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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CRL.) NO. 50 OF 2012

Niranjan Hemchandra Sashittal  and another ...  Petitioners

Versus

State of Maharashtra                                     ...Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

The gravamen of grievance of the petitioners in this  

petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of  

India pertains to procrastination in trial, gradual corrosion  

of  their  social  reputation,  deprivation  of  respectable  

livelihood because of order of suspension passed against  

the petitioner No. 1 during which he was getting a meagre  

subsistence  allowance  and  has  reached  the  age  of  

superannuation without  being considered for  promotion,

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extreme  suffering  of  emotional  and  mental  stress  and  

strain, and denial of speedy trial that has impaired their  

Fundamental  Right  enshrined  under  Article  21  of  the  

Constitution.  The asseverations pertaining to long delay  

in  trial  have been made on the constitutional  backdrop  

leading to the prayer for quashment of the proceedings of  

Special Case No. 4 of 1993 pending in the court of learned  

Special Judge, Greater Bombay.

2. Before we proceed to  state the factual  score,  it  is  

necessary to mention that this is not the first time  

that  the  petitioners  have  approached  this  Court.  

They, along with others, had assailed the order of the  

High Court of Bombay declining to quash the criminal  

proceedings against the petitioners and others on the  

ground of delay in investigation and filing of charge  

sheet  in  three  special  leave  petitions  which  were  

converted to three criminal appeals, namely, Criminal  

Appeal  Nos.  176 of 2001,  177 of 2001 and 178 of  

2001.   This  Court  adverted  to  the  facts  and  

expressed the view that there was no justification to  

quash  the  criminal  prosecution  on  the  ground  of  

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delay highlighted by the appellants in all the appeals.  

However,  this  Court  took  note  of  the  allegations  

against  two  senescent  ladies  who  were  

octogenarians  relating  to  their  abetment  in  the  

commission  of  the  crime  and  opined  that  the  

materials  were  insufficient  to  prove  that  the  old  

ladies  intentionally  abetted  the  public  servant  in  

acquiring  assets which were disproportionate to his  

known  sources  of  income  and  further  it  would  be  

unfair  and  unreasonable  to  compel  them,  who  by  

advancement of old age, would possibly have already  

crossed into geriatric  stage,  to  stand the long trial  

having no reasonable prospect of ultimate conviction  

against them and, accordingly, on those two grounds,  

allowed the appeals preferred by them and quashed  

the  criminal  prosecution  as  far  as  they  were  

concerned.   The  other  appeals,  preferred  by  the  

public servant and his wife, stood dismissed.

3. Be it noted, in the said judgment, while quashing the  

proceedings  against  the  two  ladies,  this  Court  

referred to the decision in Rajdeo Sharma v. State  

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of Bihar1 and observed that the trial was not likely  

to end within one or two years, even if the special  

court would strictly adhere to the directions issued by  

this Court in Rajdeo Sharma’s case.

4. The facts as uncurtained are that the Anti Corruption  

Bureau (ACB), after conducting a preliminary enquiry,  

filed an FIR on 26.6.1986 against the petitioner No. 1  

who was a Deputy Commissioner in the Department  

of Prohibition and Excise, Maharashtra Government,  

for  offence  punishable  under  Section  5(2)  of  the  

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.  The lodgement  

of the FIR led to conducting of raids at various places  

and,  eventually,  it  was found that the petitioner,  a  

public servant,  had acquired assets worth Rs.33.44  

lakhs which were in excess of his known sources of  

income.  After the investigation, the Government of  

Maharashtra was moved for grant of sanction which  

was  accorded  on  22.1.1993  and  thereupon,  the  

charge-sheet  was  lodged  against  the  petitioners  

along  with  two  old  ladies  on  4.3.1993  before  the  

1 (1998) 7 SCC 507

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Special  Court.   The  offence  alleged  against  the  

petitioner,  the  public  servant,  was  under  Section  

13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of  

Corruption Act, 1988.  Allegations against the ladies  

were abetment for the main offences.  As there was  

delay  in  conducting  the  investigation  and  filing  of  

charge-sheet  and  disposal  of  certain  interlocutory  

applications, the High Court of Bombay was moved  

on  15.4.1997  for  quashing  of  the  criminal  

proceedings.   As has been stated earlier,  the High  

Court  declined  to  interfere  and,  hence,  all  the  

accused  persons  approached  this  Court  in  appeal,  

wherein the criminal case in respect of the old ladies  

was delinked and quashed.   

