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Reportabl e

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Special Leave Petition (C) No. 25848 of 2011

Noor Mohammed      ... Petitioner

Versus

Jethanand and another                                ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

In a democratic body polity which is governed by a  

written Constitution and where Rule of Law is paramount,  

judiciary is regarded as sentinel on the qui vive not only to  

protect the Fundamental Rights of the citizens but also to  

see  that  the  democratic  values  as  enshrined  in  the  

Constitution are respected and the faith and hope of the  

people  in  the  constitutional  system  are  not  atrophied.

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Sacrosanctity of rule of law neither recognizes a master  

and a slave nor does it conceive of a ruler and a subject  

but, in quintessentiality, encapsules and sings in glory of  

the values of liberty,  equality and justice In accordance  

with  law  requiring  the  present  generation  to  have  the  

responsibility  to  sustain  them  with  all  fairness  for  the  

posterity  ostracising  all  affectations.  To  maintain  the  

sacredness of democracy, sacrifice in continuum by every  

member of the collective is a categorical imperative. The  

fundamental  conception  of  democracy  can  only  be  

preserved  as  a  colossal  and  priceless  treasure  where  

virtue and values of justice rule supreme and intellectual  

anaemia is kept at bay by constant patience, consistent  

perseverance, and argus-eyed vigilance.  The foundation  

of  justice,  apart  from other  things,  rests  on the speedy  

delineation of the lis pending in courts.  It would not be an  

exaggeration  to  state  that  it  is  the  primary  morality  of  

justice and ethical fulcrum of the judiciary.  Its profundity  

lies in not allowing anything to cripple the same or to do  

any  act  which  would  freeze  it  or  make  it  suffer  from  

impotency.   Delayed  delineation  of  a  controversy  in  a  

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court of law creates a dent in the normative dispensation  

of justice and in the ultimate eventuate, the Bench and  

the Bar  gradually lose their  reverence,  for  the sense of  

divinity  and  nobility  really  flows  from  institutional  

serviceability.  Therefore, historically, emphasis has been  

laid  on  individual  institutionalism  and  collective  

institutionalism  of  an  adjudicator  while  administering  

justice.  It can be stated without any fear of contradiction  

that the collective collegiality can never be regarded as an  

alien concept to speedy dispensation of justice.  That is  

the hallmark of duty, and that is the real measure.

2. Presently  to  the  factual  matrix.   The  respondent  

initiated civil action by instituting Civil Suit No. 42 of 1990  

for injunction to restrain the defendant therein from selling  

or  otherwise  transferring  the  suit  land  towards  the  

southern  side  of  the  house  and  further  to  permanently  

injunct  him  to  make  any  construction  on  the  land  in  

dispute.  After the written statement was filed, a counter  

claim was put forth by the defendant.  Thereafter, issues  

were  framed  and  the  parties  adduced  evidence  to  

substantiate their respective stands.  On 12.9.1997, the  

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learned  Civil  Judge  (Junior  Division)  Nohar,  District  

Hanumangarh, Rajasthan dismissed the suit and decreed  

the  counter  claim  filed  by  defendant-petitioner  herein.  

Being grieved by the aforesaid judgment and decree, the  

first respondent preferred Civil First Appeal No. 59 of 1997  

in  the  Court  of  the  concerned Additional  District  Judge,  

Nohar  who,  on  10.07.2001  dismissed  the  appeal.   The  

dismissal of appeal compelled the respondent to file a Civil  

Second  Appeal  No.  207/2001  in  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature of Rajasthan at Jodhpur.   

3. Be  it  noted,  we  have  not  adverted  to  the  factual  

controversy  and  findings  returned  thereon  because  

advertence to the same is not necessary for our purpose.  

4. The chequered history of the second appeal, a tragic  

one, commenced on 27.7.2011, when memorandum of the  

appeal  was  presented.   The  appeal  was  listed  for  

admission along with the stay application on 30.07.2001.  

