REPORTABLE

   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4079-4081  OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 742-744 OF 2019)

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. ........APPELLANT(S)

VS.

MANNAT JOHAL & ORS. ETC. ETC.         .......RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4082-4083 OF 2019 @ SLP (CIVIL) NO.10371-10372 OF 2019 @ DIARY NO. 9529 OF 2019

JUDGMENT

Dinesh Maheshwari, J.

1. The application for substitution of legal representatives in the petition filed

on behalf of the claimants is allowed; the named legal representative shall stand

substituted in the both the petitions.  Delay condoned in the petition filed on

behalf of the claimants.  

1.1.    Leave granted in the both the petitions.

2. These  cross-appeals  relating  to  the  vehicular  accident  compensation

claims, respectively by the insurer of the offending vehicle and by the claimants,

are  directed against  the common judgment  and order  dated  06.07.2018,  as

passed in FAO No. 1136 of 2000 (O & M) and connected matters, whereby the

High Court of Punjab and Haryana has allowed the appeal for enhancement of

compensation filed by the claimants and has modified the common award dated

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27.01.2000  as  made  by  the  Motor  Accident  Claims  Tribunal,  Chandigarh  in

MACT Case Nos. 80 of 1996 and 84 of 1996 that were filed respectively by the

parents and by the wife and children of the deceased Shri Rajpal Singh Johal.  

3. In the impugned judgment and order dated 06.07.2018, the High Court

has  made  upward  revision  of  the  amount  of  compensation  awarded by  the

Tribunal and, in place of the amount of Rs. 37,71,000/- together with interest @

12% p.a. as awarded by the Tribunal, the High Court has awarded a sum of Rs.

48,00,000/- together with interest @ 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim

petition till the date of realisation. The High Court has allowed this enhancement

essentially with reference to the principles enunciated by this Court in National

Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi & Ors.: 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC) and in

Sarla Verma and Ors. v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.: 2009 ACJ

1298 (SC).

4. In these appeals, on one hand, the insurer of the offending vehicle has

questioned the quantum of compensation so awarded, basically on the ground

that while making assessment of pecuniary loss, the ex gratia amount received

by the claimants from the employer of the deceased deserves to be deducted

while, on the other hand, the claimants have questioned the reduction of the

rate of interest by the High Court.  

4.1. Therefore, the basic question for consideration in these appeals is as to

whether the amount of compensation as awarded by the High Court is that of

just compensation or the same calls for any modification?   

5. The background aspects of the matter, so far relevant for the question at

hand, may be noticed, in brief, as follows:

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5.1. The vehicular accident in question occurred on 30.12.1995, at about 1

p.m., near the police out post Bagari (Assam), when the deceased Shri Rajpal

Singh  Johal  was  driving  a  car,  taking  his  wife  and  children  along,  from

Kaziranga  to  Guwahati.  The  offending  vehicle,  being  an  oil  tanker  bearing

registration No. AS-01-9526, rammed into the car driven by the deceased while

coming from the opposite direction. The deceased succumbed to the injuries

sustained in this accident while his wife was also injured and their two children

suffered severe shock.   

5.2. On account of demise of the victim Shri Rajpal Singh Johal due to the

injuries sustained in the accident aforesaid, two claim applications came to be

made  before  the  Motor  Accident  Claims  Tribunal,  Chandigarh:  one  on

14.05.1996 by the parents of deceased, being MACT Case No. 80 of 1996; and

another on 22.05.1996 by the wife and minor children of the deceased, being

MACT Case No. 84 of 1996. The sum and substance of the allegations in claim

applications  had  been that  the  deceased  met  with  his  untimely  end  for  the

accident in question that occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the oil

tanker in question. It was asserted that the deceased was 38 years of age; was

working as General Manager (Marketing) with Punjab Wireless System Limited,

Mohali; was drawing gross annual salary of Rs. 3,21,801.60 with perks just prior

to the accident; and he was due to be promoted as the Associate Vice President

in January 1996 whereby, his annual salary would have been enhanced to Rs.

3,50,000/-. While asserting their dependency on the deceased, the claimants

i.e.,  the  parents,  wife  and  children  of  the  deceased  claimed  compensation

against  the driver,  owner and insurer  of  the offending vehicle.  The cause of

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action being the same, these two claim petitions were consolidated, and were

tried and decided together by way of the common award dated 27.01.2000.  

