NARAYANRAO JAGOBAJI GAWANDE PUB.TRUST Vs STATE OF MAHARASHTRA .
Bench: V. GOPALA GOWDA,AMITAVA ROY
Case number: C.A. No.-000870-000870 / 2016
Diary number: 23745 / 2009
Advocates: RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOYAL Vs
ANAGHA S. DESAI
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Non-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.870 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.25972 of 2009) NARAYANRAO JAGOBAJI GOWANDE PUBLIC TRUST …APPELLANT
Versus THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.871 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.25821 of 2008)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.872 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.25841 of 2008)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 876-877 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.25923-24 of 2008)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 873 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.427 of 2009)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 874 OF 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.1223 of 2009)
And CIVIL APPEAL NO.875 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10246 of 2009)
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J U D G M E N T
Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. These appeals are directed against the common
impugned judgment and order dated 29.8.2008 passed by
the Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at
Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in various Writ Petitions
including Writ Petition No.1034 of 1995, wherein the
High Court has dismissed all the writ petitions.
3. As all the appeals raise the same question of law,
for the sake of convenience and brevity, we would refer
to the facts from the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No.
25972 of 2009. Brief facts are stated hereunder to
appreciate the rival legal contentions urged on behalf
of both the parties:
On 01.01.1937, the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act,
1936 (hereinafter referred to as the “NIT Act”) came
into force under which the Nagpur Improvement Trust
(hereinafter referred as “NIT”) was established and
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incorporated to provide for improvement and expansion
of Nagpur Town.
4. The State of Maharashtra vide notification dated
29.06.1939 sanctioned a Civil Station Expansion Scheme
of 1939 of the NIT.
5. On 28.02.1942, one Smt. Laxmibai Gawande, wife of
Narayanrao Gawande purchased a piece of land, measuring
3.59 acres, comprised in Khasra no. 65, Mouza Ajni,
Nagpur by a registered deed from Vithoba Fakira Teli.
On 27.04.1944, she executed a Release Deed in favour of
her husband Narayanrao Gawande whereby he became the
absolute owner of the said land.
6. It is an undisputed fact that the land in question
fell within the Civil Station Expansion Scheme of 1939
of NIT.
7. On 11.11.1968, Mr. Narayanrao Gawande applied to
respondent no.2-NIT for the development of his said
open space land and gave an undertaking whereby he
agreed to have the layout of the land formed as per the
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plans, suggestions and directions of respondent no.2-
NIT. In this connection, a development agreement was
executed on the same day between Narayanrao Gawande and
the NIT, whereby NIT permitted him to develop the said
land in a planned way in accordance with the approved
scheme and as per the sanctioned layout plan. In the
said layout plan, an area was reserved for primary
school, which was a public utility land.
8. After the death of Narayanrao Gawande, the
appellant-Narayanrao Jagobaji Gawande Public Trust
(hereinafter called the “appellant-trust”) was created
and the said land became the property of this trust.
On 21.02.1985, a development agreement was executed
between the appellant-trust and the NIT for ratifying
the earlier development agreement dated 11.11.1968
which included the sanctioned map/plan showing the land
reserved for primary school/public utility purpose.
Under the said agreement, the appellant-trust was
permitted to develop the layout subject to various
conditions including the following one:
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“Whereas the said Party No.2 shall agree to transfer the land and or primary school/open land in the said layout at free of cost for Party No.1 before release of plots and Party No.1 shall be free to dispose of this land as per its rules and regulations.”
The above Clause contained in the said development
agreement (hereinafter called the “impugned clause”)
provides for the transfer of the land earmarked for the
primary school or other public utility purposes, after
its development in favour of respondent no.2-NIT
without payment of any compensation to the land owners.
