Page 1

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4309  OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 17414 of 2015)  

OM PRAKASH & ANR.      …..APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED  BY HIS LR.  SAVITRI DEVI      ....RESPONDENT

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4310     OF 2017 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 20758 of 2015)

RAJENDRA PRASAD & ANR.    …..APPELLANTS

VERSUS

MISHRI LAL (DEAD) REPRESENTED  BY HIS LR. SAVITRI DEVI & ANR.         ..…RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.

Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. The  appellants/plaintiffs  (for  short,  hereinafter  to  be

referred to as “the appellants”)  are aggrieved by the dismissal of

their suit and the application under the Uttar Pradesh Urban

Page 2

2

Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972

(for short, hereinafter to be  referred to as “the Act”) for eviction

of  the  respondents  from  the  suit  premises  on  the  ground,

amongst others of default and bona fide requirement.  The suit

and the application filed under Section 21 of the Act have been

dismissed in two separate proceedings by the High Court vide

orders dated 25.02.2014 in W.P.(C) No. 26732 of 2010 and Civil

Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.31855 of 1998.

4. Both these  petitions  were  analogously  heard and thus

the present adjudication would address collectively the issues

involved.

5. We have heard  Mr. Anand Varma, learned counsel for

the appellants and Mr.  R.D. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the

respondents.

6. The  appellants  as  plaintiffs  instituted  Suit  No.  252  of

1989 in the Court of Small Causes, Allahabad against Mishri

Lal,  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the  present  respondents

seeking his eviction from the suit premises on the ground of

default in payment of rent and sub-letting of the suit premises

Page 3

3

without the knowledge and approval  of  the landlords i.e.  the

appellants. The appellants claimed themselves to be the joint

owners  of  the  suit  premises  since  the  death  of  their  grand-

mother  Chameli  Devi,  widow  of  late  Mahabir  Prasad  on

30.07.1985.  They referred to a will dated 28.12.1976 executed

by their afore-named grand-mother in support of their claim of

joint ownership.  They averred that the predecessor-in-interest

of the respondents was a tenant of the suit premises since 1968

against payment of monthly rent of Rs. 96/- and the same was

rented out on the clear understanding that the tenant would

vacate the same on one month’s notice.  The appellants alleged

that  the  tenant  i.e.  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the

respondents  paid  rent  till  October,  1979  and  thereafter

persistently failed to make payment thereof in spite of repeated

demands.  Due to such default,  the relationship between the

landlords and tenant became strained,  and as claimed by the

appellants, he without offering the rent to the landlords, made

deposits thereof under Section 30 of the Act, which was invalid

and non est in law.  Situated thus, the appellants addressed a

notice dated 18.08.1989 terminating the tenancy,  demanding

Page 4

4

payment of the arrears of rent within the statutory period of one

month  with  the  clear  indication  that  in  case  of  failure  to

respond  to  the  notice  and  the  request  for  rent,  the  tenancy

would stand determined and that the tenant would be liable for

eviction.  According to the appellants the notice was served on

26.08.1989,  but  despite  the  same,  rent  was  not  paid  and

consequently the tenancy stood terminated.   

7.   It was further alleged that the tenant also sub-let the suit

premises  to  one  Moti  Chand  for  conducting  his  business

therein.  It was thus averred that on this ground as well, as the

sub-letting was done without the knowledge and consent of the

landlords, the tenant was liable for eviction.  The suit was thus

filed  for  recovery  of  arrears  of  rent,  eviction  of  the  tenant/

defendant and for damages for unauthorised use or occupation

of the tenanted premises as well as for interest.

