REPORTABLE    

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 1108-1115  OF 2004

O.P. Sharma & Ors.           .... Appellant(s)

Versus

High Court of Punjab & Haryana              .... Respondent(s)

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1206  OF 2004

J U D G M E N T  

P. Sathasivam, J.

1) Criminal  Appeal  Nos.  1108-1115  of  2004  are  directed  

against  the  common  judgment  and  final  order  dated  

25.08.2004 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of  

Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. O.C.P. Nos. 18 and  

25  of  1999,  Crl.  O.C.P.  Nos.  3,4,5,18,19  and  20  of  2001  

whereby the  Division Bench after  rejecting the  claim of  the  

appellants herein found all of them guilty of criminal contempt  

and convicted them under Section 12 read with Sections 15  

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and  2(c)  of  the  Contempt  of  Courts  Act,  1971  (hereinafter  

referred to as “the Act”)and sentenced them to various terms of  

simple imprisonment and fine.  Feeling aggrieved by the order  

of conviction and sentence, one Surinder Sharma has filed Crl.  

A. No. 1206 of 2004.  Since the issue in all these appeals is  

common and relate to one incident, they are being disposed of  

by the following judgment.

2)   Brief facts:

(a) The District and Sessions Judge, Faridabad, by his letter  

dated 16.09.1999, addressed to the Registrar, High Court of  

Punjab & Haryana, forwarded Letter No. 376 dated 14.09.1999  

written by Shri  Rakesh Singh,  Civil  Judge (Junior  Division-

cum-Judicial  Magistrate,  Ist  Class)  Faridabad  which  was  

addressed to him.  In the said letter, the Judicial Magistrate  

has stated that on 11.09.1999 at about 3 p.m., when he was  

dealing  with  the  remand of  accused  Soran  in  FIR  No.  136  

dated  13.06.1999,  under  Sections  393/452/506/34  of  the  

Indian  Penal  Code  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  IPC”)  

pertaining  to  Police  Station  Chhainsa,  the  Assistant  Public  

Prosecutor requested him for remanding the accused to police  

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custody.  By that time, Mr. L.N. Prashar, Advocate, one of the  

contemnors/appellants herein, who represented the accused,  

opposed  the  request  of  police  remand.   After  hearing  the  

arguments,  the  Magistrate  remanded  the  accused  to  police  

custody.   When  the  order  of  police  remand was  not  found  

favourable,  Mr.  L.N.  Prashar,  advocate  became enraged and  

started hurling abuses and derogatory remarks against him.  

Upon  hearing  the  remarks,  he  tried  to  pacify  him  and  

requested him to behave properly but he did not relent and  

again uttered unparliamentary words and also threatened him  

with dire consequences.   

(b) It was further stated that the accused Soran was being  

produced  in  four  criminal  cases  on that  very  day  and was  

being represented by Mr. Prashar in all the matters.  When he  

took another remand paper of the same accused, Mr. Prashar  

became furious and again uttered unparliamentary words and  

also threatened him.  When he kept on sitting on the dias, Mr.  

Prashar  called  his  fellow  colleagues  including  Mr.  O.P.  

Sharma, Rajinder Sharma, Surinder Sharma, Advocates,   in  

total  about  15-20  advocates,  who all  belonged  to  the  same  

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group.  Then, he requested Mr. O.P. Sharma, who is a senior  

member of the Bar, to request Mr. Prashar to behave properly  

in  the  Court.   However,  Mr.  O.P.  Sharma  sided  with  Mr.  

Prashar and along with other advocates shouted slogans and  

abused in filthy language and also threatened him.   

(c) It was further stated that advocates were very aggressive  

and wanted to assault him physically.  To avoid any further  

deterioration in the situation, he retired to his Chamber.  One  

of his staff members, namely, Shri Raj Kumar, Ahlmad, had  

informed  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Faridabad  and  the  

Judicial  Magistrate,  Ist  Class,  Faridabad about  the  incident  

and they came to his Chamber and they also overheard Mr.  

Prashar  shouting  in  the  Court.   After  sometime,  Mr.  O.P.  

Goyal, Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Faridabad came there  

and pacified the advocates.  

(d)  In  continuation  of  his  letter  dated  14.09.1999,  the  

Magistrate addressed another letter dated 24.09.1999 to the  

District Judge, Faridabad.  In the said letter, it was stated that  

Mr.  Prashar  and Mr.  O.P.  Sharma,  Advocates  had  criminal  

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record and these persons have  indulged in  pressure  tactics  

since long and highlighted all the details about them.   

