other places  is not arbitrary but is based on reasonable classification.  The government is the best judge of the  situation in a particular State and what quantity of sugar will  meet  the  exigencies  of  the  situation  at  a particular place is purely a governmental function. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requirements of sugar to the eastern part of the country, and therefore, the stocks of  sugar to  be held  by the dealers in Calcutta are not required  for consumption  in Calcutta  alone.  Besides, Calcutta being  far away  from the sugar manufacturing units in Bihar  and Uttar Pradesh, from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar  is transported  by the wholesale dealers in railway wagons  which take sometime unusually longer time in transit. These  and various  other factors  have been  taken into  consideration  by  the  Government  while  fixing  the

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storage limits of sugar for the dealers in Calcutta. [519 F- H, 520 A] 512      The fact  that over the years sugar has become a scarce commodity  and   people  have  to  purchase  it  even  at  a prohibitive price,  the dealers  would be  able to  sell the sugar in  their stock  without difficulty at any time at the prevalent market price. In a rare exceptional case there may be some  hardship on  that score  but it  cannot be said, on that account,  that the  order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.  In such cases, we hope and trust that the concern ed  Government would  allow a reasonable time within which the  dealers could  dispose of  the excess quantity of sugar, if any. [520 G, 5 21 A-C]      Suraj Mal  Kailash Chand  & Ors.  v. Union  of India  & Anr.,  Writ  Petitions  Nos.  8334-48  of  1981  decided  on September  25,  1981  (unreported  case):  Bishambhar  Dayal Chandra Moharl  & ors, etc. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. etc. Writ  Petitions Nos.  2907-2908 of  1981 and  connected writ petitions  (a group  of SOS  writ petitions) decided on November S, 1981, followed.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Writ  Petition  Nos.  3846/81, 6454-55/80, 230-249,  502-510,  524,  726-27,  777-96,  803, 1069,  1207-09,1326,439-40,1607,1691-93,1702,1703-7,1734.36, 1737 40,  1759-72, 1789-90, 1879, 1946-47, 1948, 1959, 1972- 97, 2012-17, 2027-39, 2076, 2077-78, 2125-83, 2194-95, 2204- 11, 2284-2326,  2361-62,2363-64, 2365-2404,2405-26, 2444-58, 2459-88,2497-2501, 2503-05,2513-19,  2520-25,2542-73,  2597, 2616-41,2642-48, 2661-63,  2665-66,2698-2700, 2702-21, 2723- 26, 2730-44  2756-62, 2766-76,  2779-2802,2803-15,  2818-26, 2847-55, 2856-67,  2885-96, 2897  98, 2912-15,2917-26, 2968- 76, 2980-3001,  3002-46, 3047-52,  3070-87, 3088-3102, 3165- 3205,  3210-17,   3259-64,  3268-77,  3286,  3305-11,  3312- 22,3325,3346, 3355,3357-70,  3371-91, 3403, 3477-82,3484-88, 3492-3504,3505-15, 3516,3517-34,3560,  3572-79, 3637,  3693- 3730,   3732-36,    3757-75,    3899-3912,4053-69,4192-4229, 4261,4329, 4495,  4496-4508,4606-09, 4617-21,4622-69,  4846- 75, 4978-86,  5218,5349, 5533-43,  5597-5609, 5623, 5626-42, 5728, 5746,  6577-81, 6814, 6934-42,7203, ,217-20,7409,7454- 56,7484,   7641,7659,7773,7943,   7944,   8084,8089,   8090, 8192,8195, 8201,  8431, 8436,  8834, 8862,  8878-81, 8924  & 8979 of 1981.      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      Shanti Bhushan, V.M. Tarkunde, P.A. Francis and G.N. Dikshit.      R.K. Jain,  P.B. Jain,  Pankaj Kaira,  S. Mittar,  M.G. Gupta, J  B.R.  Kapoor,  Miss,  Bhajan  Ram  Rakhyani,  S.R. Srivastava, B.V.  Tawakley, Shobha  Dikshit, B.  Dutta, B.D. Sharma, Miss A. Subhashini, 513 N.N. Sharma, T.C Sharma, A. Ghosh, S.V. Tambwekar and Girish Chandra for the appearing parties. A      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      MISRA J.  In exercise  of powers conferred by section 3 of the  Essential Commodities Act, 1955, Sugar Control order 1966 was  issued by  the Government  of India,  Ministry  of Agriculture. Clause  S of  that order  empowered the Central Government to  issue directions,  inner alia,  to recognised dealers regarding production, maintenance of stock, storage, sale, grading, packing, making weighment, disposal, delivery and distribution of sugar.

