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            REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3253 OF 2008

NARENDRA   … APPELLANT

VERSUS

K. MEENA … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

ANIL R. DAVE, J.

1. This appeal has been filed by the Appellant husband,

whose decree for divorce passed by the trial Court has been

set aside by the impugned judgment dated 8th March, 2006

passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  at  Bangalore  in

Miscellaneous First Appeal No.171 of 2002 (FC).

 2. The  facts  giving  rise  to  the  present  appeal,  in  a

nutshell, are as under :

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The Respondent wife filed Miscellaneous First Appeal

under  Section  28(1)  of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,  1955

(hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) before the High Court

as she was aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 17th

November,  2001,  passed  by  the  Principal  Judge,  Family

Court,  Bangalore  in  M.C.  No.603  of  1995  under  Section

13(1)(ia) of the Act filed by the Appellant husband seeking

divorce.   

3. The Appellant husband had married the Respondent

wife on 26th February, 1992.  Out of the wedlock, a female

child named Ranjitha was born on 13th November,  1993.

The case of the Appellant was that the Respondent did not

live happily with the Appellant even for a month after the

marriage.  The reason for filing the divorce petition was that

the  Respondent  wife  had  become  cruel  because  of  her

highly suspicious nature and she used to level absolutely

frivolous but serious allegations against him regarding his

character  and  more  particularly  about  his  extra-marital

relationship.  Behaviour of the Respondent wife made life of

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the Appellant husband miserable and it became impossible

for  the  Appellant  to  stay  with  the  Respondent  for  the

aforestated reasons.  Moreover, the Respondent wanted the

Appellant  to leave his parents and other  family members

and to get separated from them so that the Respondent can

live independently; and in that event it would become more

torturous for the Appellant to stay only with the Respondent

wife with her such nature and behaviour. The main ground

was cruelty, as serious allegations were levelled about the

moral character of the Appellant to the effect that he was

having an extra-marital affair with a maid, named Kamla.

Another  important  allegation  was  that  the  Respondent

would  very  often  threaten  the  Appellant  that  she  would

commit suicide.  In fact, on 2th July, 1995, she picked up a

quarrel  with the Appellant,  went to the bathroom, locked

the door from inside and poured kerosene on her body and

attempted to commit suicide.  On getting smell of kerosene

coming from the bathroom, the Appellant, his elder brother

and  some of  the  neighbours  broke  open  the  door  of  the

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bathroom  and  prevented  the  Respondent  wife  from

committing suicide.  The aforestated facts were found to be

sufficient  by  the  learned  Family  Court  for  granting  the

Appellant a decree of  divorce dated 17th November, 2001,

after considering the evidence adduced by both the parties.

4. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of divorce

dated 17th November, 2001, the Respondent wife had filed

Miscellaneous First Appeal No.171 of 2002 (FC), which has

been  allowed  by  the  High  Court  on  8th March,  2006,

whereby the decree of  divorce dated 17th November, 2001

has been set aside.  Being aggrieved by the judgment and

order passed by the High Court, the Appellant has filed this

appeal.

5. The learned counsel appearing for the Respondent was

not  present  when the  appeal  was  called  out  for  hearing.

The matter was kept back but for the whole day, the learned

counsel  for the Respondent did not  appear.  Even on an

earlier occasion on 31st March, 2016, when the appeal was

called  out,  the  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the

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Respondent wife was not present and therefore, the Court

had heard the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant.   

