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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2788 OF 2005

NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION (MN)LTD.     … APPELLANT

VERSUS

M/S DURGA TRADING CO. AND ORS.        … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T  

SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.

This  appeal  has  been  preferred  by  the  appellant  against  

judgment  dated  6th February,  2003  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  

Judicature  at  Bombay  in  Writ  Petition  No.1552  of  2000.  By  the  

impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed  

the writ petition filed by respondent no.1 and held as follows:

“11. In the facts and circumstances of the present  case, the petitioner having acted on the agreement  of sale and having paid the entire consideration  was clearly not an unauthorized occupant within the  meaning of Section 2(g) of the Public Premises Act.  That  being  so,  there  is  no  justification  for  applying  the  summary  procedure  under  the  Public  Premises  Act,  nor  has  the  Estate  Officer  any  authority or jurisdiction to evict the petitioner  under  Section  5(2)  of  the  Public  Premises  Act.  There seems to be serious dispute about the title  which  dispute  cannot  be  resolved  under  Public  Premises Act. In our opinion, the invocation of the  provisions  of  the  Public  Premises  Act  in  the  present  case  was  wholly  improper.  The  Estate  Officer  without  any  application  of  mind  issued  directions  for  putting  locks  and  seals  on  the  premises.  In our opinion, due process of law in a  case  like  the  present  necessarily  implies  the  filing  of  suit  by  the  respondents  for  the

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enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of  the subject premises.”

2. While holding so the Division Bench of the High Court also set  

aside  the  order  dated  23rd June,  2000  and  notices  dated  17th  

November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises  

(Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act 1971 (hereinafter referred  

to  as  the  ‘1971  Act’)  by  Estate  Officer,  National  Textile  

Corporation(MN) Ltd.  

3. The factual matrix of the case is as follows:-

3.1 The  respondent  no.1  filed  a  petition  being  Writ  Petition  

No.1552  of  2000  before  the  Bombay  High  Court  challenging  the  

proceedings initiated by the appellant against it (respondent no.  

1) u/s 5A (for removal of movable structures/fixtures) and u/s 4(2)  

(b) read with Section 7(1) and (3) (for damages and eviction) of  

the 1971 Act, in respect of subject premises  i.e. land admeasuring  

2921  sq.  yards  with  structures  thereon  bearing  Nos.96  and  97  

situated at the premises of Shri Sitaram Mills Ltd. (hereinafter  

referred to as ‘SSML’ for short) at N.M. Joshi Marg, Mumbai.

3.2 In the said writ petition, respondent no. 1 submitted that the  

subject premises belonged to the erstwhile owner, SSML. On 25th  

March, 1975 an agreement to sell the subject premises was entered  

into between respondent no.1 and SSML and the full consideration of  

RS.25 Lakhs was paid by respondent no.1 to SSML.  On 1st April, 1975  

possession of the subject property was handed over to respondent  

no.1 and has since then remained with respondent no.1.  

3.3  The management of the textile undertaking of SSML was taken

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over by the Central Government w.e.f. 18th October, 1983 under the  

Textile  Undertakings  (Taking  over  of  Management)  Act,  1983  

(hereinafter referred  to as  the,  ‘1983  Act’) and  the  appellant  

corporation was appointed as its Custodian. Later,  the  right,  

title and interest in relation to the textile undertakings got  

transferred  and  vested  in  Central  Government  under  the  Textile  

Undertakings (Nationalization) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to  

as the, ‘1995 Act’) w.e.f.  1st April, 1995.

3.4 On 23rd June, 2000, the Estate Officer of the appellant  

Corporation passed an order under Sub Section (3) of Section 5A of  

the 1971 Act treating the subject premises as ‘public premises’ and  

directed  respondent  no.1  to  remove  the  movable  structures  and  

fixtures from the said premises. Thereafter, on 17th November, 2000  

the said authority issued two show cause notices to respondent no.1  

u/s 4(1) and 7(3) of the 1971 Act calling upon respondent no.1 to  

show cause why it should not be evicted from the subject premises  

and why it should not be made liable to pay damages. The appellant  

Corporation initiated the aforesaid action against respondent no.1  

on the ground that the premises were required for bona fide use.  