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    By Order  No. GSR-410-E/Ess.  Com./Sugar dated the 14th of July,  1980 the  Central Government  issued the following directions:           "In exercise  of the  powers conferred by clause 5      of the Sugar (Control) order, 1966, and in supersession      of the order of the Government of India in the Ministry      of  ’Agriculture   (Department  of   Food)  No.  GSR-60      (e)/Ess. Com./Sugar, dated the 26th February, 1980, the      Central Government  hereby directs  that no  recognised      dealer shall keep in stock at any time-      (1)   Vacuum pan  sugar, in the places mentioned below,           in excess  of  the  quantities  mentioned  against           each-           (i) in Calcutta and extended area-                (a)  recognised dealers who import sugar from                     outside West Bengal-3,500 quintals,                (b)  other recognised dealers-250 quintals;           (ii) in other places-                (a)  in cities and towns with a population of                     one lakh or more-250 quintals;                (b)  in other towns with a population of less                     than one lakh-100 quintals. 514      (2)   Khandsari (open  pan  sugar)  in  excess  of  250           quintals.           Provided that  no recognised dealer shall hold any      stock of Vacuum pan sugar or Khandsari (open pan sugar)      for a  period exceeding  ten  days  from  the  date  of      receipt by him of such stock of sugar or Khandsari. . .           Provided further  that nothing in this order shall      apply to the holding of stocks of sugar-      (i)  on Government account; or      (ii) by  the recognised  dealers nominated  by a  State           Government or  an officer authorised by it to hold           such stock  for distribution  through  fair  price           shops; or     (iii) by the Food Corporation of India.           Explanation:-For  the   purpose  of   this  order,      "Calcutta and  extended area" means the areas specified      in the  Schedule to  the notification of the Government      of West Bengal No. 7752 F.S./14-R-92/61, dated the 16th      December, 1964."      The petitioners  in this  groups of  petitions, who are dealers in  sugar,  seek  to  challenge  the  constitutional validity of  the- said  order  on  three  grounds;  (I)  the impugned order  is not covered by section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act  and is  Ultra vires; (2) the impugned order imposes  unreasonable  restrictions  on  the  right  of  the petitioners to  carry on  their trade and so it is violative of Article  19(2)(g) of  the Constitution;  (3) the impugned order is  also violative  of Article  14 of the Constitution for two  reasons: (as  the petitioners have been singled out for  hostile  treatment  from  other  dealers  of  sugar  at Calcutta,  (b)   the  impugned  order  is  unreasonable  and impracticable.      Shri Shanti Bhushan, senior counsel appearing in one of the petitions  viz., Writ Petition No. 3846 of 1981, took up the first  point. and  urged that  the impugned order is not covered by  any of the clauses of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act.      Section 3  of  the  Essential  Commodities  Act,  1955, insofar as  it is  material for  the purposes  of this case, reads: 515           "3. (1)  If the  Central Government  is of opinion

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    that  it  is  necessary  or  expedient  so  to  do  for      maintaining or  increasing supplies  of  any  essential      commodity or  for securing their equitable distribution      and availability  at fair  prices, or  for securing any      essential commodity  for the  defence of  India or  the      efficient conduct  of military  operations it  may,  by      order,  provide   for  regulating  or  prohibition  the      production, supply  and distribution  thereof and trade      and commerce therein      (2)   With prejudice  to the  generality of  the powers           conferred  by   sub-section  (1),  an  order  made           thereunder may provide-      (a)  .......... (b) .......... (c)............      (d)   for regulating  by licences, permits or otherwise           the storage,  transport,  distribution,  disposal,           acquisition, use  of consumption of, any essential           commodity."      The language  of section  3 (1) coupled with clause (d) of subsection  (2) of  section 3 is wide enough to cover the impugned  order.   