5. It  is  asserted  in  this  petition  that  after  this  Court  

disposed  of  the  earlier  criminal  appeals,  charges  

were framed only on 15.12.2007 nearly after expiry  

of  seven  years.   It  is  put  forth  that  during  the  

pendency of the trial, the wife of the petitioner No. 1  

has breathed her last on 23.5.2008.  It is averred that  

nearly  after  four  years  of  framing  of  charges,  on  

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1.2.2011,  Shri  Vasant  S.  Shete,  the  Investigating  

Officer, was partly examined by the prosecution and,  

thereafter,  the  matter  was  adjourned  on  many  an  

occasion.  Despite the last opportunity being granted  

by  the  learned  Special  Judge,  the  Investigating  

Officer  was  not  produced  for  examination.   As  

pleaded,  the  Investigating  Officer  appeared  before  

the Special  Judge on 20.7.2011 and sought further  

time  instead  of  getting  himself  examined.  

Thereafter, the matter was adjourned on 25.8.2011,  

21.9.2011  and  18.10.2011  and  the  examination  of  

the Investigating Officer  could  not  take place.   On  

15.11.2011,  the  Investigating  Officer  submitted  a  

letter to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, ACB,  

stating  that  he  had  already  taken  voluntary  

retirement  and  due  to  bad  health  was  unable  to  

attend the court and follow up the case.  He made a  

request to the ACP to appoint some other officer for  

prosecuting the case.  Thereafter,  the Investigating  

Officer  absented  himself  before  the  learned  trial  

judge  to  give  his  evidence.   It  is  contended  that  

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because  of  the  said  situation,  the  examination-in-

chief of PW-1 has not yet been completed and the  

other  witnesses  have  not  been  produced  for  

examination  by  the  prosecution.   It  is  urged  that  

despite  prayer  made  by  the  petitioner  that  the  

prosecution case ought to be closed because of its  

inability  to  produce  the  witnesses,  the  learned  

Special  Judge  has  not  closed  the  evidence.   It  is  

urged that more than ten years have elapsed since  

the earlier judgment of this Court was rendered and,  

therefore,  the  whole  proceeding  deserved  to  be  

quashed.   Emphasis  has  been  laid  on  the  loss  of  

reputation, mental suffering, stress and anxiety and  

the gross violation of the concept of speedy trial as  

enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution.   

6. The stand of the State of Maharashtra,  respondent  

No. 1,  is that after delivery of the judgment in the  

earlier  appeals,  the  accused  on  29.3.2001  moved  

numerous miscellaneous applications seeking various  

reliefs  and made a  prayer  that  framing of  charges  

should  be  deferred  till  all  the  miscellaneous  

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applications were decided.  He moved the High Court  

in its revisional jurisdiction and writ jurisdiction and  

though the  High  Court  did  not  grant  stay,  yet  the  

case was adjourned at the instance of the accused.  

On number of occasions, the accused himself moved  

applications for adjournment and some times sought  

adjournment  to  go out  of  the  country  to  Bangkok,  

Thailand and Singapore.

7. Even after the trial commenced, the accused did not  

cooperate and remained non-responsive.  A chart has  

been  filed  showing  the  manner  in  which  

adjournments  were  taken  by  the  accused  at  the  

stage of framing of charge on the ground that the  

matter  was  pending  before  the  High  Court.   A  

reference  has  been  made  to  the  order  dated  

30.1.2003 directing all the accused to remain present  

on  the  next  date  of  hearing,  i.e.,  07.2.2003,  for  

framing of charge.  Reference has been made to the  

orders passed wherefrom it is clear that the accused  

persons had sought adjournment on the ground that  

writ petitions were pending before the High Court.  It  

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is also put forth that certain applications were filed  

by the accused persons seeking longer date by giving  

personal  reasons and sometimes  on the ground of  

non-availability of the counsel.  It is the case of the  

prosecution  that  because  of  adjournments,  the  

charges  could  not  be  framed  within  a  reasonable  

time but ultimately, on 15.12.2007, the charges were  

framed.  The factual narration would further reveal  

that  certain  miscellaneous  applications  were  filed  

and  they  were  ultimately  dismissed  on  20.2.2008.  