9. Respondent no.1- State vide its order dated
05.8.1993 sanctioned the allotment of land from out of
Khasra no. 41/1 and 45 Mouza Somalwada, Nagpur in
favour of respondent no.3-Santaji Mahavidyalaya for the
construction of a senior college. Pursuant to the
aforementioned sanction, respondent no. 2-NIT allotted
a piece of land in B.D. Thapar layout to Respondent
no.3-Santaji Mahavidyalaya. On 25.02.1994 respondent
no.3 requested respondent no.2-NIT for a change in
location of the allotted plot for the construction of
said senior college. The respondent no.2-NIT, by its
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resolution allotted a land, measuring 1907.65sq.m,
comprised in Narayanrao Gawande layout to respondent
no.3 in exchange of land.
10. Feeling aggrieved by the action of allotment of
land, comprised in Narayanrao Gawande layout, taken by
respondent no.2-NIT, the appellant-trust approached the
High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 1034 of 1995.
Some other writ petitions were also filed by the
aggrieved parties. In the said Writ Petitions, the
aforesaid action of respondent no.2-NIT was challenged
on the ground of being without jurisdiction and
authority of law and also being contrary to the
provisions of the NIT Act. The High Court vide its
common judgment and order dated 29.08.2008 has
dismissed all the Writ Petitions on the ground that the
respondent no.2-NIT is free to allot the land by
following due procedure of law for public utility
purpose. It neither found arbitrariness nor illegality
in the aforesaid action of the respondent no.2-NIT in
allotting the said public utility land as reserved in
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the sanctioned layout plan. Hence, these appeals have
been filed urging various grounds questioning the
correctness of the common impugned judgment and order
passed by the High Court.
11. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant-trust contended
that the impugned clause in the development agreement
dated 21.02.1985, referred to supra, which provides for
the transfer of developed land by the land owners to
NIT free of cost and without payment of any
compensation, is void and unenforceable in law in the
light of the provisions of Sections 23 and 25 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872. He challenged the said
clause of the development agreement on the ground of it
being hit by Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act,
1872 as the said agreement is neither registered under
the provisions of the Registration Act nor stamped as
per the provisions of the Bombay Stamp Act. In this
regard he placed strong reliance upon the decision of
this Court in the case of Central Inland Water
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Transport Corpn Ltd & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly &
Anr1. The relevant para 89 cited by the learned senior
counsel reads thus:
“89…...The principle deducible from the above discussions on this part of the case is in consonance with right and reason, intended to secure social and economic justice and conforms to the mandate of the great equality clause in Article 14. This principle is that the courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so, strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract, or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a contract, entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power….”
12. He further contended that respondent no.1-State
cannot acquire any land by incorporating a clause like
the impugned clause contained in the development
agreement, in the instant case, which has been executed
between itself and the land owners to the effect that
the land owners shall transfer the land developed by
them for public utility purpose, free of cost and
without getting any compensation from the NIT. In
support of the aforesaid contention he placed strong
reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Pt. Chet
1 (1986) 3 SCC 156
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Ram Vashist v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi2 and
Yogendra Pal & Ors. v. Municipality, Bhatinda & Ors3.
13. It was further contended by him that in view of
Section 76 of the NIT Act read with Rule 3 of the NIT
Land Disposal Rules, 1983, respondent no.1-State should
not have sanctioned the allotment of land in favour of
respondent no.3. Section 76 of the NIT Act provides for
disposal of any land vested in or acquired by Trust
subject to rules, if any, made by the State Government.
However, in the present case, respondent no.2 has
allotted a piece of land comprised in Narayanrao
Gawande layout in favour of respondent no.3 when the
said piece of land was neither vested in nor acquired
by respondent no.2-NIT.
14. It was further contended by the learned Senior
counsel that the High Court has erred in holding that
the appellant-trust had received consideration for
transfer of the said land in the form of benefits. He
further submitted that release of the said land 2 (1995) 1 SCC 47 3 (1994) 5 SCC 709
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reserved in the layout plan from acquisition and grant
of permission to sub-divide the plots cannot be
considered to be a consideration. He further submitted
that the ground as noted above was not taken by
respondent no.1 before the High Court and therefore,
the same ought not to have been considered by it.