Moreover, the appellant Corporation urged before the High Court  

that since conveyance deed was not executed between the erstwhile  

owner SSML and respondent no. 1, it was merely an agreement to sell  

and  hence,  the  subject  premises  got  vested  in  the  Central  

Government under the 1995 Act.  

3.5 The High Court allowed the said writ petition by the impugned

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judgment and order dated 6th February, 2003.

4. The issue involved in the present appeal is:-

“Whether  in  the  facts  and  circumstances,  the  proceedings  

initiated  by  the  appellant  before  the  Estate  Officer  against  

respondent no.1 under the 1971 Act should continue or the appellant  

should be relegated to prefer a suit before the civil court as held  

by the High Court?”  

5. Learned Solicitor General of India appearing on behalf of the  

appellant made the following submissions:

5.1 The  claim  of  respondent  no.1  is  based  on  unregistered  

agreement to sell which never fructified into a registered sale  

deed.  Moreover, respondent no. 1 is neither the owner of the land  

nor  can  it  claim  authorized  occupancy  pursuant  to unregistered  

agreement.   

5.2 The land in question got vested with the State and it is  

deemed to have been transferred in favour of the appellant in view  

of provisions of 1983 Act and 1995 Act. In view of such vesting,  

respondent no.1 cannot claim to be an authorized occupant within  

the meaning of Section 2(g) of 1971 Act.

6. Per contra, according to the learned senior counsel appearing  

on behalf of the respondent:-

6.1 The  subject  premises  did  not  form  part  of  the  textile  

undertaking of SSML on the appointed day under the 1983 Act i.e. on  

18th October, 1983 and for that reason the management of the subject  

premises never got vested in the Central Government under the 1983

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Act and for the same reason the right, title and interest over the  

subject premises never got vested in the Central Government and the  

appellant  under  the  1995  Act.  Thus  both  the  Acts  have  no  

applicability to the subject premises.  

It  was  further  submitted  that  there  are  two  independent  

preconditions for vesting under 1995 Act.  

(i) what is acquired is the right, title and interest of the  

owner specified in column 3 of the first schedule and

(ii) such right title and interest must relate to the textile  

undertaking specified in column 2 of the first schedule.

6.2. Apart  from  the  factual  issue  with  respect  to  the  second  

requirement, the first requirement involves a mixed question of  

fact and law.  This is because whether or not a particular owner  

had “right, title and interest” on the appointed day involves a  

factual  enquiry  apart  from  vesting  by  operation  of  law.  The  

expression  “the  right,  title  and  interest  of  the  owner”  is  a  

compenditious expression covering 3 distinct aspects. Since this  

is an expropriatory legislation it ought to read strictly and all  

three  elements  must  subsist  together  before  any  vesting  takes  

place.   In  this  case,  the  appellant  has  no  right,  title  and  

interest.  

6.3. In any event, more than 12 years after respondent no.1 was put  

in possession and enjoyed the property fully, openly, continuously  

and in a manner hostile to SSML (and its successor in interest),  

respondent no.1 obtained rights in law and any residuary/vestige of

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a  title  that  remained  in  SSML  was  rendered  ineffective  or  

unenforceable in law.  

6.4. The overwhelming material available on the record suggests the  

following:

(i) Respondent no.1 and SSML had entered into an agreement to  

sell dated 25th March, 1975

(ii)  Respondent no.1 was put in possession of the   subject  

premises on 1st April, 1975 pursuant to the agreement to  

sell.

(iii) Respondent  no.1 had  paid  the  full  consideration  of  

Rs.25  lakhs  to  SSML  (Rs.21,85,000/-,  

Rs.1,15,000/-,Rs.20,000/- and Rs.1,80,000/-).