On  04.4.2009,  an  order  was  passed  requiring  the  

counsel  for  the  accused  to  submit  admission  and  

denial  of  the  documents  as  per  the  description  

mentioned in  the  application under  Section  294 of  

the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.   Some  time  was  

consumed to carry out the said exercise.  The matter  

was  also  adjourned  as  PW.1  had  undergone  an  

operation.   On  26.8.2012,  the  trial  Court  recorded  

that the witness, Shetye, was unable to attend the  

Court  and  on  the  next  date,  i.e.,  13.7.2012,  the  

Prosecution  Witness  No.  1  stated  that  he  was  

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suffering from mental  imbalance and was not  in  a  

position to depose and in view of the said situation,  

the Court directed the prosecution to lead evidence  

of other witnesses on the next date.  Relying on the  

documents  annexed  to  the  counter  affidavit,  it  is  

contended that  on most of  the dates,  the accused  

has taken adjournment on some pretext or the other.  

8. In  the  body of  the  counter  affidavit,  various  dates  

have been referred to and, computing the same, it  

has  been  stated  that  delay  attributable  to  the  

accused is 15.5 years and the delay in bringing the  

matter in queue in the trial Court is one year.  The  

rest of the delay is  caused as the prosecution has  

taken time on certain occasions and on some dates,  

the  learned  trial  Judge  was  on  leave.   In  this  

backdrop, it has been contended that it is not a fit  

case, where this Court should quash the proceedings  

in  exercise  of  powers  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution of India.

9. An affidavit-in-rejoinder has been filed stating, inter  

alia,  that  applications  were  filed  for  release  which  

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were  within  the  legal  rights  and  hence,  the  delay  

cannot be attributed to the accused persons.   It  is  

urged  that  though  number  of  orders  have  been  

passed, yet not a single witness has been examined.  

The allegation that the accused had gone on vacation  

has been seriously disputed.  Emphasis has been laid  

on  the  order  dated  18.3.2005  passed  by  the  High  

Court clarifying the position that it had not granted  

stay and the pendency of the matter should not be a  

ground to adjourn the case.  It is contended that the  

Investigating Officer is neither serious nor interested  

to  see  the  progress  of  the  trial  but  is  desirous  of  

delaying  as  he  is  aware  that  the  case  of  the  

prosecution is  totally  devoid of  merit.   It  is  further  

stated  that  there  has  been  gross  and unexplained  

delay at each stage of the proceedings and hence,  

the same deserves to be quashed.

10. We have heard  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned  senior  

counsel for the petitioner, and Mr. Sanjay V. Kharde,  

learned counsel for the respondent-State.   

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11. To appreciate the centripodal issue whether in such a  

case this Court, in exercise of powers under Article  

32 of the Constitution, should quash the criminal trial  

on the ground of delay, it is requisite to state that in  

the present petition, we are only concerned with the  

time  spent  after  02.3.2001,  i.e.,  the  date  of  

pronouncement  of  the  judgment  in  the  earlier  

criminal  appeals,  and further  the factual  matrix  as  

already exposited shows how the delay has occurred.  

The factum of delay and its resultant effect are to be  

tested on the basis of the exposition of law by this  

Court.   

12. In  Abdul  Rehman  Antulay  and  others  v.  R.S.   

Nayak and another2, a proponement was advanced  

that unless a time limit is fixed for the conclusion of  

the  criminal  proceedings,  the  right  to  speedy  trial  

would  be  illusory.   The  Constitution  Bench,  after  

referring  to  the  factual  matrix  and  various  

submissions,  opined  that  there  is  a  constitutional  

guarantee of speedy trial emanating from Article 21  

2 (1992) 1 SCC 225

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which  is  also  reflected  in  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure.  Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state  

as follows:-    

“83. But  then  speedy  trial  or  other  expressions  conveying  the  said  concept  –  are necessarily relative in nature.  One may  ask  –  speedy  means,  how  speedy?   How  long a delay is too long?  We do not think it  is possible to lay down any time schedules  for conclusion of criminal proceedings.  The  nature of offence, the number of accused,  the number  of  witnesses,  the workload in  the  particular  court,  means  of  communication  and  several  other  circumstances have to be kept in mind.”