5.3. Before the Tribunal,  driver  of  the offending vehicle  remained  ex parte

while its owner denied any negligence on part of the driver and rather alleged

that the accident occured due to rash and negligent driving by the deceased.

On the other hand, insurer of the offending vehicle denied the factum of the

accident and also alleged that the driver of the offending vehicle did not possess

a valid driving license.

5.4. On the pleadings, the Tribunal framed as many as 9 issues. After taking

evidence,  the  Tribunal  proceeded  to  determine  the  relevant  issues  in  its

impugned  award  dated  27.01.2000.  The  Tribunal  decided  the  basic  issues

relating to the factum of accident and the responsibility for the same against the

non-applicants while holding that the accident in question occurred due to rash

and negligent driving of the offending oil tanker. The Tribunal also held that the

wife and children of the deceased were dependent on him and further that the

parents were marginally dependent on him.  

5.5. On the question of quantification of compensation, the Tribunal took note

of the evidence led by the claimants as regards emoluments of the deceased as

on 01.12.1995; the fact that his colleagues were promoted as Associate Vice

President in the year 1995; that he too had the prospects of such promotion;

and that emoluments of the Associate Vice President were revised with effect

from the month of December 1996. Therefore, the Tribunal considered it just

and reasonable to assess the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,51,000/- p.a., as

per  the revised emoluments  for  the  post  of  Associate  Vice President  in  the

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employer company. Then, the Tribunal proceeded to deduct one-third towards

personal expenses of the deceased and in this manner, took the annual loss of

dependency at Rs. 2,34,000/- and, after applying the multiplier of 16, assessed

the  pecuniary  loss  of  the  claimants  at  Rs.  37,44,000/-.  The  Tribunal  further

awarded  Rs.  25,000/-  towards  transportation  of  dead-body  and  Rs.  2,000/-

towards other expenses and thus, finally awarded a sum of Rs. 37,71,000/- to

the claimants. The Tribunal also allowed interest at the rate of 12% p.a. from the

date of filing of claim application No. 80 of 1996. The Tribunal allowed a sum of

Rs. 1,00,000/- each to the mother and father of the deceased  while observing

that they were in the age group of 78 years and were only marginally dependent

on the deceased; and apportioned the remaining amount amongst the wife and

children of the deceased.

5.6. Against the award so made by the Tribunal, the claimants in MACT Case

No.  84  of  1996  preferred  an  appeal  before  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and

Haryana,  seeking  enhancement  of  the  amount  of  compensation,  while  the

insurance company preferred two separate appeals questioning the findings in

the award and seeking reduction of the amount of compensation.  

5.7. The High Court, in its impugned judgment dated 06.07.2018, in the first

place rejected the contentions urged on behalf of  the insurer as regards the

factum and  cause of  accident  and  affirmed  the  findings  of  the  Tribunal.  As

regards  quantum  of  compensation,  the  High  Court  proceeded  to  make

enhancement over the amount awarded by the Tribunal with reference to the

decisions in  Pranay Sethi  and  Sarla Verma (supra).  The High Court did not

accept the basis of assessment of loss of income with reference to the likely

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enhanced emoluments of deceased on his expected promotion and subsequent

revision of pay-scale in the year 1996. The High Court, therefore, took the base

annual  emoluments  at  Rs.  3,21,801.60  and,  while  deducting  Rs.  20,000/-

towards income-tax, rounded off the figure to Rs. 3,00,000/-. The High Court,

thereafter, provided for enhancement of 40% towards future prospects and then,

looking to five number of  dependents,  deducted one-fourth towards personal

expenses  of  the  deceased.  In  this  manner,  the  High  Court  arrived  at  the

multiplicand of Rs. 3,15,000/- and, while applying the multiplier of 15 in view of

the age of  the deceased at  38 years,  worked out  the pecuniary loss at  Rs.

47,25,000/-.  The  High  Court  further  awarded  Rs.  40,000/-  towards  loss  of

consortium, Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 15,000/- towards

loss to estate. Accordingly, the High Court assessed the total compensation at

Rs, 47,95,000/- and rounded it up to Rs. 48,00,000/-. The High Court, however,

allowed interest  at  the rate of  7.5% p.a.,  while holding that  the respondents

related with the offending vehicle were liable to make payment of compensation.