6. The  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  Appellant

submitted that the High Court had committed a grave error

in the process of re-appreciating the evidence and by setting

aside  the  decree  of  divorce  granted  in  favour  of  the

Appellant.   He  submitted  that  there  was  no  reason  to

believe  that  there  was  no  cruelty  on  the  part  of  the

Respondent wife.  He highlighted the observations made by

the Family Court and took us through the evidence, which

was  recorded  before  the  Family  Court.   He  drew  our

attention  to  the  depositions  made  by  independent

witnesses,  neighbours of  the Appellant,  who had rescued

the Respondent wife from committing suicide by breaking

open the door of the bathroom when the Respondent was on

the  verge  of  committing  suicide  by  pouring  kerosene  on

herself and by lighting a match stick.  Our attention was

also  drawn  to  the  fact  that  serious  allegations  levelled

against  the  character  of  the  Appellant  in  relation  to  an

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extra-marital affair with a maid were absolutely baseless as

no maid named Kamla had ever worked in the house of the

Appellant.  It was also stated that the Respondent wife was

insisting  the  Appellant  to  get  separated  from  his  family

members and on 12th July, 1995 i.e. the date of the attempt

to  commit  suicide,  the  Respondent  wife  deserted  the

Appellant husband.  According to the learned counsel, the

facts  recorded  by  the  learned  Family  Court  after

appreciating the evidence were sufficient to show that the

Appellant  was  entitled  to  a  decree  of  divorce  as  per  the

provisions of Section 13(1)(ia) of the Act.   

7. We have carefully gone through the evidence adduced

by the parties before the trial Court and we tried to find out

as to why the appellate Court had taken a different view

than the one taken by the Family Court i.e. the trial Court.   

8. The High Court came to the conclusion that there was

no cruelty meted out to the Appellant, which would enable

him to get a decree of divorce, as per the provisions of the

Act.   The allegations  with  regard to  the  character  of  the

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Appellant  and  the  extra-marital  affair  with  a  maid  were

taken  very  seriously  by  the  Family  Court,  but  the  High

Court did not give much importance to the false allegations

made.   The  constant  persuasion  by  the  Respondent  for

getting separated from the family members of the Appellant

and constraining the Appellant to live separately and only

with her was also not considered to be of any importance by

the High Court.  No importance was given to the incident

with regard to an attempt to commit suicide made by the

Respondent wife.  On the contrary, it appears that the High

Court found some justification in the request made by the

Respondent  to  live  separately  from  the  family  of  the

Appellant husband.  According to the High Court, the trial

Court  did  not  appreciate  the  evidence  properly.   For  the

aforestated reasons,  the High Court reversed the findings

arrived at by the learned Family Court and set aside the

decree of divorce.

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9. We do not agree with the manner in which the High

Court has re-appreciated the evidence and has come to a

different conclusion.

10. With regard to the allegations of cruelty levelled by the

Appellant, we are in agreement with the findings of the trial

Court.  First of all, let us look at the incident with regard to

an attempt to  commit suicide by the Respondent.   Upon

perusal of the evidence of the witnesses, the findings arrived

at by the trial Court to the effect that the Respondent wife

had  locked  herself  in  the  bathroom  and  had  poured

kerosene  on  herself  so  as  to  commit  suicide,  are  not  in

dispute.  Fortunately for the Appellant, because of the noise

and  disturbance,  even  the  neighbours  of  the  Appellant

rushed to help and the door of the bathroom was broken

open  and  the  Respondent  was  saved.   Had  she  been

successful in her attempt to commit suicide, then one can

foresee the  consequences  and the plight  of  the Appellant

because in that event the Appellant would have been put to

immense difficulties because of the legal provisions.  We feel

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that there was no fault on the part of the Appellant nor was

there  any  reason  for  the  Respondent  wife  to  make  an

attempt  to  commit  suicide.   No  husband  would  ever  be

comfortable with or tolerate such an act by his wife and if

the  wife  succeeds  in  committing  suicide,  then  one  can

imagine how a poor husband would get entangled into the

clutches of law, which would virtually ruin his sanity, peace

of mind, career and probably his entire life.  The mere idea

with  regard  to  facing  legal  consequences  would  put  a

husband under tremendous stress.   The thought  itself  is

distressing.   Such a mental  cruelty  could  not  have  been

taken lightly by the High Court. In our opinion, only this

one event was sufficient for the Appellant husband to get a

decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty.  It is needless to

add  that  such  threats  or  acts  constitute  cruelty.   Our

aforesaid view is fortified by a decision of this Court in the

case  of  Pankaj  Mahajan v.  Dimple @ Kajal  (2011)  12

SCC  1, wherein  it  has  been  held  that  giving  repeated

threats to commit suicide amounts to cruelty.