8.    The  original  defendant/tenant  in  his  written  statement

though  admitted  the  tenancy  under  Smt.  Chameli  Devi,  the

grand- mother of the appellants, he refused to acknowledge the

appellants as his landlords.  He claimed that the tenancy had

Page 5

5

commenced from 1957 and that  he had paid rent  up to the

month of September, 1989 to the landlord,  Bhola Nath (father

of the appellants) and that on his refusal to accept the same

thereafter, he had deposited the rent in court under Section 30

of the Act.  The defendant/tenant admitted Smt. Chameli Devi

to be the landlady who used to realize the rent till her life time

and after her death,  Bhola Nath, her eldest son used to collect

the  same.   He  admitted  the  receipt  of  the  notice  dated

18.08.1989, but denied that he was a defaulter in payment of

rent or that he was liable for eviction from the suit premises.  

9.   According  to  him,   Motichand  was  his  nephew  and

partner in his business and that as he was like his own son, the

allegation of  sub-letting  was unfounded.   Elaborating  on the

facts  preceding  the  deposit  of  rent  in  Court,  the  tenant

reiterated that after the refusal by Shri Bhola Nath to accept the

rent subsequent to September, 1989, he remitted the rent for

the  month  of  October  and  November,  1989  by  money  order

dated 04.12.1989 but the same was refused again.  He stated

that thereafter, for the second time, he dispatched the rent for

Page 6

6

the  months  of  October,  November  and  December,  1989  on

26.12.1989 by money order but similarly the same was refused.

According to the tenant, he again on 12.01.1990 remitted the

rent  for  the  months  of  October,  1989  to  January,  1990  by

money order and as the same was refused again,  he started

depositing the rent in Court, the first deposit being vide Misc.

Case  No.41  of  1990  for  the  months  of  October,  1989  to

January, 1990.

10.   He denied the execution of the will dated 28.12.1976 by

Smt.  Chameli  Devi,  who  had  two  sons   Bhola  Nath  and

Bacchanlal, but admitted that the eldest son Bhola Nath used

to realize  rent from him.

11.   Parallelly the appellants also filed an application under

Section 21 of the Act before the Prescribed Authority against the

original defendant/tenant seeking  release of the suit premises

on  the  ground  of  bona  fide  and  genuine  need  therefor  to,

amongst  others  conduct  their  business  therein.    This

application was contested as well by the original defendant by

Page 7

7

filing  his  objection  questioning  the  bona  fide  need  of  the

appellants.   

12.    The Trial Court, on the basis of the pleadings, framed

issues  and  the  parties  adduced  evidence,  both  oral  and

documentary.   The  appellants  in  particular  examined  their

father  Bhola Nath as PW2, who admittedly used to collect rent

from the defendant/tenant till September, 1979, as claimed by

them.  

13.   The Trial Court decreed the suit, both on the ground of

default in payment of rent and sub-letting of the suit premises.

In reaching this conclusion, it amongst others took note of the

testimony  of  Bhola  Nath,  son  of  Smt.  Chameli  Devi,  who

supported the pleaded case of the appellants and endorsed the

factum of execution of will by Smt. Chameli Devi on the basis of

which  they  (appellants)  claimed  joint  ownership  of  the  suit

premises.   It  also noticed that such joint ownership had not

been questioned or disputed by any quarter.  It also referred to

a compromise decree between the heirs of  Bhola Nath and his

brother Bachan Lal, rendered in Original Case No. 95 of 1986

Page 8

8

qua  the  will,  which  too  authenticated  the  claim  of  the

appellants of the suit premises.  Noticing the admission of the

original defendant/tenant of having paid rent to  Bhola Nath,

the  father  of  the  appellants,  the  Trial  Court  negated  his

challenge to their  claim of joint ownership and their status of

landlord vis-a-vis the suit premises.   

14.   While  upholding  the  allegation  of  sub-letting,  the  Trial

Court as well held that the deposit of rent made by the original

defendant was not in terms of the Act and therefore he was not

entitled to the protection from eviction.  It held the view that

though disputed, even if  the rent for the months of October,

1989 to January, 1990 had been sent to Bhola Nath vide money

order, it did not amount to offering thereof to the appellants, the

landlords, and thus the deposit in Court was not as mandated

by Section 30 of the Act.  According to the Trial Court,  Bhola

Nath was only a collector of rent on behalf of the appellants and

therefore,  offer  thereof  ought  to  have  been  made  to  them

(appellants) for a valid deposit under Section 30 of the Act.  The

suit was thus decreed  in full, as prayed for.