As regards apportionment, the High Court allowed a sum of Rs. 26,00,000/- to

the  wife  of  the  deceased;  Rs.  8,00,000/-  to  the  son  of  the  deceased;  Rs.

10,00,000/- to the daughter of the deceased; and Rs. 2,00,000/- each to the

mother and father of the deceased.   

6.  Assailing the impugned judgment of the High Court, learned counsel for

the  insurer  has  strenuously  argued  that  the  High  Court  has  erred  in  not

considering  and  applying  the  principles  enunciated  in  Reliance  General

Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma & Ors.: 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC) and

in  not  deducting  the  ex  gratia  amount  received  by  the  claimants  from  the

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employer of the deceased. Learned counsel has also attempted to argue that

the High Court has taken into consideration certain payments like conveyance

allowance, performance linked special pay and company lease accommodation

while  making  the  calculation  of  total  annual  gross  salary,  though  such

allowances ought to have been deducted.  Per contra, learned counsel for the

claimants would submit that a clear case for enhancement over the modified

award of the High Court is made out, particularly when the High Court reduced

the  annual  income  figure  of  the  deceased  from  Rs.  3,51,000/-  to  Rs.

3,21,801.60 and further slashed it to Rs. 3,00,000/- and then, reduced the rate

of interest at 7.5% p.a. as against the rate allowed by the Tribunal at 12% p.a.

According to the learned counsel, the rate of interest as allowed by the Tribunal

was in conformity with the lending rates at the time of accident in the year 1995

and should not have been reduced. The learned counsel has also argued that a

few  components  of  allowances  and  benefits  as  taken  into  consideration  for

assessment of the annual income had been the part of composite pay packet of

the deceased and the claimants were also the beneficiaries of such allowances

while being dependent on the deceased. The learned counsel for the claimant

has also countered the submissions as regards the ex gratia payment made by

the employer with the contentions that such an amount is not required to be

deducted  from  the  total  compensation,  while  relying  on  the  decision  in

Sebastiani Lakra & Ors. v. National Insurance Company Ltd. & Ors. : 2019

ACJ 34 (SC).  

7. Having given anxious consideration to the rival submissions and having

examined the record, we are clearly of the view that the modified award made

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by the High Court in this case remains that of just compensation and no case for

interference is made out in either of these appeals.  

8.  It remains trite, and need not be over-emphasised, that while dealing with

the  question  of  quantification  in  a  claim  for  compensation  under  the  Motor

Vehicles  Act,  1988  ('the  Act  of  1988'),  the  endeavor  has  to  be  to  ensure

awarding of just compensation to the claimant/s. In Shashi Sharma (supra), this

Court reiterated on the basics regarding meaning of the expression "just" in the

context of the Act of 1988 in the following:-

“17.  ........ the term “compensation” has not been defined in  the  1988  Act.  By  interpretative  process,  it  has  been understood  to  mean  to  recompense  the  claimants  for  the possible loss suffered or likely to be suffered due to sudden and untimely death of their family member as a result of motor accident. Two cardinal principles run through the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 in the matter of determination of compensation. Firstly, the measure of compensation must be just and adequate; and secondly, no double benefit should be  passed  on  to  the  claimants  in  the  matter  of  award  of compensation. Section 168 of  the 1988 Act makes the first principle  explicit.  Sub-section  (1)  of  that  provision  makes  it clear that the amount of compensation must be just. The word “just”  means—fair,  adequate,  and  reasonable.  It  has  been derived from the Latin word “justus”, connoting right and fair. In para 7 of State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, it has been held that the expression “just”  denotes that the amount must be equitable,  fair,  reasonable  and  not  arbitrary.  In  para  16  of Sarla  Verma v.  DTC,  this  Court  has  observed  that  the compensation “is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit”. That, however, may depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as to what amount would be a just compensation.”