After  so  stating,  the  Court  gave  certain  examples  

relating to a murder trial where less number of witnesses  

are  examined  and  certain  trials  which  involve  large  

number of witnesses.  It also referred to certain offences  

which, by their very nature, e.g., conspiracy cases, cases  

of  misappropriation,  embezzlement,  fraud,  forgery,  

sedition, acquisition of disproportionate assets by public  

servants, cases of corruption against high public officials,  

take longer time for investigation and trial.  The Court also  

took note of the workload in each court, district, regional  

and State-wise and the strikes by the members of the Bar  

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which  interfere  with  the  work  schedules.   The  Bench  

further proceeded to observe that in the very nature of  

things, it is difficult to draw a time limit beyond which a  

criminal proceeding will not be allowed to go, and if it is a  

minor offence, not an economic offence and the delay is  

too  long,  not  caused  by  the  accused,  different  

considerations may arise but each case must be left to be  

decided on its own facts and the right to speedy trial does  

not become illusory when a time limit is not fixed.

13. In the said case, in paragraph 86, the Court culled  

out 11 propositions which are meant to sub-serve as  

guidelines.   The  Constitution  Bench  observed  that  

the  said  propositions  are  not  exhaustive  as  it  is  

difficult to foresee all situations and further, it is not  

possible to lay down any hard and fast rules.  The  

propositions  which  are  relevant  for  the  present  

purpose are reproduced below:-

“(5) While  determining  whether  undue  delay has occurred (resulting in violation of  Right  to  Speedy  Trial)  one  must  have  regard to all  the attendant circumstances,  including  nature  of  offence,  number  of  accused and witnesses, the workload of the  court concerned, prevailing local conditions  

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and  so  on  –  what  is  called,  the  systemic  delays.  It is true that it is the obligation of  the State to ensure a speedy trial and State  includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and  practical  approach  should  be  adopted  in  such matters instead of a pedantic one.

xxx    xxx xxx

(8) Ultimately,  the Court has to balance  and  weigh  the  several  relevant  factors  -  ‘balancing test’ or ‘balancing process’ – and  determine in each case whether the right to  speedy  trial  has  been  denied  in  a  given  case.

(9) Ordinarily speaking,  where the court  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  right  to  speedy  trial  of  an  accused  has  been  infringed the charges or the conviction, as  the case may be, shall be quashed.  But this  is not the only course open.  The nature of  the  offence and other  circumstances  in  a  given case may be such that  quashing of  proceedings may not be in the interest of  justice.   In  such a case,  it  is  open to the  court to make such other appropriate order  –  including  an  order  to  conclude the  trial  within  a  fixed  time where  the  trial  is  not  concluded or reducing the sentence where  the trial has concluded – as may be deemed  just and equitable in the circumstances of  the case.       

It  has  been  laid  down  therein  that  it  is  neither  

advisable nor practicable to fix any time-limit for trial of  

offences  inasmuch  as  any  such  rule  is  bound  to  be  

qualified one.   

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14. In  Kartar  Singh  v.  State  of  Punjab3,  another  

Constitution Bench, while accepting the principle that  

denial of the right to speedy trial to the accused may  

eventually  result  in  a  decision  to  dismiss  the  

indictment or a reversal of conviction, further went  

on to state as follows:-

“92. Of course, no length of time is per se  too  long  to  pass  scrutiny  under  this  principle nor the accused is called upon to  show  the  actual  prejudice  by  delay  of  disposal of cases. On the other hand, the  court  has  to  adopt a  balancing approach  by taking note of  the possible prejudices  and disadvantages to be suffered by the  accused  by  avoidable  delay  and  to  determine  whether  the  accused  in  a  criminal proceeding has been deprived of  his  right  of  having  speedy  trial  with  unreasonable  delay  which  could  be  identified  by  the  factors  — (1)  length  of  delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3)  the  accused's  assertion  of  his  right  to  speedy trial,  and (4)  prejudice caused to  the accused by such delay.”  