(e) The entire incident was published in a local newspaper  

‘Mazdoor  Morcha’  which  necessitated  action  under  the  Act  

against  Shri  Satish  Kumar,  owner,  publisher,  printer  and  

Editor of the said newspaper.

(f) Based on the letter of the District & Sessions Judge as  

well as letter of the Judicial Magistrate, Faridabad, the High  

Court  took  the  matter  by  suo  motu and  initiated  contempt  

proceedings against the contemnors under Section 2(c) of the  

Act relating to the incident which took place on 11.09.1999 in  

the Court  of  Shri  Rakesh Singh,  Civil  Judge,  Faridabad for  

taking appropriate action.  

3) Before  the  High  Court,  the  respective  

contemnors/advocates  filed  affidavits  highlighting  the  

circumstances under which the unfortunate incident occurred  

and by filing separate affidavits they tendered unconditional  

apology and also regretted for the same.  On direction by the  

High  Court,  all  of  them  appeared  before  the  Magistrate  

concerned  and  expressed  their  regret  and  also  tendered  

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unconditional  apology.   The  Division  Bench,  taking  note  of  

seriousness of the issue and finding that the reference made  

by  the  Magistrate  is  based  upon  correct  facts  and  overall  

conduct of the contemnors found all of them guilty of criminal  

contempt within the meaning of Section 2(c)  of  the Act and  

imposed  simple  imprisonment  of  six  months/three  months  

with  a  fine  of  Rs.1,000-2,000/-  each.   As  stated  earlier,  

challenging  the  said  conviction  and  sentence,  the  above  

appeals have been filed.   

4) Heard  Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani  and  Mr.  V.  Giri,  learned  

senior  counsel  for  the  appellants  and  Mr.  S.  Chandra  

Shekhar, learned counsel for the respondent.  

Submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani

5) At  the  outset,  Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani,  learned  senior  

counsel for the appellants submitted that in view of the fact  

that  the  appellants  herein,  after  realizing  their  mistake  

immediately, offered unconditional apology by filing affidavits  

before the High Court and also appeared before the Magistrate  

before whom the unfortunate incident had occurred, tendered  

apology and regret  for  their  action,  prayed for  leniency and  

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setting  aside  the  order  of  the  High  Court  sentencing  the  

contemnors to jail.  He also submitted that inasmuch as the  

alleged incident had occurred in September, 1999, considering  

the  passage  of  time  and  by  realizing  the  mistake  tendered  

unconditional apology before the High Court as well as before  

the concerned Magistrate, their sentence of imprisonment may  

be  set  aside.   He  further  submitted  that  all  the  

appellants/contemnors  prepared  to  file  fresh  affidavits  

conveying  their  unconditional  apology  and  regret  for  the  

incident and also assured that they would not indulge in such  

activities in future.   

Controversial behaviour of the Contemnors

6) Before considering the acceptability of the affidavits filed  

by  the  appellants,  in  order  to  visualize  seriousness  of  the  

matter,  it  is  useful  to  refer  the  exchange  of  words  and  

behaviour  of  the  appellants  (in  English  version)  while  the  

Magistrate  remanded  the  accused  Soran  to  police  custody.  

They are:

“You have taken bribe.  You do all works only after taking  bribe.  You are indulging in gangism.”

“What can you do to me.  You may make contempt against  me.  I will  suck your blood.  I  will  not leave you till  High  

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Court.  Bahanchod, you are considering this Court as inn.  Come out, we will just now teach you a taste of Judgeship.  My name is L.N. Prashar.  You will come to know today as to  how  you  pass  orders  against  me.   Even  earlier,  criminal  cases are pending against me.  If  one more case proceeds  against me, it would make no difference.  It would cause you  very clearly to have an enmity with me and now I will see to  it that I suck your blood.  If you have any courage, you come  out.”

7) When the Magistrate took up another remand paper of  

the  same  accused,  Mr.  Prashar,  again  became  furious  and  

uttered that:

“You dismiss this bail application.  I have no faith in your  Court. I am not going to furnish any bail bonds.  There is no  need for us to have any bail from your Court.”

8) At that stage, the Magistrate asked his Reader to call the  

Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Faridabad  so  that  the  situation  

could  be  brought  under  control.   On  this,  Mr.  Prashar  

remarked:

“What can your CJM do.  You may call him as well.  We will  see your CJM also.  You are indulging in big gangism.”

9) Thereafter,  the  Magistrate  requested  Mr.  O.P.  Sharma,  

Advocate, who is a senior member of the Bar, to request Mr.  

Prashar to behave properly in the Court.  However, Mr. O.P.  

Sharma, Advocate, sided with Mr. Prashar and shouted.  

