REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2058 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.11544/08

Narayan Dutt & others  ...Appellant(s)

- Versus -

State of Punjab & another ...Respondent(s)

With Civil Appeal No.2059 of 2011

[Arising out of SLP (C) No.5910/11 (CC No.3090/10)]

State of Punjab ...Appellant(s)

- Versus –

Rajinder Pal Singh & others ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave  is  granted  in  both  the  special  leave  

petitions.  They are  heard together  as common  

questions of facts and law are involved. 1

3. One  Kiranjit Kaur,  daughter of  a handicapped  

school  master,  was  abducted  when  she  was  

returning from school on 29.07.1997, and then  

gang-raped  and  murdered  by  Gurprit  Singh,  

Jagraj Singh, Desh Raj and Partap Singh. The  

Hon’ble  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Barnala,  

after holding the trial convicted and sentenced  

them to undergo life imprisonment. In the area  

an Action Committee was formed to ensure that  

accused persons, involved in the gang-rape and  

murder  of  that  girl,  were  brought  to  book.  

That committee consisted, inter-alia, of Manjit  

Singh, Prem Kumar and Narayan Dutt, accused in  

the present case, as its members. Ultimately,  

the accused persons in the case of gang-rape  

and murder of Kiranjit Kaur were punished, as  

aforesaid.  

4. On  3.03.2001,  Beant  Singh  (father  of  Jagraj  

Singh),  Dalip  Singh  (grandfather  of  Jagraj  

Singh),  Gurnam  Singh  and  Rajinder  Pal  Singh  

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(nephew of Dalip Singh), while coming out of  

Court,  after  hearing  a  criminal  case,  were  

attacked  by  a  mob  consisting  of  7  persons,  

namely- Sukhwinder Singh, Labh Singh and Avtar  

Singh (all armed with kirpans), Bakhtaur Singh  

(armed with a ghop), Manjit Singh (armed with a  

kirch), along with Prem Kumar and Narayan Dutt  

(both  without  any  weapon  in  their  hands).  

Apparently, Bakhtaur Singh gave a blow to the  

head of Dalip Singh, who was being allegedly  

held  by  Prem  Kumar  and  Narayan  Dutt,  which  

resulted in his death.

5. Beant Singh lodged an FIR on the same day under  

Sections 307, 148, 149 and 120-B of IPC and  

investigation commenced in the matter. During  

the  course  of  investigation  Dalip  Singh  had  

passed away, and thus, the charge under Section  

302  IPC  was  added.  After  investigation,  the  

police, in its report under Section 173 Cr.P.C,  

found that Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar and Narayan  

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Dutt  were  innocent.  Thus,  charge  sheet  was  

filed by the police only against the remaining  

four accused under Sections 302/34, 326, 325,  

324 and 323 IPC and the case was committed to  

the Court of Sessions for trial. At the stage  

of trial, Beant Singh moved an application on  

11.9.2001 under Section 319 Cr.P.C.,  whereupon  

the Sessions Judge by an order dated 19.9.2001  

summoned Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar and Narayan  

Dutt.  The Sessions  Judge found  a prima-facie  

case  against them  and framed  charges against  

all  accused,  including  those  three,  under  

Sections 302, 148, 326, 325, 324 and 323 of IPC  

on 6.2.2002.

6. However,  the  prosecution  then  filed  an  

application dated 29.10.2002 under section 321  

Cr.P.C., seeking to withdraw the case against  

Manjit Singh, Prem Kumar and Narayan Dutt and  

that  was  disallowed  by  the  Trial  Court  vide  

order dated 7.11.2002.

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7. Aggrieved, the accused filed criminal revision  

petitions (No. 2248/2002 and 2413/2002), which  

were dismissed by the High Court of Punjab and  

Haryana vide common order dated 14.10.2003. A  

Special leave petition filed by the State of  

Punjab  against  the  order  of  the  High  Court  

dated  14.10.2003  was  also  dismissed  by  this  

Court.

8. Accordingly,  the  trial  commenced  against  all  

the 7 accused.

9. The  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Barnala,  

convicted all the accused by judgment and order  

dated  28.03.2005  and  convicted  them  under  

Sections  148  IPC  and  Sections  302,  302/149,  

323, 149, 324, 325 and 326 on various counts  

and  passed  an  order  of  life  sentence  on  

30.03.2005.

