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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  1785      OF 2014   (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 14409 of 2010)

Om Prakash Chautala … Appellant

Versus

Kanwar Bhan and others …Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

1. Reputation  is  fundamentally  a  glorious  amalgam  and  

unification of virtues which makes a man feel proud of his  

ancestry  and  satisfies  him to  bequeath  it  as  a  part  of  

inheritance on the posterity.  It  is  a  nobility  in  itself  for  

which a conscientious man would never barter it with all

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the tea of China or for that matter all the pearls of the  

sea.   The  said  virtue  has  both  horizontal  and  vertical  

qualities.  When reputation is hurt, a man is half-dead.  It  

is an honour which deserves to be equally preserved by  

the  down  trodden  and  the  privileged.   The  aroma  of  

reputation is an excellence which cannot be allowed to be  

sullied with the passage of time.  The memory of nobility  

no one would like to lose; none would conceive of it being  

atrophied.  It is dear to life and on some occasions it is  

dearer  than  life.   And  that  is  why  it  has  become  an  

inseparable facet of Article 21 of the Constitution.   No one  

would like to have his reputation dented.  One would like  

to perceive it as an honour rather than popularity.  When  

a court deals with a matter that has something likely to  

affect a person’s reputation, the normative principles of  

law are to be cautiously and carefully adhered to.   The  

advertence  has  to  be  sans  emotion  and  sans  populist  

perception, and absolutely in accord with the doctrine of  

audi alteram partem before anything adverse is said.  

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2. We  have  commenced  with  aforesaid  prefatory  note  

because  the  centripodal  question  that  has  eminently  

emanated  for  consideration  in  this  appeal,  by  special  

leave, is whether the judgment and order passed by the  

learned  single  Judge  of  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  

Haryana  at  Chandigarh  in  CWP  No.  12384  of  2008  

commenting on the conduct of the appellant and further  

directing recovery of interest component awarded to the  

employee, the first respondent herein, from the present  

appellant  and  also  to  realize  the  cost  and  seek  

compensation  in  appropriate legal  forum,  including civil  

court, though the appellant was not arrayed as a party to  

the writ petition, and denial of expunction of the aforesaid  

observations and directions by the Division Bench in L.P.A.  

No.  1456 of 2009 on the foundation that the same are  

based  on  the  material  available  on  record  and,  in  any  

case,  grant of liberty to  claim compensation or interest  

could not be held to be a stricture causing prejudice to the  

appellant  who would have full  opportunity  of  defending  

himself in any proceeding which may be brought by the

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respondent for damages or recovery of interest, is legally  

defensible  or  bound to  founder  on the ground that  the  

appellant  was  not  impleaded  as  a  respondent  to  the  

proceeding.    Be  it  noted,  the  Division  Bench has  also  

opined that the observations made by the learned single  

Judge  are  not  conclusive  and  no  prejudice  has  been  

caused to  the  appellant,  the  then Chief  Minister  of  the  

State of Haryana.

3. Filtering the unnecessary details, the facts which are to be  

exposited are that  the first  respondent  was working as  

Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies in the State of  

Haryana.  On  4.2.2001  during  a  state  function  “Sarkar  

Apke  Dwar”  at  Jagadhari  constituency  the  appellant  

received  a  complaint  from  some  person  in  the  public,  

including the elected representative, about the working of  

the respondent No.1.  The appellant after considering the  

verbal  complaint  announced the  suspension of  the  first  

respondent during the press conference on the same day.  

On  06.02.2001  the  first  respondent  was  placed  under  

suspension by the letter of the Financial Commissioner &

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Secretary to Govt. of Haryana, Cooperation Department,  

Chandigarh  which  was  followed  by  charge  sheet  dated  

27.03.2002.    The first respondent filed CWP No. 16025 of  

2001 against the suspension order which was disposed of  

on  20.03.2002  with  direction  to  the  Government.   On  

28.03.2002  the  1st respondent  was  reinstated  pending  

inquiry. After issuance of charge sheet and revocation of  

the suspension order, the first respondent submitted his  

reply on 5.6.2002.  

4. As the facts would undrape, nothing happened thereafter  

and  he  stood  superannuated  on  31.01.2005  and  was  

granted provisional pension, provident fund and amount  

of Group Insurance Claim but pension as due and other  

retiral  benefits  like  gratuity,  leave  encashment,  

commutation of other leaves, etc.  were withheld due to  

pendency of  disciplinary  proceedings.   On 6.2.2007 the  

first respondent filed CWP No.  2243 of 2007 which was  

disposed of by the High Court directing the government to  

complete the enquiry within a period of six months from  

the date of receipt of copy of the order.  As the enquiry

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was  not  concluded  within  the  stipulated  time,  the  

employee preferred CWP No. 12384 of 2008.  The learned  

single Judge vide judgment and order dated 20.10.2009  

allowed the writ petition and set aside the charge-sheet  

and the punishment with further directions to release all  

the  pension  and  pensionary  benefits  due  to  the  first  

respondent within a period of one month with interest @  

10 % p.a. from the due date to the date of payment.   In  

course of judgment the learned single Judge made certain  

observations against the appellant herein.  