The petitioner herein had entered caveat and was present  

on the date of admission and on the basis of the prayer  

made by both the parties, the court called for the lower  

courts’ records.  Subsequently, the matter was listed on  

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8.11.2001,  5.12.2001  and  18.1.2002  but  due  to  non-

appearance  of  counsel  for  the  parties,  no  order  was  

passed.   On  18.2.2002,  though  none  was  present  on  

behalf  of  the appellant  therein,  yet the court adjourned  

the appeal.  Similarly, adjournments were granted in the  

absence  of  counsel  on  20.01.2003  and  4.2.2003.   It  is  

interesting  to  note  that  when the  appeal  was  listed  on  

4.2.2003,  the  court  directed  issuance  of  notice  to  the  

appellant  for  making  appropriate  arrangements  for  his  

representation.   It is apposite to note that the counsel for  

the  respondent  therein  was  present  on  that  day.  

Thereafter,  the  matter  was  adjourned  on  many  an  

occasion awaiting for service of notice on the appellant.  

After completion of service of notice, the matter was listed  

on  23.9.2003  and,  as  usual,  none  was  present  for  the  

appellant.   Similar  was the situation on 7.10.2003.   On  

10.11.2003, when none was present for the appellant, the  

appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution in the presence  

of the counsel for the respondent.  

5. After  the  appeal  was  dismissed  for  want  of  

prosecution, the appellant before the High Court woke up  

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from slumber  and filed an application for  restoration  in  

2004  which  was  eventually  allowed  vide  order  dated  

9.1.2006.   As  the  order  sheet  would  reflect,  time  got  

comatosed  for  more  than  six  years  and  eventually,  

ministerial  order  of  restoration  was  recorded  on  

11.5.2010.   After  the  formality  of  restoration  was  over  

breaking the artificial arrest of time, when the file moved  

like a large python, the appeal was listed before the court  

for  admission  on  25.10.2010  on  which  day  the  learned  

counsel for the appellant commenced the argument and  

ultimately  sought  adjournment.   The  matter  stood  

adjourned to 10.11.2010.  Thereafter, an application under  

Section 100 (5) read with Order 41, Rule 2 Code of Civil  

Procedure was filed by the appellant and opportunity was  

granted to  the  counsel  for  the  respondent,  the  plaintiff  

therein,  to  file  reply  to  the  same  and  the  matter  was  

directed to be listed after two weeks.   As the order sheet  

would  further  uncurtain  the  appeal  was  listed  again  on  

29.11.2010 and in the meantime, the respondent had filed  

an application under Order 41 Rule 27 read with Section  

151 of CPC.   

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6. On  24.2.2011,  when  the  matter  was  listed  for  

admission,  the  Court  directed  that  the  matter  shall  be  

listed  for  admission  and  all  the  applications  would  be  

considered on that date.  On 7.3.2011, it was directed by  

the court to list the matter after one week as adjournment  

was sought for.  Similar prayer for adjournment was made  

on 16.3.2011 and the  matter  was again  directed  to  be  

listed after two weeks as prayed for.  On 27.04.2011, the  

learned Single Judge passed the following order:   

“None for the appellant.

I  have  perused  the  record.   This  second appeal was filed as back as in the  year  2001  and  it  is  now  more  than  10  years that it is not yet either admitted for  final  hearing  with  a  view  to  find  out  whether  it  involves  any  substantial  question  of  law  within  the  meaning  of  Section  100.   It  has  undoubtedly  caused  serious concern to my conscience that this  appeal  has  taken  ten  years  to  decide  whether  it  involves  any  substantial  question of law.

The matter is being adjourned almost  on every occasions in the last ten years to  accommodate  the  counsel  regardless  of  the  sufficient  cause  and  only  on  mere  request.  

Even today the counsel is engaged for  the appellant has not appeared.  Another  counsel got up and said that the counsel  

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engaged  is  not  well  and,  therefore,  the  case be adjourned.  

I could have dismissed the appeal for  want of prosecution but I prefer not to do  so  because  it  does  not  serve  anybody’s  purpose.   With  extreme  reluctance  and  against my conscience and with a view to  do substantial  justice to  the appellant  to  give right of audience, I am constrained to  adjourn  the  case  to  accommodate  the  counsel (though I am not supposed to) and  list  the appeal  for  admission in  the  next  week.”  