15. It was further contended by him that the High Court
has failed to appreciate the scope and scheme of
various provisions of NIT Act, particularly Sections
26, 39, 45, 58, 59 and 68.
16. While contending further, he drew the attention of
this Court towards various provisions under chapter IV
of the NIT Act dealing with Improvement Schemes.
Section 26 of the NIT Act deals with the matters to be
provided for improvement schemes. Further, Section 27
of the NIT Act provides for various kinds of
improvement schemes which include a street scheme under
its clause (d). Section 31 of the NIT Act specifically
deals with Street scheme. Section 31 (2)(a) stipulates
that the Trust can even acquire a land, which in its
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opinion, is necessary for the execution of a street
scheme. Under Section 44 of the NIT Act, power is given
to the State Government to sanction, reject or return
improvement scheme. Once an improvement scheme is
sanctioned by the State Government, a final
notification in that regard is issued by it under
Section 45 (1)(a) of the NIT Act. He further submitted
that in item 2 of the Schedule appended to the NIT Act
it is provided that publication of notification under
the provisions of Sections 39 and 45 of the NIT Act
shall have the same effect as a notification under
Sections 4(1) and 6 respectively of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894. He further submitted that it has
already come on record that the notification under
Section 45 of the NIT Act in respect of “Ajni Street
Scheme”, was published and the entire land covered
under the said street scheme including the land owned
by the appellant-trust was under acquisition for the
execution of the said street scheme.
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17. The learned senior counsel further drew the
attention of this Court towards Section 58 of the NIT
Act. The aforesaid Section deals with the acquisition
by agreement and empowers the Trust to enter into an
agreement with any person for the acquisition, by
purchase, lease or exchange of any land within the area
comprised in a sanctioned scheme. He further submitted
that Section 58 of NIT Act does not in any manner
provides for opting to acquire a part of the land
covered under the scheme and a part of land being left
un-acquired either by agreement or by compulsory
acquisition. In the light of aforesaid, if at all,
respondent no.2-NIT intended to acquire the land of the
appellant-trust under the aforesaid Section, it could
not have acquired the said land, by development
agreement, without acquiring the entire land (measuring
about 13.45 acres). Further, assuming that NIT can
acquire a part of land by agreement under Section 58 of
the NIT Act, then it ought to have acquired the
remaining land by compulsory acquisition and nothing
like this has happened in the instant case.
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18. It was further contended by the learned counsel
that Section 68 of the NIT Act empowers the Trust to
abandon the acquisition of the land which is
subsequently discovered to be unnecessary for the
execution of the scheme on the terms and conditions
stipulated therein. He further submitted that from the
perusal of both the provisions of Sections 58 and 68 of
the NIT Act, it is clear that the development agreement
in question has been entered into between the parties
under Section 68 of the NIT Act as all the conditions
required under the said Section are fulfilled. He
fortified his aforementioned submission by emphasizing
upon clause 2(ii)(b) of the development agreement which
reads thus:
“b) If and when any improvement scheme for development of the area in which the aforesaid Kh. No. 65 of Mouza Ajni is situated is sanctioned by the State Government, the party no. 2 shall be liable to pay the betterment or abandonment charges which may be assessed on the plots in accordance with the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act.”
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19. He further contended that once a scheme is declared
and notification akin to Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 is issued in this regard, the
entire land covered under the scheme has to be acquired
by NIT and no provision of the NIT Act permits the
release of any land, partly or wholly, by NIT from
acquisition, except in a case where the said land is
subsequently discovered to be unnecessary for the
execution of the scheme as contemplated under Section
68 of the NIT Act which empowers the abandonment of
acquisition. He further submitted that there is no
other provision in the NIT Act which empowers the NIT
to release the land on the terms and conditions
contained in the development agreement and particularly
the condition contained in the impugned clause. The
fact of the matter, in the instant case, clearly shows
that the land of the appellant-trust which was included
in the approved scheme by the State Government was
subsequently discovered to be unnecessary for the
execution of the said scheme by the NIT.
