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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7414 OF 2014 (arising out of SLP (C) No.19549 of 2013)

Nawal  Kishore  Sharma  ….Appellant(s)

Versus Union of  India and Others                         … Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

M.Y. EQBAL, J.

1.  Leave granted.

2. Aggrieved  by  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

16.4.2013 passed by learned Single Judge of Patna High  

Court  dismissing  appellant’s  writ  petition  for  want  of  

territorial  jurisdiction,  this  appeal  by  special  leave  has  

been preferred by the appellant, who in November, 1988  

had  joined  the  off-shore  Department  of  the  Shipping  

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Corporation of India (in short, “the Corporation”) and after  

about eight years he was transferred from the off-shore  

duty to a main fleet in the Foreign Going Department.   

3. It  is  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  he  was  found  

medically fit in the medical test conducted by the Marine  

Medical  Services  in  February,  2009  and  thereafter,  on  

29.9.2009,  an  agreement  known  as  the  articles  of  

agreement for employment of seafarers was executed for  

appellant’s  off-shore  duty.   On  18.6.2010,  when  the  

appellant  reported  sickness  i.e.  cough,  abdominal  pain,  

swelling in leg and difficulty in breathing, he was sent for  

medical  treatment  ashore  at  Adani,  Mundra  Port.   The  

Medical Officer ashore advised him for admission in the  

Hospital  and  accordingly  he  was  signed  off  for  further  

medical  treatment.   Thereafter,  he  was  considered  

permanently  unfit  for  sea  service  due  to  dilated  

cardiomyopathy (heart muscle disease) as per certificate  

dated 18.3.2011 issued by Corporation’s Assistant Medical  

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Officer.   Consequently,  the Shipping Department  of  the  

Government  of  India,  Mumbai  issued  order  dated  

12.4.2011  cancelling  registration  of  the  appellant  as  a  

Seaman.

4. It is contended by the appellant that after he settled  

at his native place Gaya, Bihar,  he sent several letters/  

representations  from  there  to  the  respondents  for  his  

financial claims as per statutory provisions and terms of  

contract.   On  the  disability  compensation  claim,  

Respondent  no.2-Corporation  communicated  vide  letter  

dated  7.10.2011  that  since  the  appellant  was  declared  

unfit  for  sea  service  due  to  heart  problem  (organic  

ailment)  he  will  be  entitled  to  receive  severance  

compensation  of  Rs.2,75,000/-,  which  was  although  

offered, but not accepted by the appellant.   It was also  

informed  that  he  is  not  entitled  to  receive  disability  

compensation,  which  becomes  payable  only  in  case  a  

seaman becomes incapacitated as a result of the injury.

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5. By  filing  a  writ  petition,  the  appellant  approached  

Patna High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India for grant of various reliefs including 100% disability  

compensation and pecuniary damages.  However, at the  

time  of  hearing,  respondents  raised  the  question  of  

maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that no  

cause of action or even a fraction of cause of action arose  

within the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court  

and contended that the appellant was appointed by the  

Corporation on the post of Seaman for off-shore services  

and he discharged his  duty  outside the territory  of  the  

State of Bihar.  It is the case of the respondent that the  

order declaring the appellant permanently unfit as well as  

the  letter/order  dated  7.10.2011  was  passed  by  an  

authority of the respondent Corporation at Mumbai.  Per  

contra,  it  is  the  case  of  the  appellant  that  he  is  a  

permanent resident of Bihar and he asserted his rights in  

the State of Bihar and all communications with respect to  

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rejection  of  his  claims  were  made  at  his  residential  

address in the State of Bihar.  

6. After  hearing  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

parties  and  considering  entire  materials  on  record,  

learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court dismissed  

the writ petition of the appellant holding that no cause of  

action, not even a fraction of cause of action, arose within  

its territorial  jurisdiction.  Hence, the present appeal by  

special leave.

7. We  have  heard  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

parties.