Page 9

9

15.   This  verdict  was  challenged  by  the  original

defendant/tenant  in  revision  before  the  District  Judge,

Allahabad,  who  reversed  the  same  on  the  ground  that  the

appellants  have  not  been  able  to  prove  that  they  were  the

exclusive landlords owners of the suit premises.   

16. The appellants thereafter filed a writ petition before the

High Court, which remanded the matter to the Revisional Court

by  noticing,  in  particular  the  compromise  decree  dated

05.04.1989 in Original Case No. 95 of 1986, in which the joint

ownership  of  the  appellants  in  the  suit  premises  had  been

decreed.   

17. The  Revisional  Court,  on  remand,  however  maintained

that  the  will  dated  28.12.1976,  on  the  basis  of  which  the

appellants  claimed  joint  ownership  had  not  been  proved,  as

required under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925

and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.  Besides, it

also expressed its  reservation with regard to the authenticity

and  genuineness  of  this  document.   The  suit  was  thus

dismissed  by  upturning  the  decree  of  the  Trial  Court.

Page 10

10

Consequently, the Revisional Court did not examine the other

issues on merits.

18.  By the impugned judgment and order as well,  the High

Court, while limiting itself to the aspect of the proof of the will,

concurred with the Revisional Court and dismissed the suit of

the  appellants.  Apropos,  the  proceedings  based  on  the

application under Section 21 of the Act for the eviction of the

original defendant on the ground of bona fide requirement, the

High  Court,  by  the  impugned  verdict,  upheld  the  rejection

thereof,  as  recorded by  the  Prescribed Authority  by  negating

their status of that of a landlord.  In reaching this conclusion,

the  High  Court  noted  that  Bhola  Nath,  the  father  of  the

appellants  used  to  collect  rent  from  the  original  defendant

throughout and that they did not at any point of time claim to

be the owners/landlords of the suit property, pursuant to the

will executed by Smt. Chameli Devi.  It also concurred with the

findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate

Court on the issue of bona fide need and comparative hardship.

The High Court was of the view that the will dated 28.12.1976

Page 11

11

on  the  basis  of  which  the  appellants  had  claimed  joint

ownership  was  not  proved  as  required in  law and thus,  the

mere registration thereof did not either suggest its genuineness

or  its  validity  so  as  to  provide  the  locus  standi to  them  to

maintain the application.

19. The learned counsel for the appellants has emphatically

urged that the issue of their joint ownership having been settled

finally  in  view  of  the  compromise  decree  dated  05.04.1989

rendered in Original Case No. 95 of 1986 and their status  as

the  heirs  of  Smt.  Chameli  Devi  having  been  conclusively

established, the suit filed for the eviction of the predecessor-in-

interest of the respondents  in that capacity was maintainable,

more particularly in the absence of  any dispute of title inter se

the other legal heirs.  In the alternative, it has been argued that

in any view of the matter, the appellants   being the sons of

Bhola  Nath,  who  admittedly  used  to  collect  rent  and  was  a

landlord under the Act, they were entitled to receive rent qua

the suit property from the tenant as landlords under the statute

and,  therefore  not  only  the  predecessor-in-interest  of  the

Page 12

12

respondents were estopped from denying their status as such,

but had made himself liable for eviction therefrom by persistent

default  in  payment  of  rent.   The  learned  counsel  for  the

appellants has submitted that the High Court in this factual

background had grossly erred in dismissing the suit and the

application for release of the suit premises filed under Section

21  of  the  Act  on  the  sole  purported  ground  that  the  will

executed by Smt. Chameli Devi on  28.12.1976 had not been

proved.   Additionally,  as the appellants have proved that the

original tenant had continuously defaulted in payment of rent

and  had  sub-let  the  premises  without  the  knowledge  and

approval  of  the  landlords,  the  Trial  Court  was  justified  in

decreeing the suit  for  his  eviction,  he  urged.   It  was further

argued that the suit premises being required  bone fide by the

appellants for their genuine need for business, the impugned

judgments  and  orders,  if  allowed  to  stand  would  result  in

serious miscarriage of justice.

20. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondents

has maintained that the appellants in the attendant facts and

Page 13

13

circumstances are neither the landlords nor the owners of the

suit premises, which is clearly borne out by the fact that the

rent therefor was initially collected by Smt. Chameli Devi and

thereafter, by their father Bhola Nath, during his lifetime.  It

has been argued that as  Bhola Nath refused to receive rent, it

was offered to him and thereafter was deposited in court under

Section 30 of the Act and thus the original defendant/tenant

by no means can be branded as defaulter.  It was reiterated that

Motichand was the nephew of the original tenant as well as a

partner in his business and thus his stay in the suit premises

did not amount to sub-letting thereof.  The learned counsel for

the respondents also endorsed the finding of  all the forums on

the absence of bona fide need or requirement of the appellants

of the suit premises.   

21. The  competing  assertions  and the  materials  on  record

have been duly taken note of.  Before adverting thereto, it would

be  appropriate  to  undertake  a  brief  survey  of  the  relevant

provisions of the Act, which as the title suggests, is a legislation

for regulation of letting and rent of and the eviction of tenants

Page 14

14

from certain classes of  building,  situated in the urban areas

and for matters connected there with.  The expressions “tenant”

and “landlord” are defined as hereunder:

3(a)  “tenant”   in  relation  to  a  building,  means  a person  by  whom  its  rent  is  payable,  and  on  the tenant's death, his heirs.

3(j)  “landlord”,  in  relation  to  a  building,  means  a person  to whom  its rent is or if the building were let would be, payable, and includes, except in clause (g), the agent or attorney, or such person.  

22. It would be apparent from hereinabove that a “tenant” in

relation to a building is a person by whom rent is payable and

on his  death,  his  heirs.    “Landlord”  vis-a-vis  a building,  as

defined, means a person to whom its rent is or if the building

was let, would be payable and or include the agent or attorney

of such person.  The definition of “Family” being not relevant in

the present context qua the expression “landlord” is not being

dilated  upon.   In  terms of  Section  20  of  the  Act,  a  suit  for

eviction of a tenant for building after the determination of his

tenancy may be instituted on one or more of  the grounds as

enumerated in sub-section (2), clauses (a) to (g) which includes:

Page 15

15

 (i) arrears of rent for not less than four months and

failure to pay the same to the landlord within one

month  from  the  date  of  service  upon  him  of  a

notice of demand; and  

(ii)  sub-letting of  the suit  premises by the tenant in

contravention of the provisions of Section 25 of the

whole or any part of the building.

23. Sub-section 4 of Section 20 provides that if at the first

hearing of the suit, the tenant unconditionally pays or tenders

to the landlord, the entire amount of rent and damages for use

and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for

use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent)

together with interest thereon at the rate of 9% per annum and

the landlord’s cost of the suit in respect thereof after deducting

therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under

sub-section 1 of Section 30, the court may in lieu of passing a

decree for eviction, pass an order relieving the tenant against

his liability for eviction, on that ground.  The proviso thereto

Page 16

16

being not of any consequence in the present case is not being

referred to.   

24. Section 21 authorises the Prescribed Authority to order

the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any

specified part thereof, if it is satisfied, on an application by the

landlord,  that,  amongst  others  the  building  is  bona  fide

required  either  in  its  existing  form  or  after  demolition  and

raising of new construction by the landlord for occupation by

himself or any member of its family or any person for whose

benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for

purposes of any profession, trade or calling or  if the landlord is

a trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust.