(iv)   The sale took place pursuant to a Special Resolution  

passed at the Extra Ordinary General Meeting of the  

Company held on 2nd March, 1975.

(v)   The sale of subject premises was reflected in the  

Balance Sheet and in Schedule of Fixed Assets of SSML  

for the year ended 31st March, 1975.

(vi)   SSML accepted tenancy under respondent no.1 over an  

area of 5802 sq. ft. of the subject premises and was  

paying rent to respondent no.1

(vii) SSML paid capital gains tax on the sale of the subject  

property  which  is  clear  from  the  letter  dated  

28.01.1980  written  by  SSML  to  the  Commissioner  of  

Income Tax.

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(viii) Various Government authorities have since recognized  

that  it  is  the  respondent  no.1  to  whom  the  said  

premises belongs.  This is clear, inter alia, from the  

following  

(a)Order dated 23rd March, 1977 passed by the Competent  

Authority under the Urban Land Ceiling Act granting  

permission to SSML to transfer the subject premises to  

respondent no.1 by way of sale.

(b) the agreements dated 5th May, 1976 and 1st September,  

1976 whereby respondent no.1 had let out a portion of  

the  property  on  the  first  and  second  floor  to the  

Collector of Customs through President of India.  Even  

after the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act, the President of  

India through the Collector of Customs continued the  

agreements with respondent no.1.  At no stage did the  

Collector of Customs approached the Central Government  

or appellant;

(c) BMC made separate property tax assessment in the  

name of respondent no.1

(d) the property tax assessed and paid by respondent  

no.1 to the Bombay Municipal Corporation

(e) BMC granted separate water connection in the name  

of  respondent  no.1 vide  its  letter  dated  20th July,  

1981.

(f) NOC dated 5th February, 1982 issued u/s 230A(1) by

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the Income Tax Authorities in respect of the sale of  

the subject premises.

(g) The order of the Recovery Officer, Provident Fund  

and  Labour  Dues  dated 5th February, 1983 inter  alia  

stating that the attachment on Plot No.9 (part) was  

raised and vacated as the building on Plot No.9 (part)  

was agreed to be sold by SSML to respondent no.1

(h)  Though  the  1983  Act  had  come  into  force,  the  

Customs Department in 1993 surrendered 12571 sq.ft out  

of 15805 sq.ft. in its possession on the 1st floor of  

the subject premises to respondent no.1.

(i)  Though  the  1995  Act  had  come  into  force,  the  

Customs  Department  surrendered  the  remaining  3234  

sq.ft in its possession on the first floor and the  

entire 8667 sq.ft in its possession on the 2nd floor to  

respondent no.1 on 26th February, 1997.

(j)  Letter  dated  23rd February,  1985  from  Valuation  

Officer,  Income  Tax  Department  to  respondent  no.1  

regarding  assessment  of  rent  of  the  premises  of  

respondent  no.1 occupied  by  the  Customs  admeasuring  

8667 sq.ft and 15305 sq.ft.

(k)  Various  letters  from  Building  Department,  New  

Customs  House,  Bombay  to  respondent  no.1  regarding  

reassessment of rent of premises occupied by Customs  

Department.

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6.5. The Correspondence between the parties also shows that the  

subject premises were never considered as a part of the textile  

undertaking after the same was sold to respondent no.1 in the year  

1975.

6.6. It was submitted that the subject premises herein were not  

part  of  the  assets  or  rights  or  leaseholds  or  powers  or  

authorities  or  privileges  or  property  of  the  textile  company  

(SSML)  immediately  before  1st April,  1994.   Since  the  subject  

premises  and  all  rights  in  respect  of  these  premises  stood  

excluded from the textile undertaking of SSML in 1975, SSML had no  

“ownership, possession, power or control” in relation to the said  

premises and hence the subject premises stand excluded from the  

first part of Section 4(1) of 1995 Act.