5. Grieved by the observations and inclusive directions made  

in the judgment the appellant preferred LPA No. 1456 of  

2009.   The  contentions  raised  by  the  appellant  in  the  

intra-court appeal that the adverse remarks were not at  

all necessary to adjudicate upon the issue involved in the  

matter, and further when he was not impleaded as a party  

to  the  writ  petition  recording  of  such  observations  was  

totally  impermissible,  as  it  fundamentally  violated  the  

principles  of  natural  justice,  were  not  accepted  by  the

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Division Bench as a consequence of which the appeal did  

not meet with success.   

6.  We have heard Mr. P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel for  

the appellant  and Mr.  Hitesh Malik,  Additional  Advocate  

General appearing for the State.  Despite service of notice  

there  is  no  appearance  on  behalf  of  the  private  

respondent, that is, respondent No. 1.

7. As  has  been  indicated  earlier,  the  appellant  was  not  a  

party to the proceeding.  It is manifest that the learned  

single  Judge  has  made  certain  disparaging  remarks  

against the appellant and, in fact, he has been also visited  

with  certain  adverse  consequences.   Submission  of  Mr.  

P.P. Rao, learned senior counsel, is that the observations  

and  the  directions  are  wholly  unsustainable  when  the  

appellant was not impleaded as a party to the proceeding  

and  further  they  are  totally  unwarranted  for  the  

adjudication of the controversy that travelled to the Court.

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8. In  State of Bihar and another  v.  P.P. Sharma, IAS  

and another1, this Court has laid down that the person  

against  whom mala  fides  or  bias  is  imputed should  be  

impleaded as a party respondent to the proceeding and  

be given an opportunity to meet the allegations.  In his  

absence no enquiry into the allegations should be made,  

for such an enquiry would tantamount to violative of the  

principles of natural justice as it amounts to condemning a  

person without affording an opportunity of hearing.

9. In  Testa Setalvad and another  v.  State of Gujarat  

and  others2 the  High  Court  had  made  certain  caustic  

observations casting serious aspersions on the appellants  

therein,  though  they  were  not  parties  before  the  High  

Court.   Verifying  the  record  that  the  appellants  therein  

were  not  parties  before  the  High  Court,  this  Court  

observed: -

“It is beyond comprehension as to how the learned  Judges in the High Court could afford to overlook  such a basic and vitally essential tenet of the “rule  of  law”,  that  no  one  should  be  condemned  

1 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 2 (2004) 10 SCC 88

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unheard, and risk themselves to be criticized for  injudicious approach and/or render their decisions  vulnerable  for  challenge  on  account  of  violating  judicial norms and ethics.”

And again: -

“Time  and  again  this  Court  has  deprecated  the  practice  of  making  observations  in  judgments,  unless the persons in respect of whom comments  and criticisms were  being made were parties  to  the  proceedings,  and  further  were  granted  an  opportunity  of  having  their  say  in  the  matter,  unmindful of the serious repercussions they may  entail on such persons.”

10. In State of W.B. and others v. Babu Chakraborthy 3 the principle was reiterated by stating that the High Court  

was not justified and correct in passing observations and  

strictures against the appellants 2 and 3 therein without  

affording an opportunity of being heard.

11. In  Dr. Dilip Kumar Deka and another  v.  State of  

Assam and another4, after referring to the authorities in  

State of Uttar Pradesh  v.  Mohammad Naim5,  Jage  

Ram  v.  Hans Raj Midha6, R.K. Lakshmanan  v.  A.K.  

3 (2004) 12 SCC 201 4 (1996) 6 SCC 234 5 AIR 1964 SC 703 6 (1972) 1 SCC 181

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Srinivasan7 and  Niranjan  Patnaik  v.  Sashibhusan  

Kar8, this Court opined thus: -

“7. We are surprised to find that in spite of the  above  catena  of  decisions  of  this  Court,  the  learned Judge did not, before making the remarks,  give any opportunity to the appellants, who were  admittedly not parties to the revision petition, to  defend themselves.  It cannot be gainsaid that the  nature  of  remarks  the  learned Judge has  made,  has  cast  a  serious  aspersion  on  the  appellants  affecting their character and reputation and may,  ultimately affect their career also.  Condemnation  of  the  appellants  without  giving  them  an  opportunity  of  being  heard  was  a  complete  negation of  the fundamental  principle  of  natural  justice.”