25. Sub-section 4 clarifies that such an order may be made

notwithstanding that the tenancy has not been determined with

the exception that no such order would be made in the case of

tenancy created for a fixed term by registered lease, before the

expiry of such term.   

26. Section 30 of the Act permits deposit of rent in court in

certain circumstances.  It predicates that if any person claiming

Page 17

17

to  be a  tenant  of  a  building tenders any amount  as rent  in

respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged

landlord  refuses  to  accept  the  same,  then  the  tenant  may

deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to

deposit any rent which he alleges to be due for any subsequent

period  in  respect  of  such  building  until  the  landlord  in  the

meantime  signifies  by  notice  in  writing  to  the  tenant,  his

willingness to accept it.  Sub-section 2 elaborates that where

any bona fide doubt or dispute has arisen as to the person who

is entitled to receive any rent in respect of  any building, the

tenant may likewise deposit the rent stating the circumstances

under which such deposit is made and may until such doubt

has been removed or   such dispute has been settled by the

decision of any competent court or by settlement between the

parties,  continue  to  deposit  the  rent  that  may  subsequently

become due in respect of such building.   

27.  Whereas sub-sections (4) and (5) provide for issuance of

notice  of  the  deposit  to  the  alleged  landlord  or  the

person/persons  concerned,  sub-section  (6)  mandates  that  in

Page 18

18

respect of such a deposit being made, it would be deemed that

the person depositing it has paid it on the date of such deposit

to  the  person  in  whose  favour  it  is  deposited.   Section  38

proclaims  that  the  provisions  of  that  Act  would  have  effect

notwithstanding anything inconsistent  therewith contained in

the  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882  or  in  the  Code  of  Civil

Procedure, 1908.

28.  It is a matter of record that Smt. Chameli Devi, widow of

Mahabir Prasad was the grand-mother of the appellants.  As the

verdict in original Case No. 95 of 1986, consistently referred to

by  all  the  Forums,  would  divulge,    Mahavir  Prasad  and

Chameli Devi had two sons Bhola Nath and Bachhan Lal.  As

noted hereinabove, the appellants are the sons of Bhola Nath.

Incidentally,  Radha  Devi,  wife  of  Bacchan  Lal  and  her  sons

instituted the afore-mentioned suit i.e. Original Case No.95 of

1986 in the Court of the Additional Civil Judge- VI, Allahabad

seeking declaration of title in respect, amongst others of the suit

premises.   This  was  contested  by   Bhola  Nath  and  the

appellants and  in  course  of  the  adjudication,  the  will  dated

Page 19

19

28.12.1986 executed by Chameli Devi surfaced for scrutiny.  On

the basis of this document, the appellants claimed ownership of

the  suit  premises.   As the decision rendered in that  suit  on

05.04.1989 would reveal, a compromise was arrived at between

the  parties  having  due  regard  to  the  said  will,  whereby  the

ownership of the suit premises of the sons of Bhola Nath and

Bacchan  Lal  was  declared  and  a  decree  to  that  effect  was

passed.  This decree, indisputably, has become final, in absence

of any challenge thereto before any forum.  In the face of this

compromise decree,  in our comprehension, the dismissal of the

suit and the rejection of the application for the release under

Section 21 of the Act by the High Court on the sole ground that

the appellants had no locus to maintain the same in absence of

formal  proof  of  the  will  dated  28.12.1976  was  grossly

misdirected and thus cannot be sustained, more particularly in

view of the definition of the “landlord” provided in the Act.   