8. The short question that falls for consideration in the  

facts of the present case is that as to whether the Patna  

High  Court  is  correct  in  taking  the  view that  it  has  no  

jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.  For answering  

the said question we would like to consider the provision  

of  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  as  it  stood  prior  to  

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amendment.   Originally,  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  

read as under:-

“Art.226.  Power  of  High  Courts  to  issue  certain  writs. –  (1)  Notwithstanding  anything  in  article  32,  every  High  Court  shall  have  power,  throughout  the  territories  in  relation  to  which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to  any  person  or  authority,  including  in  appropriate cases any Government, within  those territories directions, orders or writs,  including  writs  in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus,  mandamus,  prohibition,  quo  warranto and certiorari, or any of them or  the  enforcement  of  any  of  the  rights  conferred  by  Part  III  and  for  any  other  purpose. (2) The power conferred on a High Court  by clause (1) shall not be in derogation of  the power conferred on the Supreme Court  by clause (2) of article 32”.

9. While  interpreting  the  aforesaid  provision  the  

Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of  Election  

Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao, AIR 1953  

SC 210, held that the writ court would not run beyond the  

territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the person or  

the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to  

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court’s jurisdiction either by residence or location within  

those territories.   The rule that cause of action attracts  

jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and  

cannot  apply  to  writs  issued  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution which makes no reference to any cause of  

action or where it arises but insist on the presence of the  

person  or  authority  within  the  territories  in  relation  to  

which  High  Court  exercises  jurisdiction.   In  another  

Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Rashid  

and Son vs. Income tax Investigation Commission  

Etc., AIR 1954 SC 207, this Court took the similar view  

and  held  that  the  writ  court  cannot  exercise  its  power  

under Article 226 beyond its territorial jurisdiction.  The  

Court was of the view that the exercise of power conferred  

by Article  226 was subject  to  a  two-fold  limitation viz.,  

firstly, the power is to be exercised in relation to which it  

exercises  jurisdiction  and  secondly,  the  person  or  

authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue  

writ  must  be  within  those  territories.   These  two  

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Constitution  Bench  judgments  came  for  consideration  

before a larger Bench of seven Judges of this Court in the  

case of Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh  vs.  Union of India and  

another, AIR  1961  SC  532.   The  Bench  approved  the  

aforementioned  two  Constitution  Bench  judgments  and  

opined  that  unless  there  are  clear  and  compelling  

reasons,  which  cannot  be  denied,  writ  court  cannot  

exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution  

beyond its territorial jurisdiction.

10. The  interpretation  given  by  this  Court  in  the  

aforesaid  decisions  resulted  in  undue  hardship  and  

inconvenience to the citizens to invoke writ  jurisdiction.  

As a result, Clause 1(A) was inserted in Article 226 by the  

Constitution  (15th)  Amendment  Act,  1963  and  

subsequently  renumbered  as  Clause  (2)  by  the  

Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976.  The amended  

Clause (2) now reads as under:-

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“226.  Power  of  the  High  Courts  to  issue certain writs – (1) Notwithstanding  anything in  article 32,   every High Court  shall  have  power,  throughout  the  territories in relation to which it exercises  jurisdiction,  to  issue  to  any  person  or  authority,  including  in  appropriate  cases,  any  Government,  within  those  territories  directions, orders or writs,  including writs  in  the  nature  of  habeas  corpus,  mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and  certiorari,  or  any  of  them,  for  the  enforcement of any of the rights conferred  by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by Clause (1) to  issue  directions,  orders  or  writs  to  any  Government, authority or person may also  be exercised by any High Court exercising  jurisdiction  in  relation  to  the  territories  within which the cause of action, wholly or  in  part,  arises  for  the  exercise  of  such  power,  notwithstanding  that  the  seat  of  such  Government  or  authority  or  the  residence  of  such  person  is  not  within  those territories. (3) xxxxx (4) xxxxx”

11.  On  a  plain  reading  of  the  amended  provisions  in  

Clause (2), it is clear that now High Court can issue a writ  

when the person or the authority against whom the writ is  

issued is located outside its territorial  jurisdiction, if  the  

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cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court’s  

territorial jurisdiction. Cause of action for the purpose of  

Article  226  (2)  of  the  Constitution,  for  all  intent  and  

purpose  must  be  assigned  the  same  meaning  as  

envisaged  under  Section  20(c)  of  the  Code  of  Civil  

Procedure.  The expression cause of action has not been  

defined  either  in  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  or  the  

Constitution. Cause of action is bundle of facts which is  

necessary for the plaintiff to prove in the suit before he  

can succeed.  