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10. All the accused appealed before the High Court  

of Punjab and Haryana. During the pendency of  

the  appeals,  Narayan  Dutt,  Manjit  Singh  and  

Prem Kumar also filed petitions under Article  

161  of  the  Constitution  of  India  before  the  

Governor of Punjab.

11. The  Governor  of  Punjab,  vide  order  dated  

24.07.2007,  in  exercise  of  his  powers  under  

Article  161, granted  pardon to  Narayan Dutt,  

Prem  Kumar  and  Manjit  Singh  and  they  were  

directed to be released immediately.

12. Challenging that order Rajinder Pal Singh filed  

a writ petition before the High Court of Punjab  

and Haryana.

13. The  criminal  appeals  of  the  accused  and  the  

writ petition of Rajinder Pal Singh were heard  

together  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  

Haryana.  The High  Court framed  two questions  

for consideration:

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a. Whether  case  of  the  prosecution  is  proved  against  all  the  appellants  by  evidence on record? b. Whether  the  order  of  pardon  is  sustainable in law?

14. Vide  the  impugned  common  judgment  dated  

11.03.2008,  the  High  Court  allowed  the  writ  

petition and set aside the order of pardon of  

the Governor of Punjab. It gave the benefit of  

doubt  to  Prem  Kumar  and  Narayan  Dutt,  and  

allowed  their  appeals  by  acquitting  them.  

However,  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  

Sukhwinder Singh, Labh Singh, Bakhtaur Singh,  

Avtar Singh and Manjit Singh was upheld by the  

High Court and it was of the opinion that the  

prosecution  had  successfully  established  the  

offences against them.

15. Against  the  said  impugned  judgment  dated  

11.03.2008, the State of Punjab filed Special  

Leave  Petition  (CC  No.3090/2010)  before  this  

Court.  Accused  Narayan  Dutt,  Prem  Kumar  and  7

Manjit Singh also filed another Special Leave  

Petition  (No.11544/2008)  before  this  Court.  

Both the Special Leave Petitions were directed  

against the order of the High Court whereby the  

order of pardon by the Governor of Punjab was  

set aside.

16. In the background of these facts, questions of  

law arising before us are:

a. Whether the power under Article 161 is  subject to judicial review and if yes, to  what extent? b. Whether  the  Governor  had  rightly  exercised  his  power  to  pardon  under  Article 161?

17. The order of the Governor dated 6.8.2007, which  

is relevant in the present context, reads as  

follows:

“I have considered the matter carefully. Ever since the lodging of FIR, there has  been  a  widespread  public  belief  that  Sarvshri  Narain  Dutt,  Prem  Kumar  and  Manjit Singh had been falsely implicated  in the murder of Dalip Singh, because of  their  role  as  leaders  of  the  Action  Committee set up to secure justice for the  

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late Kiranjit Kaur’s family. This has been  corroborated by the investigation into the  case,  during  the  course  of  which,  the  above  three  persons  were  found  to  be  innocent. The Intelligence Wing has also  supported the innocence of these persons.

It is also noteworthy that out of the 7  persons  accused  and  convicted  for  the  murder  of  Dalip  Singh,  pardon  has  been  sought  only  for  the  three  persons  that  have  been  found  to  be  innocent.  This  benefit  has  not  been  proposed  for  the  other  4  accused.  Further,  the  recommendation  for  pardon  had  initially  been moved by the previous government, and  has also been endorsed by the present one.  Hence, the recommendation for pardon seems  to be objective and bona fide.

The courts have held that the power under  Article  72  and  161  is  a  wide  power,  conferred inter alia with the purpose of  doing  justice  in  cases  even  where  the  courts might have convicted a person.

In view of the above, I exercise my powers  under  Article  161  and  grant  “pardon”  to  Sarvshri  Narain  Dutt,  Prem  Kumar  and  Manjit  Singh  in  FIR  No.  56  dated  03.03.2001 P.S- Kotwali Barnala.”

18. Article  161  of  the  Constitution  of  India  

confers on the Governor of a State the right to  

grant pardons, remissions, reprieves or commute  

the  sentence  of  any  person  convicted  of  any  

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offence against any law relating to a matter to  

which the executive power of the State extends.