29.     Noticeably, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents

had admitted the tenancy under Smt. Chameli Devi.  He has

admitted as well that during her lifetime, rent used to be paid to

Page 20

20

her  and  thereafter  her  elder  son,  Bhola  Nath,  father  of  the

appellants used to receive the rent.  It is his pleaded case that

as  was  the  arrangement,  he  paid  rent  to  Bhola  Nath  upto

September,  1979,  whereafter  he  refused to  accept  the  same.

Incidentally,  even  assuming  that  the  plea  of  the  original

defendant of having paid rent to Bhola Nath up to September,

1989  is  correct  (the  allegation  of  the  appellants  is  that  the

default is from October, 1979), the default from October 1989

is  incidentally  subsequent  to  the  compromise  decree,  as

afore-mentioned  whereunder  the  sons  of  Bhola  Nath  and

Bachan Lal were held to be the owners of the suit premises.  It

is  a  matter  of  record  that  the  appellants  by   notice  dated

19.08.1989  had  demanded  from  the  original  defendant  the

arrears  of   rent  from  October,  1979  which  was  admittedly

received by him but not acted upon.  In spite thereof, according

to the original defendant, he offered rent to Bhola Nath for the

months  of  October,  1989 to  January,  1990 by  remitting  the

same  by  money-orders  and  on  the  alleged  refusal  thereof,

eventually deposited the rent in court under Section 30.

Page 21

21

30.      In view of the categorical  disclosure in the notice dated

18.08.1989,   issued  on  behalf  of  the  appellants,  requiring

payment of rent in arrears to them as the landlords and also

indicating  determination  of  tenancy  in  case  of  failure  in

payment, we are of the view that the so called offer of rent for

the months of October, 1989 to  January, 1990 to Bhola Nath

by money-orders and thereafter deposit in Court under Section

30 of the Act would be of no avail to the original defendant and

on his death,  the present respondents.  The original defendant

in terms of the aforementioned  notice was fully aware of the

compromise decree  and the status of the appellants as the joint

owners/landlords and thus his offer of rent to Bhola Nath, who

ceased  to  be  the  landlord,  was  not  in  compliance  either  of

sub-section 4  of  Section  20 or  Section 30 of  the  Act  to  be

availed  as  a  defence  against  his/their  eviction  from the  suit

premises.   The  original  defendant  and  consequently  the

respondents has/have therefore rendered   himself/themselves

as defaulters within the meaning of the Act and are liable to be

evicted  thereunder.  It  is  more  so  as  admittedly  neither  the

original defendant nor the respondents had ever endeavoured to

Page 22

22

offer rent to the appellants after the compromise decree dated

05.04.89.   

31. Viz-a-vis  the  aspect  of  sub-letting,  we  are  inclined  to

concur with the finding of the Trial Court that Motichand, who

was the nephew of the original defendant, had been inducted in

the suit premises  as a sub-tenant.  Further as it is a matter of

record  that  the  original  defendant  had  constructed  his  own

house elsewhere where he has been residing with his wife, the

accommodation of his nephew Motichand in the suit premises

did  amount  to  sub-letting  and  the  same  having  been  done

without the knowledge and approval of the landlords,  this too

provided a ground for his eviction therefrom. Additionally, even

if the deposit of  arrears of rent in full by the original defendant

at the time of institution of the suit  is construed to be valid, in

the face of his own house elsewhere, he is not entitled to the

protection from eviction under the proviso to sub-section 4 of

Section 20.  To be elaborate, under sub-section 4 of Section 20,

as referred to hereinabove, if a tenant, at the first hearing  of

the suit, unconditionally pays or tenders  to the landlord  the

Page 23

23

entire amount of rent and damages for use and  occupation of

the building due from him together with  interest thereon  @

9% per annum and the landlords' costs of the suit in respect

thereof,  after  deducting  therefrom  any  amount  already

deposited by the tenant under sub-section1 of Section 30,  the

court  may,  in  lieu  of  passing  a  decree  for  eviction  on  that

ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability

for  eviction  on  the  ground  of  default.   The  proviso  thereto

predicates that this benefit would not be available to a tenant

who or any member of  his family has built  or has otherwise

acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition,

any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified

area  or town area.  Apart from the fact that no evidence is

forthcoming to attest  that the requirements of sub-section 4 of

Section 20 had been fully complied with, the construction of his

own  house  elsewhere,  as  is  evident  from  the  record,    did

dis-entitle the  original defendant and now  the respondents to

avail  the benefit  of  such protection, as contemplated  by the

Act.  