9. In  a  case like  the  present  one,  relating  to  the  death  of  the  vehicular

accident  victim,  any  process  of  awarding  "just"  compensation  involves

assessment of such amount of pecuniary loss which could be reasonably taken

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as the loss of dependency suffered by the claimants due to the demise of the

victim.  In  other  words,  such  a  process,  by  its  very  nature,  involves  the

assessment of monetary contribution that the claimants were likely to receive

from the deceased had he not met with the untimely end due to the accident.

For the purpose of such an assessment, while some of the basic facts, like the

age, job and income of the deceased and the number of dependents with extent

of  their  dependency,  could  be reasonably  ascertained from the evidence on

record, yet,  several uncertain factors also,  per force, come into play, like the

future prospects of the deceased coupled with various imponderables related

with a human life. As the process, by its very nature, involves a substantial deal

of  guess-work,  this  Court,  over  the  years,  has  evolved and applied  several

principles so as to ensure that as far as possible, the methods for assessment

remain uniform, curbing against disparity in the amount of compensation to be

awarded in similarly circumstanced cases. It is not necessary for the present

purpose to traverse through the large number of past decisions, particularly for

the reason that the basic parameters stand explained and standardised with the

larger Bench decision in  Pranay Sethi  (supra),  wherein this Court  has partly

modulated the parameters enunciated in the two-Judge Bench decision in Sarla

Verma (supra), and has laid down the principles as follows:-

“59.3. While determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the  age of  40  years,  should  be  made.  The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax.

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59.4. In case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed  salary,  an  addition  of  40% of  the  established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of  40  years.  An addition  of  25% where  the  deceased was between  the  age  of  40  to  50  years  and  10%  where  the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded  as  the  necessary  method  of  computation.  The established  income  means  the  income  minus  the  tax component.

59.5. For  determination  of  the  multiplicand,  the deduction for personal and living expenses, the tribunals and the courts shall be guided by paras 30 to 32 of  Sarla Verma which we have reproduced hereinbefore.

59.6. The selection of multiplier shall be as indicated in the Table in Sarla Verma read with para 42 of that judgment.

59.7. The age of the deceased should be the basis for  applying the multiplier.

59.8. Reasonable  figures  on  conventional  heads, namely,  loss  of  estate,  loss  of  consortium  and  funeral expenses should  be Rs 15,000,  Rs 40,000 and Rs 15,000 respectively. The aforesaid amounts should be enhanced at the rate of 10% in every three years."

9.1. For completion of the principles above-quoted, appropriate would it to be

to  take  note  of  paragraphs  30  to  32  as  also  paragraph 42  in  Sarla  Verma

(supra) which read as under:-

“30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards  personal  and  living  expenses  is  calculated  on  the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra, the general practice is  to  apply  standardised  deductions.  Having  considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one- third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family  members  is  4  to  6,  and  one-fifth  (1/5th)  where  the number of dependent family members exceeds six.

31. Where  the  deceased  was  a  bachelor  and  the claimants are the parents,  the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor  would  tend  to  spend  more  on  himself.  Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in

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a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will  not be considered as a dependant and the mother  alone  will  be  considered  as  a  dependant.  In  the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father.

32. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings,  only  the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where the family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning  sisters  or  brothers,  his  personal  and  living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third.

***** ***** ***** 42. We therefore hold that the multiplier to be used

should be as mentioned in Column (4)  of  the Table,  which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 (for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years), reduced by one unit for every five years, that is M-17 for 26 to 30 years, M-16 for 31 to 35 years, M-15 for 36 to 40 years, M-14 for 41 to 45 years, and M-13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, that is, M-11 for 51 to 55 years, M-9 for 56 to 60 years, M-7 for 61 to 65 years and M-5 for 66 to 70 years.”

10. Applying the principles aforesaid to the present case,  we find that the

award  made  by  the  Tribunal  suffered  from  a  few  fundamental  errors  and

shortcomings as regards the assessment of multiplicand. The Tribunal, instead

of taking the last drawn emoluments of the deceased, chose to proceed on his

enhanced projected emoluments after the expected promotion and pay revision.

However, thereafter, the Tribunal did not provide for any further future prospects.

The  Tribunal  also  did  not  make  any  deduction  towards  the  tax  component.