19. The nature and scope of the power of pardon and  

the extent of judicial review over such power  

has come up for consideration in a catena of  

cases and has now virtually crystallised into a  

rule of law.

20. In  Maru Ram & Ors. v.  Union of India & Ors.  [AIR 1980 SC 2147] Krishna Iyer J, speaking for  

the Constitution Bench, held that although the  

power under Articles 72 and 161 were very wide,  

it could not “run riot”.  His Lordship held  

that no legal power can run unruly like John  

Gilpin on the horse, but “must keep sensibly to  

a  steady course”.  According to  His Lordship,  

“all  public  power,  including  constitutional  

power, shall never be exercisable arbitrarily  

or  mala fide  and, ordinarily,  guidelines for  

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fair and equal execution are guarantors of the  

valid play of power.” (para 62 at p. 2170)

21. The Court further observed that “Article 14 is  

an expression of the egalitarian spirit of the  

Constitution  and  is  a  clear  pointer  that  

arbitrariness is anathema under our system. It  

necessarily follows that the power to pardon,  

grant  of remission  and commutation,  being of  

the  greatest  moment  for  the  liberty  of  the  

citizen, cannot be a law unto itself but must  

be  informed  by  the  finer  canons  of  

constitutionalism.” The Constitution Bench also  

observed “the Government is not and should not  

be as free as an individual in selecting the  

recipients  for  its  largesse.  Whatever  its  

activity,  the  Government  is  still  the  

Government and will be subject to restraints,  

inherent  in  its  position  in  a  democratic  

society.  A  democratic  Government  cannot  lay  

down arbitrary and capricious standards for the  

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choice of persons with whom alone it will deal…  

Every action of the Executive Government must  

be informed with reason and should be free from  

arbitrariness… it makes no difference whether  

the exercise of the power involves affectation  

of some right or denial of some privilege… From  

this angle, even the power to pardon, commute  

or remit is subject to the wholesome creed that  

guidelines should govern the exercise even of  

Presidential power.” (para 63 at p. 2170-71)

22. The Bench cautioned that political vendetta or  

party  favoritism  should  not  be  the  basis  of  

exercising such power. It also advised that the  

government  should  make  rules  for  its  own  

guidance in the exercise of the pardon power to  

exclude the vice of discrimination.

23. In  conclusion,  the  Bench  observed  that  

considerations  for  exercise  of  power  under  

Articles  72/161  “may  be  myriad  and  their  

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occasions  protean,  and  are  left  to  the  

appropriate  Government,  but  no  consideration  

nor  occasion  can  be  wholly  irrelevant,  

irrational, discriminatory or mala fide. Only  

in these rare cases will the court examine the  

exercise.” (para 72 at p. 2175)

24. In the subsequent Constitution Bench decision  

in Kehar Singh & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.  [AIR 1989 SC 653] on the same question, this  

Court quoted the United States Supreme Court in  

Ex Parte Williams Wells, (1854-57) 15 Law Ed  421, on its power to scrutinize the  exercise  

of this power and  pointed out that it was to  

be used “particularly when the circumstances of  

any case disclosed such uncertainties as made  

it  doubtful  if  there  should  have  been  a  

conviction of the criminal, or when they are  

such  as  to  show  that  there  might  be  a  

mitigation of the punishment without lessening  

the  obligation  of  vindicatory  justice.”  The  

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Bench  also  quoted  Chief  Justice  Taft  in  Ex  parte  Philip  Grossman,  (1924)  267  US  87),  wherein the learned Chief Justice opined:

“Executive  clemency  exists  to  afford  relief  from  undue  harshness  or  evident  mistake  in  the  operation  or  the  enforcement  of  the  criminal  law.  The  administration of justice by the Courts is  not necessarily always wise or certainly  considerate  of  circumstances  which  may  properly  mitigate  guilt.  To  afford  a  remedy,  it  has  always  been  thought  essential in popular governments, as well  as in monarchies, to vest in some other  authority  than  the  Courts  power  to  ameliorate  or  avoid  particular  criminal  judgments…” (para 8 at p. 658)