Page 24

24

32. It is no longer res integra and is settled by this Court in

Sri  Ram Pasricha vs. Jagannath and Ors.,  (1976) 4 SCC

184,  Dhannalal vs. Kalawatibai and Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 16

and  India  Umberalla  Manufacturing  Co.  and  Ors.  vs.

Bhagabandei  Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Savitri Agarwalla

(Smt.) and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178 that  a suit for eviction of a

tenant can be maintained  by one of the co-owners and it would

be no defence to the tenant to  question  the maintainability of

the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined

as  parties to the suit.  The judicially propounded proposition is

that when the property forming the subject matter of eviction

proceedings  is  owned  by  several  co-owners,  every  co-owner

owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with

others and thus it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or

a  fractional  owner  of  the  property  and  that  he  can  alone

maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the

other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object.  In the

contextual  facts,  not  only  the  compromise  decree,  as

aforementioned,  has  declared  the  appellants  to  be  the  joint

owners of the suit premises, their status as such has not been

Page 25

25

questioned  at  any  stage  by  anyone  interested  in  the  title

thereto.   

33.   Further,  the  original  defendant  having  accepted  Smt.

Chameli Devi as his landlady and thereafter continued to pay

rent  to  her  son Bhola  Nath,  the  father  of  the  appellants,  in

terms of the definition of “landlord” in Section 3(j) of the Act, he

during  his life time and after his demise, the respondents are

estopped under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 to

dispute the status of the appellants as their landlord in a suit

for his eviction from the tenanted premises.   

34. That a tenant during the continuance of the tenancy is

debarred on the doctrine of estoppel from denying the title of his

landlord through whom he claims tenancy, as is enshrined in

Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872,   is so well-settled

a legal  postulation that  no decision need be  cited  to  further

consolidate  the  same.   This  enunciation,  amongst  others  is

reiterated by this Court in S. Thangappan vs. P. Padmavathy

(1999)  7  SCC  474  and  Bhogadi  Kannababu  and  Ors.  vs.

Vuggina Pydamma and others (2006) 5 SCC 532.   In any

Page 26

26

view of the matter, the appellants, being the son of Bhola Nath,

who at all relevant time, was the landlord vis-à-vis the original

defendant and the respondents in terms of Section 3(j) of the

Act, their status as landlords for the purpose of eviction under

the Act, could not have been questioned so as to non suit them

for want of locus.  

35.        To reiterate, the High Court by the decisions impugned,

had dismissed the suit and the application for release of  the

suit premises under Section 21 of the Act,  principally on the

ground of want of standing of the appellants.  In the face of the

determination  made  hereinabove,  the  said  conclusion  is

unsustainable on facts and in law and are  thus liable to be set

aside, which we hereby do.  Having regard to the conclusions

recorded  on  the  aspect  of  default  in  payment  of  rent  and

sub-letting, both statutorily recognized grounds for eviction of a

tenant under Section 20 of the Act, it is considered inessential

to  dilate  on  the  ground  of  bona  fide  requirement  and

comparative  hardship.    In  the  wake  up  of  the  above,  the

impugned judgments and orders of the High Court are set-aside

Page 27

27

and  the  suit  of  the  appellants  is  decreed  in  full.   The

respondents would vacate the suit premises at the earliest and

in no case later than three months from today.   The appeals

are allowed.  No costs.

............................................J.    (ARUN MISHRA)

….........................................J.     (AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI;  MARCH 21, 2017.