REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.7470 OF 2009

North East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation        ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Smt. Sujatha            …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the final

judgment and order dated  29.11.2006  passed  by

the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in M.F.A.

No.4170 of 2002 whereby the High Court dismissed

the appellant’s appeal and confirmed the order

dated 23.04.2002 passed by the Commissioner for

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Workmen’s  Compensation (Labour  Court), Bellary

(hereinafter referred to as “the Commissioner”).  

2. The issue involved in this appeal lies in a

narrow compass. It is clear from the facts

mentioned hereinbelow.

3. One Mallikarjuna was an employee of the

appellant­a State  Road  Transport  Corporation for

the State of Karnataka working as a driver. He died

while he was on duty on 06.04.1999 when he felt

pain in his chest and suffered heart attack.

4. The respondent is the wife of deceased

Mallikarjuna. The respondent filed a claim petition

before the Commissioner under the Workmen’s

Compensation Act, 1923 (for short “the Act”)

claiming compensation for the death of her husband

Mallikarjuna. The appellant (employer) contested

the claim petition.  

5. By order dated 23.04.2002, the Commissioner

allowed the claim petition and awarded a sum of

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Rs.3,79,120/­ with a direction to the appellant to

deposit the awarded sum within 45 days, failing

which, the awarded amount would carry interest at

the rate of 12% per annum.

6. The employer (appellant herein) felt aggrieved

and filed appeal in the High Court of Karnataka at

Bangalore. By impugned order, the High Court

dismissed the appeal, which has given rise to filing

of this special leave to appeal by the employer  in

this Court.

7. So the question, which arises for consideration

in this appeal is whether the High Court was

justified in dismissing the employer’s appeal and

thereby was justified in upholding the order of the

Commissioner.

8. None appeared for both the parties. We,

therefore, perused the record of the case. On

perusal of the record, we are inclined to modify the

order of the Commissioner dated 23.04.2002 in

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favour of the respondent to the extent indicated

infra.  

9. At the outset,  we may take note  of the  fact,

being  a settled  principle, that the  question  as to

whether the employee met with an accident,

whether the accident occurred during the course of

employment, whether it arose out of an

employment, how and in what manner the accident

occurred, who was negligent in causing the

accident, whether there existed any relationship of

employee and employer, what was the age and

monthly salary of the employee, how many are the

dependents of the deceased employee, the extent of

disability caused to the employee  due to injuries

suffered in an accident, whether there was any

insurance coverage obtained by the employer to

cover the incident etc. are some of the  material

issues which arise for the just decision of the

Commissioner in a claim petition when an employee

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suffers any bodily injury or dies during the course of

his employment and he/his LRs sue/s his employer

to claim compensation under the Act.

10.  The afore­mentioned questions are essentially

the questions of fact and, therefore, they are

required to be proved with the aid of evidence. Once

they  are  proved either  way, the findings  recorded

thereon are regarded as the findings of fact.  

11. The appeal provided under Section 30 of the

Act to the High Court against the order of the

Commissioner lie only against the specific orders set

out in clause (a) to (e) of Section 30 of the Act with a

further rider contained in first proviso to the Section

that the appeal must involve substantial question of

law.  

12. In other words, the appeal provided under

Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the

order of the Commissioner is not like a Regular First

Appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil

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Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts

and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High

Court to decide the appeal is confined only to

examine the substantial questions of law arising in

the case.

13. When an employer files the appeal, he is

under a legal obligation to deposit the entire

awarded sum in terms of second proviso to Section

30 of the Act as a pre­condition to file the appeal in

the  High  Court except  where the appeal is filed

against the order falling in clause (b).

14. It is only when the employer deposits the

entire awarded money along with the memo of

appeal duly certified by the Commissioner, his

appeal is regarded as being properly filed in

conformity with the requirement of Section 30 of the

Act.

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15. Such appeal is then heard on the question of

admission with a view to find out as to whether it

involves any substantial question of law or not.

Whether the appeal involves a substantial question

of law or not depends upon the facts of each case

and needs an examination by the High Court.  If the

substantial question of  law arises, the High Court

would admit the appeal for final hearing on merit

else would dismiss in limini with reasons that it does

not involve any substantial question/s of law.

16. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find

that the appeal before the High Court did not

involve any substantial question of law on the

material questions set out above. In other words, in

our view, the Commissioner decided all the material

questions arising in the case properly on the basis

of evidence adduced by the parties and rightly

determined the compensation payable to the

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respondent. It was, therefore, rightly affirmed by the

High Court on facts.  

17. In this view of the matter, the findings being

concurrent findings of fact of the two courts below

are binding on this Court. Even otherwise, we find

no good ground to call for any interference on any of

the factual findings. None of the factual findings are

found to be either perverse or arbitrary or based on

no evidence or against any provision of law.  We

accordingly uphold these findings.

18. This takes  us to examine the  next question

which  was  wrongly  decided  by the  Commissioner

and  the  High Court  also  did  not  notice the  error

committed by the Commissioner.

19. The question relates to grant of interest on the

awarded amount and further, from which date, it is

to be awarded to the claimant (respondent).

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20. The grant of  interest on the awarded sum is

governed by Section 4­A of the Act. The question as

to when does the payment of compensation under

the Act “becomes due” and consequently what is the

point of time from which interest on such amount is

payable as provided under Section 4­A (3) of the Act

remains no more  res integra  and is settled by the

two decisions of this Court.