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“We will do like this only.  Lock his Court and raise slogans  against him…. On the asking of Shri O.P. Sharma, Advocate,  other Advocates accompanying him raised slogans, “RAKESH  SINGH MURDABAD, RAKESH SINGH MURDABAD….. …..  He was also threatened by saying you come out.  We will  see your gangism.”  

10) When all the officers were sitting in the chamber of the  

Magistrate, they over-heard Mr. Prashar shouting in the Court  

in loud voice saying,

“You are indulging in gangism.  You are passing orders of  your choice.  The contempt can not harm me.  I will see to it  as to how you remain in service.”

Professional Conduct and Etiquette – Rules and decisions  

of this Court

11) In the light of the above scenario, before considering the  

fresh  affidavits  filed  before  this  Court  by  the  appellants-

Advocates,  let  us  recapitulate  various  earlier  orders  of  this  

Court as to the duties of lawyer towards the Court and the  

Society being a member of the legal profession.   

12) The  role  and  status  of  lawyers  at  the  beginning  of  

Sovereign  and  Democratic  India  is  accounted  as  extremely  

vital  in deciding that  the Nation’s  administration was to be  

governed  by  the  Rule  of  Law.  They  were  considered  

intellectuals  amongst  the  elites  of  the  country  and  social  

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activists amongst the downtrodden. These include the names  

of  galaxy  of  lawyers  like  Mahatma  Gandhi,  Motilal  Nehru,  

Jawaharlal Nehru, Bhulabhai Desai, C. Rajagopalachari,  Dr.  

Rajendra Prasad and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, to name a few. The  

role  of  lawyers in the  framing of  the  Constitution needs no  

special mention. In a profession with such a vivid history  

it  is  regretful,  to  say  the  least,  to  witness  instances  of  the  

nature  of  the  present  kind.  Lawyers  are  the  officers  of  the  

Court in the administration of justice.

13) Section  I  of  Chapter-II,  Part  VI  titled  “Standards  of  

Professional Conduct and Etiquette” of the Bar Council of India  

Rules specifies the duties of an advocate towards the Court  

which reads as under:

“Section I - Duty to the Court

1. An advocate shall, during the presentation of his case and  while  otherwise  acting before  a court,  conduct himself  with  dignity and self-respect. He shall not be servile and whenever  there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judicial  officer, it shall be his right and duty to submit his grievance to  proper authorities.

2. An advocate shall maintain towards the courts a respectful  attitude, bearing in mind that the dignity of the judicial office  is essential for the survival of a free community.

3. An advocate shall not influence the decision of a court by  any illegal or improper means. Private communications with a  judge relating to a pending case are forbidden.

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4. An  advocate  shall  use  his  best  efforts  to  restrain  and  prevent his client from resorting to sharp or unfair practices  or  from  doing  anything  in  relation  to  the  court,  opposing  counsel or parties which the advocates himself ought not to  do.  An  advocate  shall  refuse  to  represent  the  client  who  persists  in  such  improper  conduct.  He  shall  not  consider  himself a mere mouth-piece of the client, and shall exercise  his  own  judgement  in  the  use  of  restrained  language  in  correspondence, avoiding scurrilous attacks in pleadings, and  using intemperate language during arguments in court.

5. An advocate shall appear in court at all times only in the  prescribed  dress,  and  his  appearance  shall  always  be  presentable.

6. An  advocate  shall  not  enter  appearance,  act,  plead  or  practise  in  any  way  before  a  court,  Tribunal  or  Authority  mentioned in Section 30 of the Act, if the sole or any member  thereof is related to the advocate as father, grandfather, son,  grand-son,  uncle,  brother,  nephew,  first  cousin,  husband,  wife,  mother,  daughter,  sister,  aunt,  niece,  father-in-law,  mother-in-law, son-in-law, brother-in-law daughter-in-law or  sister-in-law.

For the purposes of this rule, Court shall mean a Court,  Bench or Tribunal in which above mentioned relation of the  Advocate is a Judge, Member or the Presiding Officer.

7. An advocate shall not wear bands or gown in public places  other than in courts except on such ceremonial occasions and  at such places as the Bar Council of India or the court may  prescribe.

8. An  advocate  shall  not  appear  in  or  before  any  court  or  tribunal or any other authority for or against an organisation  or an institution, society or corporation, if he is a member of  the Executive Committee of such organisation or institution or  society or corporation.  “Executive Committee ”,  by whatever  name it may be called, shall include any Committee or body of  persons which, for the time being, is vested with the general  management of the affairs of the organisation or institution,  society or corporation.

Provided that this rule shall not apply to such a member  appearing as “amicus curiae” or without a fee on behalf of a  Bar Council, Incorporated Law Society or a Bar Association.