15. However,  thereafter,  certain  pronouncements,  

namely, “Common Cause”, A Registered Society  

through  its  director  v.  Union  of  India  and  

others4,  “Common  Cause”,  A  Registered  

3 (1994) 3 SCC 569 4 (1996) 4 SCC 33

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Society through its director v. Union of India   

and  others5,  Raj  Deo  Sharma  (supra)  and  Raj  

Deo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar6, came to the  

field  relating  to  prescription  of  outer  limit  for  the  

conclusion of the criminal trial and the consequences  

of such delay, being either discharge or acquittal of  

the  accused.   The  controversy  required  to  be  

addressed and, accordingly, the matter was  referred  

to a Seven-Judge Bench in  P. Ramchandra Rao v.  

State of Karnataka7 and the larger Bench by the  

majority  opinion,  analyzing  the  dictum  of  A.R.  

Antulay’s case and Kartar Singh’s case and other  

legal  principles  relating  to  the  power  of  the  

Legislature, the power of the Court and spectrums of  

jurisdiction,  recorded  certain  conclusions.   The  

conclusion Nos. 3 and 4, which are pertinent for the  

present case, are as under:-

“(3) The  guidelines  laid  down  in  A.R.  Antulay case are not exhaustive but only  illustrative.   They  are  not  intended  to  operate  as  hard-and-fast  rules  or  to  be  applied like a straitjacket  formula.   Their  

5 (1996) 6 SCC 775 6 (1999) 7 SCC 604 7 (2002) 4 SCC 578

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applicability  would  depend  on  the  fact  situation  of  each  case.   It  is  difficult  to  foresee all situations and no generalization  can be made.

(4) It is neither advisable, nor feasible, nor  judicially  permissible  to  draw  or  prescribe an outer limit for conclusion of  all criminal proceedings.  The time-limits  or  bars  of  limitation  prescribed  in  the  several  directions  made  in  Common  Cause (I),  Raj  Deo Sharma (I)  and Raj   Deo Sharma (II) could not have been so  prescribed or  drawn and are not  good  law.  The criminal courts are not obliged  to  terminate  trial  or  criminal  proceedings merely on account of lapse  of time, as prescribed by the directions  made  in    Common  Cause  Case  (I),  Raj    Deo  Sharma Case  (I)  and  (II).  At  the  most the periods of time prescribed in  those  decisions  can  be  taken  by  the  courts seized of the trial or proceedings  to act as reminders when they may be  persuaded to apply their judicial mind to  the facts and circumstances of the case  before  them  and  determine  by  taking  into  consideration  the  several  relevant  factors  as  pointed  out  in  A.R.  Antulay  case  and  decide  whether  the  trial  or  proceedings  have  become  so  inordinately  delayed  as  to  be  called  oppressive  and  unwarranted.   Such  time-limits  cannot  and  will  not  by  themselves be treated by any Court as a  bar to further continuance of the trial or  proceedings and as mandatorily obliging  the  court  of  terminate  the  same  and  acquit or discharge the accused.”  

[Emphasis added]

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16. At this juncture, we may notice few decisions to show  

how  the  principles  laid  down  in  Abdul  Rehman  

Antulay (supra) and P. Ramachandra Rao (supra)  

have  been  applied  by  this  Court  either  for  the  

purpose of quashing of the prosecution or refusal to  

accede to the prayer in that regard. In Vakil Prasad  

Singh v. State of Bihar8, the two-Judge Bench took  

note of  factual  scenario  that  the investigation was  

conducted by an officer who had no jurisdiction to do  

so; that the accused-appellant therein could not be  

accused of causing delay in the trial because he had  

successfully exercised his right to challenge an illegal  

investigation;  that  despite  direction  by  the  High  

Court to complete the investigation within a period of  

three months on 7.9.1990, nothing had happened till  

27.2.2007 and the charge-sheet could only be filed  

on 1.5.2007 and, accordingly, opined that it was not  

a  case  where  there  was  any  exceptional  

circumstance  which  could  be  possibly  taken  into  

consideration for condoning the inordinate delay of  

more  than  two  decades  in  investigation  and,  8 (2009) 3 SCC 355

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accordingly, quashed the proceedings before the trial  

court.   