Moreover,  the Tribunal  deducted one-third towards personal  expenses of  the

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deceased though he had had five dependents. Then, the Tribunal applied the

multiplier  of  16.  Apparently,  the assessment  made by the Tribunal  could not

have  been  countenanced,  for  being  not  in  conformity  with  the  principles  in

Pranay Sethi (supra).  

11. The High  Court,  on  the other  hand,  took  the  figure  of  the last  drawn

emoluments  of  the  deceased  and  made  the  deduction  towards  income-tax.

Thereafter, the High Court provided for future prospects at 40% and made the

deduction of one-fourth towards personal expenses. In this manner, the High

Court arrived at the figure of multiplicand at Rs.  3,15,000/-. On this multiplicand,

the High Court applied the multiplier of 15 in view of the age of deceased at 38

years and hence, worked out the pecuniary loss at Rs. 47,25,000/-. As noticed,

the High Court further awarded Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium, Rs.

15,000/- towards funeral expenses, and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss to estate; and

finally assessed the total compensation at Rs, 47,95,000/-, rounded up to Rs.

48,00,000/-.

11.1. The  assessment  so  made  by  the  High  Court  stands  more  or  less  in

conformity  with  the  principles  enunciated  in  Pranay  Sethi (supra).  The  only

doubtful area is that the High Court provided for enhancement towards future

prospects only at 40% on the last drawn emoluments of the deceased and not

at 50% though he was shown to be in a settled employment with future chances

of  promotion  as  also  pay  revision.  However,  on  the  facts  and  in  the

circumstances of the present case, we are not considering any modification in

the amount awarded by the High Court for a variety of factors, as indicated infra.

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12. Taking up the question of ex gratia payment received by the claimants

from  the  employer  of  the  deceased,  it  is  noticed  that  an  amount  of  Rs.

3,21,801/- was paid by the employer to the claimants, being one year's gross

salary of the deceased. While relying on the decision in  Shashi Sharma,  it is

contended on behalf of the insurer that the ex gratia amount so received by the

claimants is required to be deducted. Noticeable it is that in  Shashi Sharma's

case, a three-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with the payment received

by  the  legal  heirs  of  the  deceased  in  terms  of  Rule  5  of  the  Haryana

Compassionate  Assistance  to  the  Dependents  of  Deceased  Government

Employees  Rules,  2006  ('Rules  of  2006')  whereunder,  on  the  death  of  a

government  employee,  the  family  would  continue  to  receive  as  financial

assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by

the deceased employee for periods specified in the Rules and after the said

period, the family would be entitled to receive family pension. The family would

also be entitled to retain the government accommodation for a period of one

year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000/- as ex gratia1. 1 Rule 5 of the Rules of 2006 taken into consideration in Shashi Sharma's case had been as under:

“5. Criteria for financial assistance.—(1) On the death of any government employee, the family of the employee would continue to receive as financial assistance a sum equal to the pay and other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee in the normal course without raising a specific claim—

(a)for a period of fifteen years from the date of death of the employee, if the employee at the time of his death had not attained the age of thirty-five years;

(b) for a period of twelve years or till the date the employee would have retired from government service on attaining the age of superannuation, whichever is less, if the employee at the time of his death had attained the age of thirty-five years but had not attained the age of forty-eight years;

(c) for a period of seven years or till the date the employee would have retired from government service on attaining the age of superannuation, whichever is less, if the employee had attained the age of forty-eight years.

(2) The family shall be eligible to receive family pension as per the normal rules only after the period during which he receives the financial assistance as above is completed.

(3)  The  family  of  a  deceased  government  employee  who  was  in  occupation  of  a government residence would continue to retain the residence on payment of normal rent/licence fee for a period of one year from the date of death of the employee.