7. At last, on 9.5.2011, the learned counsel for both the  

sides  appeared  and  the  matter  was  admitted  on  two  

substantial  questions of law and there was direction for  

stay of operation of the impugned judgment and decree  

passed by the courts below.   

8. Mr.  H.D.  Thanvi,  learned counsel  for  the petitioner,  

has contended that there was no substantial question of  

law  involved  and  the  High  Court  had  no  reason  to  

entertain the second appeal only on the factual score.   

9. When the matter was listed on 21.9.2012 before us,  

the following order was passed: -  

“Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner  submitted that Second Appeal preferred by  Respondent No. 1 in 2001 was dismissed  

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for  non-prosecution  on  10.11.2003,  but  later restored to file in January, 2006 and  after  almost  10  years  of  filing  of  the  second appeal,  the judgment and decree  of both the courts below have been stayed  by the High Court by its  impugned order  dated 9.5.2011.

Registrar  General  of  the  Rajasthan  High Court is directed to file the details of  the progress of S. B. Civil  Second Appeal  No. 207 of 2001, from 2001 to 2011, within  two weeks.”

10. In  pursuance of  the  aforesaid  order,  the  Registrar  

General has sent a report to this Court on the basis of  

which we have referred to the proceedings before the  

High Court.  At this juncture, we may clearly state that  

we had not issued notice to the contesting respondent  

as we are not inclined to interfere with the order.  But,  

a pregnant one, the manner in which the proceedings  

in  the  second  appeal  continued,  being  disturbing,  

compels us to say something on the said score.  Not  

that  this  Court  is  saying  it  for  the  first  time  but  a  

reminder serves as a propeller for keen introspection  

and paves the path of needed rectification.   

11. The  proceedings  in  the  second  appeal  before  the  

High Court, if we allow ourselves to say so, epitomizes  

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the corrosive effect that adjournments can have on a  

litigation  and  how  a  lis  can  get  entangled  in  the  

tentacles of an octopus.  The philosophy of justice, the  

role  of  a  lawyer  and  the  court,  the  obligation  of  a  

litigant and all legislative commands, the nobility of the  

Bench  and  the  Bar,  the  ability  and  efficiency  of  all  

concerned and ultimately the divinity of law are likely  

to make way for apathy and indifference when delay of  

the present nature takes place, for procrastination on  

the  part  of  anyone  destroys  the  values  of  life  and  

creates a catastrophic turbulence in the sanctity of law.  

The  virtues  of  adjudication  cannot  be  allowed  to  be  

paralyzed by adjournments and non-demonstration of  

due diligence to deal with the matter.  One cannot be  

oblivious to the feeling necessities of the time.  No one  

can afford to sit in an ivory tower.  Neither a Judge nor  

a lawyer can ignore “the total push and pressure of the  

cosmos”.  It is devastating to expect infinite patience.  

Change of attitude is the warrant and command of the  

day.  We may recall  with profit  what Justice Cardozo  

had said:  

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“It  is  true,  I  think,  today  in  every  department of law that the social value of  a rule has become a test of growing power  and importance”.   

12. It has to be kept in mind that the time of leisure has  

to be given a decent burial.  The sooner it takes place,  

the  better  it  is.   It  is  the  obligation  of  the  present  

generation to march with the time and remind oneself  

every  moment  that  rule  of  law  is  the  centripodal  

concern and delay in delineation and disposal of cases  

injects  an  artificial  virus  and  becomes  a  vitiating  

element.   The unfortunate characteristics of endemic  

delays have to be avoided at any cost.  One has to bear  

in mind that this is the day, this is the hour and this is  

the  moment,  when all  soldiers  of  law fight  from the  

path.  One has to remind oneself of the great saying,  

“Awake, Arise, ‘O’ Partha”.

13. As advised, at present, we are disposed to refer to  

certain pronouncements of this Court.   A three-Judge  

Bench  in  Kailash  v.  Nanhku  and  others1,  while  

dealing with the issue whether Order 8 Rule 1 of Code  

of Civil Procedure is mandatory or directory, referred to  

1 (2005) 4 SCC 480

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the observations in  Sushil Kumar Sen  v.  State of  

Bihar2 which we may profitably reproduce: -

“The mortality of justice at the hands  of  law troubles  a  judge's  conscience and  points  an  angry  interrogation  at  the  law  reformer.