21. As early as in 1975, a four Judge Bench of this

Court in  Pratap  Narain  Singh  Deo  Vs.  Srinivas

Sabata & Anr.  (1976) 1 SCC 289: AIR 1976SC 222

speaking through Singhal, J. has held that an

employer becomes liable to pay compensation as

soon as the personal injury is caused to the

workman in the accident which arose out of and in

the course of employment. It was accordingly held

that it is the date of the accident and not the date of

adjudication of the claim, which is material.

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22. Another question analogues to the main

question arose before the Three Judge Bench of this

Court in the case of Kerala State Electricity Board

& Anr. Vs. Valsala K. & Anr. (1999) 8SCC 254: AIR

1999SC 3502 as  to  whether increased amount of

compensation and enhanced rate of interest

brought on statute by amending Act 30/1995 with

effect from 15.09.1995 would also apply to cases in

which the  accident took  place  before  15.09.1995.

Their lordships, placing reliance on the law laid

down in  Pratap  Narain’s  case  (supra) held that

since the relevant date for determination of the rate

of compensation is the date of accident and not the

date of adjudication of the claim by the

Commissioner and hence if the accident has taken

place prior to 15.09.1995, the rate applicable on the

date of accident would govern the subject.  

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23. After these two  decisions, this  Court in two

cases (both by the Two Judge Bench) viz.  National

Insurance  Company  Ltd  vs.  Mubasir  Ahmed  &

Anr.  (2007) 2 SCC  349 and  Oriental Insurance

Company Ltd. vs. Mohmad Nasir & Anr.  (2009) 6

SCC 280  without noticing the law laid down in

Pratap  Narain  and  Valsala  cases (supra) took a

contrary view and held that payment of

compensation would fall due only after the

Commissioner's order or with reference to the date

on which the claim application is made.

24. This  conflict  of view  in the  decisions  on  the

question was noticed by this Court (Two Judge

Bench) in  Oriental Insurance  Company Ltd  vs.

Siby George and others  (2012) 12 SCC 540.

Justice Aftab Alam speaking for the Bench referred

to afore­mentioned decisions and explaining the

ratio of each decision held that since the two later

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decisions rendered in the cases of  Mubasir  and

Mohmad  Nasir  (supra)  which took contrary view

without  noticing the earlier two  decisions of this

Court rendered in Pratap Narain and Valsala cases

(supra) by the larger Benches (combination of four

and three Judges respectively) and hence later

decisions rendered in  Mubasir  and  Mohmad Nasir

cases (supra) cannot be held to have laid down the

correct  principles  of law on the  question and nor

can, therefore, be treated as binding precedent on

the question.  

25. In other words,  the  law laid down in  Pratap

Narain  and Valsala  cases  (supra) was held to hold

the field through  out as laying  down  the correct

principle of law on the subject. The Two Judge

Bench in  Oriental Insurance Company Ltd  vs.

Siby George and others  (supra) accordingly

followed  the  principle  of law  laid  down  in  Pratap

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Narain  and  Valsala  cases  (supra) and decided the

case instead of following the law laid down in

Mubasir  and  Mohmad Nasir  cases (supra)  which

was held per incuriam.

26. Now coming to the facts of this case, we find

that the Commissioner awarded the interest to the

respondents at the rate of 12% per annum on the

awarded sum but it was awarded from the expiry of

45 days from the date of order and that too, if the

appellant failed to deposit the awarded sum within

45 days.  

27. In other words, if the appellant had deposited

the awarded sum within 45 days from the date of

the order then the respondent was not entitled to

claim any interest on the awarded sum, but if the

appellant had failed to deposit the awarded amount

within 45 days, then the respondent was entitled to

claim interest at the rate of 12% per annum from

the date of the order.

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28. In our opinion, the afore­mentioned direction

of the Commissioner in awarding the interest on the

awarded sum is contrary to law laid down by this

Court in  Pratap Narain’s  case  (supra)  and hence

not legally sustainable.

29. In the light of the forgoing  discussion, even

though the respondent did not challenge this

direction by filing any appeal in the High Court nor

challenged it by filing any appeal in this Court too,

yet the question being a pure question of law, this

Court with a view to do substantial  justice to the

respondent consider it just and proper to modify the

order of the Commissioner in respondent's favour so

as to make the same in conformity with the law laid

down by this Court in the above referred two

decisions (supra).

30. Accordingly and in view of the foregoing

discussion, the order of the  Commissioner dated

23.04.2002 is modified in favour of the respondent

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to the extent that the awarded sum of

Rs.  3,79,120/­ shall carry interest  at the rate of

12% per annum from the date of accident i.e.

06.04.1999.

31. The  Commissioner is accordingly  directed to

work out the total amount payable by the appellant

to the respondent in terms of the order passed by

this Court.

32. Since no one appeared for the appellant as well

as respondent in this case, the Registry shall send a

copy of this order to the Commissioner, the

appellant and the respondent respectively within

one week.  

33. The Commissioner, on receipt of the order, will

issue notice to the parties and calculate  the total

amount to enable the appellant to deposit the same

within one month for being paid to the respondent

after due verification.

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34. The appeal stands accordingly disposed of with

afore­mentioned directions and modifications in the

order of the Commissioner dated 23.04.2002 passed

in case No. KAB/KNP/7/985/99.     

………...................................J.   [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

                                    …...……..................................J.

        [INDU MALHOTRA] New Delhi; November 02, 2018

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