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12.1. The  aforesaid  decision  in  Shashi  Sharma has  been  explained  and

distinguished by another three-Judge Bench of this Court in  Sebastiani Lakra

(supra) in the following:-

“10. In Shashi Sharma's case, 2016 ACJ 2723 (SC), this court was dealing with the payments made to the legal heirs  of  the deceased in terms of  rule 5(1)  of  the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependants of  Deceased Government  Employees  Rules,  2006  (for  short  'the  said Rules’).   Under rule 5 of  the said Rules on the death of  a government employee, the family would continue to receive as  financial  assistance  a  sum equal  to  the  pay  and  other allowances that was last drawn by the deceased employee for periods  set  out  in  the  Rules  and  after  the  said  period  the family was entitled to receive family pension.  The family was also entitled to retain the Government accommodation for a period of one year in addition to payment of Rs. 25,000 as ex gratia.  In this case, the three-Judge Bench adverted to the principles laid down in Helen C. Rebello's case 1999 ACJ 10 (SC),  followed  in  Patricia  Jean  Mahajan's  case  2002  ACJ 1441 (SC), and came to the conclusion that the decision in Vimal Kanwar's case 2013 ACJ 1441 (SC), did not take a view contrary to Helen C. Rebello or Patricia Jean Mahajan cases (supra).  The following observations are relevant:

"(12) The principle expounded in this decision in Helen  C.  Rebello's  case  that  the  application  of general  principles  under  the  common  law  to estimate  damages  cannot  be  invoked  for computing compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.  Further,  the  'pecuniary  advantage'  from whatever  source  must  correlate  to  the  injury  or death caused on account of motor accident.  The view  so  taken  is  the  correct  analysis  and interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939, and must apply proprio vigore to  the  corresponding  provisions  of  the  Motor

Contd..

…contd. (4) Within fifteen days from the date of death of a government employee, an ex gratia

assistance of twenty-five thousand rupees shall be provided to the family of the deceased employee to meet the immediate needs on the loss of the bread earner.

(5) House rent allowance shall not be a part of allowance for the purposes of calculation of assistance.”

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Vehicles  Act,  1988.   This  principle  has  been  re- stated in the subsequent decision of the two-Judge Bench in Patricia Jean Mahajan's case, 2002 ACJ 1441 (SC), to reject the argument of the insurance company to deduct the amount receivable by the dependants  of  the  deceased  by  way  of  'social security compensation' and 'life insurance policy'."

However,  while  dealing with  the scheme the court  held  that applying  a  harmonious  approach  and  to  determine  a  just compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act it would be appropriate to exclude the amount received under the said Rules under the head of ‘pay and other allowances’ last drawn by the employee.  We may note that on principle this court has not  disagreed  with  the  proposition  laid  down  in  Helen  C. Rebello or in Patricia Jean Mahajan (supra), but while arriving at  a just  compensation,  it  had ordered the deduction of  the salary received under the statutory Rules.”

12.2. In the present case too, it has not been shown if the ex gratia amount

received by the claimants had been under any Rules of service and would be of

continuous assistance, as had been the case in Shashi Sharma (supra) as per

the Rules of 2006 considered therein. In an overall analysis and with reference

to the decision in Sebastiani Lakra (supra), we are clearly of the view that the

decision in Shashi Sharma would not apply to the facts of the present case and

no deduction in the amount awarded by the High Court appears necessary.  

12.3 Apart  from the above,  as  noticed,  the High Court  has even otherwise

provided for  enhancement  towards future prospects  only  at  40% though the

deceased was in a settled job and was not self-employed or on fixed salary. If at

all an assertion is made that the assistance received by the claimants or a part

of allowances received by the deceased need to be taken into consideration for

making certain deductions, the enhancement by way of future prospects at 50%

would be effectively setting off any such proposed deduction. In other words, in

the ultimate analysis, the amount of pecuniary loss as assessed by the High

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Court remains reasonable and cannot be said to be either exorbitant or too low

so as to call for any interference.  

13. The aforesaid features equally apply to the contentions urged on behalf of

the claimants as regards the rate of interest. The Tribunal had awarded interest

at the rate of 12% p.a. but the same had been too high a rate in comparison to

what is ordinarily envisaged in these matters. The High Court, after making a

substantial enhancement in the award amount, modified the interest component

at a reasonable rate of 7.5% p.a. and we find no reason to allow the interest in

this matter at any rate higher than that allowed by High Court.  

14. The upshot of the discussion aforesaid is that in our view, the amount

ultimately receivable by the claimants in terms of the judgment of the High Court

remains that of just compensation and no case for interference is made out.

15. Accordingly, both these appeals fail, and are dismissed.

...............................................J.           (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

      ..............................................J.             (DINESH MAHESHWARI)

New Delhi, Date:  23rd April, 2019.

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