17. In  Sudarshanacharya  v.  Purushottamacharya  

and another9, a criminal prosecution was launched  

for  commission  of  an  offence  for  misappropriation  

and criminal breach of trust.  On an application being  

filed for quashing of the proceedings, the High Court  

declined to quash the proceedings taking note of the  

fact that the accused had also played a role in the  

procrastination of the proceeding and directed that  

the case be heard on day-to-day basis.  The matter  

travelled  to  this  Court  and  a  contention  was  

advanced  that  it  would  be  unfair  to  submit  the  

accused-appellant to the agony of a trial after a lapse  

of  long  time.   The  Division  Bench  referred  to  the  

principles  laid  down  in  P.  Ramachandra  Rao  

(supra) and, further taking note of the conduct of the  

accused, declined to quash the proceedings.

18. At  this  stage,  we  think  it  apposite  to  advert  to  

another aspect which is some times highlighted.  It is  

9 (2012) 9 SCC 241

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quite  common  that  a  contention  is  canvassed  in  

certain cases that unless there is a speedy trial, the  

concept of fair trial is totally crucified.  Recently, in  

Mohd.  Hussain  alias  Julfikar  Ali  v.  State  

(Government  of  NCT  of  Delhi)10,  a  three-Judge  

Bench, after referring to the pronouncements in  P.  

Ramchandra  Rao’s case,  Zahira  Habibulla  H.  

Shekh  and  another  v.  State  of  Gujarat  and  

others11, Satyajit Banerjee and others v. State  

of  West  Bengal  and  others12,  pointed  out  the  

subtle distinction between the two in the following  

manner:-

“40  “Speedy  trial”  and  “fair  trial”  to  a  person accused of a crime are integral part  of Article 21.  There is, however, qualitative  difference between the right to speedy trial  and the accused’s right of fair trial.  Unlike  the accused’s right of fair trial, deprivation  of the right to speedy trial does not per se  prejudice the accused in defending himself.  The right to speedy trial is in its very nature  relative.   It  depends  upon  diverse  circumstances.   Each  case  of  delay  in  conclusion of a criminal trial has to be seen  in the facts and circumstances of such case.  Mere  lapse  of  several  years  since  the  commencement  of  prosecution  by  itself  

10 (2012) 9 SCC 408 11 (2004) 4 SCC 158 12 (2005) 1 SCC 115

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may  not  justify  the  discontinuance  of  prosecution or dismissal of indictment.  The  factors  concerning  the  accused’s  right  to  speedy  trial  have  to  be  weighed  vis-à-vis  the impact of the crime on society and the  confidence of the people in judicial system.  Speedy trial  secures  rights  to  an accused  but it does not preclude the rights of public  justice.   The nature and gravity  of  crime,  persons involved, social impact and societal  needs must be weighed along with the right  of  the  accused to  speedy trial  and  if  the  balance tilts in favour of the former the long  delay in conclusion of criminal trial should  not  operate  against  the  continuation  of  prosecution and if the right of the accused  in the facts and circumstances of the case  and exigencies of situation tilts the balance  in  his  favour,  the  prosecution  may  be  brought to an end.”

[Emphasis added]

19. It is to be kept in mind that on one hand, the right of  

the  accused is  to  have  a  speedy  trial  and on  the  

other,  the  quashment  of  the  indictment  or  the  

acquittal or refusal for sending the matter for re-trial  

has to be weighed, regard being had to the impact of  

the crime on the society and the confidence of the  

people  in  the  judicial  system.   There  cannot  be  a  

mechanical approach.  From the principles laid down  

in  many  an  authority  of  this  Court,  it  is  clear  as  

crystal  that  no  time  limit  can  be  stipulated  for  

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disposal of the criminal trial.  The delay caused has  