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20. It was further contended that a bare perusal of the
development agreement reveals that all the terms and
conditions of the development agreement, except the
condition contained in the impugned clause, relate to
development of the property. There is no relevance of
the condition contained in the impugned clause with the
development purpose as contemplated under sub-section
(1) of Section 68 of NIT Act. Therefore, in the light
of aforesaid, the NIT does not have any power,
whatsoever, to incorporate such condition in the
development agreement, which is not only unilateral but
also unconscionable. Thus, the said condition cannot be
made binding upon the appellant-trust and consequently,
the same cannot be enforced against it.
21. It was further submitted that NIT has no power to
acquire, by transfer or otherwise, land de hors the
provisions of the NIT Act in lieu of charging the
betterment contribution from the appellant-trust. He
further submitted that Section 68(4) of the NIT Act
provides that when an agreement is executed in
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pursuance of sub-section (1) to Section 68 of the NIT
Act, the proceedings for the acquisition of land shall
be deemed to be abandoned. Section 68(5) of the NIT Act
provides that the provisions contained in Sections 70-
74 of the NIT Act shall apply mutatis mutandis for the
assessment of betterment charges, its levy and
recovery. Further, as per Section 70 of the said Act,
NIT is required to pass a resolution determining such
betterment contribution. Once such a resolution is
passed, the execution of the scheme, by a legal fiction
under sub-section (1) to Section 70 of the NIT Act, is
deemed to have been completed and the betterment
contribution is then, calculated as per the procedure
prescribed therein. He further submitted that nothing
has been placed on record by NIT to show that any such
resolution has been passed assessing the betterment
contribution under Section 70(1) of NIT Act. He further
submitted that the development agreement in question
itself provides for the payment of the betterment
charges, in future, on such conditions, from such
persons, as may be assessed in accordance with the
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provisions of the NIT Act. For this purpose, the clause
2(ii)(b) of the development agreement (supra)
stipulates that the appellant-trust shall bind itself
to incorporate a clause in the sale deed of each plot
to the effect that the plot is sold subject to the
responsibility of the purchaser to pay betterment
charges to NIT in accordance with the provisions of the
NIT Act.
22. It was further submitted by him that the NIT Act
is a self-contained Act and there is no need to place
reliance upon the provisions of Maharashtra Regional &
Town Planning Act, 1966 and Nagpur Corporation Act,
1948. He contended that the High Court has erred in
not holding the impugned clause in the development
agreement as void and unenforceable in law as the same
is opposed to the public policy and contrary to law
laid down by this Court in various cases.
23. He further submitted that the finding recorded by
the High Court that the terms and conditions of the
development agreement were neither unconscionable nor
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void and that there was no inequality of bargaining
power between the parties, is completely perverse in
the light of the facts and circumstances of the instant
case. He further submitted that respondent no.2-NIT
enjoys a monopoly status as regards the permission to
develop the land under the NIT Act. NIT exerts pressure
on such land owners who desire to develop their land
and compels them to incorporate such void and
unconscionable clauses in the development agreement
executed between itself and the land owners, like the
impugned clause in the instant case.
24. Per contra, Mr. V. Giri, the learned senior counsel
appearing on behalf of the respondents sought to
justify the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court on the ground that the same is well founded
both on facts and law and is not vitiated in law.
Therefore, no interference of this Court with the
impugned judgment is required in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.
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25. It was contended by Mr. Giri that when the parties
entered into development agreement, they were fully
aware of the nature of the transaction, conditions and
respective obligations incorporated therein. On the
basis of the same, the appellant-trust has commercially
exploited the said land. There was no objection raised
by it at any point of time while entering into such
agreement and even thereafter, when the appellant-trust
and such other persons who, based upon the development
agreements got the benefit out of the same. He further
submitted that the entire development agreement has to
be read as a whole. It is very clear from the
provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 that the
consideration of any such agreement is permissible and
valid in law and not to defeat the provisions of any
law. The same is neither fraudulent nor opposed to
public policy.