12. The term ‘cause of action’ as appearing in Clause (2)  

came for consideration time and again before this Court.   

13.   In the case of State of Rajasthan and Others  vs.  

M/s  Swaika  Properties  and  Another, (1985)  3  SCC  

217, the fact was that the respondent-Company having its  

registered  office  in  Calcutta  owned certain  land on  the  

outskirts  of  Jaipur  City  was  served  with  notice  for  

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acquisition of land  under Rajasthan Urban Improvement  

Act, 1959.  Notice was duly served on the Company at its  

registered  office  at  Calcutta.   The  Company,  first  

appeared before the Special Court and finally the Calcutta  

High  Court  by  filing  a  writ  petition  challenging  the  

notification  of  acquisition.   The  matter  ultimately  came  

before this Court to answer a question as to whether the  

service of  notice under  Section 52(2)  of  the Act  at  the  

registered  office  of  the  Respondent  in  Calcutta  was  an  

integral  part  of  cause of  action and was it  sufficient  to  

invest  the  Calcutta  High  Court  with  a  jurisdiction  to  

entertain  the  petition  challenging  the  impugned  

notification.  Answering the question this Court held:-

“7. Upon these facts, we are satisfied that  the cause of action neither wholly nor in part  arose  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned  Single  Judge  had  no  jurisdiction  to  issue  a  rule  nisi  on  the  petition  filed  by  the  respondents  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution  or  to  make  the  ad  interim  ex  parte  prohibitory  order  restraining  the  appellants  from  taking  any  steps  to  take  possession of the land acquired. Under sub-

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section  (5)  of  Section  52  of  the  Act  the  appellants  were  entitled  to  require  the  respondents  to  surrender  or  deliver  possession  of  the  lands  acquired  forthwith  and  upon  their  failure  to  do  so,  take  immediate  steps to  secure such  possession  under sub-section (6) thereof.

8. The  expression  “cause  of  action”  is  tersely  defined  in  Mulla’s  Code  of  Civil   Procedure:

“The  ‘cause  of  action’  means  every  fact  which, if traversed, it would be necessary for  the plaintiff to prove in order to support his  right to a judgment of the court.” In other words, it is a bundle of facts which  taken with the law applicable to them gives  the  plaintiff  a  right  to  relief  against  the  defendant. The mere service of notice under  Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents  at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne  Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits  of the State of West Bengal, could not give  rise to a cause of action within that territory  unless  the  service  of  such  notice  was  an  integral  part  of  the  cause  of  action.  The  entire  cause  of  action  culminating  in  the  acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of  the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan  i.e.  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. The  answer  to  the  question  whether  service  of  notice  is  an  integral  part  of  the  cause  of  action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of  the  Constitution  must  depend  upon  the  nature of the impugned order giving rise to a  cause  of  action.  The  notification  dated  February  8,  1984  issued  by  the  State  

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Government under Section 52(1)  of the Act  became  effective  the  moment  it  was  published in the Official Gazette as thereupon  the notified land became vested in the State  Government  free  from all  encumbrances.  It  was  not  necessary  for  the  respondents  to  plead the service of notice on them by the  Special  Officer,  Town  Planning  Department,  Jaipur under Section 52(2) for the grant of an  appropriate  writ,  direction  or  order  under  Article  226 of  the Constitution for  quashing  the  notification  issued  by  the  State  Government under Section 52(1) of the Act. If  the  respondents  felt  aggrieved  by  the  acquisition of their lands situate at Jaipur and  wanted  to  challenge  the  validity  of  the  notification issued by the State Government  of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act  by  a  petition  under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution, the remedy of the respondents  for the grant of such relief had to be sought  by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan  High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of  action wholly or in part arose.”

14. This provision was again considered by this Court in  

the  case  of  Oil  and  Natural  Gas  Commission  vs.  