25. The Bench having regard to the nature of the  

power of the President under Article 72, stated  

that  the  President  under  Article  72  could  

scrutinize the evidence on record of a criminal  

case and come to a different conclusion from  

that of the court. In doing so, “the President  

does  not  amend  or  modify  or  supersede  the  

judicial  record.  The  judicial  record  remains  

intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in  

a wholly different plane from that in which the  

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Court  acted.  He  acts  under  a  constitutional  

power,  the  nature  of  which  is  entirely  

different from the judicial power and cannot be  

regarded  as  an  extension  of  it.”  The  Bench  

quoted  with  approval  the  formulations  of  

Sutherland, J. in  U.S. v.  Benz, (1930) 75 Law  Ed 354, wherein the learned Judge held:

“The  judicial  power  and  the  executive  power  over  sentences  are  readily  distinguishable. To render judgment is a  judicial function. To carry the judgment  into effect is an executive function. To  cut short a sentence by an act of clemency  is  an  exercise  of  executive  power  which  abridges the enforcement of the judgment,  but does not alter it qua a judgment.”

26. In Kehar Singh (supra) this Court observed that  the  order  of  the  President  under  Article  72  

could not be subjected to judicial review on  

merits  except  within  the  strict  limitations  

defined in Maru Ram (supra). Therefore, on the  ambit of judicial review,  Kehar Singh (supra)  concurred with Maru Ram (supra).

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27. In  Swaran Singh v.  State of U.P. & Ors. [AIR  1998 SC 2026], a three-Judge Bench held that  

“this Court has no power to touch the order  

passed by the Governor under Article 161 of the  

Constitution.  If  such  power  was  exercised  

arbitrarily, mala fide or in absolute disregard  

of the finer canons of the constitutionalism,  

the by-product order cannot get the approval of  

law and in such cases, the judicial hand must  

be stretched to it.” (para 12 at p. 2028)

28. Again in  Satpal & Anr. v.  State of Haryana &  Ors. [AIR 2000 SC 1702], this Court held that  the power of granting pardon under Article 161  

was  very  wide  and  did  not  contain  any  

limitation as to the time and occasion on which  

and the circumstances under which it was to be  

exercised. Since the power is a constitutional  

power, it is amenable to judicial review on the  

following grounds:

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a.If  the  Governor  had  been  found  to  have  

exercised the power himself without being  

advised by the government,  

b.If  the  Governor  transgressed  his  

jurisdiction in exercising the said power,  

c.If  the  Governor  had  passed  the  order  

without applying his mind,

d.The order of the Governor was mala fide, or

e.The  order  of  the  Governor  was  passed  on  

some extraneous considerations.

29. Further,  if  the  Governor  was  not  aware  of  

general  considerations  such  as  period  of  

sentence undergone by the convict, his conduct  

and  behaviour  while  undergoing  sentence  and  

other  such  material  considerations,  it  would  

make the order of the Governor under Article  

161 arbitrary and irrational.

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30. The Constitution Bench in  Bikas Chatterjee v.  Union  of  India  &  Ors. [(2004)  7  SCC  634]  reiterated the same principles on the extent of  

judicial  review  as  laid  down  in  Maru  Ram  (supra) and Satpal (supra).  

31. In Epuru Sudhakar & Anr. v. Government of A.P.  & Ors. [AIR 2006 SC 3385] this Court observed  that it was well settled that the exercise or  

non-exercise  of  the  power  of  pardon  by  the  

President  or  Governor  was  not  immune  from  

judicial review and limited judicial review was  

available in certain cases.

32. Justice  Pasayat,  delivering  the  judgment,  

summed up the ground on which judicial review  

of an order passed under Articles 72 and 161  

could be undertaken.  Those grounds are:

(a) that the order has been passed without  application of mind;

(b) that the order is malafide;

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(c) that  the  order  has  been  passed  on  extraneous  or  wholly  irrelevant  considerations;

(d) that  relevant  materials  have  been  kept  out of consideration;

(e) that  the  order  suffers  from  arbitrariness.

33. Justice Kapadia (as His Lordship then was) in  

his concurring opinion, observed that “granting  

of pardon is in no sense an overturning of a  

judgment  of  conviction,  but  rather  it  is  an  

Executive  action that  mitigates or  set aside  

the punishment for a crime. It eliminates the  

effect  of  conviction  without  addressing  the  

defendant’s guilt or innocence. The controlling  

factor in determining whether the exercise of  

prerogative power is subject to judicial review  

is  not  its  source  but  its  subject-matter.”  