26. It was further contended by the learned senior
counsel that there was no inequality of bargaining
power with the appellant-trust at the time of getting
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the development scheme sanctioned. In this regard, he
placed strong reliance upon the decisions of this Court
in Premsingh and Others v. Birbal and others4 and
Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivrj Adhav5 to
press upon the point that there is no need of a court
decree to set aside an agreement, like the development
agreement in the instant case (as the impugned clause
therein is not void ab initio) especially when the
agreement as well as the clause in question are amply
clear and there has been no ambiguity regarding the
same at any point of time. Thus, the terms and
conditions of the said development agreement are
binding upon the parties.
27. It was further contended by him that since the
parties have already acted upon the terms and
conditions of the said development agreement, the
entire agreement is required to be considered in
totality. He further submitted that there is no
justification of reading any clause by severing it in
4 (2006) 5 SCC 353 5 (1988) 1 SCC 530
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isolation or in part(s) to examine and consider the
legal submissions made on behalf of the appellant-
trust. It was further submitted that it is a well
settled principle of law that a party to an agreement
cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate after
availing the benefit from it. In support of this
contention he placed strong reliance upon the decision
of this Court in the case of New Bihar Biri Leaves Co.
& Ors v. State of Bihar & Ors6. The relevant paragraph
48 cited by him reads thus:
“48. It is a fundamental principle of general application that if a person of his own accord, accepts a contract on certain terms and works out the contract, he cannot be allowed to adhere to and abide by some of the terms of the contract which proved advantageous to him and repudiate the other terms of the same contract which might be disadvantageous to him. The maxim is qui approbat non reprobat (one who approbates cannot reprobate). This principle, though originally borrowed from Scots Law, is now firmly embodied in English Common Law. According to it, a party to an instrument or transaction cannot take advantage of one part of a document or transaction and reject the rest. That is to say, no party can accept and reject the same instrument or transaction (Per Scrutton, L.J., Verschures Creameries Ltd. v.
6 (1981) 1 SCC 537
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Hull & Netherlands Steamship Co.; see Douglas Menzies v. Umphelby; see also stroud’s judicial dictionary, Vol. I, p. 169, 3rd Edn.)”
28. The learned senior counsel drew the attention of
this Court towards Section 58 of the NIT Act which
reads thus:
“The Trust may enter into an agreement with any person for the acquisition, by purchase, lease or exchange by the Trust from such person, of any land within the area comprised in the sanctioned scheme.”
It was submitted by him that if the appellant-trust has
entered into an agreement with the NIT, then, the said
public utility land can be said to have been acquired
by an agreement in view of the exchange of not
implementing the scheme as per the sanctioned
notification under Section 45 of the NIT Act but
agreeing to sanction a private layout with regard to
land comprised within the sanctioned scheme of the NIT.
Thus, in light of aforesaid, it cannot be said that the
public utility land, which is being transferred to the
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NIT free of cost, is without any compensation.
29. On the issue of allotment of land in favour of
respondent no.3, it was contended by him that NIT does
not have inherent jurisdiction over any piece of land.
The NIT gets ownership of a land through the procedure
as contemplated in the NIT Act. The NIT has been
established by the State Government for the improvement
of the city of Nagpur through the implementation of
various improvement schemes. He further submitted that
these schemes are framed by NIT from the matters
provided in Section 26 of the NIT Act. These schemes
are framed by the NIT and published by notification
under Section 39 of the NIT Act, which is equivalent to
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894. Thereafter, going through the provisions of
Section 40,41,42,43 and 44 of the NIT Act, the
improvement schemes are sanctioned by the State
Government by a notification issued under Section 45 of
the NIT Act, which is equivalent to Section 6 of the
Land Acquisition Act. Section 46 of the NIT Act allows
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the alteration of improvement schemes after its
sanction. Thus, in the light of aforesaid, he further
submitted that the High Court has rightly concluded
that the NIT has a jurisdiction over the areas, which
are part and parcel of notification issued under
Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 equivalent
to Section 45 of the NIT Act. He further submitted that
the land in question is definitely a part and parcel of
the improvement schemes of the NIT sanctioned by the
State Government under the provision of Section 45 of
the NIT Act.