The processual  law so  dominates  in  certain  systems  as  to  overpower  substantive rights and substantial  justice.  The humanist  rule  that  procedure should  be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal  justice compels consideration of vesting a  residuary power in judges to act ex debito  justitiae where the tragic sequel otherwise  would be wholly  inequitable.  … Justice is  the goal of jurisprudence — processual, as  much as substantive.”

The Bench further referred to the pronouncement in  

State of Punjab  v.  Shamlal Murari3 to emphasise the  

approach relating to the process of adjective law.  It has  

been stated in the said case: -

“Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a  servant,  not an obstruction but an aid to  justice.  Procedural  prescriptions  are  the  handmaid  and  not  the  mistress,  a  lubricant,  not  a  resistant  in  the  administration of justice.”

14. We may note with profit that the Court had further  

opined that the procedure is directory but emphasis was  

laid on the concept of desirability and for  the aforesaid  2 (1975) 1 SCC 774 3 (1976) 1 SCC 719

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purpose, reference was made to  Topline Shoes Ltd.  v.  

Corpn.  Bank4.   Analysing  the  purpose  behind  it,  the  

three-Judge-Bench,  referring  to  Topline  Shoes  Ltd.  

(supra), observed thus: -

“36. The  Court  further  held  that  the  provision is more by way of procedure to  achieve the  object  of  speedy disposal  of  such disputes. The strong terms in which  the provision is couched are an expression  of “desirability” but do not create any kind  of  substantive  right  in  favour  of  the  complainant  by reason of  delay so  as  to  debar  the  respondent  from  placing  his  version  in  defence  in  any  circumstances  whatsoever.”

15. In  Shiv  Cotex  v.  Tirgun  Auto  Plast  Private  

Limited  and  others5 this  Court  was  dealing  with  a  

judgment passed by the High Court in a second appeal  

wherein the High Court had not formulated any substantial  

question  of  law  and  further  allowed  the  second  appeal  

preferred  by  the plaintiff  solely  on  the  ground that  the  

stakes were high and the plaintiff should have been non-

suited on the basis of no evidence.  This Court took note of  

the fact that after issues were framed and the matter was  

fixed  for  production  of  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff  on  

4 (2002) 6 SCC 33 5 (2011) 9 SCC 678

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three  occasions,  the  plaintiff  chose  not  to  adduce  the  

evidence.  The question posed by the Court was to the  

following effect: -

“Is the court obliged to give adjournment  after  adjournment  merely  because  the  stakes are high in the dispute?  Should the  court be silent spectator and leave control  of the case to a party to the case who has  decided not to take the case forward?”

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to answer thus: -

“15. It  is sad, but true, that the litigants  seek - and the courts grant - adjournments  at the drop of the hat. In the cases where  the Judges are little proactive and refuse to  accede  to  the  requests  of  unnecessary  adjournments, the litigants deploy all sorts  of methods in protracting the litigation. It  is not surprising that civil disputes drag on  and  on.  The  misplaced  sympathy  and  indulgence by the appellate and revisional  courts compound the malady further. The  case in hand is a case of such misplaced  sympathy.  It  is  high  time  that  courts  become  sensitive  to  delays  in  justice  delivery  system  and  realise  that  adjournments do dent the efficacy of the  judicial process and if this menace is not  controlled  adequately,  the  litigant  public  may lose faith in the system sooner than  later.  The courts,  particularly  trial  courts,  must ensure that on every date of hearing,  effective progress takes place in the suit.

16. No  litigant  has  a  right  to  abuse  the  procedure provided in CPC. Adjournments  have  grown  like  cancer  corroding  the  entire body of justice delivery system.”