12. At this juncture, it may be clearly stated that singularly  

on  the  basis  of  the  aforesaid  principle  the  disparaging  

remarks and directions, which are going to be referred to  

hereinafter,  deserve to be annulled but we also think it  

seemly to advert to the facet whether the remarks were  

really  necessary  to  render  the  decision  by  the  learned  

single  Judge  and  the  finding  recorded  by  the  Division  

Bench that the observations are based on the material on  

record and they do not cause any prejudice, are legally  7 (1975) 2 SCC 466 8 (1986) 2 SCC 569

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sustainable.    As far as finding of the Division Bench is  

concerned that they are based on materials brought on  

record  is  absolutely  unjustified  in  view of  the  following  

principles laid down in Mohammad Naim (supra): -

“It  has  been  judicially  recognized  that  in  the  matter  of  making  disparaging  remarks  against  persons or authorities whose conduct comes into  consideration before courts of law in cases to be  decided  by  them,  it  is  relevant  to  consider  (a)  whether the party whose conduct is in question is  before  the  court  or  has  an  opportunity  of  explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there  is  evidence  on  record  bearing  on  that  conduct  justifying  the  remarks;  and  (c)  whether  it  is  necessary  for  the  decision  of  the  case,  as  an  integral  part  thereof,  to  animadvert  on  that  conduct.”

13. On a perusal of the order we find that two aspects are  

clear,  namely,  (i)  that the appellant was not before the  

court, and (ii) by no stretch of logic the observations and  

the directions  were required to decide the lis.   We are  

disposed to think so as we find that  the learned single  

Judge  has  opined  that  the  order  of  suspension  was  

unjustified and that is why it was revoked.  He has also  

ruled  that  there  has  been  arbitrary  exercise  of  power

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which was amenable to judicial review and, more so, when  

the  charges  were  dropped  against  the  employee.  

Commenting on the second charge-sheet dated 15.3.2004  

the  learned  single  Judge,  referring  to  the  decisions  in  

State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan9, State  

of  Punjab and others  v.  Chaman Lal  Goyal10,  The  

State  of  Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Bani  Singh  and  

another11 and P.V. Mahadevan v. M.D. T.N. Housing  

Board12, thought it appropriate to quash the same on the  

ground of delay.  The conclusion could have been arrived  

at without making series of comments on the appellant,  

who, at the relevant time, was the Chief Minister of the  

State.

14. At this juncture, we think it apt to point out some of the  

observations made against the appellant: -

“Arrogance of power by the Chief Minister seems  to be at play in this case”

xxx xxx xxx

9 (1998) 4 SCC 154 10 (1995) 2 SCC 570 11 JT 1990 (2) SC 54 12 (2005) 6 SCC 636

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“The  petitioner  is  also  justified  in  making  a  grievance  that  first  the  Chief  Minister  had  suspended him on the basis of a loose talk in the  press conference and thereafter the officials of the  Government have attempted to justify their  own  mistakes  on  the  one pretext  or  the  other.   The  petitioner would term this case to be “a proof of  worst ugly look of Indian democracy”.  He may be  an aggrieved person but his anger is justified to  refer  this  treatment  to  be  an  ugly  face  of  democracy.  Is not it dictatorial display of power in  democratic set up?  Final order is yet to be passed  regarding this charge sheet.   It  is  orally pointed  out  that  the  charge  sheet  is  finalized  on  16.9.2009.  It is done without holding any enquiry  or associating the petitioner in any manner.  How  can this be sustained in this background?”

xxx xxx xxx

“Chief Minister was bound to inform himself of the  well known maxim “be you ever so high, the law is  above you”.

xxx xxx xxx

“The  respondents,  thus,  have  made  themselves  fully responsible for this plight of the petitioner on  account of the illegalities that have been pointed  out  and  which  the  respondents  have  failed  to  justify in any cogent or reasonable manner.  They  all are to be held accountable for this.  This would  include even the then Chief Minister, who initiated  this illegal process and did not intervene to correct  the illegality ever thereafter.”

xxx xxx xxx

“The interest awardable shall  be recovered from  all  the  officers  and  including  the  Chief  Minister,

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who  were  either  responsible  for  placing  the  petitioner under suspension or in perpetuating the  illegality  and  had  unnecessarily  charged  and  harassed the petitioner.”

xxx xxx xxx

“Liberty  is,  therefore,  given  to  the  petitioner  to  seek compensation for the harassment caused to  him  by  approaching  any  appropriate  Forum,  including  Civil  Court,  where  he  can  seek  this  compensation even from the then Chief Minister.”