30. It was further submitted by him that Pt. Chet Ram Vashist and Yogendra Pal cases, referred to supra, upon
which the learned senior counsel on behalf of the
appellant-trust has relied upon are of no relevance to
the case in hand as the facts and the circumstances of
the instant case differ from the facts and
circumstances of the aforesaid cases.
31. We have carefully heard both the parties at length
and have also given our conscious thought to the
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materials on record and the relevant provisions of law.
We are of the view that the High Court in its judgment
and order has rightly held that respondent no.1-State
and respondent no.2-NIT are bound to stick to the
development plan and scheme. It has placed reliance
upon the decision of this Court in Chairman, Indore
Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd. & Ors7, wherein this Court, while dealing with the
aspect of town planning and Articles 300-A and 14 of
the Constitution of India, has observed as under:
“………The courts must make an endeavour to strike a balance between the public interest on the one hand and protection of a constitutional right to hold property, on the other. For the aforementioned purpose, an endeavour should be made to find out as to whether the statute takes care of public interest in the matter vis-à-vis the private interest, on the one hand, and the effect of lapse and/or positive inaction on the part of the State and other planning authorities, on the other.”
Further, the High Court has rightly held thus:
“NIT or such other local authority needs to consider the purpose, Scheme, development plan and the circular issued from time to time by striking a balance of public and private
7 (2007) 8 SCC 705
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interest. The petitioners are bound by the agreement and undertaking as given. In fact, both the parties are bound by the agreements. In totality the permissible action of respondent NIT is within the frame of law and the record. There is no substance in these petitions.”
32. The High Court has, further, rightly held that the
impugned clause contained in the said development
agreement is neither void nor illegal for want of
consideration. It has also been rightly held by it that
after consideration of whole scheme of the NIT Act,
particularly, provisions under Sections 29 to 70 and
121 of the said Act read with the terms and conditions
of the said development agreement entered into between
the parties, it is clear that the said development
agreement creates reciprocal rights and obligations
between the parties with some objects. The aforesaid
objects as cited by the High Court in its judgment and
order read thus:
“(a)Abandonment of the land from acquisition of NIT.
(b)Permission to develop the said land and sanction of a scheme of a layout therein,
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(c)Entrustment of the job of supervision of such development on NIT,
(d)Transfer of the public utility land, reserved in the said layout to the NIT.
(e)Immediate and reciprocal permission to develop the land by making a layout in the said land and permission to sell plots therein, i.e. permission for commercial exploitation of the land.”
Thus, seeking abandonment of acquisition of the land as
provided under Section 68 of the NIT Act is a huge
benefit which the appellant-trust has gained from the
agreement. Further, it is not open for the appellant-
trust to avail only the beneficial part of the said
development agreement to form a layout plan and allow
the sites to be allotted in favour of allottees, when
it itself is not willing to discharge the obligation of
transferring the reserved land for public utility
purpose, as agreed upon in the development agreement.
33. Further the High Court has rightly observed that
another benefit derived by the appellant-trust from the
said development agreement is immediate and reciprocal
sanction for the development of the said land with
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permission for the commercial usage of the same,
presuming that there would be no acquisition.