Section  3  (1)  authorises  the  Central Government to  pass an  order for  regulating or prohibiting the production,  supply and  distribution  of  an  essential commodity and trade and commerce therein if it is of opinion that it  is necessary or expedient to do so for securing the equitable distribution  and availability. at a fair price of the essential  commodity. The  same power has been made more specific by  clause (d)  of sub-section  (2) of  section  3, which  provides  for  regulating  by  licences.  permits  or otherwise, the  storage, transport,  distribution, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of, any essential commodity. Sugar,  which  term  includes  khandsari,  is  an  essential commodity  and  over  the  years  it  has  become  a  scarce commodity. In  the public  interest it  became essential  to pass the impugned order to secure its equitable distribution and availability  at fair  prices. To  that  end  it  became necessary  to  prevent  hoarding  and  black-marketing.  The expression  "to  secure  their  equitable  distribution  and availability at  fair prices"  is wide  enough to  cover the impugned  order.   Likewise,  the  expression  "storage  and distribution" used  in clause  (d)  of  sub-section  (2)  of section 3  should be  given a  liberal construction  to give effect to  the legislative  intent  of  public  welfare.  So construed, the impugned order is fully pro- 516 tected and  is not  ultra vires  section 3  of the Essential Commodities Act, 195 5.      This leads  us to  the second  contention, namely,  the impugned order  being violative of Article 19 (1) (g) of The Constitution inasmuch as it imposed unreasonable restriction on the  right of  the  petitioners  to  carry  on  trade  or business.      A person  has a right to carry on any occupation, trade or business and only restriction on this unfettered right is the authority of the State to make a law imposing reasonable restrictions under  clause (6).  The expression  ’reasonable restrictions’ signifies  that the  limitation imposed  on  a person in enjoyment of that right should not be arbitrary or of an  excessive nature  beyond  what  is  required  in  the interest of  the public.  No cut and dry test can be applied to  each   individual  statute  impugned,  nor  an  abstract standard or  general pattern  of reasonableness  can be laid down as  applicable in all cases. The Court in each case has to strike a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed by Article 19  (1) (g)  and the  social  control  permitted  by clause (6)  of Article 19. By the impugned order the Central

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Government has only put an embargo on the dealers on keeping sugar in  excess of  the quantity  specified. It  was passed only with  a view  to prevent  hoarding and black-marketing, and to  ensure equitable  distribution and  availability  of sugar at fair prices in the open market.      Reliance was  placed by Shri Shanti Bhushan on State of Mysore  v.   H.  sanjeeviah.(J)   In  that  Case  the  State Government of  Mysore  had  framed  rules  to  regulate  the transit of  timber, firewood,  charcoal and bamboos from all lands in  exercise of  powers conferred by section 37 of the Mysore Forest  Act 11  of 1900.  By rule 2 framed on October 13, 1952, it was provided that no person shall import forest produce into,  export forest  produce from,  or move  forest produce within,  any of  the areas  specified in  Schedule A unless  such   forest  produce   is  accompanied  by  permit prescribed in  rule 3. On April 15, 1959 the State of Mysore issued a  notification adding a proviso to rule 2 which read as follows: 517           "Provided that  no such permit shall authorise any      person to  transport forest produce between SUN set and      sun-rise in any of the areas specified in Schedule A." By another  notification dated  September 14, 1960 the State Government introduced  the second  proviso to  rule 2  which read:           "provided further  that permission  may be granted      to timber  merchants  on  their  request  to  transport      timber upto  10  p.m.  (22  hrs)  under  the  following      conditions:      (i)   the party  who wishes  to avail of the concession           should pay  a cash deposit of Rs. 1000 as security           for the  compliance with  the timber transit rules           as in force;      (ii) that  the deposit  may be  forfeited to government           for breach  of any of the conditions of the timber           transit rules." The dealers  in timber  challenged the  two provisos  on the grounds inner  alia that  they were  beyond the  rule making authority conferred  upon the State Government by section 37 of the  Mysore Forest  Act 11  of 1900  and in any event the provisos imposed unauthorized restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce  and intercourse.  