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After so stating, the Bench observed as follows: -

“A  party  to  the  suit  is  not  at  liberty  to  proceed  with  the  trial  at  its  leisure  and  pleasure  and  has  no  right  to  determine  when the evidence would be let in by it or  the matter should be heard. The parties to  a  suit  —  whether  the  plaintiff  or  the  defendant  —  must  cooperate  with  the  court in ensuring the effective work on the  date of hearing for which the matter has  been  fixed.  If  they  don’t,  they  do  so  at  their own peril.”

16. In Ramon Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Subhash Kapoor  

and others6, after referring to a passage from Mahabir  

Prasad Singh v.  Jacks Aviation Pvt. Ltd.7,  the Court  

cautioned thus: -

“Nonetheless  we  put  the  profession  to  notice  that  in  future  the  advocate  would  also  be  answerable  for  the  consequence  suffered  by  the  party  if  the  non- appearance was solely on the ground of a  strike call.  It is unjust and inequitable to  cause the party alone to suffer for the self  imposed dereliction of his advocate.   We  may  further  add  that  the  litigant  who  suffers  entirely  on  account  of  his  advocate’s  non-appearance  in  Court,  he  has also the remedy to sue the advocate  for  damages  but  that  remedy  would  remain unaffected by the course adopted  in this case.  Even so, in situations like this,  when the Court mulcts the party with costs  for the failure of his advocate to appear,  we make it clear that the same Court has  power  to  permit  the  party  to  realize  the  

6 AIR 2001 SC 207 7 AIR 1999 SC 287

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costs  from  the  advocate  concerned.  However,  such  direction  can  be  passed  only after affording an opportunity to the  advocate.  If he has any justifiable cause  the Court can certainly absolve him from  such a liability.”

17. Be it noted, though the said passage was stated in  

the  context  of  strike  by  the  lawyers,  yet  it  has  its  

accent on non-appearance by a counsel in the court.   

18. In this context, we may refer to the pronouncement  

in  Pandurang  Dattatraya  Khandekar  v.  Bar  

Council  of  Maharashtra,  Bombay  and  others8,  

wherein the Court observed that an advocate stands in  

a loco parentis towards the litigants and it, therefore,  

follows  that  the  client  is  entitled  to  receive  

disinterested, sincere and honest treatment especially  

where the client approaches the advocates for succour  

in times of need.

19.  In  Lt.  Col.  S.J.  Chaudhary  v.  State  (Delhi  

Administration)9, a three-Judge Bench, while dealing  

with  the  role  of  an  advocate  in  a  criminal  trial,  has  

observed as follows: -

8 (1984) 2 SCC 556 9 AIR 1984 SC 618

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“We are unable to appreciate the difficulty  said to be experienced by the petitioner.  It  is  stated  that  his  Advocate  is  finding  it  difficult  to  attend  the  court  from day-to- day.  It is the duty of every Advocate, who  accepts  the  brief  in  a  criminal  case  to  attend  the  trial  from  day-to-day.   We  cannot  over-stress  the  duty  of  the  Advocate to attend to the trial from day-to- day.  Having accepted the brief, he will be  committing  a  breach  of  his  professional  duty, if he so fails to attend.”  

20. In Mahabir Prasad Singh (supra), the Bench, laying  

emphasis on the obligation of a lawyer in his duty towards  

the Court and the duty of the Court to the Bar, has ruled  

as under: -

“A  lawyer  is  under  obligation  to  do  nothing that shall detract from the dignity  of the Court of which he is himself a sworn  officer  and  assistant.   He  should  at  all  times pay deferential respect to the judge,  and scrupulously observe the decorum of  the Court room. (Warevelle’s Legal Ethics  at p.182)

Of course, it is not a unilateral affair.  There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also  to be courteous to the members of the Bar  and  to  make  every  endeavour  for  maintaining  and  protecting  the  respect  which members of the Bar are entitled to  have from their clients as well as from the  litigant public.  Both the Bench and the Bar  are  the  two  inextricable  wings  of  the  judicial forum and therefore the aforesaid  mutual  respect  is  sine  qua  non  for  the  efficient  functioning  of  the  solemn  work  carried on in Courts of law.  But that does  

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not mean that  any advocate or  group of  them  can  boycott  the  courts  or  any  particular Court and ask the Court to desist  from discharging judicial function.  At any  rate,  no  advocate  can  ask  the  Court  to  avoid a case on the ground that he does  not want to appear in that Court.”