34. This Court is of the view that the High Court has
rightly held that the impugned clause in the
development agreement is neither void nor opposed to
the public policy. The High Court has held thus:
“42.When the parties entered into agreement, they were fully aware of the nature of trans- action, conditions and respective obligations. There was no objection raised at any point of time while entering into such agreement and even thereafter when petitioners and such other persons who based upon the said agree- ment got the benefit out of the same. We can- not read the clauses in isolation. We have to read the whole agreement in question. It is very clear even from the provisions of the Contract Act that the consideration of any such agreement was permissible and not unlaw- ful and/or not prohibited by law and was not to defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent and/or is immoral or opposed to public policy.
43.The submissions, that such contract and es- pecially the clause is void, in view of provi- sions contained under Section 23/25 of the Indian Contract Act being opposed to pub- lic policy; violative of fundamental rights of the petitioner; violative of the right of property of petitioner/society; because of un- equal bargain power; being forbidden by law
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and further in view of Section 25 of the Con- tract Act, as the agreement to transfer is without consideration and the same was not registered, have no force.”
In view of the findings and reasons recorded by the
High Court in the Central Inland Water Transport Corpn
Ltd & Anr case (supra) upon which the reliance was
placed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant-
trust is of no relevance to the fact situation.
35. Further, it has been rightly held by the High Court
that the appellant-trust has accepted and acted upon
the said development agreement like other beneficiaries
who are either the societies or other similar persons
who are benefited by the approved scheme of the NIT. It
is noteworthy that the appellant-trust has accepted all
the terms and conditions of the development agreement
without any objection while executing the same. The
impugned clause of the said development agreement
provides for the transfer of land in favour of NIT
which is earmarked in the layout for the public utility
purpose. The same is in terms of the approved
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development plan by Maharashtra Government and as per
the provisions of the Maharashtra Regional & Town
Planning Act, 1966 contained in its Chapter-V i.e.,
Sections 59-112 and Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948.
36. The findings recorded on the relevant contentious
issues by the High Court in the impugned judgment with
cogent and valid reasons are legal and justifiable.
Therefore, we do not find any valid reason, whatsoever,
to interfere with the said impugned judgment and order
as the same, in our opinion, is a well-considered and
reasoned decision. The same does not suffer from
erroneous reasoning or error in law which requires
interference by this Court.
37. For the reasons stated supra, the civil appeals are
dismissed. The order dated 01.10.2009 granting status
quo shall stands vacated. …………………………………………………………J. [V. GOPALA GOWDA]
……………………………………………………….J. [AMITAVA ROY]
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New Delhi, February 4, 2016
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ITEM NO.1B-For Judgment COURT NO.9 SECTION IX S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Civil Appeal 870/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25972/2009 NARAYANRAO JAGOBAJI GAWANDE PUB.TRUST Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 871/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25821/2008 C.A. No. 872/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 25841/2009
C.A. No. 876-877/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s).25923-25924/2008 C.A. No. 873/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 427/2009 C.A. No. 874/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 1223/2009 C.A. No. 875/2016 @ SLP (C) No(s). 10246/2009 Date : 04/02/2016 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT today. For Appellant(s) Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,Adv. Mr. Manish Pitale, Adv.
Ms. Deeplaxmi S. Matwankar, Adv. Mr. Chander Shekhar Ashri,Adv. Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav,Adv. For Respondent(s) Mr. Satyajit A. Desai, Adv. Ms. Anagha S. Desai,Adv. Mr. Vimal Chandra S. Dave,Adv. Mr. A. Venayagam Balan,Adv.
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Mr. Kunal A. Cheema, Addl. Govt. Adv. Mr. Nishant Katneshwarkar, Govt. Adv. Mr. Yogesh Ahirrao, Adv. Mr. Siddhesh Kotwal, Adv. Ms. Shreya Bhatnagar, Adv. Mr. Raghunatha S., Adv. Mr. Nirnimesh Dubey, Adv.
Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amitava Roy.
Delay condoned. Leave granted. The appeals are dismissed in terms of the signed
Non-Reportable Judgment. The order dated 01.10.2009 granting status quo
shall stands vacated.
(VINOD KUMAR) COURT MASTER
(CHANDER BALA) COURT MASTER
(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)