(para 64 at p. 3402)

34. His Lordship further added that “the exercise  

of  power  depends  upon  the  facts  and  

circumstances of each case and the necessity or  19

justification for exercise of that power has to  

be  judged  from  case  to  case...  Rule  of  law  

should  be  the  overarching  constitutional  

justification for judicial review.” (para 65,  

67 at p. 3402)

35. In that case, an order of remission had been  

passed, inter alia, on an inference that the  

accused  was  not  involved  in  the  murder,  was  

falsely implicated and false witnesses had been  

produced. This Court held such reasons to be  

irrelevant and held that the order of remission  

was bad.

36. From the abovementioned judicial decisions it  

is  clear  that  there  is  limited  scope  of  

judicial review on the exercise of power by the  

Governor under Article 161.

37. Keeping the aforesaid principles in our mind if  

we look at the order of the Governor it appears  

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that  there has  been consideration  of various  

aspects  of  the  matter  by  the  Governor  in  

granting  pardon.  The  Governor’s  order  also  

contains some reasons.

38.   The Governor’s order does not contain any  

reference  to  the  order  of  conviction  and  

sentence imposed on the accused persons.  It is  

axiomatic that before the power of the Governor  

under  Article  161  of  the  Constitution  is  

invoked by any person, the condition precedent  

is  that  such  person  or  persons  must  be  

convicted of any offence against any law and  

will  be  subjected  to  undergo  a  sentence.  

Therefore, an omission of any reference to an  

order  of  conviction  or  sentence  in  the  

Governor’s order in respect of the accused is  

really of no consequence.

39. However, in this case before the Governor could  

pass the aforesaid order of pardon, the accused  

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persons  filed  appeals  against  the  order  of  

conviction  and  sentence  and  the  same  were  

pending before the Hon’ble High Court. This is  

a relevant fact for the Governor to take into  

consideration  before  granting  his  power  of  

pardon.  But,  in  the  instant  order  of  the  

Governor there is no reference to this fact.  

This  court,  therefore,  is  inclined  to  infer  

that  all  relevant  facts  were  possibly  not  

placed before the Governor.

40. Apart from this, there is another vital aspect  

in  the  order  of  the  Governor  which  requires  

serious consideration, in as much as, in the  

order  of  the  Governor,  there  are  some  

observations  about the  guilt or  innocence of  

the accused persons who prayed for pardon under  

Article 161 of the Constitution.

41. It  is  well  settled  that  to  decide  on  the  

innocence or otherwise of an accused person in  

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a criminal trial is within the exclusive domain  

of a Court of competent jurisdiction as this is  

essentially a judicial function. A Governor’s  

power  of  granting  pardon  under  Article  161  

being  an  exercise  of  executive  function,  is  

independent of the Court’s power to pronounce  

on the innocence or guilt of the accused.  The  

powers of a Court of law in a criminal trial  

and subsequent appeal right upto this Court and  

that  of  the  President/Governor  under  Article  

72/161 operate in totally different arenas and  

the nature of these two powers are also totally  

different  from  each  other.   One  should  not  

trench upon the other.  The instant order of  

the Governor, by pronouncing upon the innocence  

of the accused, has therefore, if we may say so  

with  respect,  exceeded  the  permissible  

constitutional limits under Article 161 of the  

Constitution.

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42. For these reasons, we are constrained to hold  

that  we  cannot  approve  the  order  of  the  

Governor. We therefore, set aside the order and  

remand  it  to  the  Hon’ble  Governor  for  re-

consideration of the matter in accordance with  

law.

43. It may be mentioned in this connection, that of  

those  three  accused  persons,  two  persons  

namely, Prem Kumar and Narayan Dutt, had been  

acquitted  by  the  High  Court  by  judgment  and  

order  dated 11.3.2008  in connection  with the  

criminal appeals filed by them.  

44. The appeals are thus disposed of. No orders as  

to costs.

.......................J. (G.S. SINGHVI)

.......................J. 24

New Delhi (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY) February 24, 2011

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