21. While recapitulating the duties of a lawyer towards  

the Court and the society, being a member of the legal  

profession, this Court in  O.P. Sharma and others v.  

High Court of Punjab and Haryana10 has observed  

that the role and status of lawyers at the beginning of  

sovereign  and  democratic  India  is  accounted  as  

extremely  vital  in  deciding  that  the  nation’s  

administration was to be governed by the Rule of Law.  

The Bench emphasized on the role of eminent lawyers  

in the framing of the Constitution.  Emphasis was also  

laid on the concept that lawyers are the Officers of the  

Court in the administration of justice.   

22.  In  R.K. Garg, Advocate  v.  State of Himachal  

Pradesh11,  Chandrachud, C.J.,  speaking for the Court  

pertaining to the relationship between the Bench and  

the Bar, opined thus: -

10 (2011) 6 SCC 86 11 (1981) 3 SCC 166

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“....the Bar and the Bench are an integral  part  of  the  same  mechanism  which  administers  justice  to  the  people.  Many  members of the Bench are drawn from the  Bar and their past association is a source  of inspiration and pride to them. It ought to  be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It is  unquestionably  true that  courtesy breeds  courtesy and just as charity has to begin at  home, courtesy must begin with the Judge.  A  discourteous  Judge  is  like  an  ill-tuned  instrument in the setting of a court room.  But  members  of  the  Bar  will  do  well  to  remember that such flagrant violations of  professional  ethics  and  cultured  conduct  will only result in the ultimate destruction  of a system without which no democracy  can survive.”

23. We have referred to the aforesaid judgments solely  

for the purpose that this Court, in different contexts, had  

dealt with the malady of adjournment and expressed its  

agony  and  anguish.   Whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  

litigation,  speedy  and  appropriate  delineation  is  

fundamental to judicial duty.  Commenting on the delay in  

the justice delivery system, although in respect of criminal  

trial, Krishna Iyer, J. had stated thus: -

“Our justice system, even in grave cases,  suffers from slow motion syndrome which  is  lethal  to  “fair  trial”,  whatever  the  ultimate  decision.   Speedy  justice  is  a  component  of  social  justice  since  the  community, as a whole, is concerned in the  criminal  being  condignly  and  finally  

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punished within a reasonable time and the  innocent  being  absolved  from  the  inordinate ordeal of criminal proceedings.”

24. In criminal  jurisprudence,  speedy trial  has become  

an  indivisible  component  of  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution and it has been held by this Court that it is  

the constitutional obligation on the part of the State to  

provide  the  infrastructure  for  speedy  trial  (see  

Hussainara Khatoon  v. Home Secretary, State of  

Bihar12,  Hussainara  Khatoon  (IV)  and  others  v.  

Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna13).    

25. In  Diwan  Naubat  Rai  and  others  v.  State  

through Delhi Administration14, it has been opined  

that  right  to  speedy  trial  encompasses  all  stages  of  

trial,  namely,  investigation,  enquiry,  trial,  appeal  and  

revision.   

26. In  Surinder  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab15,  it  has  

been reiterated that speedy trial is implicit in the broad  

sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of  

India.   Thus,  it  has  been put  at  the  zenith  and that  

12 AIR 1979 SC 1360 13 (1980) 1 SCC 98 14 AIR 1989 SC 542 15 (2005) 7 SCC 387

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makes the responsibility of everyone Everestine which  

has to be performed with Olympian calmness.

27. The  anguish  expressed  in  the  past  and  the  role  

ascribed to the Judges, lawyers and the litigants is a  

matter of perpetual concern and the same has to be  

reflected  upon  every  moment.   An  attitude  of  

indifference can neither be appreciated nor tolerated.  