The High  Court held that the State Government while seeking to regulate the transport of timber stopped transport altogether. This Court upholding the order of the High Court observed:           "Power  to   impose  restrictions  of  the  nature      contemplated by  the two  provisos to r. 2 is not to be      found in  any of the clauses of sub-s. (2) of s. 37. By      sub-s. (I)  the State  Government is  invested with the      power to  regulate trans  port of  forest  produce  "in      transit by  land or  water." The  power which the Stale      Government may  exercise is  however power  to regulate      transport of  forest produce,  and not  the   power  to      prohibit or  restrict transport.  Prima facie,  a  rule      which totally  prohibits the movement of forest produce      during the  period  between  sun-set  and  sun-rise  is      prohibitory or  restrictive of  the right  to transport      forest produce.  A rule  regulating  transport  in  its      essence   permits   transport,   subject   to   certain      conditions devised to promote trans port." 518      This Court further observed:           "If the  provisos are  in truth restrictive of the      right to  transport the  forest produce,  however, good      the grounds  apparently  may  be  for  restricting  the

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    transport  of  forest  produce,  they  cannot  on  that      account transform  the power  conferred by the provisos      into a power merely regulatory." The facts of the present cases are materially different from the facts  of H. Sanjeeviah’s case (supra). In that case the impugned  provisos  to  rule  2  completely  prohibited  the transport of  the forest  produce between  sun-set and  sun- rise. But  in the  cases in  hand the  direction enjoined  a recognised dealer  not to keep sugar in stock at any time in excess of  the quantity  specified therein. It only seeks to regulate the limit of storage of sugar and does not prohibit its storage. The case of H. Sanjeeviah, therefore, is not of much help to the petitioners herein.      In M/s.  Laxmi Khandsari  & Ors.  v. State  of  U.P.  & ors.(l) this  Court made  the following  observations  about reasonable restrictions on the right conferred by Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution in the following terms:           "As to  what  are  reasonable  restrictions  would      naturally depend on the nature and circumstances of the      case, the character of the statute, the object which it      seeks to  serve, the existing circumstances, the extent      of the evil sought to be remedied as also the nature of      restraint or  restriction placed  on the  rights of the      citizen. It  is difficult to lay down any hard and fast      rule of  universal application  but  in  imposing  such      restrictions the State must adopt an objective standard      amounting to  a social control by restricting the right      of the  citizens where the necessities of the situation      demand. The restrictions must be in public interest and      are imposed  by striking  a just  balance  between  the      deprivation of  right and the danager or evil sought to      be avoided.  If the  restrictions imposed  appear to be      consistent  with  the  directive  principles  of  State      policy they  would have  to be upheld as the same would      be in public 519      interest   and    manifestly    reasonable.    Further,      restrictions   may be  partial, complete,  permanent or      temporary but  they must  bear a  close nexus  with the      object in  the interest  of  which  they  are  imposed.      Another important  test is  that restriction should not      be excessive  or arbitrary.  The court must examine the      direct and  immediate import  of -  the restrictions on      the  rights  of  the  citizens  and  determine  if  the      restrictions  are   in  larger  public  interest  while      deciding the  question that they contain the quality of      reasonableness. In  such cases  a doctrinaire  approach      should not be made but care should be taken to see that      the real  purpose   which is  sought to  be achieved by      restricting the  rights of  the citizens is sub-served.      At the  same time,  the possibility  of an  alternative      scheme which  might have been but has not been enforced      would not  expose the  restrictions to challenge on the      ground that they are not reasonable." Judged in  that light and on an overall consideration of the various aspects  of the  matter,  restrictions  put  by  the impugned order  can by  no means be said to be unreasonable. It is only regulatory and not prohibitory.      We  now  take  up  the  last  contention,  namely,  the impugned  order   being  violative  of  Article  14  of  the Constitution. The learned counsel seeks to invoke Article 14 on  two   grounds:  (1)   the  impugned  order  applies  two standards, one  for the  dealers, at  Calcutta, who had been authorised to  keep 3,500  quintals at  one time,  while the dealers at  other places  have been  authorised to keep only