15. On a studied scrutiny of the judgment in entirety we  

have no hesitation in holding that the observations made  

by the learned single Judge were really not necessary as  

an integral part for the decision of the case as stated in  

Mohammad Naim’s case.   Needless  to  say,  once  the  

observations are not justified, as a natural corollary, the  

directions have to be treated as sensitively susceptible.

16. In this context, it is necessary to state about the role of  

a Judge and the judicial approach.  In  State of M.P.  v.  

Nandlal Jaiswal13,  Bhagwati,  CJ,  speaking for the court  

expressed  strong disapproval of the strictures made by  

the learned Judge in these terms: - 13 (1986) 4 SCC 566

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“We may observe in conclusion that judges should  not  use  strong  and  carping  language  while  criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses.  They  must  act  with  sobriety,  moderation  and  restraint.  They  must  have  the  humility  to  recognise  that  they  are  not  infallible  and  any  harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them  against any party may be mistaken and unjustified  and  if  so,  they  may  do  considerable  harm  and  mischief and result in injustice.”  

17. In  A.M.  Mathur  v.  Pramod  Kumar  Gupta  and  

others14 the  Court  observed  that  judicial  restraint  and  

discipline are necessary to the orderly administration of  

justice.  The duty of restraint and the humility of function  

has to be the constant theme for a Judge,  for  the said  

quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges  

to command respect as to protect the independence of  

the  judiciary.   Further  proceeding  the  two-Judge  Bench  

stated thus: -

“Judicial  restraint  in  this  regard might  better  be  called  judicial  respect,  that  is,  respect  by  the  judiciary. Respect to those who come before the  court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the  State,  the  executive  and  the  legislature.  There  must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail  or when litigants and public believe that the judge  has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good  for the judge nor for the judicial process.”

14 (1990) 2 SCC 533

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18. In  Amar Pal Singh  v.  State of Uttar Pradesh and  

another15,  it  has  been  emphasized  that  intemperate  

language should be avoided in the judgments and while  

penning  down the  same the  control  over  the  language  

should not be forgotten and a committed comprehensive  

endeavour has to be made to put the concept to practice  

so that as a conception it gets concretized and fructified.

19. It needs no special emphasis to state that a Judge is not  

to be guided by any kind of notion.  The decision making  

process  expects  a  Judge  or  an  adjudicator  to  apply  

restraint,  ostracise  perceptual  subjectivity,  make  one’s  

emotions  subservient  to  one’s  reasoning  and  think  

dispassionately.   He  is  expected  to  be  guided  by  the  

established  norms  of  judicial  process  and  decorum.   A  

judgment may have rhetorics but the said rhetoric has to  

be dressed with reason and must be in accord with the  

legal principles.  Otherwise a mere rhetoric, especially in a  

judgment, may likely to cause prejudice to a person and  

courts  are not  expected to  give  any kind  of  prejudicial  15 (2012) 6 SCC 491

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remarks against a person, especially so, when he is not a  

party before it.  In that context, the rhetoric becomes sans  

reason,  and  without  root.   It  is  likely  to  blinden  the  

thinking process.  A Judge is required to remember that  

humility  and  respect  for  temperance  and  chastity  of  

thought are at the bedrock of apposite expression.  In this  

regard,  we  may  profitably  refer  to  a  passage  from  

Frankfurter, Felix, in Clark, Tom C.,16:

“For  the  highest  exercise  of  judicial  duty  is  to  subordinate one’s personal pulls and one’s private  views to the law of which we are all guardians –  those impersonal convictions that make a society  a  civilized  community,  and  not  the  victims  of  personal rule,”

20. The said learned Judge had said: -

“What becomes decisive to a Justice’s functioning  on  the  Court  in  the  large area  within  which  his  individuality moves is his general attitude towards  law, the habits of mind that he has formed or is  capable of unforming, his capacity for detachment,  his temperament or training for putting his passion  behind his judgment instead of in front of it.17”

16 Mr. Justice Frankfurter : ‘A Heritage for all Who Love the Law,’ 51 A.B.A.J. 330, 332 (1965) 17 -FRANKFURTER, Felix, Foreword, to Memorial issue for Robert H. Jackson, 55 Columbia Law  Review (April, 1955) P. 436

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21. Thus,  a  Judge  should  abandon  his  passion.  He  must  

constantly remind himself that he has a singular master  

“duty to truth” and such truth is to be arrived at within the  

legal parameters.  No heroism, no rehtorics.