Utpal Kumar Basu and others, (1994) 4 SCC 711.  In  

this case the petitioner Oil and Natural Gas Commission  

(ONGC)  through  its  consultant  Engineers  India  Limited  

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(EIL)  issued an advertisement in the newspaper inviting  

tenders for  setting up of  Kerosene Recovery Processing  

Unit  in  Gujarat  mentioning  that  the  tenders  containing  

offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi.  After  

the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at  

New  Delhi,  the  respondent  NICCO  moved  the  Calcutta  

High  Court  praying  that  ONGC  be  restrained  from  

awarding the contract to any other party.  It was pleaded  

in  the petition that  NICCO came to know of  the tender  

from the publication  in  the  “Times  of  India”  within  the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Calcutta  High  Court.   This  Court  by  

setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court  

came to the following conclusion :-

“6. Therefore,  in  determining  the  objection  of  lack  of  territorial  jurisdiction  the court must take all the facts pleaded in  support  of  the  cause  of  action  into  consideration  albeit  without  embarking  upon an enquiry as to the correctness or  otherwise of the said facts. In other words  the  question  whether  a  High  Court  has  territorial  jurisdiction  to  entertain  a  writ  petition must be answered on the basis of  the  averments  made in  the  petition,  the  

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truth  or  otherwise  whereof  being  immaterial.  To  put  it  differently,  the  question of territorial jurisdiction must be  decided  on  the  facts  pleaded  in  the  petition.  Therefore,  the  question  whether  in the instant case the Calcutta High Court  had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the  writ petition in question even on the facts  alleged  must  depend  upon  whether  the  averments  made in  paragraphs 5,  7,  18,  22,  26  and  43  are  sufficient  in  law  to  establish that a part of the cause of action  had  arisen  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Calcutta High Court.”

15.   In Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Union of India  

and Another, (2004) 6 SCC 254, this Court elaborately  

discussed Clause (2)  of  Article 226 of  the Constitution,  

particularly  the  meaning  of  the  word  ‘cause  of  action’  

with reference to Section 20(c)  and Section 141 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure and observed:-

“9. Although in view of Section 141 of the  Code of Civil Procedure the provisions thereof  would  not  apply  to  writ  proceedings,  the  phraseology  used  in  Section  20(c)  of  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure  and  clause  (2)  of  Article  226,  being  in  pari  materia,  the  decisions  of  this  Court  rendered  on  interpretation  of  Section  20(c)  CPC  shall  

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apply  to  the  writ  proceedings  also.  Before  proceeding  to  discuss  the  matter  further  it  may be pointed out that the entire bundle of  facts pleaded need not constitute a cause of  action  as  what  is  necessary  to  be  proved  before the petitioner can obtain a decree is  the  material  facts.  The  expression  material  facts is also known as integral facts.

10. Keeping in view the expressions used  in clause (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution  of India, indisputably even if a small fraction  of  cause  of  action  accrues  within  the  jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have  jurisdiction in the matter.”

Their Lordships further observed as under:-

“29. In view of clause (2) of Article 226 of  the  Constitution  of  India,  now  if  a  part  of  cause of action arises outside the jurisdiction  of the High Court, it would have jurisdiction to  issue a  writ.  The decision  in  Khajoor  Singh  has, thus, no application.

30. We must,  however,  remind ourselves  that even if a small part of cause of action  arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the  High  Court,  the  same by  itself  may not  be  considered  to  be  a  determinative  factor  compelling  the  High  Court  to  decide  the  matter  on  merit.  In  appropriate  cases,  the  Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary  jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum  conveniens.”  

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16. In  the  case  of  Union of  India  and  others  vs.  

Adani  Exports Ltd.  and another,  (2002)  1  SCC 567,  

this  Court  held that  in  order  to  confer  jurisdiction on a  

High Court to entertain a writ petition it must disclose that  

the integral facts pleaded in support of the cause of action  

do  constitute  a  cause  so  as  to  empower  the  court  to  

decide the  dispute and the  entire  or  a  part  of  it  arose  

within its jurisdiction. Each and every fact pleaded by the  

respondents in their application does not  ipso facto lead  

to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of  

action  within  the  Court’s  territorial  jurisdiction  unless  

those facts are such which have a nexus or relevance with  

the lis  i.e. involved in the case.  This Court observed:

“17. It is seen from the above that in order to  confer  jurisdiction  on  a  High  Court  to  entertain  a  writ  petition  or  a  special  civil  application  as  in  this  case,  the  High  Court  must  be  satisfied  from  the  entire  facts  pleaded in support of the cause of action that  those  facts  do  constitute  a  cause  so  as  to  empower the court to decide a dispute which  has,  at  least  in  part,  arisen  within  its  jurisdiction.  It  is  clear  from  the  above  judgment that each and every fact pleaded  

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by the respondents in their application does  not  ipso  facto  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  those  facts  give  rise  to  a  cause  of  action  within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless  those facts  pleaded are such which have a  nexus  or  relevance  with  the  lis  that  is  involved in the case.  Facts which have no   bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in  the case, do not give rise to a cause of action  so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the  court  concerned.  If  we  apply  this  principle  then we see that none of the facts pleaded in  para 16 of the petition, in our opinion, falls  into  the  category  of  bundle  of  facts  which  would constitute a cause of action giving rise  to  a  dispute  which  could  confer  territorial  jurisdiction on the courts at Ahmedabad.”

17. In  Om Prakash Srivastava   vs.  Union of India  

and Another  (2006) 6 SCC 207,   answering a similar  

question this Court observed that on a plain reading of  

Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High  

Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs  

for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or  

for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to  

which  it  exercises  jurisdiction  notwithstanding  that  the  

seat of the Government or authority or the residence of  

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the person against  whom the direction,  order  or  writ  is  

issued is not within the said territory. In para 7 this Court  

observed:-

“7. The question whether or not cause of action  wholly  or  in  part  for  filing  a  writ  petition has  arisen  within  the  territorial  limits  of  any  High  Court  has  to  be  decided  in  the  light  of  the  nature and character of the proceedings under  Article  226  of  the  Constitution.  In  order  to  maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to  establish that a legal right claimed by him has  prima  facie  either  been  infringed  or  is  threatened to  be  infringed by  the  respondent  within  the  territorial  limits  of  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  and  such  infringement  may  take  place  by  causing  him  actual  injury  or  threat  thereof.”

18.       In the case of   Rajendran Chingaravelu vs.  

R.K.  Mishra,  Additional  Commissioner  of  Income  

Tax and Others,   (2010)  1  SCC 457, this  Court  while  

considering the scope of Article 226(2) of the Constitution,  

particularly the  cause  of  action in maintaining a writ  

petition, held as under:  

“9. The  first  question  that  arises  for  consideration  is  whether  the  Andhra  Pradesh  

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High Court was justified in holding that as the  seizure took place at Chennai (Tamil Nadu), the  appellant could not maintain the writ  petition  before  it.  The  High  Court  did  not  examine  whether  any part  of cause of  action arose in  Andhra  Pradesh.  Clause  (2)  of  Article  226  makes it  clear that the High Court exercising  jurisdiction in relation to the territories within  which the cause of action arises wholly or  in  part,  will  have  jurisdiction.  This  would  mean  that  even  if  a  small  fraction  of  the  cause of  action  (that  bundle  of  facts  which  gives  a  petitioner,  a  right  to  sue)  accrued within  the  territories of Andhra Pradesh, the High Court of  that State will have jurisdiction.

xxxxxx

11. Normally,  we  would  have  set  aside  the  order  and  remitted  the  matter  to  the  High  Court  for  decision  on  merits.  But  from  the  persuasive submissions of  the appellant,  who  appeared  in  person  on  various  dates  of  hearing,  two  things  stood  out.  Firstly,  it  was  clear that the main object of the petition was to  ensure that at least in future, passengers like  him are not put to unnecessary harassment or  undue  hardship  at  the  airports.  He  wants  a  direction  for  issuance of  clear  guidelines  and  instructions  to  the  inspecting  officers,  and  introduction  of  definite  and  efficient  verification/investigation procedures. He wants  changes  in  the  present  protocol  where  the  officers are uncertain of what to do and seek  instructions and indefinitely wait for clearances  from  higher-ups  for  each  and  every  routine  step, resulting in the detention of passengers  

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for  hours  and  hours.  In  short,  he  wants  the  enquiries, verifications and investigations to be  efficient,  passenger-friendly  and  courteous.  Secondly,  he  wants  the  Department/officers  concerned  to  acknowledge  that  he  was  unnecessarily harassed.”