to be weighed on the factual score, regard being had  

to the nature of the offence and the concept of social  

justice and the cry of the collective.  In the case at  

hand, the appellant has been charge-sheeted under  

the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1988  for  

disproportionate assets.  The said Act has a purpose  

to  serve.   The  Parliament  intended  to  eradicate  

corruption and provide deterrent  punishment when  

criminal culpability is proven.  The intendment of the  

legislature has an immense social relevance.  In the  

present day scenario, corruption has been treated to  

have the potentiality of corroding the marrows of the  

economy.   There  are  cases  where  the  amount  is  

small and in certain cases, it is extremely high.  The  

gravity  of  the  offence  in  such  a  case,  in  our  

considered  opinion,  is  not  to  be  adjudged  on  the  

bedrock  of  the  quantum of  bribe.   An  attitude  to  

abuse the official position to extend favour in lieu of  

benefit  is  a  crime  against  the  collective  and  an  

anathema  to  the  basic  tenet  of  democracy,  for  it  

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erodes  the  faith  of  the  people  in  the  system.   It  

creates an incurable concavity in the Rule of Law.  Be  

it noted, system of good governance is founded on  

collective faith in the institutions.  If corrosions are  

allowed to continue by giving allowance to quash the  

proceedings  in  corruption  cases  solely  because  of  

delay without  scrutinizing  other  relevant  factors,  a  

time may come when the unscrupulous people would  

foster and garner the tendency to pave the path of  

anarchism.   

20. It can be stated without any fear of contradiction that  

corruption  is  not  to  be  judged  by  degree,  for  

corruption mothers disorder, destroys societal will to  

progress, accelerates undeserved ambitions, kills the  

conscience,  jettisons  the  glory  of  the  institutions,  

paralyses the economic health of a country, corrodes  

the  sense  of  civility  and  mars  the  marrows  of  

governance.   It  is  worth  noting  that  immoral  

acquisition  of  wealth  destroys  the  energy  of  the  

people believing in honesty, and history records with  

agony how they have suffered.  The only redeeming  

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fact  is  that  collective  sensibility  respects  such  

suffering  as  it  is  in  consonance  with  the  

constitutional  morality.   Therefore,  the  relief  for  

quashing  of  a  trial  under  the  1988  Act  has  to  be  

considered in the above backdrop.

21. It  is  perceivable  that  delay  has  occurred  due  to  

dilatory tactics adopted by the accused, laxity on the  

part of the prosecution and faults on the part of the  

system,  i.e.,  to  keep  the  court  vacant.   It  is  also  

interesting to note that though there was no order  

directing  stay  of  the  proceedings  before  the  trial  

court,  yet  at  the  instance  of  the  accused,  

adjournments  were  sought.   After  the  High  Court  

clarified the position,  the accused,  by exhibition of  

inherent  proclivity,  sought  adjournment  and  filed  

miscellaneous  applications  for  prolonging  the  trial,  

possibly  harbouring  the  notion  that  asking  for  

adjournment  is  a  right  of  the  accused  and  filing  

applications is his unexceptional legal right.   When  

we say so, we may not be understood to have said  

that  the  accused  is  debarred  in  law  to  file  

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applications, but when delay is caused on the said  

score,  he cannot advance a plea that the delay in  

trial  has  caused  colossal  hardship  and  agony  

warranting  quashment  of  the  entire  criminal  

proceeding.  In the present case, as has been stated  

earlier, the accused, as alleged, had acquired assets  

worth Rs. 33.44 lacs.  The value of the said amount  

at the time of launching of the prosecution has to be  

kept  in  mind.   It  can  be  stated  with  absolute  

assurance  that  the  tendency  to  abuse  the  official  

position has spread like an epidemic and has shown  

its propensity making the collective to believe that  

unless bribe is given, the work may not be done.  To  

put it differently, giving bribe, whether in cash or in  

kind, may become the “mantra” of the people.  We  

may hasten to add, some citizens do protest but the  

said protest may not inspire others to follow the path  

of  sacredness  of  boldness  and  sacrosanctity  of  

courage.  Many may try to deviate.  This deviation is  

against the social and national interest.  Thus, we are  

disposed to think that the balance to continue the  

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proceeding  against  the  accused-appellants  tilts  in  

favour  of  the  prosecution  and,  hence,  we  are  not  

inclined to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 32  

of  the  Constitution  to  quash  the  proceedings.  

However,  the  learned  Special  Judge  is  directed  to  

dispose of the trial  by the end of December, 2013  

positively.

22. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J.                                            [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; March 15, 2013

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