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250 quintals  in cities  with a  population of  one lakh  or more, and only 100 quintals in other towns with a population of less than one lakh. F      The fixation  of limits  for storing  sugar in Calcutta and other places is not arbitrary but is based on reasonable classification. The  government is  the best  judge  of  the situation in  a particular  State and that quantity of sugar will meet  the exigencies  of the  situation at a particular place is  purely a  governmental function. For one, Calcutta serves as a feeder line to meet the requirements of sugar to the eastern  part of  the country, and therefore, the stocks of sugar  to be  held by  the dealers  in Calcutta  are  not required for consumption in Calcutta alone Besides, Calcutta being far  away from  the sugar manufacturing units in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, from where bulk of supplies are obtained, sugar is transported by the wholesale 520 dealers in  railway wagons  which  take  sometime  unusually longer time in transit. These and various other factors have been taken into consideration by the Government while fixing the storage limits of sugar for the dealers in Calcutta.      His second  ground  for  invoking  Article  14  of  the Constitution is  that the impugned order is unreasonable and impracticable in  that no  dealer can be sure of the sale of sugar on  any particular  day. If per chance a dealer is not able to  dispose of the excess sugar on a particular. day he would  expose  himself  to  punishment  under  the  Act.  No provision has been made in the order or in the rules for the purchase by  the Government  of the  excess sugar.  For  the State it  was contended  that similar  orders with regard to wheat came  up for  consideration in this Court in Suraj Mal Kailash Chand   Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. and Bishambhar Dayal Chandra  Mohan Ors.  etc. v.  State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. etc.(2)  when this  Court upheld  the validity of these orders. In view of the decision of this Court in those cases it is  not open  to Shri  Shanti Bhushan  to  challenge  the constitutional validity of the impugned order.      Shri Shanti  Bhushan, however, refutes the argument and says that  those decisions  do not  stand in  the way of the petitioners. The  situation with  regard to  wheat was quite different inasmuch  . s  clause 25  of the impugned order in Sutlaj Mal’s case (supra) provided that the State Government or the  Collector  or  the  Licensing  Authority  may  issue directions to  any dealer  with regard  to  purchase,  sale, disposal, storage  or exhibition of the price and stock list of all  or any  of the  trade articles. But there is no such provision in  the impugned  order in  the instant  case and, therefore,   the dealers can expose themselves to punishment merely because at any particular point of time the stock was in excess  of the prescribed limits. Bishambhar Dayal’s case (supra) also  related to  wheat. There  was a scheme for the procurement of wheat by the State Government but there is no such scheme in respect of sugar. This fact distinguishes the present case for the facts-of the aforesaid decision.      The argument though attractive cannot be accepted. Over the years sugar has become a scare commodity and people have to 521 purchase  it   even  at   a  prohibitive   price.   In   the circumstances it A cannot be expected that the dealers would not be  able to  sell the  sugar in  their stock.  There  is absolutely no difficulty in selling the sugar at any time at the prevalent  market price.  If in  a rare  case  there  is difficulty  on  that  score  we  hope  and  trust  that  the concerned Government  would allow  a reasonable  time within

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which the petitioners are permitted to dispose of the excess quantity of  sugar, if  any. In any case, in some given case there may  be some  hardship but  it cannot  be said on that account that  the impugned  order is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.      For the  foregoing discussion  the writ  petitions must fail. They  are accordingly  dismissed. In the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to costs. S.R.                                   Petitions dismissed. 522