19.  Regard  being  had  to  the  discussion  made  

hereinabove, there cannot be any doubt that the question  

whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a  

writ petition has arisen within the territorial limit of any  

High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and  

character  of  the  proceedings  under  Article  226  of  the  

Constitution.   In  order  to  maintain  a  writ  petition,  the  

petitioner has to establish that a legal  right claimed by  

him  has  been  infringed  by  the  respondents  within  the  

territorial limit of the Court’s jurisdiction.

20.   We  have  perused  the  facts  pleaded  in  the  writ  

petition and the documents relied upon by the appellant.  

Indisputably, the appellant reported sickness on account  

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of various ailments including difficulty in breathing.  He  

was referred to hospital.  Consequently, he was signed off  

for  further  medical  treatment.   Finally,  the  respondent  

permanently declared the appellant unfit for sea service  

due to dilated cardiomyopathy (heart  muscles disease).  

As a result, the Shipping Department of the Government  

of  India  issued  an  order  on  12.4.2011  cancelling  the  

registration of the appellant as a seaman.  A copy of the  

letter was sent to the appellant at his native place in Bihar  

where he was staying after he was found medically unfit.  

It further appears that the appellant sent a representation  

from his  home in  the State of  Bihar  to  the respondent  

claiming disability compensation.  The said representation  

was replied by the respondent, which was addressed to  

him on his home address in Gaya, Bihar rejecting his claim  

for disability compensation.  It is further evident that when  

the appellant was signed off and declared medically unfit,  

he returned back to his home in the District of Gaya, Bihar  

and,  thereafter,  he  made  all  claims  and  filed  

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representation from his home address at Gaya and those  

letters  and  representations  were  entertained  by  the  

respondents  and  replied  and  a  decision  on  those  

representations were communicated to him on his home  

address in Bihar.  Admittedly, appellant was suffering from  

serious heart muscles disease (Dilated Cardiomyopathy)  

and breathing problem which forced him to stay in native  

place, wherefrom he had been making all correspondence  

with regard to his disability compensation.  Prima facie,  

therefore,  considering  all  the  facts  together,  a  part  or  

fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of  

the Patna High Court where he received a letter of refusal  

disentitling him from disability compensation.

21. Apart  from that,  from the  counter  affidavit  of  the  

respondents  and  the  documents  annexed  therewith,  it  

reveals that after the writ petition was filed in the Patna  

High Court, the same was entertained and notices were  

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issued.   Pursuant  to  the  said  notice,  the  respondents  

appeared and participated in the proceedings in the High  

Court.   It  further  reveals  that after  hearing the counsel  

appearing for both the parties, the High Court passed an  

interim  order  on  18.9.2012  directing  the  authorities  of  

Shipping  Corporation  of  India  to  pay  at  least  a  sum of  

Rs.2.75 lakhs, which shall be subject to the result of the  

writ  petition.  Pursuant  to  the  interim  order,  the  

respondent  Shipping  Corporation  of  India  remitted  

Rs.2,67,270/- (after deduction of income tax) to the bank  

account of the appellant.  However, when the writ petition  

was taken up for hearing, the High Court took the view  

that no cause of action, not even a fraction of cause of  

action, has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction.

22. Considering  the  entire  facts  of  the  case  narrated  

hereinbefore  including  the  interim order  passed  by  the  

High  Court,  in  our  considered opinion,  the  writ  petition  

ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial  

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jurisdiction.  As noticed above, at the time when the writ  

petition  was  heard  for  the  purpose  of  grant  of  interim  

relief,  the  respondents  instead  of  raising  any  objection  

with regard to territorial  jurisdiction opposed the prayer  

on  the  ground  that  the  writ  petitioner-appellant  was  

offered  an  amount  of  Rs.2.75  lakhs,  but  he  refused  to  

accept  the  same  and  challenged  the  order  granting  

severance compensation by filing the writ petition.  The  

impugned  order,  therefore,  cannot  be  sustained  in  the  

peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.   

23.   In  the  aforesaid,  the  appeal  is  allowed  and  the  

impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside and  

the matter is remitted to the High Court for deciding the  

writ petition on merits.

…………………………….J. (Ranjan Gogoi)

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…………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal)

New Delhi, August 7, 2014.

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