22. Another facet gaining significance and deserves to be  

adverted to,  when caustic observations are made which  

are not necessary as an integral part of adjudication and it  

affects the person’s reputation – a cherished right under  

Article 21 of the Constitution.  In Umesh Kumar v. State  

of  Andhra  Pradesh  and  another18 this  Court  has  

observed: -

“Personal rights of a human being include the right  of reputation.  A good reputation is an element of  personal  security  and  is  protected  by  the  Constitution  equally  with  the  right  to  the  enjoyment of life, liberty and property.  Therefore,  it  has  been  held  to  be  a  necessary  element  in  regard to right to life of a citizen under Article 21  of the Constitution.  The International Covenant on  Civil and Political Rights, 1966 recognises the right  to  have  opinions  and  the  right  to  freedom  of  expression under Article 19 is subject to the right  of reputation of others.”

18 (2013) 10 SCC 591

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23. In  Kiran  Bedi  v.  Committee  of  Inquiry  and  

another19 this  Court  reproduced  the  following  

observations from the decision in D.F. Marion v. Davis20:

“25.  … ‘The right to the enjoyment of a private  reputation,  unassailed by malicious  slander  is  of  ancient origin, and is necessary to human society.  A  good  reputation  is  an  element  of  personal  security,  and  is  protected  by  the  Constitution  equally  with  the  right  to  the  enjoyment  of  life,  liberty, and property.”

24.In  Vishwanath  Agrawal  v.  Sarla  Vishwanath  

Agrawal21,  although in a different context, while dealing  

with the aspect of reputation, this Court has observed that  

reputation is not only the salt of life, but also the purest  

treasure  and  the  most  precious  perfume  of  life.  It  is  

extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of the  

grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well as  

for the posterity.”

25. In  Mehmood  Nayyar  Azam  v.  State  of  

Chhattisgarh and others22 this Court has ruled that the  

reverence  of  life  is  insegregably  associated  with  the  19 (1989) 1 SCC 494 20 217 Ala 16 : 114 So 357 : 55 ALR 171 (1927) 21 (2012) 7 SCC 288 22 (2012) 8 SCC 1

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dignity  of  a  human  being  who  is  basically  divine,  not  

servile.  A  human personality  is  endowed with  potential  

infinity  and  it  blossoms  when  dignity  is  sustained.  The  

sustenance  of  such  dignity  has  to  be  the  superlative  

concern of  every sensitive soul.  The essence of  dignity  

can never be treated as a momentary spark of light or, for  

that matter, “a brief candle”, or “a hollow bubble”. The  

spark of life gets more resplendent when man is treated  

with dignity sans humiliation, for every man is expected to  

lead an honourable life which is a splendid gift of “creative  

intelligence”.  When a dent is  created in  the reputation,  

humanism is paralysed.  

26. In  Board  of  Trustees  of  the  Port  of  Bombay  v.  

Dilipkumar  Raghavendranath  Nadkarni  and  

others23,  while  dealing  with  the  value  of  reputation,  a  

two-Judge Bench expressed thus: -

“The expression ‘life’ has a much wider meaning.  Where therefore the outcome of  a  departmental  enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or  livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of  human  civilization  which  make  life  worth  living  

23 (1983) 1 SCC 124

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would be jeopardized and the same can be put in  jeopardy  only  by  law  which  inheres  fair  procedures.   In  this  context  one  can  recall  the  famous words of Chapter II of Bhagwad-Gita :

Sambhavitasya Cha Kirti Marnadati Richyate”

27. The aforesaid principle has been reiterated in State of  

Maharashtra  v.  Public  Concern  for  Governance  

Trust and others24.

28. In view of the aforesaid analysis,  we have no hesitation  

in holding that disparaging remarks, as recorded by the  

learned single Judge, are not necessary for arriving at the  

decision which he has rendered, the same being not an  

integral part and further that could not have been done  

when the appellant was not a party before the court and  

also he was never afforded an opportunity to explain his  

conduct, and the affirmation of the same by the Division  

Bench  on  the  foundation  that  it  has  not  caused  any  

prejudice  and  he  can  fully  defend  himself  when  a  

subsequent  litigation  is  instituted,  are  legally  

unacceptable.   Accordingly,  we  expunge  the  extracted  

remarks hereinbefore and also any remarks which have  24 (2007) 3 SCC 587

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been made that are likely to affect the reputation of the  

appellant. Since, the appeal is confined only to expunging  

of adverse remarks, the same is allowed.  There shall be  

no order as to costs.

……………………….J. [Anil R. Dave]

……………………….J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; January 31, 2014.