Therefore,  the  serviceability  of  the  institution  gains  

significance.  That is the command of the Majesty of  

Law  and  none  should  make  any  maladroit  effort  to  

create  a  concavity  in  the  same.   Procrastination,  

whether  at  the  individual  or  institutional  level,  is  a  

systemic disorder.   Its  corrosive effect  and impact is  

like a disorderly state of the physical frame of a man  

suffering  from  an  incurable  and  fast  progressive  

malignancy.  Delay either by the functionaries of the  

court or the members of the Bar significantly exhibits  

indolence and one can aphoristically say, borrowing a  

line from Southwell “Creeping snails have the weakest  

force”.  Slightly more than five decades back, talking  

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about the responsibility of the lawyers,  Nizer Louis16  

had put thus: -

“I consider it a lawyer’s task to bring calm  and  confidence  to  the  distressed  client.  Almost everyone who comes to a law office  is emotionally affected by a problem.  It is  only a matter of degree and of the client’s  inner resources to withstand the pressure.”

28. A few lines from illustrious Frankfurter is fruitful to  

recapitulate:

“I think a person who throughout his life is  nothing  but  a  practicing  lawyer  fulfils  a  very great and essential function in the life  of society.  Think of the responsibilities on  the one hand and the satisfaction on the  other, to be a lawyer in the true sense.”

29. In a democratic set up, intrinsic and embedded faith  

in  the  adjudicatory  system is  of  seminal  and pivotal  

concern.  Delay gradually declines the citizenry faith in  

the system.  It is the faith and faith alone that keeps  

the  system  alive.   It  provides  oxygen  constantly.  

Fragmentation  of  faith  has  the  effect-potentiality  to  

bring in a state of cataclysm where justice may become  

a casuality.  A litigant expects a reasoned verdict from  

a temperate Judge but does not intend to and, rightly  

16 My life in Court (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961) p.213

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so, to guillotine much of time at the altar of reasons.  

Timely delivery of justice keeps the faith ingrained and  

establishes the sustained stability.  Access to speedy  

justice is regarded as a human right which is deeply  

rooted in the foundational concept of democracy and  

such a right is not only the creation of law but also a  

natural  right.   This  right  can be fully  ripened by the  

requisite commitment of all concerned with the system.  

It cannot be regarded as a facet of Utopianism because  

such  a  thought  is  likely  to  make the  right  a  mirage  

losing the centrality  of  purpose.   Therefore,  whoever  

has a role to play in the justice dispensation system  

cannot  be  allowed  to  remotely  conceive  of  a  casual  

approach.

30. In this context, it is apt to refer to a passage from  

Ramdeo  Chauhan  Alias  Raj  Nath  v.  State  of  

Assam17: -

“22.  ...  The  judicial  system  cannot  be  allowed to be taken to ransom by having  resort  to  imaginative  and  concocted  grounds  by  taking  advantage  of  loose  

17 (2001) 5 SCC 714

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sentences appearing in the evidence of  some  of  the  witnesses,  particularly  at  the stage of special leave petition.  The  law insists on finality of judgments and  is  more  concerned  with  the  strengthening  of  the  judicial  system.  The courts are enjoined upon to perform  their  duties  with  the  object  of  strengthening  the  confidence  of  the  common  man  in  the  institution  entrusted  with  the  administration  of  justice.   Any effort  which weakens the  system  and  shakens  the  faith  of  the  common man in the justice dispensation  system has to be discouraged.”  

31. In  Zahira Habibulla H. Sheikh and another  

v. State of Gujarat and others18, emphasizing on  

the duty of Court to maintain public confidence in  

the  administration  of  justice,  this  Court  has  

poignantly held as follows: -

“35.  ...Courts  have  always  been  considered to have an overriding duty to  maintain  public  confidence  in  the  administration of justice – often referred  to as the duty to vindicate and uphold  

18 (2004) 4 SCC 158

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the  “majesty  of  the  law”.   Due  administration  of  justice  has  always  been  viewed  as  a  continuous  process,  not  confined  to  determination  of  the  particular  case, protecting its  ability to  function as a court of law in the future  as in the case before it.”

Thus,  from  the  aforesaid,  it  is  clear  as  day  that  

everyone involved in the system of dispensation of justice  

has to inspire the confidence of the common man in the  

effectiveness of the judicial system.  Sustenance of faith  

has to be treated as spinal sans sympathy or indulgence.  