6.7. It was further submitted that there is a serious dispute about  

title that cannot be resolved under the 1971 Act. The appellant  

cannot be permitted to take a unilateral decision in its own favour  

that the property belongs to it, and on the basis of such decision  

take recourse to the summary remedy. Due process of law in a case  

like the present necessarily implies the filing of a suit by the  

appellant for enforcement of their alleged rights in respect of the  

subject premises.  

6.8. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondent no. 1, also relied  

upon decisions of this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna  

Rao and Anr. (1982) 2 SCC 134 wherein the Court held that having  

regard to the bona fide title dispute, the respondents cannot be

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evicted summarily; and State of U.P. v. Zia Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 483  

wherein  this  Court  held  that  the  question  of  title  cannot  be  

decided  under  U.P.  Public  Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorised  

Occupants) Act, 1972 and the decision on the subject had to be made  

by either revenue court or civil court.  

7. Before adverting to the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsels for the parties, it would be necessary to make a brief  

reference to the provisions of the 1983 Act and the 1995 Act.  

Section 2(d) of the 1983 Act defines “textile undertaking” as  

follows:  

“(2)(d)  “textile  undertaking”  or  “the  textile  undertaking” means an undertaking specified in the  second column of the first Schedule;”

Section 3(1) of the 1995 Act provides that on the appointed  

date, the right, title and interest of the owner in relation to  

every textile undertaking shall stand transferred to and shall vest  

absolutely  in  the  Central  Government.  Sub-section  (2)  thereof  

provides that every textile undertaking which stands vested in the  

Central Government by virtue of sub-section (1) shall immediately  

after it has so vested, stand transferred to and vested in the  

National Textile Corporation.  

Section 3 of the 1995 Act reads:

“3(1) On the appointed day, the right, title and  interest of the owner in relation to every textile  undertakings shall stand transferred to, and shall  vest absolutely in, the Central Government.  

(2) Every textile undertaking which stands vested in  the Central Government by virtue of sub-section  (1) shall, immediately after it has so vested,  stand  transferred  to,  and  vested  in,  the  National Textile Corporation.”

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The key expression in sub-section (3) for the purposes of  

this case is:

“the  right,  title  and  interest  of  the  owner  in  relation to every textile undertaking”  

8. The real issue in the present case is whether the subject  

premises can be said to be an asset of the SSML vested with the  

State.

9. In National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Sitaram Mills Ltd. &  

Ors. 1986 (Supp.) SCC 117, this Court noticed the stand taken by  

parties with regard to property in question.  The said case related  

to the very same mill SSML. The Division Bench of the High Court  

of Bombay on a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of  

India filed by SSML while upholding the constitutional validity of  

Section  3(1)  of  the  Textile  Undertakings  (Taking  Over  of  

Management) Act, 1983 held that the surplus land appurtenant to the  

mill was not an ‘asset in relation to the textile undertaking’  

within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act and  

directed the Central Government to restore the possession of the  

said land to the Company. Being aggrieved by the said decision the  

appellant corporation approached this Court. In the said case this  

Court held:

“40…….The  legislature  in  enacting  the  law  for  the  taking  over  of  the  management  of  the  textile  undertakings  therefore  clearly  had  the  intention  of  taking over the surplus lands of the Company. In our  opinion, the High Court ought to have interpreted sub- section (2) of Section 3 of the Act in the context of  sub-section (1) thereof and the other provisions of the  Act  in  consonance  with  the  intention  of  the  legislature. It was the intention of the legislature to