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9. An Advocate should not act or plead in any matter in which  he is himself peculiarly interested.

Illustration  

I. He should not act in a bankruptcy petition when he himself  is also a creditor of the bankrupt.

II. He should not accept a brief from a company of which he is  Director.

10.  An advocate shall  not  stand as a surety,  or  certify  the  soundness of a surety for his client required for the purpose of  any legal proceedings.”

14) In  the  case  of  Daroga  Singh  and  Others vs.  B.K.  

Pandey,  (2004)  5  SCC  26,   one  Additional  District  and  

Sessions Judge was attacked in a pre-planned and calculated  

manner in his courtroom and chamber by police officials for  

not passing an order they sought. This Court held that,  

“The Courts cannot be compelled to give "command orders".  The act committed amounts to deliberate interference with  the  discharge  of  duty  of  a  judicial  officer  by  intimidation  apart from scandalizing and lowering the dignity of the Court  and interference with the administration of justice. The effect  of  such an act  is  not  confined to  a particular  court  or  a  district, or the State, it has the tendency to effect the entire  judiciary  in  the  country.  It  is  a  dangerous  trend.  Such a  trend has to be curbed. If for passing judicial orders to the  annoyance of the police the presiding officers of the Courts  are to be assaulted and humiliated the judicial system in the  country would collapse.”  

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15) In  R.D. Saxena vs.  Balram Prasad Sharma, (2000) 7  

SCC 264, this Court held as under:

“In our country, admittedly, a social duty is cast upon the  legal  profession  to  show the  people  beckon  (sic beacon)  light by their conduct and actions. The poor, uneducated  and exploited mass of the people need a helping hand from  the legal profession, admittedly,  acknowledged as a most  respectable profession. No effort should be made or allowed  to be made by which a litigant could be deprived of  his  rights, statutory as well as constitutional, by an advocate  only on account of the exalted position conferred upon him  under the judicial system prevalent in the country……..”

16) In Mahabir Prasad Singh vs. Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd.,  

(1999) 1 SCC 37, this Court held that it is the solemn duty of  

every  Court  to  proceed  with  judicial  function  during  Court  

hours and no Court should yield to pressure tactics or boycott  

calls or any kind of browbeating.  The Bench as well as the  

Bar has to avoid unwarranted situations or trivial issues that  

hamper the cause of justice and are in the interest of none.

17) In the case of  Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, In Re: ,  

(1998)  7  SCC  248, the  advocate  was  charged  of  criminal  

contempt of  Court  for  the use of  intemperate  language and  

casting  unwarranted  aspersions  on  various  judicial  officers  

and  attributing  motives  to  them  while  discharging  their  

judicial functions. This Court held as under:

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“The  subordinate  judiciary  forms  the  very  backbone  of  administration  of  justice.  This  Court  would  come  down a  heavy  hand  for  preventing  the  judges  of  the  subordinate  judiciary  or  the  High  Court  from  being  subjected  to  scurrilous and indecent attacks,  which scandalise or have  the tendency to scandalise, or lower or have the tendency to  lower  the  authority  of  any  court  as  also  all  such actions  which interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of  any judicial proceedings or obstruct or tend to obstruct the  administration of justice in any other manner. No affront to  the majesty of law can be permitted. The fountain of justice  cannot be allowed to be polluted by disgruntled litigants. The  protection  is  necessary  for  the  courts  to  enable  them  to  discharge their judicial functions without fear.”  

18) In  Chetak Construction Ltd. vs.  Om Prakash & Ors.,  

(1998)  4  SCC  577,  this  Court  deprecated  the  practice  of  

making allegations against the Judges and observed as under:

“Indeed, no lawyer or litigant can be permitted to browbeat  the court or malign the presiding officer with a view to get a  favourable order. Judges shall not be able to perform their  duties freely and fairly if such activities were permitted and  in  the  result  administration  of  justice  would  become  a  casualty and rule of law would receive a setback. The Judges  are obliged to decide cases impartially and without any fear  or  favour.  Lawyers  and  litigants  cannot  be  allowed  to  “terrorize”  or  “intimidate”  Judges  with  a  view  to  “secure”  orders which they want. This is basic and fundamental and  no civilised system of administration of  justice can permit  it……..”

Similar  view has  been reiterated  in  Radha Mohan Lal vs.  

Rajasthan High Court, (2003) 3 SCC 427.