If someone considers the task to be herculean, the same  

has to be performed with solemnity, for faith is the ‘elan  

vital’ of our system.   

32. Coming  to  the  proceedings  before  the  High  Court  

from the date of presentation of the second appeal till  

the  date  of  admission,  the  manner  in  which  it  has  

progressed  is  not  only  perplexing  but  also  shocking.  

We are inclined to think that the Court should not have  

shown indulgence of such magnitude by adjourning the  

matter  when  the  counsel  for  the  appellant  was  not  

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present.   It  is  difficult  to  envision  why  the  Court  

directed fresh notice to the appellant when there was  

nothing suggestive for passing of such an order.  The  

matter should have been dealt with taking a recourse  

to the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure.  It is  

also astonishing that the lawyers sought adjournments  

in a routine manner and the court also acceded to such  

prayers.  When the matter stood dismissed, though an  

application for restoration was filed,  yet it  was listed  

after a long lapse of time.  Adding to the misery, the  

concerned official took his own time to put the file in  

order.  From the Registrar General’s communication it  

is  perceptible that some disciplinary action has been  

initiated  against  the  erring  official.   That  is  another  

matter and we do not intend to say anything in that  

regard.  But the fact that cannot be brushed aside is  

that there is enormous delay in dealing with the case.  

Had  timely  effort  been  made  and  due  concern  

bestowed, it could have been avoided.  There may be  

cases where delay may be unavoidable.   We do not  

intend to give illustrations, for facts in the said cases  

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shall speak for themselves.  In the case at hand, as we  

perceive, the learned counsel sought adjournment after  

adjournment  in  a  nonchalant  manner  and  the  same  

were granted in a routine fashion.  It is the duty of the  

counsel as the officer of the court to assist the court in  

a  properly  prepared  manner  and  not  to  seek  

unnecessary adjournments.  Getting an adjournment is  

neither  an  art  nor  science.   It  has  never  been  

appreciated by the courts.  All who are involved in the  

justice dispensation system, which includes the Judges,  

the lawyers, the judicial officers who work in courts, the  

law officers of the State, the Registry and the litigants,  

have to show dedicated diligence so that a controversy  

is  put  to  rest.   Shifting  the  blame  is  not  the  cure.  

Acceptance of responsibility and dealing with it like a  

captain in the frontier is the necessity of the time.  It is  

worthy  to  state  that  diligence  brings  satisfaction.  

There has to be strong resolve in the mind to carry out  

the  responsibility  with  devotion.   A  time  has  come  

when all  concerned are required to abandon idleness  

and arouse oneself and see to it that the syndrome of  

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delay does not  erode the concept  of  dispensation of  

expeditious  justice  which  is  the  constitutional  

command.  Sagacious acceptance of the deviation and  

necessitous steps taken for the redressal of the same  

would be a bright lamp which would gradually become  

a laser beam.  This is the expectation of the collective,  

and  the  said  expectation  has  to  become  a  reality.  

Expectations are not to remain at the stage of hope.  

They have to  be metamorphosed to  actuality.   Long  

back, Francis Bacon, in his aphoristic style, had said,  

“Hope is good breakfast, but it is bad supper”.  We say  

no more on this score.

33. Though  we  have  dwelled  upon  the  issue,  yet  we  

restrain from issuing any directions, for the High Court  

as a constitutional Court has to carry the burden and  

live up to the requisite expectations of the litigants.  It  

is also expected from the lawyers’ community to see  

that delay is avoided.  A concerted effort is bound to  

give results.  Therefore, we request the learned Chief  

Justice of the High Court of Rajasthan as well  as the  

other learned Chief Justices to  conceive and adopt a  

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mechanism, regard being had to the priority of cases,  

to avoid such inordinate delays in matters which can  

really be dealt with in an expeditious manner.  Putting  

a step forward is  a step towards the destination.   A  

sensible  individual  inspiration  and  a  committed  

collective  endeavour  would  indubitably  help  in  this  

regard.  Neither less, nor more.

34. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, disposed  

of.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J.                                            [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; January 29, 2013

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