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11. The  Respondent  wife  wanted  the  Appellant  to  get

separated from his  family.   The evidence  shows that  the

family  was  virtually  maintained  from  the  income  of  the

Appellant husband. It is not a common practice or desirable

culture for a Hindu son in India to get separated from the

parents upon getting married at the instance of  the wife,

especially when the son is the only earning member in the

family.   A  son,  brought  up  and  given  education  by  his

parents, has a moral and legal obligation to take care and

maintain the parents, when they become old and when they

have either no income or have a meagre income.  In India,

generally people do not subscribe to the western thought,

where, upon getting married or attaining majority, the son

gets separated from the family.  In normal circumstances, a

wife is expected to be with the family of the husband after

the marriage.  She becomes integral to and forms part of the

family of the husband and normally without any justifiable

strong  reason,  she  would  never  insist  that  her  husband

should get separated from the family and live only with her.

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In the instant case, upon appreciation of the evidence, the

trial Court came to the conclusion that merely for monetary

considerations,  the  Respondent  wife  wanted  to  get  her

husband separated from his family.  The averment of the

Respondent  was  to  the  effect  that  the  income  of  the

Appellant was also spent for maintaining his family.  The

said grievance of the Respondent is absolutely unjustified.

A  son  maintaining  his  parents  is  absolutely  normal  in

Indian  culture  and  ethos.   There  is  no  other  reason  for

which the Respondent wanted the Appellant to be separated

from the family - the sole reason was to enjoy the income of

the  Appellant.   Unfortunately,  the High Court  considered

this to be a justifiable reason. In the opinion of the High

Court, the wife had a legitimate expectation to see that the

income  of  her  husband  is  used  for  her  and  not  for  the

family members of the Respondent husband.  We do not see

any reason to justify the said view of the High Court.  As

stated  hereinabove,  in  a  Hindu  society,  it  is  a  pious

obligation  of  the  son to  maintain  the  parents.   If  a  wife

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makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and

normal  custom  of  the  society,  she  must  have  some

justifiable reason for that and in this case, we do not find

any justifiable reason, except monetary consideration of the

Respondent  wife.   In  our  opinion,  normally,  no  husband

would tolerate this and no son would like to be separated

from his old parents and other family members,  who are

also dependent upon his income.  The persistent effort of

the  Respondent  wife  to  constrain  the  Appellant  to  be

separated  from  the  family  would  be  torturous  for  the

husband and in our opinion, the trial Court was right when

it  came to  the  conclusion that  this  constitutes an act  of

‘cruelty’.    

12. With regard to the allegations about an extra-marital

affair  with maid named Kamla, the re-appreciation of  the

evidence by the High Court does not appear to be correct.

There is sufficient evidence to the effect that there was no

maid  named  Kamla  working  at  the  residence  of  the

Appellant.  Some averment with regard to some relative has

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been relied upon by the High Court to come to a conclusion

that there was a lady named Kamla but the High Court has

ignored  the  fact  that  the  Respondent  wife  had  levelled

allegations  with  regard  to  an  extra-marital  affair  of  the

Appellant with the maid and not with someone else.  Even if

there  was  some  relative  named  Kamla,  who  might  have

visited the Appellant,  there is nothing to substantiate the

allegations  levelled  by  the  Respondent  with  regard  to  an

extra-marital  affair.   True,  it  is  very  difficult  to  establish

such allegations but at the same time, it is equally true that

to  suffer  an  allegation  pertaining  to  one’s  character  of

having  an  extra-marital  affair  is  quite  torturous  for  any

person – be it a husband or a wife.  We have carefully gone

through  the  evidence  but  we  could  not  find  any  reliable

evidence to show that the Appellant had an extra-marital

affair with someone.  Except for the baseless and reckless

allegations,  there  is  not  even  the  slightest  evidence  that

would suggest that there was something like an affair of the

Appellant  with the  maid named by  the Respondent.   We

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consider  levelling  of  absolutely  false  allegations  and  that

too, with regard to an extra-marital life to be quite serious

and that can surely be a cause for metal cruelty.  