19) Advocacy  touches  and  asserts  the  primary  value  of  

freedom of  expression.  It  is  a  practical  manifestation of  the  

principle  of  freedom  of  speech.  Freedom  of  expression  in  

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arguments  encourages  the  development  of  judicial  dignity,  

forensic skills of advocacy and enables protection of fraternity,  

equality and justice. It plays its part in helping to secure the  

protection  or  other  fundamental  human  rights,  freedom  of  

expression,  therefore,  is  one of  the  basic  conditions  for  the  

progress of advocacy and for  the development of  every man  

including  legal  fraternity  practising  the  profession  of  law.  

Freedom of expression, therefore, is vital to the maintenance of  

free society.  It is essential to the rule of law and liberty of the  

citizens.  The  advocate  or  the  party  appearing  in  person,  

therefore, is given liberty of expression. But they equally owe  

countervailing duty to maintain dignity, decorum and order in  

the  court  proceedings  or  judicial  processes.  Any  adverse  

opinion  about  the  judiciary  should  only  be  expressed  in  a  

detached manner and respectful language. The liberty of free  

expression is not to be confounded or confused with licence to  

make  unfounded  allegations  against  any  institution,  much  

less the judiciary [vide  D.C. Saxena  vs.  The Hon’ble Chief  

Justice of India, (1996) 5 SCC 216].

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20) In  the  matter  of  In  re:  Vinay  Chandra  Mishra  (the  

alleged contemner), (1995) 2 SCC 534, the contemner who  

was a senior advocate, President of the Bar and Chairman of  

the Bar Council of India, on being questioned by the Judge  

started to shout and said that no question could have been  

put  to  him  and  that  he  will  get  the  High  Court  Judge  

transferred  or  see  that  impeachment  motion  is  brought  

against him in Parliament. This Court while sentencing him to  

simple  imprisonment  for  six  weeks  suspended  him  from  

practising as an advocate for a period of three years and laid  

down as follows:  

“The contemner has obviously misunderstood his  function  both as a lawyer representing the interests of his client and  as an officer of the court. Indeed, he has not tried to defend  the said acts in either of his capacities. On the other hand,  he has tried to deny them. Hence, much need not be said on  this  subject  to  remind  him  of  his  duties  in  both  the  capacities.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  observe  that  by  indulging  in  the  said  acts,  he  has  positively  abused  his  position both as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, and  has done distinct disservice to the litigants in general and to  the  profession of  law and the  administration of  justice  in  particular.”

21) In  the  case  of  Supreme  Court  Bar  Association vs.  

Union of India & Anr.,  (1998)  4 SCC 409,  a Constitution  

Bench of this Court overruled In re: Vinay Chandra Mishra  

(the alleged contemner) and held as under:

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“The  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  to  punish  for  contempt of court, though quite wide, is yet limited and  cannot be expanded to include the power to determine  whether  an  advocate  is  also  guilty  of  "Professional  misconduct" in a summary manner which can only be  done under the procedure prescribed in the Advocates  Act. The power to do complete justice under Article 142  is in a way, corrective power, which gives preference to  equity over law but  it  cannot be used to deprive a  professional lawyer of the due process contained in  the Advocates Act 1961 by suspending his licence  to  practice  in  a  summary manner,  while  dealing  with a case of contempt of court.”

It also opined that:-  

"An Advocate who is found guilty of contempt of court  may also, as already noticed, be guilty of professional  misconduct in a given case but it is for the Bar Council  of  the  State  or  Bar  Council  of  India  to  punish  that  Advocate  by  either  debarring  him  from  practice  or  suspending  his  licence,  as  may  be  warranted,  in  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  each  case.  The  learned  Solicitor  General  informed  us  that  there  have  been  cases where the Bar Council of India taking note of the  contumacious  and  objectionable  conduct  of  an  advocate, had initiated disciplinary proceedings against  him  and  even  punished  him  for  "professional  misconduct",  on  the  basis  of  his  having  been  found  guilty  of  committing  contempt  of  court.  We  do  not  entertain any doubt that the Bar Council of the State or  Bar Council of India, as the case may be, when apprised  of the established contumacious conduct of an advocate  by the High Court or by this Court, would rise to the  occasion, and taken appropriate action against such an  advocate.  Under  Article  144  of  the  Constitution  "all  authorities,  civil  and judicial,  in the territory of  India  shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. The Bar Council  which performs a public duty and is charged with the  obligation to protect the dignity of  the profession and  maintain  professional  standards  and  etiquette  is  also  obliged to act "in aid of the Supreme Court ". It must,  whenever,  facts  warrant  rise  to  the  occasion  and  

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discharge its duties uninfluenced by the position of the  contemner advocate. It must act in accordance with the  prescribed procedure, whenever its attention is drawn  by  this  Court  to  the  contumacious  and  unbecoming  conduct  of  an  advocate  which  has  the  tendency  to  interfere with due administration of justice....."  