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take over all the assets belonging to the Company held  in  relation  to  the  textile  undertaking.  The  note  attached to the report of the Task Force includes the  total lands belonging to the petitioners’ Company for  the purpose of determining the value of the assets of  the  Company  and  does  not  exclude  the  Real  Estate  Division. Even for determining the total compensation  to be paid on nationalisation, the Task Force takes  into account the total surplus lands of the Company and  does not exclude any land belonging to the so-called  Real Estate Division. The viability study of the IDBI  also heavily relied on the surplus lands held by the  petitioners’ Company. 41. In the premises, the High Court has manifestly erred  in  holding  that  the  said  Real  Estate  Division  was  separate  and  distinct  from  the  textile  undertaking.  Surplus lands of the textile mills taken over under  sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act are but a vital  physical resource capable of generating and sustaining  economic growth of the textile mills. There can be no  doubt that the legislative intent and object of the  impugned Act was to secure the socialisation of such  surplus lands with a view to sustain the sick textile  undertakings so that they could be properly utilised by  the Government for social good i.e. in resuscitating  the dying textile undertakings. Hence, a paradoxical  situation should have been avoided by adding a narrow  and  pedantic  construction  of  a  provision  like  sub- section (2) of Section 3 of the Act which provides for  the consequences that ensue upon the taking over in  public  interest  of  the  management  of  a  textile  undertaking  under  sub-section  (1)  thereof  as  a  step  towards nationalisation of such undertakings, which was  clearly against the national interest. In dealing with  similar legislation, this Court has always adopted a  broad and liberal approach…….”

10. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.1  

placed reliance on the aforesaid decision in Sitaram Mills Ltd. to  

suggest that the execution of the agreement dated 25th March, 1975  

was not disputed in the said case.  

11. While giving the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the  

High Court also proceeded on such presumption that the property in  

question has been sold by the Textile Undertaking and observed as

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follows:

“9………….It would not be out of place to mention that in  an appeal arising out of the judgment of the Division  Bench of this Court in respect of this very Mill, the  Supreme Court has recorded in its judgment that the  property  in  question  has  been  sold  by  the  textile  undertaking prior to the commencement of the 1983 Act.  There seems to be hardly any dispute about the factual  position.  The execution of the agreement dated 25th  

March, 1975 is not disputed.  There is also no serious  dispute that the entire consideration has been paid.  Further the transaction is duly substantiated by the  contemporaneous records like the balance sheet, profit  and loss account, the resolution passed by the Board of  Directors, etc.  During the period 1975 to 1998 the  property has been dealt with by the petitioner as its  own property. It has been let out to various Government  bodies from time to time.  The rent in respect of the  subject premises has been collected by the petitioner  and the tax has always been paid by the petitioner.  Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act furnishes  a statutory defence to a person who has no registered  title deed in his favour to maintain his possession if  he  can  prove  a  written  and  signed  contract  in  his  favour and some action on his part in part performance  of that contract.”

12. From bare perusal of paragraph 35 of decision in Sitaram Mills  

Ltd. it is apparent that in the said case the  learned counsel for  

the Maharashtra Girni Kamgar Union filed a detailed tabular chart  

before the Court to demonstrate that the Real Estate Division was  

part and parcel of the textile undertaking.  In the said chart it  

was  mentioned  that  ‘of  the  remaining  plots,  on  plot  no.4  

admeasuring 9765 square yards there were certain old godowns of the  

textile mill and they were sold by the petitioners (i.e. SSML) to a  

charitable trust of the tantias in 1974-75 for setting off loans  

taken from the trust for the textile business.’

The aforesaid chart produced by one of the parties before this  

Court was though noticed but no finding has been given by this

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Court  that  the  property  in  question  was  sold  by  the  textile  

undertaking prior to commencement of 1983 Act.  On the other hand  

if show that the land in question was point of the textile mills.

13. The agreement to sell relied upon by respondent no.1 itself  

contains clause 1(d), 2, 3, 6 etc. which mandates the execution of  

registered  sale-deed  or  conveyance  deed  within  three  years.  

However, the same was never done. A suit for specific performance  

was filed by respondent no.1 before Bombay High Court against SSML  

25  years after unregistered  agreement to sell dated 25th March,  

1975, thereby, acknowledging that there was no registered document  

of title with respondent no.1.  The said suit is still pending.