13. This Court, in the case of  Vijaykumar Ramchandra

Bhate v. Neela Vijaykumar Bhate, 2003 (6) SCC 334 has

held as under:-

“7.   The question that requires to be answered first is as to whether the averments, accusations and  character  assassination  of  the  wife  by  the appellant  husband  in  the  written  statement constitutes  mental  cruelty  for  sustaining  the claim for divorce under Section 13(1)(i-a)  of  the Act. The position of law in this regard has come to  be  well  settled  and  declared  that  levelling disgusting  accusations  of  unchastity  and indecent  familiarity  with  a  person  outside wedlock  and  allegations  of  extramarital relationship is a grave assault on the character, honour, reputation, status as well as the health of  the  wife.  Such  aspersions  of  perfidiousness attributed to the wife, viewed in the context of an educated  Indian  wife  and  judged  by  Indian conditions and standards would amount to worst form of insult and cruelty, sufficient by itself to substantiate cruelty in law, warranting the claim of the wife being allowed. That such allegations made in the  written  statement  or  suggested  in the  course  of  examination  and  by  way  of cross-examination satisfy the requirement of law has  also  come  to  be  firmly  laid  down  by  this Court. On going through the relevant portions of

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such allegations, we find that no exception could be taken to the findings recorded by the Family Court  as well  as  the  High Court.  We find that they  are  of  such  quality,  magnitude  and consequence as to cause mental pain, agony and suffering amounting to the reformulated concept of  cruelty in matrimonial  law causing profound and lasting disruption and driving the wife to feel deeply  hurt  and  reasonably  apprehend  that  it would  be  dangerous  for  her  to  live  with  a husband  who  was  taunting  her  like  that  and rendered the maintenance of  matrimonial  home impossible.”

14. Applying the said ratio to the facts of this case, we are

inclined  to  hold  that  the  unsubstantiated  allegations

levelled by the Respondent wife and the threats and attempt

to commit suicide by her amounted to mental cruelty and

therefore, the marriage deserves to be dissolved by a decree

of divorce on the ground stated in Section 13(1)(ia) of the

Act.

15. Taking an overall view of the entire evidence and the

judgment delivered by the trial Court, we firmly believe that

there was no need to  take a  different  view than the one

taken by the trial Court.  The behaviour of the Respondent

wife appears to be terrifying and horrible.  One would find it

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difficult  to  live  with  such  a  person  with  tranquility  and

peace of mind.  Such torture would adversely affect the life

of  the  husband.   It  is  also  not  in  dispute  that  the

Respondent  wife  had  left  the  matrimonial  house  on  12th

July, 1995 i.e. more than 20 years back.  Though not on

record,  the learned counsel  submitted that  till  today,  the

Respondent  wife  is  not  staying  with  the  Appellant.   The

daughter of the Appellant and Respondent has also grown

up and according to the learned counsel, she is working in

an  IT  company.   We  have  no  reason  to  disbelieve  the

aforestated  facts  because  with  the  passage  of  time,  the

daughter  must have grown up and the separation of  the

Appellant and the wife must have also become normal for

her and therefore, at this juncture it would not be proper to

bring them together, especially when the Appellant husband

was treated so cruelly by the Respondent wife.   

16. We,  therefore,  quash  and  set  aside  the  impugned

judgment  delivered  by  the  High  Court.   The  decree  of

divorce dated 17th November, 2001 passed by the Principal

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Judge, Family Court, Bangalore in M.C. No.603 of 1995 is

hereby restored.  

17. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed with no order as to

costs.

.…………………………….J.                  (ANIL R. DAVE)

……………………………..J.                                (L. NAGESWARA RAO)

NEW DELHI OCTOBER 06, 2016.