The Bench went on to say :-  

"………There is no justification to assume that the Bar  Council is would not rise to the occasion, as they are  equally responsible to uphold the dignity of the courts  and the majesty of law and prevent any interference in  the administration of  justice.  Learned counsel  for  the  parties present before us do not dispute and rightly so  that  whenever  a  court  of  record,  records  its  findings  about  the  conduct  of  an  Advocate  while  finding  him  guilty of committing contempt of court and desires or  refers the matter to be considered by the concerned Bar  Council,  appropriate action should be initiated by the  concerned Bar Council  in accordance with law with a  view to maintain the dignity of the courts and to uphold  the  majesty  of  law  and  professional  standards  and  etiquette.”

22) In M.B. & Sanghi, Advocate vs. High Court of Punjab  

& Haryana, (1991) 3 SCC 600,  this Court took notice of the  

growing tendency amongst some of the Advocates of adopting  

a  defiant  attitude  and  casting  aspersions  having  failed  to  

persuade the Court to grant an order in the terms they expect.  

Holding the Advocates guilty of contempt, this Court observed  

as under:  

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"The  tendency  of  maligning  the  reputation  of  Judicial  Officers  by  disgruntled  elements  who  fail  to  secure  the  desired order is ever on the increase and it is high time it is  nipped fat the bud. And, when a member of the profession  resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to browbeating  the Judge into submission, it is all the more painful. When  there  is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  scandalise  which  would  shake the confidence of the litigating public in the system  the  damage  caused  is  not  only  to  the  reputation  of  the  concerned Judge but also to the fair name of the judiciary,  Veiled  threats,  abrasive  behavior,  use  of  disrespectful  language and at times blatant condemnatory attacks like the  present  one  are  often designedly employed with a  view to  taming a judge into submission to secure a desired order.  Such cases raise larger issues touching the independence of  not only the concerned Judge but the entire institution. The  foundation  of  our  system  which  is  based  on  the  independence and impartiality of those who man it will be  shaken  if  disparaging  and  derogatory  remarks  are  made  against  the Presiding Judicial  Officers with impunity.  It  is  high time that we realise that the much cherished judicial  independence  has  to  be  protected  not  only  from  the  executive or the legislature but also from those who are an  integral part of the system."

23) In the case of L.D. Jaikwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh,  

(1984) 3 SCC 405, it was held by this Court that acceptance of  

an  apology  from  a  contemnor  should  only  be  a  matter  of  

exception and not that of a rule and expressed its opinion as  

under:  

"6. We do not think that merely because the appellant has  tendered his apology we should set aside the sentence and  allow him to go unpunished.  Otherwise,  all  that  a person  wanting  to  intimidate  a  Judge  by  making  the  grossest  imputations against him to do, is to go ahead and scandalize  him, and later on tender a formal empty apology which costs  him  practically  nothing.  If  such  an  apology  were  to  be  accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception, we would in  fact be virtually issuing a 'licence' to scandalize courts and  commit contempt of court with impunity.  It  will  be rather  

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difficult to persuade members of the Bar, who care for their  self-respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay  such a  price  for  it.  And no sitting  Judge  will  feel  free  to  decide any matter as per the of his conscience on account of  the fear of being scandalized and prosecuted by an advocate  who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge  goes  against  his  wishes.  If  this  situation  were  to  be  countenanced,  advocates  who  can  cow  down  the  Judges,  and make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of  character assassination and persecution, will be preferred by  the litigants to the advocates who are mindful of professional  ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of courts.  

7. We  have  yet  to  come  across  a  Judge  who  can  take  a  decision which does not displease one side or the other. By  the very nature of his work he has to decide matters against  one  or  other  of  the  parties.  If  the  fact  that  he  renders  a  decision which is resented to by a litigant or his lawyer were  to expose him to such risk, it will sound the death knell of  the institution. A line has therefore to be drawn somewhere,  some day, by someone. That is why the Court is impelled to  act  (rather  than  merely  sermonize),  much  as  the  Court  dislikes imposing punishment whilst exercising the contempt  jurisdiction,  which  no  doubt  has  to  be  exercised  very  sparingly and with circumspection. We do not think that we  can adopt an attitude of unmerited leniency at the cost of  principle  and at  the  expense  of  the  Judge  who  has  been  scandalized. We are fully aware that it is not very difficult to  show magnanimity when someone else is the victim rather  than when oneself is the victim. To pursue a populist line of  showing indulgence is not very difficult — in fact it is more  difficult  to  resist  the  temptation  to  do  so  rather  than  to  adhere  to  the  nail-studded  path  of  duty.  Institutional  perspective demands that considerations of populism are not  allowed to obstruct the path of duty. We, therefore, cannot  take a lenient or indulgent view of this matter. We dread the  day when a Judge cannot work with independence by reason  of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly  humiliate him and heap disgrace on him with impunity, if  any  of  his  orders,  or  the  decision  rendered  by  him,  displeases any of the advocates, appearing in the matter.