14. Section 4 of 1995 Act relates to general effect of vesting.  

Relevant parts of which read as follows:-

“4(1).The textile undertakings referred to in Section 3  shall  be  deemed  to  include  all  assets,  rights,  leaseholds, powers, authorities and privilege and all  property,  moveable  and  immovable   including  lands,  buildings,  workshops,  stores,  instruments,  machinery  and  equipment,  cash  balances,  cash  on  hand,  reserve  funds,  investments  and  book  debts  pertaining  to the  textile undertakings and all other rights and interests  in,  or  arising  out  of,  such  property  as  were  immediately before the appointed day in the ownership,  possession, power or control of the textile company in  relation to the said undertakings, whether within or  outside India, and all books of account, registers and  all other documents of whatever nature relating thereto  and shall also be deemed to include the liabilities and  obligations specified in sub-section (2) of Section 5.”

“4(2)  All property as aforesaid which have vested in  the Central Government under sub-section (1) of Section  3  shall,  by  force  of  such  vesting,  be  freed  and  discharged  from  any  trust,  obligation,  mortgage,  charge, lien and all other incumbrances affecting it,  and any attachment, injunction or decree or order of  any court or other authority restricting the use of

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such property in any manner shall be deemed to have  been withdrawn.”

“4(5)For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared  that  the  mortgage  of  any  property  referred  in  sub- section (2) or any other person holding any charge,  lien or other interest in, or in relation to, any such  property shall be entitled to claim, in accordance with  his rights and interests, payment of the mortgage money  or other dues, in whole or in part, out of the amounts  specified in relation to such  property in the First  Schedule, but no such mortgage, charge, lien or other  interest  shall  be  enforceable  against  any  property  which has vested in the Central Government.”

“4(6) If,  on  the  appointed  day, any  suit,  appeal  or  other proceeding of whatever nature in relation to any  property  which  has  vested  in  the  Central  Government  under section 3, instituted or preferred by or against  the  textile  company  is  pending,  the  same  shall  not  abate, be discontinued or be, in any way, prejudicially  affected  by  reason  of  the  transfer  of  the  textile  undertakings or of anything contained in this Act, but  the suit, appeal or other proceeding may be continued,  prosecuted  or  enforced  by  or  against  the  National  Textile Corporation.”

Thus, it is clear that all other rights and interests in or  

arising out of such property as were existing immediately before  

the appointed day in the ownership, possession, power or control of  

the textile company in relation to the said undertaking vested with  

the Central Government and by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section  

(3)  stood  transferred  to,  and  vested  in,  the  National  Textile  

Corporation.   Liability  if  any  of  the  owner  of  a  textile  

undertaking  i.e.  SSML  of  any  period  to  the  appointed  day  is  

liability of such owner (SSML) and can be enforceable against him  

and  not against  the Central Government  or  the  National Textile  

Corporation in view of Section 5(1) of 1995 Act, which reads as

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follows:

“5(1) Every  liability,  other  than  the  liability  specified in sub-section (2), of the owner of a textile  undertaking, in relation to the textile undertakings in  respect of any period prior to the appointed day, shall  be the liability of such owner and shall be enforceable  against him and not against the Central Government or  the National Textile Corporation.”  

15. Therefore respondent no.1 cannot derive any advantage against  

the Central Government or the National Textile Corporation on the  

ground of pendency of a suit against the owner (SSML).  

16. In  M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors,  

(1988) 2 SCC 299,  while dealing with a case involving National  

Textile Corporation-appellant herein, the Court noticed the meaning  

of the expressions “arising out of, pertaining to and in relation  

to” and observed:

“49. The words “arising out of” have been used in the  sense that it comprises purchase of shares and lands  from income arising out of the Kanpur undertaking. We  are of the opinion that the words “pertaining to” and  “in relation to” have the same wide meaning and have  been  used  interchangeably  for  among  other  reasons,  which may include avoidance of repetition of the same  phrase  in  the  same  clause  or  sentence,  a  method  followed  in  good  drafting.  The  word  “pertain”  is  synonymous  with  the  word  “relate”,  see  Corpus  Juris  Secundum, Volume 17, page 693. 50.  The  expression  “in  relation  to”  (so  also  “pertaining  to”),  is  a  very  broad  expression  which  presupposes another subject matter. These are words of  comprehensiveness  which  might  have  both  a  direct  significance  as  well  as  an  indirect  significance  depending on the context, see State Wakf Board v. Abdul  Azeez29, following and approving Nita Charan Bagchi v.  Suresh Chandra Paul30, Shyam Lal v. M. Shyamlal31 and 76  Corpus  Juris  Secundum  621.  Assuming  that  the  investments in shares and in lands do not form part of  the  undertakings  but  are  different  subject  matters,  even then these would be brought within the purview of  the vesting by reason of the above expressions. In this

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connection reference  may be  made to 76 Corpus  Juris  Secundum at pages 620 and 621 where it is stated that  the term “relate” is also defined as meaning to bring  into  association  or  connection  with.  It  has  been  clearly mentioned that “relating to” has been held to  be equivalent to or synonymous with as to “concerning  with” and “pertaining to”. The expression “pertaining  to”  is  an  expression  of  expansion  and  not  of  contraction.”

17. The First Schedule of the 1995 Act provides the amount which  

the Central Government has to pay to the owner of every  textile  

undertaking for the transfer and vesting of such undertaking to it.  

This provision cannot be the starting point of investigation as to  

which  amount  relates  to  which  property  or  as  a  guide  to  

construction (See paragraph 54 of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. v.  

Union of India & Ors, (1988) 2 SCC 299).  

In the said case of M/s Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. the Court  

further held:

“57. The expression “and all other rights and interests  in or arising out of such property, as were immediately  before the appointed day, in the ownership, possession,  power or control of the company in relation to the said  undertakings”, appearing in sub-section (1) of Section  4 of the Act indicates that the shares which have been  purchased  from  out  of  the  funds  of  the  textile  undertakings and which have been held for the benefit  of the said textile undertakings, would come within the  scope of Section 4 of the Act and thus would also vest  in Central Government under Section 3. The origin of  these  shares  and  their  connection  with  the  textile  undertakings have been fully corroborated. The textile  business is the only business of Swadeshi Cotton Mills.  There is interconnection and interrelation between all  the six undertakings. Investments in Swadeshi Polytex  Limited  from  the  funds  of  Kanpur  undertaking  have  always been made. Investments in Swadeshi Mining and  Manufacturing Company Ltd. were always made from the  funds of the Kanpur  undertaking. Assets/ investments  held and used for the benefit of the textile business  of SCM, were carried on in its textile undertakings.” Therefore, it is clear that the property in question stood

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vested in the Central Government and, in turn, stood transferred  

and vested with National Textile Corporation under sub-section (2)  

of Section 3 of 1995 Act. Even if it is admitted that respondent  

no.1 has acted on the agreement to sell and has paid the entire  

consideration, it cannot be a ground to hold that respondent no.1  

is authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the  

1971 Act.   

18. We are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court  

failed to analyze the provisions correctly and wrongly presumed  

that  the  property  in  question  has  been  sold  to  the  Textile  

Undertaking  prior  to  the  commencement  of  1983  Act.  The  Court  

wrongly relied on Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to  

hold that respondent no.1 has valid defence available under the  

said provision and hence erred in holding that respondent no. 1 is  

an authorized occupant within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the  

1971 Act.  

19. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment  

dated 6th February, 2003 passed by the Division Bench of High Court  

of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.1552 of 2000 and uphold  

notices dated 17th November, 2000 issued under Sections 4 and 7 of  

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971.  

Now, it is open to the Competent Authority/Court to proceed in  

accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  1971  Act  and  pass  an  

appropriate order.  The appeal is allowed but there is no order as  

to costs.

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………………………………………….J.                (SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

………………………………………….J.                (PRAFULLA C. PANT)

NEW DELHI; FEBRUARY 17, 2015.

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