24) In  the  case  of  R.K.  Garg  Advocate  v.  State  of  

Himachal Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 166, where a lawyer hurled  

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a shoe on the judicial officer which hit him on the shoulder,  

this Court opined that there is no doubt that the Bar and the  

Bench  are  an  integral  part  of  the  same  mechanism  which  

administers justice to the people. Many members of the Bench  

are drawn from the Bar and their past association is a source  

of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to be a matter of  

equal pride to the Bar. It is unquestionably true that courtesy  

breeds  courtesy  and just  as  charity  has  to  begin  at  home,  

courtesy must begin with the Judge. A discourteous Judge is  

like an ill-tuned instrument in the setting of a courtroom. But  

members  of  the  Bar  will  do  well  to  remember  that  such  

flagrant violations of professional ethics and cultured conduct  

will only result in the ultimate destruction of a system without  

which no democracy can survive.

25) In  Lalit Mohan Das vs.  Advocate General, Orissa &  

Another, AIR 1957 SC 250, this Court observed as under:  

"A member of the Bar undoubtedly owes a duty to his client  and  must  place  before  the  Court  all  that  can  fairly  and  reasonably be submitted on behalf of his client. He may even  submit that a particular order is not correct and may ask for  a review of that order. At the same time, a member of the  Bar is an officer of the Court and owes a duty to the Court in  which  he  is  appearing.  He  must  uphold  the  dignity  and  decorum of the Court and must not do anything to bring the  Court itself into disrepute. The appellant before us grossly  

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overstepped  the  limits  of  propriety  when  he  made  imputations of partiality and unfairness against the Munsif  in  open Court.  In  suggesting  that  the  Munsif  followed no  principle in his orders, the appellant was adding insult  to  injury, because the Munsif had merely upheld an order of  his predecessor on the preliminary point of jurisdiction and  Court fees, which order had been upheld by the High Court  in revision. Scandalizing the Court in such manner is really  polluting  the  very  fount  of  justice;  such  conduct  as  the  appellant  indulged  in  was  not  a  matter  between  an  individual member of the Bar and a member of the judicial  service; if brought into disrepute the whole administration of  justice.”

26) A lawyer cannot be a mere mouthpiece of his client and  

cannot  associate  himself  with  his  client  in  maligning  the  

reputation of judicial officer merely because his client failed to  

secure the desired order from the said officer.   A deliberate  

attempt  to  scandalize  the  Court  which  would  shake  the  

confidence  of  the  litigating  public  in  the  system and would  

cause  a  very  serious  damage  to  the  name of  the  judiciary.  

[vide  M.Y.  Shareef  &  Anr. Vs.  Hon’ble  Judges  of  Nagpur  

High Court & Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 757; Shamsher Singh Bedi  

vs.  High Court of Punjab & Haryana, (1996) 7 SCC 99 and  

M.B. Sanghi, Advocate vs. High Court of Punjab & Haryana  

& Ors. (supra)].

27) Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel, strenuously  

pleaded  to  accept  the  solemn  statements  made  by  all  the  

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appellants-Advocates  in  the  form  of  affidavits  dated  

28.04.2011.  Now, we are reproducing the affidavit filed before  

us by Mr. O.P. Sharma (appellant No.1 herein):

    “IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1108-1115 OF 2004

In the matter of  O.P. Sharma & Ors.         ………..Petitioners Versus High Court of Punjab & Haryana          ……..Respondent

         AFFIDAVIT

I, O.P. Sharma, S/o Late Shri M.R. Sharma aged about 61  years  R/o  252  Sector-9,  Faridabad,  Haryana  presently  at  New Delhi do hereby solemnly affirm and state as under:-

1.  That  the  Deponent  is  one  of  the  appellants  in  the  abovementioned Appeals.

2. That the deponent has the highest and abiding faith in the  institution of Judiciary and can not imagine saying or doing  any thing which would undermine the dignity and prestige of  the institution.

3. That the deponent hereby tenders unconditional apology  before this Hon’ble Court for the incident which took place in  the  Courts  at  Faridabad  out  of  which  this  contempt  proceedings arise and further undertake to maintain a good  behaviour in future.

4. That at the first available opportunity the unconditional  apology  and  undertaking  for  maintaining  good  behaviour  was filed before the Ld. Magistrate.

     Sd/-    Deponent

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VERIFICATION

I  the  abovenamed  deponent  do  hereby  verify  that  the  contents  of  the  above affidavit  are  true  to the  best  of  my  knowledge.

Verified at New Delhi on this 28th Day of April, 2011.

     Sd/-   Deponent”

Similar  affidavits  have  been  filed  by  other  appellants  

reiterating what they had stated before the High Court and the  

Magistrate concerned tendering unconditional apology for the  

incident which took place in the Court  at Faridabad.   They  

also  assured  this  Court  that  they  would  maintain  good  

behaviour in future.  Though sub-Section 1 of Section 12 of  

the Act enables the court to award simple imprisonment for a  

term which may extend to six months, proviso empowers the  

court that accused may be discharged or punishment awarded  

may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of  

the court.  In fact, Explanation to this Section makes it clear  

that an apology shall  not be rejected merely on the ground  

that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona  

fide.

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28) Considering  the  plea  made  by  Mr.  Ram  Jethmalani,  

learned senior  counsel  and President of  the Supreme Court  

Bar Association, in tendering unconditional apology, recorded  

even at the initial stage before the High Court and before the  

Magistrate,  Faridabad  before  whom  the  unwanted  incident  

had occurred and the present affidavits filed before us once  

again  expressing  unconditional  apology  and  regret  with  an  

undertaking  that  they  would  maintain  good  behaviour  in  

future  and  in  view  of  the  language  used  in  ‘proviso’  and  

‘explanation’ appended to Section 12(1) of the Act, we accept  

the affidavits filed by all the Appellants.   

29)  Shri Satish Kumar, owner, publisher, printer and Editor  

of  ‘Majdur Morcha’  newspaper has also filed affidavit  before  

this Court similar to one by the other appellants.  Considering  

the fact that the newspaper has merely published what had  

happened in the Court, we are of the view that it would be just  

and fair to apply the same relief to him also.  We reiterate that  

acceptance of an apology from a contemnor should only be a  

matter of exception and not that of a rule.   

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30) A Court, be that of a Magistrate or the Supreme Court is  

sacrosanct.  The integrity and sanctity of an institution which  

has  bestowed  upon  itself  the  responsibility  of  dispensing  

justice is ought to be maintained.  All the functionaries, be it  

advocates,  judges  and  the  rest  of  the  staff  ought  to  act  in  

accordance with morals and ethics.   

Advocates Role and Ethical Standards:  

31) An advocate’s duty is as important as that of a Judge.  

Advocates have a large responsibility towards the society.  A  

client’s  relationship  with  his/her  advocate  is  underlined  by  

utmost  trust.   An  advocate  is  expected  to  act  with  utmost  

sincerity  and  respect.   In  all  professional  functions,  an  

advocate should be diligent and his conduct should also be  

diligent and should conform to the requirements of the law by  

which  an  advocate  plays  a  vital  role  in  the  preservation  of  

society and justice system.  An advocate is under an obligation  

to uphold the rule of law and ensure that the public justice  

system  is  enabled  to  function  at  its  full  potential.   Any  

violation of the principles of professional ethics by an advocate  

is  unfortunate  and  unacceptable.  Ignoring  even  a  minor  

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violation/misconduct  militates  against  the  fundamental  

foundation of the public justice system.  An advocate should  

be dignified in his dealings to the Court, to his fellow lawyers  

and to the litigants.  He should have integrity in abundance  

and should never do anything that erodes his credibility. An  

advocate has a duty to enlighten and encourage the juniors in  

the profession.  An ideal advocate should believe that the legal  

profession has an element of service also and associates with  

legal service activities. Most importantly, he should faithfully  

abide by the standards of professional conduct and etiquette  

prescribed by the Bar Council of India in Chapter II, Part VI of  

the Bar Council of India Rules.   

32) As  a  rule,  an  Advocate  being  a  member  of  the  legal  

profession has a social duty to show the people a beacon of  

light by his conduct and actions rather than being adamant on  

an unwarranted and uncalled for issue.

33) We hope and trust that the entire legal fraternity would  

set an example for other professionals by adhering to all the  

above-mentioned principles.  

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34) In the light of the above discussion and reasons which we  

have noted in the  earlier  paras and as an exception to  the  

general rule, we accept the unconditional apology tendered in  

the form of affidavits in terms of proviso to Section 12(1) of the  

Act and discharge all the appellants.      

35) All the appeals are disposed of on the above terms.

   ...…………….…………………………J.  

         (P. SATHASIVAM)  

 ...…....…………………………………J.    (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

NEW DELHI; MAY 9, 2011.

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